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A B S T R A C T 
Armed Conf l ict and Border Society: The East and Midd le Marches, 1536-1560 
Jeffrey Marcus Becker 
The final phase o f the Anglo-Scots Wars (1542-1560) significantly affected 
Northumberland. The Tudor government attempted to use the militørised society o f 
Northumberland as a means o f subduing Scotland. However, the ensuing confl ict took 
a heavy to l l on the Marchers. Instabil i ty plagued the region, whi le leading mi l i tary 
families feuded w i th each other. The efforts o f the Tudors were not concerted enough 
to overcome the Marchers' allegiance to k i th and k in . March society proved to be 
remarkably inhospitable for Tudor state bui ld ing, and in the end, the mil i tary 
community o f Northumberland remained just as vulnerable to both internal and 
external threats as it had been before the wars. 
This work questions the success o f Tudor state bui ld ing in the mid-sixteenth 
century. The analysis employs both State Papers and local documents to i l luminate the 
poli t ical dialogue between central government and the peripheral frontier 
administration. Of f ic ia l correspondences o f March officers also highlight the depths to 
which Tudor pol icy had taken root in Northumberland. A n analysis o f muster rol ls 
suggests that Northumbrian society'ร involvement in the wars greatly fluctuated over 
nearly a twenty-year period, only to see the mi l i tary capacities o f Northumbrians 
signif icantly wane by լ 560. The personal testimonies o f off icers imply that the Tudors 
had some init ial success ๒ bringing significant mi l i tary power to their side. However, 
the same documents also suggest that incoherent policies resulted f rom the rapid 
succession o f three separate monarchs after the death o f Henry V I I L In the end, the 
Tudor state was unable to insti l order in Northumberland, and the mi l i tary necessities o f 
frontier security remained problematic for the rest o f the sixteenth century. 
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Chapter One: In t roduct ion 
Th is w o r k probes the problemat ic relat ionship between the Tudor 
government and its No r thumbr ian subjects, and argues that Tudor in tervent ion 
actual ly weakened the Nor thumbr ian m i l i t a r y commun i ty . The last phase o f the 
Anglo-Scots wars, w h i c h o f f i c i a l l y lasted f r o m 1 5 4 2 - 1 5 5 1 ― t h e per iod k n o w n as the 
' rough w o o i n g ' ― a n d f r o m 1557-1560, was characterised by desul tory raids and 
increased disorder. Th is had p ro found effects upon the relat ionship between the 
Marchers, but especial ly affected was the relat ionship between the c rown and its 
Border soldiers. In an attempt to bu i l d a m o d e m army that cou ld e f fec t ive ly subject 
Scots to Engl ish ru le, the Tudors on ly created instabi l i ty in an already vo lat i le , 
mi l i tar ised society. 
I n their co l lect ion o f essays on medieval f ront iers, Robert Bart let t and Angus 
M a c K a y conclude that European f ront ier societies shared the c o m m o n trait o f 
m i l i t a r i sm. ' The society that inhabi ted the Nor the rn Marches o f Tudor England 
exhib i ted the tendency to mi l i tar ise, ma in l y because the defence o f the Eng l ish 
f ront ier was ent i re ly dependent upon m i l i t a r y service from the Borderers themselves. 
The Nor thumbr ian m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i t y was def ined b y three groups that served the 
c rown on the borders: the gentry, w h o prov ided leadership as part o f their m i l i t a r y 
ob l igat ion to the c r o w n ; their tenants, w h o were ob l iged to serve as part o f their 
tenure; and the border clans o f the uplands, whose ob l igat ion to serve could on l y be 
enforced b y a local magnate w h o was fami l ia r w i t h their chieftains. Th is was not a 
harmonious group. The gentry and their tenants of ten found themselves the v ic t ims 
o f the clans' tendency to p i l fe r l ivestock, extort their neighbours and cause general 
unrest. However , Nor thumbr ians tended to uni te when at tacking the Scots, g i v i n g 
1 Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay, eds.. Medieva! Frontier Societies, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), p. v. 
շ 
the impression that the m i l i t a ry in f rastmcture o f the Marches was enough to 
overawe the Scott ish Borders. 
Before 1536, the c rown rel ied upon border magnates to defend the Ang l o -
Scott ish frontier. Marcher society fed the defensive networks o f the East and M i dd l e 
Marches through the patronage o f the Percys, the power f i i l f am i l y whose ranks 
inc luded the Earl o f Northumberland. As Ma rch Wardens, who were the rank ing 
of f icers a long the frontier, the Percys recrui ted fo l lowers in every comer o f 
Northumberland. A s Warden i n West March, Lo rd Dacre d id the same, operat ing in 
the t roubled areas o f G i ls land and Bewcastle. The author i ty o f the c rown was 
essential ly weak since i t depended who l l y upon the services o f these magnates. 
f r om accruing too much m i l i t a r y power, the connect ions that a l lowed Percy and 
Dacre to ftinction were largely unaffected. Bo th fami l ies were able to use the gentry, 
their tenants and the up land clans as a means o f defend ing the border, even i f i t 
meant the occasional co l lus ion w i t h ruffians. 
M i l i t a r y tenure and the social bond o f b lood t i e s ― k i n s h i p and k i n d r e d ― 
proved essential to m i l i t a r y recrui tment i n the Marches. M a n y smal l bands that 
patro l led the f ront ier were composed o f members f r o m a single extended fam i l y who 
were accustomed to render ing m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion accord ing to specif icat ions o f thei r 
tenure. W h e n the Percys rap id ly decl ined in power in the 1530'ร, the c r o w n resumed 
contro l o f the frontiers, but found it d i f f i cu l t to penetrate the web o f No r thumbr ian 
fami l ies fo r recru i tment purposes. In an e f for t to rebu i ld its power in the borders, 
Tudor statecraft and m i l i t a r y amb i t ion explo i ted the Marchers for their m i l i t a r y 
potent ia l . The c r o w n sought to use the gent ry 's connect ions i n the Marches to 
bolster the m i l i t a r y power o f the of f ices that were fo rmer ly f i l l ed through Percy 
patronage, and the results were d ismal at t imes. The gentry s imp ly d id not have the 
resources avai lable to them to ef fect ive ly harness the m i l i t a r y power o f 
Nor thumber land. Add i t i ona l l y , four Tudor monarchs ru led dur ing this per iod, 
p roduc ing an incoherent array o f pol ic ies and Border of f icers. A s such, i t is d i f f i cu l t 
to track appointments to M a r c h of f ices, especial ly i n the m i d 1550'ร, due to a 
pauci ty o f source mater ia l , but the lack o f clear po l i cy under the m id -Tudor 
monarchs proved u l t imate ly detr imental to the war ef fort . 
Th rough the d is t r ibut ion o f of f ices and fees, Henry V I I I created a pool o f 
roya l retainers, or 'Border pensioners' , and was successful i n deput is ing some 
Highlanders to po l i ce their o w n rebel l ious f a m i l y members, w h i c h essential ly 
invo lved an attack upon the insulat ing factors o f k i t h and k i n . I ron ica l ly , i t was 
unchecked ra id ing that kept the clans m i l i t a r i l y prepared, so that domestic po l i c i ng 
weakened recru i tment numbers.^ Moreover , the Tudor government used the m i l i t a r y 
tenancies to gather o f fens ive armies, even though their o r ig ina l purpose was s t r ic t ly 
defensive. Th is encouraged the Marchers to on l y serve for wages. 
B y the same token, the m i l i t a r y necessity o f emp loy ing the Marchers 
undermined law enforcement. Nor thumbr ians , especial ly the re iv ing clans, used 
their m i l i t a ry services as a means o f increasing their standing w i t h the government. 
However , the government 'ร patronage created problems when royal pardons were 
extended to cr imina ls and rebels in exchange for salaried m i l i t a r y service, as i t on l y 
encouraged a cyc le o f rec id iv i sm and penitence. Moreover , inconsistent roya l 
pol ic ies towards the Nor thumbr ians upset the del icate relat ionships the Borderers 
had forged not o n l y amongst themselves but also w i t h their more power f t i l Scott ish 
neighbours in Liddesdale and Teviotdale. It was also dur ing this t ime that several 
2 These are located in the SP 1 collection o f the National Archives, Kew (Public Record Off ice). Also 
see John Roche Dasent (ed.), Acts of the Privy Council of England, (London: HMSO, 1890-91), and 
Sir Harris Nicholas (ed.), Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, (London: H M R C , 
1831). 
prominent reiver cl ans rose against their governors, w h i c h immedia te ly questioned 
whether the local gentry were capable o f securing the Marches from mi l i t a ry threats 
w i thou t the direct in tervent ion large garrisons. The threat that the surnames 
presented was palpable i n the Pr ivy Counc i l ; a good propor t ion o f the Counc i l ' s 
records from this per iod discusses the problemat ic surnames o f N o r t h Tynedale and 
Redesdale. The result o f roya l in tervent ion was increased v io lence along the front ier, 
wh i l e the impor tant border fortresses were le f t isolated and the Nor thumbr ian 
m i l i t a r y leadership overwhe lmed. 
A complex, delicate hierarchy def ined the Nor thumbr ian m i l i t a ry 
commun i t y , and this was upset b y roya l in tervent ion. M u l t i p l e of f ices created by 
Henry V I I I compl icated the upper t iers o f Marcher m i l i t a r y society. The 
Nor thumber land gentry f i l l ed these of f ices, al though many were incapable o f 
pe r fo rm ing the task that the c rown had handed them. The c o m m o n Marchers o f 
Nor thumber land also had a key ro le to p lay i n Border warfare. However , their ro le 
changed in the 1540'ร, and those w h o were prev ious ly responsible for defending the 
border were used b y the central government i n of fensive manoeuvres, w h i c h 
resulted i n at t r i t ion rates that Nor thumber land could not support. There is also the 
quest ion o f the great re i v i ng clans, and their subsequent decl ine i n m i l i t a ry power 
after the wars. The i r roles in the Ang lo-Scot t i sh wars o f 1542-1560 suggest at least 
a g r o w i n g par t ia l i ty for roya l service, and the pay that went w i t h i t , a marked 
contrast to their reputat ion as freebooters and undisc ip l ined rabble. Th is migh t be 
seen as a v i c to ry for the Tudor state, but l i ke the common Marchers, the clans 
essential ly wasted away through at t r i t ion and through increasing pressure b y the 
Scots Border clans. Overa l l , the per iod 1536-60 marked a major t ransformat ion in 
Border admin is t ra t ion, but i t was Nor thumbr ian society that fel t the effects o f this 
change. 
The struggle to establish roya l power in the borders has attracted the 
attent ion o f antiquarians and histor ians, who have produced a weal th o f l i terature, 
w i d e l y rang ing from pr inted source mater ia l to histor ical surveys. W i l l i a m Gray 'ร 
Chorographia was in i t i a l l y produced in 1649 as a h is tory o f Newcast le , but was also 
descr ipt ive o f the o ld t radi t ions o f the Libert ies o f Tynedale and Redesdale, some o f 
w h i c h were s t i l l extant i n the remote, upper reaches o f bo th dales. Gray noted that 
the ' rank riders' o f the d a l e s ― n o doubt descendants o f the re iv ing c l a n s ― s t i l l 
honed their mar t ia l sk i l ls through rust l ing l ivestock, al though now they were 
subjected to more consistent ław enforcement at the frequent assizes i n Newcast le.^ 
Chorographia also suggested that people o f the uplands st i l l regarded themselves as 
customary m i l i t a r y tenants, a remnant o f the border tenant right that p rov ided the 
Tudo r monarchs w i t h a supply o f Border soldiers, despite the legal demise o f this 
f o r m o f tenure i n the early years o f the Stuarts."^ Gray clearly regarded the up land 
dwel lers as homo silvestris, who were s t i l l be ing transformed into a c iv i l i sed people 
through the enforcement o f Eng l ish law. I n contrast, B ishop W i l l i a m N icho lson 
comp i led the Leges Marchiarum, w h i c h was a part ial reprint o f the late sixteenth-
century Bell MSS, as a means o f show ing h o w a unique, Marcher inst i tu t ion kept a 
marg ina l ized people w i t h i n the conf ines o f 'Engl ishness ' , a p rob lem more f u l l y 
discussed i n the last chapter.^ Nineteenth-century antiquarians such as John 
•՚ W i l l i am Gray,  Chorographia or a Survey of New՝castle-on-Tyne,  (London and Newcastle, 1649). 
Gray descended from the Grays o f Chill ingham, probably one o f the most influential border families 
o f the East March. They were also known for their literary talents. A քօսքէ66ոէհ-շ6ոա^ Sir Thomas 
Gray o f Chi l l ingham wrote the Scaiacronica,  and it is l ikely that his descendant was looking to 
complement this work. 
4 This is discussed in chapter five. 
5 W i l l i am Nicholson,  Leges Marchiarum or Border Laws,  (London, 1747), Most o f the  Leges and the 
Bell MSS catalogued March law as existed in the twi l ight o f Tudor England, but border ordinances 
drawn up from the twelf th century onwards also appear in both collections. Tough has pointed out 
Hodgson, George Ridpath and James Raine compi led surveys and col lect ions o f 
pr in ted sources re lat ing to Nor thumbr ian h is tory , al though their almost haphazard 
use o f documents a l lowed forgeries and error, as we l l as fo lk lo re , to inf luence their 
understanding o f Marcher society.^ The insular nature o f Nor thern pol i t ics i n the 
midd le ages prompted these early authors to assume that Tudor power 
ftindamentally t ransformed Border society in to a funct ional part o f the Eng l ish 
nat ion through increasing royal intervent ion. 
The study o f Border h is tory reached a watershed in the f i rst quarter o f the 
twent ie th century when D .L .W. Tough and Rachel Reid made use o f the recent ly 
calendared State Papers col lect ion.^ However , the research o f Reid and T o u g h 
presented a status quo portrai t o f Border admin is t ra t ion, where the c rown and the 
P r i vy Counc i l were portrayed as active part ic ipants in a Border administ rat ion that 
was an inherent aspect o f expanding state power.^ Th is marked l i t t le divergence 
f r o m the previous approaches as Tough saw the t ransformat ion o f March 
admin is t rat ion into a c i v i l government as a matter o f central, rather than local , 
po l i t ics . T o u g h l im i ted his chronology to the re ign o f El izabeth, part ia l ly because 
Re id 'ร w o r k had already argued that the Counc i l o f the No r th , wh i ch faci l i tated 
Border admin is t rat ion under Henry v n i and Edward VI , was indicat ive o f the 
progressive Eng l ish state. Bo th authors saw Tudo r efforts in the borders as cr i t ica l 
to the success o f Tudor state power , despite the stopgap measures w i t h w h i c h the 
government acted. 
that Nicholson did not include the entire Bel l MSS, which suggests that he was working wi th an 
incomplete manuscript, o f which there are several in the Carlisle Dean and Chapter Records. 
6 John Hodgson, A History of Northumberland, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1820-1825); James Raine, 
The History and Antiquities of North Durham, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1852). George Ridpath, The 
Border Histofy of England and Scotland, (Berwick, 1848). 
7 Rachel Reid, The King 'ร Council in the North, (London: Longmans and Green, 1921); D.L.W. 
Tough, The Last Years ofa Frontier, (Oxford: OÜP, 1928). 
8 Tough, Frontier^ preface & p. 278. 
The ro le o f the Tudor government in the borders has subsequently prov ided a 
v iable arena fo r more recent debates. Tudor h is tor iography has essential ly polar ised, 
w i t h t w o dist inct camps arguing that Tudor responses to problems posed b y the 
frontiers represented either l im i ted or increased state power. B . w . Beckinsale 
downplayed the uniqueness o f the N o r t h , and argued that the state'ร approach to 
problems was u n i f o r m l y persistent, serving as a bel lwether o f the rise o f the Engl ish 
nation.^ Compar ing s imi lar problems that affected other regions, Beckinsale 
concluded that the barriers to royal power i n the Marches were not unique. M .E . 
James, on the other hand, approached the 'Nor thern p rob lem ' as a regional matter o f 
a l ineage-based loca l i t y reconc i l ing w i t h a g row ing , ' c i v i ľ Tudor s t a t e . J a m e s 
argued that Percy in f luence was a barr ier to roya l power , so that the c rown appointed 
all ies to key of f ices i n order to of fset the entrenched magnates. Th is resulted i n 
tension rivalry between the two. Us ing pr ivate letters, f a m i l y records, and accounts 
o f the Pi lgr image o f Grace in 1536, James reasoned that the Ear l o f Cumber land 's 
appointment as M a r c h Warden in 1534 abrupt ly siphoned muscle f r o m the Percys* 
t rad i t ional , feudal m i l i t a r y strength i n the Nor thern counties. I n turn, this disaffected 
some o f Cumber land 's new tenants, who were s t i l l al l ies o f the Percys. Since the 
Earl o f Nor thumber land saw Cumber land as a terr i tor ia l rival, James concluded that 
Percy sought to undermine Cumber land 's author i ty b y encouraging lawlessness and 
rebel l ion among his ex-tenants who had been subsumed b y Cumber land 's o f f ice .* ' 
James' w o r k o n Thomas Lo rd Whar ton bu i l t upon the percept ion that royal favour 
had shi f ted away from those w i t h the largest estates, and turned to those Border 
9 B.W. Beckinsale, "The Characteristics o f the Tudor Nor th" , Northern History, vo l . 4 (1969), pp. 67֊ 
83. 
'0 M.E. James,  Family, Lineage and Civil Society: A Study of Society, Politics, and Mentalii}' in the 
Durham Region, 1500֊1640, (Clarendon: Oxford, 1974). 
" James, *The First Earl o f Cumberland and the Decline o f Northern Feudalism,"  Northern Histop, 
vol 1 (1966), pp. 60-69. 
gentry who were wi l l ing enough to serve the king.'^ Wharton was representative o f 
the transformed Border administration, as service to the king earned him a place 
amongst the new elite o f March society. James viewed the rise o f Wharton as an 
example of the increased power o f the Tudor state: a co-operative venture between 
the central government and local elites. 
R .พ . Hoyle questions James' conclusions, and the notion that royal 
hegemony in the borders necessitated disposing o f the Percys. Instead, Hoyle indicts 
the policy that placed Cumberland in such an important position, arguing that 
Cumberland's problems stemmed from his earldom, which was hollow and bereft o f 
any connections or loyal officers. Mil i tary power was the least important factor in 
Cumberland's recruitment o f followers, a policy that contributed to Cumberland's 
military weakness.'^ Hoyle argues that during the rebellions o f 1536, the siege o f 
Cumberland's castle at Skipton-in-Craven was not machinated by a Percy hand as 
James had claimed, but was merely a manifestation o f an old rivalry between 
Cumberland and one o f his tenants, since Percy was too weak to encourage any 
rebellion against Cumberland. However, Hoyle'ร focus, including his recent work 
on the Pilgrimage o f Grace, ՚՛* does not incorporate Northumberland and the impact 
of the Tudor policy in the Marches. 
Recent challenges to historians' assumptions regarding the English nation-
state provide a better foundation for this work. In his seminal article on the 
'Northern Problem', M.L. Bush disputes the notion o f the 'ubiquity o f the crown's 
effective authority' in demonstrating that the gentry o f the borders were used in a 
՚ 2 James, Change and Continuity in the Tudor North: The Rise of Thomas First Lord Wharton, 
Borthwick Papers, vol . 27, (York, 1965). 
՚ 3 R W. Hoyle, "The Earl o f Cumberland: A Reputation Reassessed," Northern ատէօդ՝ vol. 22 
ᄂ Hoyle, The Pilgrimage ofGrace and the Politics of the 1530ร, (Oxford: OUP， 2001). 
clumsy policy o f filling Border offices after the fall o f the Percys and Dacres. 15 
Bush's conclusions dovetail with the recent work o f Steven Ellis on Tudor frontiers. 
Ellis argues that the frontiers of the British Isles challenged the power o f the Tudor 
state, though the undermining o f Border magnates such as the Percys and Lord 
Dacre provided an overall step forward for the British state. Tudor intervention 
brought the region direct royal involvement at the expense of seigniorial power. 
However, Ellis saw it as a very limited success since the Tudor policy o f promoting 
lesser men to rule the borders was unrealistic considering the demands o f Border 
defence. Despite the new face o f the English state, the reorganisation o f Border 
administration failed to solve the problems o f the north, which was 'assimilated 
administratively and culturally to the centre,' while remaining polit ically 
marginalised.'^ This notion is partially reflected in the frustrations experienced by 
the mil i tary officers o f the Border, a dominant theme in this work. El l is ' greatest 
contribution comes from his methodology as he has called for a more balanced study 
o f centres and peripheries o f power. Ellis has underscored the need for 
understanding Marcher society within the contemporary political framework, what 
he terms the 'effective devolution o f authority with the retention of overall 
control.' '^ Nevertheless, Ell is' focus upon the failure o f Marcher administration only 
provides a partial reason for the military decline of the Northumbrians, which 
challenged the later Elizabethan administration. 
Internecine violence and warfare had a dire effect upon the military 
infrastructure o f the Marches, but especially affected were the Marchers who held no 
administrative post or office. This is a contentious point that is subject to differing 
՚ 5 M.L. Bush, "The Problem o f the Far Nor th" , Northern History, vo l 6 (1971), р 63. 
I 6 S.G. Ell is, ' A Border Baron and the Tudor State: The Rise and Fall o f Lord Dacre o f the Nor th ' , 
The Historical Journal, vol . 35 (1992), pp 253-77. 
՚ 7 ร.G. Ell is, 'Civ i l is ing Northumberland: Representations o f Englishness in the Tudor Stat๙， Journal 
of Historical Sociology, vol . 12, no. 2. (1999), p. 123. 
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interpretation o f the source materials. Ralph Robson'ร study o f the surnames of 
North Tynedale suggests that the heidsmen o f the Marches took advantage o f both 
devolved and central authority, but suffered in the end from an ill-advised 
association wi th the English government.'^ However, Robson does not look at 
Northumberland society wholly, which portrays only a partial view o f the mil i tary 
community of the borders, much like George MacDonald Fraser's work on the 
reiving c l a n s . T h e result is a confusing glimpse of an older 'lineage' society, one 
that valued the connections of ki th and kin, and one that was at odds with the new 
'c iv i l ' society. Such isolated studies of the clans obfuscate why the surnames 
perpetrated acts o f violence against each other or their English neighbours. Robson 
and Fraser sensationalise the violence o f the surnames, and exaggerate the cross-
border relationships that both Tynedale and Scottish Liddesdale shared. In doing so, 
both authors miss the opportunity to answer the more vital questions pertaining to 
the rise and fall o f Northumbrian military power. 
Others have downplayed the effects o f violence and warfare in the sixteenth-
century borders. Anthony Goodman is amongst the first to question the nature o f 
violence in the Anglo-Scottish Borders, suggesting that cross-border ties were more 
characteristic o f the borders than bloodshed or violence.^' Goodman's student, 
Maureen Meikle, takes his thesis one step further. Meikle thoughtftiUy analyses the 
gentry of the East Marches using National Archives records, as well as family 
records,^^ concluding that cross-border relations and the 'normal' daily business o f 
estate management counters the perception that the Marches suffered from pandemic 
's El l is, Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). p. 258. 
" Ralph Robson, The R^e and Fall ofthe English Highland Clans: Tudor Responses to a Mediaeval 
Problem, (Edinburgh: East Linton, 1989). 
՜2° G.M. Fraser, The Steel Bonnets, (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1971). 
2 ' Anthony Goodman, 'The Anglo-Scottish Marches in the Fifteenth Century: A Frontier Society?' in 
R.A. Mason, (ed.), Scotland and England, 1286-1815, (Edinburgh: Donald Press, 1987). 
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violence. However, Meikle'ร work side-steps any in-depth look at the small but 
established military community that was actively engaged in both domestic security 
and the Anglo-Scots Wars. Rather than viewing Northumbrian society as a tied to 
the defence o f the borders, Meikle emphasises the connection to ' c i v i l ' society. Sti l l , 
Meikle'ร thesis is an elegant analysis o f a section o f the Northumbrian gentry 
community that lived in an area which was more settled than other areas o f the 
borders. Many o f the East Marcher families were eager to avoid any entanglement 
that might lead to a violent bloodfeud, with a few notable exceptions such as the 
Herons and the Carrร. Meikle admits that low-level feuding was still a problem in 
the settled East Marches, although it did not tend to erapt into catastrophic violence 
that threatened the military infrastrucณre of the East March.^-^ Richard Lomas 
subsequently followed the approach employed by Goodman and Meikle. Using 
accounts of priory lands in North Durham and Tweedale, both o f which were in the 
East March, Lomas argued that the incomes from lands in the East Marches were not 
affected as much by violence as through depopulation.^^* Lomas concluded that 
Border warfare was thus not as destructive as previously thought. 
While violence in the Marches was certainly limited in some areas, there 
arise some problems when portraying the Marches as largely settled and governed 
by a 'c iv i l ' society with only small pockets o f extreme violence. Firstly, while 
Meikle and Lomas have demonstrated the dangers o f overemphasizing the extent of 
the economic damage that resulted from armed conflict, their narrow studies 
underestimate the fact that the East March was still a war zone. It is true that the 
22 Maureen Meik le, * Lairds and Gentlemen: A Study o f the Landed Families o f the Anglo-Scottish 
Borders, 1540-1603', (Edinburgh University Ph.D, 1986). 
23 Meikle has provided an entire appendix that charts the feuds o f the East Marches; she counts no 
less than 257 individual feuds in both the Scottish and English East Marches. See 'Lairds and 
Gentlemen', Appendix. I. 
2 4 Richard Lomas, T h e Scots and South Tweedside: The Impact o f Border Warfare, c. 1290-1520/ 
Scottish Historical Revieพ 15 (1996) pp. 143-167. 
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battles o f Haddon Rig, Ancrum Moor and Faimington Crag all occurred outside the 
alleged 'quiet zones'. Yet the East March was not removed from the war and its 
effects. Most o f the battlefields were within a day's march o f Home Castle, one o f 
Meikle'ร foci of study. The Tweed valley itself was a well-used route into Scotland 
by the Berwick garrison, and the destmction they wrought upon the tenants o f the 
Merse and Tweedale during the wars o f 1542-60 left the area depleted and scarred. 
A deeper look at evidence suggests that due to their proximity to the front lines, the 
East Marchers were no less active in the wars than other Northumbrians. Another 
problem with this approach is that while areas in close vicinity to Berwick-upon-
Tweed provide a tempting case study for downplaying frontier violence, any lack o f 
manifest violence, whether cross-border raiding by Scots or internal feuding, must 
be attributed to Berwick'ร military status and large garrison. Berwick deterred Scots 
raids, and was also a centre o f Border administration that was able to dispense 
justice through the courts o f the resident Warden. This influence reached beyond the 
walls o f the town, and thus allowed a more civilised society to emerge in certain 
parts o f the East March. When the Berwick garrison was drawn into a deadly feud, 
as it was in 1557,^^ the result was a complete breakdown of order in the areas that 
had рифоЛе01у been quiet. The East March was thus just as prone to violence as 
other areas of the Marches, as its uneasy peace was entirely dependent upon the 
stability o f gentry relations. 
The Anglo-Scottish Marches were war-torn, but they were also fascinatingly 
complex: an inhospitable terrain inhabited by a closed and xenophobic society that 
was inured to the threat o f violence from every direction. But Marcher society was 
also vulnerable. The power vacuum left by the Percys drew the gentry into roles for 
2 5 Meik le, Maureen. 'Northumberland Div ided: Anatomy o f a Sixteenth-Century Bloodfeud. ' 
Archaeologia Aeliana. 5th series, vol. 20 (1992), pp. 79-89. 
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which they were unprepared. Tudor policy ensured that the Northumbrians played 
an active role in the Anglo-Scots wars, and that they would ultimately suffer 
unsustainable losses, despite the frequent defeats they inflicted upon the Scots. The 
Borderers' militarism made them attractive recruits, but it also led the crown to 
overestimate what it could expect from its Border guards. Their ultimate failure was 
not so much a result o f one single reason. Royal prerogative, military obligation, 
leadership and authority, as well as identity all shaped how Northumbrians formed 
their own defensive networks; when these delicate connections were ruptured by 
sustained conflict and administrative change, the Northumbrian military community 
lapsed into decay. It was a legacy that Henry would hand to all o f his children^ but it 
was Elizabeth who was left to counter the effects of twenty years o f costly conflict. 
The politics o f the borders challenge the notion o f unilateral state authority, 
and this study builds upon Ell is ' argument that royal patronage increased the king's 
affinity in the Marches but adversely affected administration. M y intent is to show 
that while royal influence increased in the Marches in the form o f royal 
appointments, as Ellis argues, the crown was ultimately left with an empty authority 
since it still could not instil order. Tudor polices towards Northumberland were not a 
step forward for the British state. Evidence suggests that any effective central 
authority was continually dependant upon the co-operation o f the individual 
Marchers, which was diff icult to secure, especially i f the person concerned was not 
as servile as Lord Wharton, whose career is discussed at length throughout this 
work. The central government affected the administration o f Marcher government, 
but the execution o f military office required some independence o f the crown as 
Border contingencies could not stay for royal guidance from 300 miles away. 
Ultimately, the crown was not mil itari ly powerfii l enough to ensure good rule in its 
frontiers; instead, Northumbrians and the crown were mutually dependent on each 
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other for defence. The result was that some Marchers were able to retain their 
military ascendancy, whilst others suffered from the inconsistent policies that 
barraged the Marches over a twenty-year period. This problem undermined any 
attempt to instil royal authority in the Marches. 
The shift o f the Northumbrian military infrastructure from a defensive role to 
one used for offensive риф08Є8, and the subsequent decline in Northumbrian 
military power, reveals itself in the material originating from military operations that 
began just after the rebellion o f 1536-7. The State Papers collection at the Public 
Record office provides the staple of the evidence for this phenomenon, as do the 
Cotton Caligula and Additional Manuscripts o f the British Library. The State Papers 
collection and the reports o f the March officials in the British Library Caligula MSS 
demonstrate that the Tudor government employed a conftising array o f policies over 
twenty years, all o f which were affected by central politics. 
The collection of Border Papers (PRO, SP 59) provides another source of 
evidence that characterises the borders during Elizabeth'ร reign, though many o f the 
documents refer to sources o f evidence from the լ 540'ร and the 1550'ร that are now 
lost. O f particular interest are the surveys o f Sir Robert Bowes from 1541 and 
1551,^^ which shed crucial l ight on the state o f the borders in the mid-sixteenth 
century. Sir Thomas Wharton's catalogue of March Law is also in the State Papers 
15 collection, as is his order for the setting o f the watch, both of which underscore 
the ongoing military reforms that affected the Northumbrians. Exchequer accounts 
have also proven useful, as they provide lists o f Northumberland soldiers and 
pensioners, as wel l as surveys o f the main fortresses. The Talbot and Shrewsbury 
MSS, and the Bishop's Additional MSS o f Lambeth Palace, provide a wealth of 
2 6 PRO, SP 1/168 f. 19 (survey o f 1541) and B L , Calig. V I I I , f. 106 (survey o f 1551). These surveys 
appear as evidence in most chapters o f this work due to their wealth o f in format ion. 
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detail about the borders in the 1540'ร and 1550'ร, when the Talbot earls o f 
Shrewsbury fil led multiple high-ranking posts in Northern government. Although 
some o f these letters are copies o f original documents in the State Papers collections, 
many others are unique to the collection. Local records offices have also been 
useful, although the manuscripts of Northumberland Records Offices are more 
scattered. There are some useful family collections such as the Seton-Delavale 
MSS, although most of the local Northumbrian records used in this study are 
unclassified, miscellaneous documents. 
Records and accounts from the main Border towns of Berwick, Newcastle 
and Carlisle have provided some peripheral evidence for this study. There are a few 
organised collections, such as the Bell MSS o f the Carlisle Records Office, that 
specifically deal wi th Border administration. The Berwick Records Office contains 
mostly borough records, but it also has some muster lists. However, these are from 
later in Elizabeth's reign, when mercenaries and inland men dominated the garrison, 
although many were from north of the Trent, usually Yorkshire and Lancashire or 
Cheshire. They consequently tell us little about the Northumbrians. Most o f the 
earlier records for the garrison were sent to the Exchequer, and many have 
subsequently been lost, which ftirther impedes any meaningftil analysis o f the 
Berwick garrison in relation to Marcher society. The Berwick accounts that have 
survived are largely surveys o f fortresses in the East Marches, and are mostly 
financial details. O f the garrison muster rolls that have survived, litt le can be done 
with them since few other records exist wi th which they can be meaningfully 
connected. Other financial records that have originated at Berwick, such as those 
relating to the building o f the trace italiene-siyÌQ walls later in Elizabeth's reign, 
provide an interesting glimpse into the fonctions o f a border fortress, but they yield 
little information regarding the military community that served the earlier Tudors. 
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This is not suφrising, considering that all business o f the Marches was reported to 
the Council o f the North, whose records are now lost, although some still exist in the 
Hamilton Papers. Regardless o f where records were sent, the Wardens o f the East 
March were headquartered at Berwick, so the paucity o f source material for the 
Berwick garrison is both puzzling and disappointing. 
Reconstructing sixteenth-century mil i tary communities from manuscript 
sources is diff icult, especially in the borders where there were both regular and 
auxiliary soldiers, as well as foreign mercenaries, on active duty at any given time. 
By using the State Papers collections and the surviving muster lists in the Exchequer 
records, it is possible to gain an understanding o f the mil i tary capabilities o f the 
common Border soldiers, as well as the Border service that his tenant right 
demanded. R .พ . Hoyle and M.L. Bush both demonstrate the dif f iculty in 
understanding the relationship between mil itary obligation and tenant right, but the 
crown and its officers engaged in l ively discussions regarding forensic service owed 
by Borderers, much of which has been preserved in the State Papers?^ Although 
they do not discuss individual tenancies, these correspondences at least provide a 
framework for understanding the nature of common mil itary obligation. 
Some Northumbrians such as Edward Charlton o f Hesleyside, or Little John 
Heron o f Chipchase, figure more prominently in the manuscripts due to their 
elevated social status and their more active role in Border affairs, although their 
careers say little about the lesser sort o f men who participated in the wars. The 
prevalence o f names that appear infrequently in the archives indicate that there were 
2^Bush, M.L. ^Tenant Right Under the Tudors: A Revision Revised ' Bul let in o f the John Rylands 
University Library o f Manchester 77 (1995), pp. 161-88; Hoyle R . พ . ' A n Ancient and Laudable 
Custom: The Development and Definit ion o f Tenant Right in North-Westera England in the 
Sixteenth Century/ Past and Present 116 (1987), pp. 24-55. The debate about tenant right is covered 
in more detail in chapter six. 
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many fleeting, part-time border soldiers. Such soldiers often rose in rank, and their 
importance in the mil i tary scheme emerges as they advanced from common soldier 
to land sergeant, or even petty captain. Border officers also became increasingly 
diligent in identifying active Borderers. By comparing these letters to muster lists, 
the prevalence o f military service and the effects o f Border militarism begin to 
surface. 
Wi l ls and inventories at Durham and York have not worked well in 
establishing the dynamics o f the military community since few active Borderers 
from this period, aside from Wil l iam lord Eure and Robert lord Ogle, left behind 
wil ls that have actually survived.^^ No wil ls from members o f the upland clans have 
survived, i f any were produced at all. Others who died in combat, such as Sir Ralph 
Eure, mostly died intestate, or their wi l ls have been lost. It was my original intent to 
use wil ls to analyse how Northumbrian soldiers related to their fellow soldiers by 
determining i f any o f the testator'ร fellow soldiers were bequeathed goods― 
especially armour֊֊or i f they served as witnesses. We are allowed occasional 
glimpses, such as the wi l l o f George Bowes o f Biddick, which bequeathed armour to 
Bowes' brother.^^ However, this w i l l originated in the last years o f Elizabeth's reign, 
and is quite possibly indicative of the renascent chivalry that sprouted amongst all 
European soldiery in the last half o f the sixteenth century.^^ The bequeathing o f 
weaponry is not included in most mid-sixteenth century wil ls, suggesting that 
armour and weaponry were either scavenged from the field or merely handed over to 
heirs informally. Without any firm evidence, though, it is diff icult to surmise i f the 
mil i tary community reinforced itself through wil ls. 
2 8 W i l l i am Lord Eure'ร w i l l is in the PRO, whi le Surtees has printed Ogles' w i l l 
2 9 Robert Surtees, The Histoty and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham, vo l . I， (London, 
1816-40), p. 200; James, Lineage and Civil Society, p. 177. 
30 I.A.A. Thompson, T h e European Crisis o f t he 1590'ร: The Impact o f Wár； in War and Society in 
Habsburg Spain, (Aldershot: Vanorum, 1992), pp. 271-76. 
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Studies o f the suraames have been hindered by the dearth o f evidence. The 
clans often left l itt le written evidence, as most o f their military services were formed 
through the customary understanding o f Border service, which did not entail formal 
record keeping. Some Northumbrian officers wrote prolif ically about the surnames, 
so their testimonies provide the bulk of the evidence for this work. The surveys o f 
Bowes and Ellerkar have illustrated some aspects of the dales societies,^' but there is 
much more evidence scattered about in the State р apers archives, as well as in the 
Cotton Manuscripts of the British Library. This presents a quandary in that men 
who wrote the commentaries about the dalesmen were bound to portray the 
surnames in a negative light since the authors represented the interests o f M.E. 
James' ' c iv i l ' society who saw the surnames as the Percys' enfants terribles?^ 
Some, l ike Little John Heron of Chipchase and Sir Ralph Eure, were more 
sympathetic than the earl o f Hertford or the duke of Norfolk were, which makes it 
possible to create a less biased study o f the reiving clans without exaggerating the 
depths o f their criminality. 
Although this study is a military history o f Northumbrian Border society, the 
approach is thematic as opposed to narrative, in order to show the formative 
elements o f the Northumberland mil itary community. Despite their unique status, 
the Border soldiers o f Northumberland were part o f a wider development known as 
the 'mil i tary revolutions'. Although this term has become loaded with a myúaá o f 
connotation, it is necessary in the first sections o f this study to connect the mil i tary 
arena o f the borders to the wider British and European military theatres, in order that 
3 ' PRO, SP 1/168, ff. 19-54; B L , Càlig, в V I I I f. 106. These surveys are also printed in ftxll in 
Hodgson's Northumberland, as wel l as in M.A. Richardson, Reprints of Rare Tracts (Newcastle-
՝^^James, Family^Lineage and Civil Society, p. 45 & pp. 183-87. James points out that men such as 
Eure and Bowes f i l led the vacuum left by the Nevil les and Percys, and that the gentry in general was 
more interested in serving the king than upholding the interests o f the old nobil i ty. 
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we might understand the niche that they occupied. Because I have avoided the 
narrative approach to warfare/^ a description o f Anglo-Scottish warfare is included 
in the second chapter. As the Borderers were part o f a wider society, it is necessary 
to describe the factors that influenced Border warfare. The English military effort in 
the Anglo-Scottish Marches differed from the English military experience on the 
continent. Like Ireland, the Anglo-Scottish frontier conflict was heavily 
characterised by raiding due to the openness of the Marches and the lack o f a strong, 
consistent policing apparatus in the Marches. Such approaches to armed conflict 
required specialist troops who were adept at negotiating the treacherous terrain o f 
the borders, which resulted in local men serving not only as guides but also as 
cavalry. Their presence reduced the need for levies from the southern counties, but 
it also placed them in harm's way when traditionally they were only used as the first 
line of defence. A brief overview o f the geography, and the socio-economic factors 
o f Northumberland society form another part of the introductory chapter. The third 
and fourth chapters discuss the policies of the central government, and what military 
responsibilities it expected o f its Marcher officers and soldiers. The final three 
chapters examine the elements that fused together the military community o f 
Northumberland. Chapter five analyses military office and authority in the borders, 
with specific references to the role o f the leading lords and gentry in the execution o f 
Tudor policy. Conflicts in leadership are also treated in this chapter to illustrate that 
not all Tudor officers acted in concerted fashion. Mil i tary obligation and the 
military role o f the common Marchers are the subjects o f chapter six. This chapter 
3 3 Gervase Phil l ips, Пе Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550, (Woodbridge: Boydel l , 1999). Phill ips 
rightly quotes James McPherson that the importance o f contingency in mi l i tary h is tory jcan best be 
described in a narrative formať. See James McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom, (Oxford: OUP, 
1988), p. 858. This approach works best wi th a chronological format, and this is exactly the approach 
that Phill ips has used. However, in thematic developments, the new mil i tary history eschews this 
approach. 
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wi l l complement the previous section by demonstrating the diff iculty that the Tudors 
experienced in harnessing the customary mil i tary obligations o f their Border tenants, 
and i t draws a distinction between border service and national military obligation. 
Border service, or the obligation to serve the Warden when policing the frontier or in 
the pursuit o f Scottish raiders, has often been confused with national military 
obligation. Border service essentially excluded the Northumberland military 
community from service in France, unlike other counties that all gave heavily to 
England'ร continental military enterprises, but as we shall see, the Tudors tried to 
alter this. Chapter seven w i l l argue that the conflicts between the Marchers and the 
government regarding the pursuit o f border warfare were rooted in the military 
identity that was a natural part o f the militarised Northumbrian frontier, which only 
complicated the fractures that appeared the Northumbrian military community. The 
vagaries of Border conflict demanded a unified response in the face o f Scottish 
aggression and criminality, but such responses were hamstrung by varied 
іпЇЄфгеЇаІІ0П8 o f duty fuelled by custom, which undermined Border service, and by 
the high value placed on blood ties. Mi l i tary leadership in the Marches thus faced a 
crisis, which directly threatened the government's ability to implement its own 
policies. Ultimately, this work w i l l focus upon the intersection o f March society and 
Border conflict. For nearly three hundred years, the two were inseparable, but the 
role o f Northumbrian society in the war as a whole has still remained obscured. 
This is neither purely a local study, nor is it a study solely o f Tudor policy. Rather, 
this work w i l l explore the synergetic relationship between a specific locality and the 
central government in London. 
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Chapter 2: Border Conflict in Europe and the British Isles 
The bloody, guerrilla-style armed conflict that typified the Seven Years' War 
in North America is often seen as a watershed in British military history, where 
professional troops required the services of frontier-dwelling scouts and natives.' 
The combination o f regular army with local mil i t ia was not a new practice, however. 
Warfare in the inhospitable terrain o f the Anglo-Scottish Marches hindered military 
action, and required the services from the Marchers as skirmishers and scouts. 
Frontier troops that excelled in guerrilla warfare were indispensable to the English 
war effort. While Anglo-Scottish border warfare exhibited its own idiosyncrasies, 
border warfare in general had developed similarities throughout the British Isles, and 
in Europe to some extent. This chapter discusses English approaches to border 
warfare in the context o f wider European mil itary practice, and addresses how the 
geography, economy and conservative society o f the Marches required the English 
government to employ more innovative approaches to armed conflict. 
The frontier conflicts o f the sixteenth century have received some recent 
attention, but only in the shadow of the 'mil i tary revolution' debates. J.R. Hale 
claimed that warfare in the British Isles was not on a scale when compared to 
European warfare, which has led to historians to focus elsewhere.^ Research has 
largely focused upon the significance o f gunpowder and the resulting general, 
homogenising Western military reform, though some֊most notably Geoffrey 
Parker一have modified their earlier conclusions to explain the continual disparity o f 
military power amongst European princes. 3 There still remains an underlying 
' For the most recent study o f the French-Indian confl ict, see Matthew c. Ward, Breaking the 
Backcountry: The Seven Years ' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754-1765, (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh UP, 2003). 
է J.R, Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London: Hambledon Press, 1983), p. 247. 
3 Geoffrey Parker, T h e 'Mi l i ta ry Revolution, 1560-1660'—A Myth? ' , in c. J. Rogers, ed. The 
Military Revolution Debate, p. 43. John Lynn, 'The trace italienne and the Growth o f Armies ' , in 
ibid, p. 169. 
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technological determinism in Parker's thesis, which begins with the advent o f 
modem artillery and Italian-Style fortifications. It details a technological change that 
led to the creation of large navies and thus ushered in the rise o f the West, which in 
ณm allowed for colonialism to occur. This argument has its merit, though it has had 
some critiques, most o f which point to Parker'ร overly general statements. The 
subtle aspects o f European warfare are glossed over by what David Eltis describes as 
'oversimplifications' o f a more complex բհ€ոօա€ոօո . ՛ * Parker'ร focus upon 
technological advances has also caused some debate. David Parrott has cautioned 
historians to avoid swallowing the rhetoric o f sixteenth-century mil i tary reformers 
and theorists, especially where fortifications were concerned, as it often did not 
reflect the mil i tary expediencies that characterised contemporary warfare.^ In all o f 
these debates, the military developments that took place in the wilder frontiers have 
altogether been overlooked. 
While the variegated interpretations o f the military revolution avoid general 
statements o f frontier warfare, individual case studies argue that frontier defence 
was a costly yet necessary appendage o f the state. David Potter'ร work on Picardy 
shows how the French king drew the frontier nobility closer to the crown by offer 
them offices and commands in the army. 6 As a 'hot' frontier, the military service o f 
the local Picardy nobles was essential for keeping the territory in French possession. 
As a result, the area became highly militarised, even though the mil i tary machine 
there was in chaos for most of the sixteenth century.^ James B. Wood'ร work on the 
armies o f the Valois kings during the Wars o f Religion underscores the need for a 
4 Dav id Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe, (London, 1995)， p. 11. 
3 Dav id Parrott, T h e Ut i l i ty o f Fortif ications in Early Modem Europe: Italian р rinces and Their 
Citadels, 1540-1640% War in History, vo l . v i i , pt. շ (2000) pp. 127-153. 
о David Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-1560, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1993). 
'Ibid, p. 306. 
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balance between internal security and the protection o f the frontier.^ Wood's 
assessment of the French army complements Potter'ร research, portraying a French 
army that was in desperate need o f a more advanced mil itary bureaucracy so that 
internal rebellion and frontier security could be managed more efficiently. 
Foreign and internal threats stretched mil itary resources to the l imit. Most 
rulers elected to keep the majority o f their professional soldiers stationed in border 
garrisons, though this policy often left rul ers without a policing apparatus. Wood has 
shown that the Valois kings of France concentrated their troops in the vast frontier 
shared with their Habsburg rivals, leaving Charles IX wi th too few soldiers in the 
interior to crush the initial Huguenot rebellion.^ Emperors Charles V and Ferdinand 
I， on the other hand, had literally thousands o f miles o f frontier to defend from 
French and Turkish armi es. Most o f the immediate defensive arrangements on the 
eastern frontier were administered by the Austrian Diet,'^ while the struggle wi th 
France over Burgundy required the immediate attention o f the emperor. However, 
rebellion upset the mil i tary balance in the Habsburgs' frontiers, just as it did for the 
French border provinces." After the failure o f the Regensburg Colloquy, Charles V 
was engaged in suppressing Philip of Hesse and the Schmalkaldic League; the 
rebellion siphoned precious troops from the borders, though this was mended by 
alternating truces with the Turks and the French. By juggling his military resources, 
Charles was able to deploy the veteran troops that crushed the Lutherans at 
Mühlberg in 1547. In 1559, the treaty o f Cateau-Cambresis temporarily difftised the 
wars with France, while in 1555 the Augsburg settlement with the Lutheran princes 
8 James B. Wood, The King 'ร Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in 
France, 1562-1576, (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
9 Wood, The King 'ร Army, p. 4. 
'0 ร. Guldescu, The Croatian-Siavonian Kingdom, 1526-1792, (The Hague: Mouton Press, 1970); 
G.E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-J 747, (Urbana: บ o f l Press, 1960). 
՚ ՚ J.D. Traçy, Emperor Charles v, Impresario of War ： Campaign Strategy, International Finance, 
and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). 
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a l lowed the Habsburgs to shi f t troops f r o m the internal German pr incipal i t ies back 
to the front iers. W h i l e d ip lomacy prov ided some surety for the French and Imper ia l 
frontiers, the general po l i t i ca l instabi l i ty in the cont inent kept both French and 
Habsburg border garrisons act ive so that neither power was able to stand d o w n a l l o f 
its armi es after the cease-fire. 
England 'ร rulers had even fewer resources for their borders, and these, too, 
were strained in t imes o f m i l i t a r y and po l i t i ca l cr is is. W h e n Henry V I I I ' s best border 
soldiers became act ive part icipants in the rebel l ions o f 1536, i t left the entire A n g l o -
Scott ish f ront ier vulnerable to invasion. Before he moved against the rebels, Henry ' s 
in i t ia l steps ensured that the Scots upheld the treaty o f 1534, i n w h i c h James agreed 
not to wage war on England, regardless o f any pretext. '^ L u c k was o n the Eng l ish 
side; Scott ish reivers were the on ly fore ign parties to enter England du r ing the 
rising. F i f teen years later the Engl ish ran out o f luck . B o t h the West Count ry rising 
and Ke t t ' s rebel l ion in 1549 forced Protector Somerset to d iver t fo re ign mercenaries, 
who were earmarked to bolster the s t ruggl ing garrisons i n the Scott ish Pale. W i t hou t 
these essential t roops, the embatt led Engl ish Pale that had been established in the 
Scott ish Lowlands suffered yet more depr iva t ion. Moreover , the heavy-handed 
approach used b y the German landsknechts and I ta l ian arquebusiers i n que l l i ng bo th 
rebel l ions ref lected poor ly upon Somerset's admin is t ra t ion. '^ The Protector pa id the 
ul t imate pr ice for h is m i l i t a r y blunders, and the borders were lef t open to the ravages 
o f the Franco-Scott ish a rmy that lodged i n the fo rmer Eng l ish outposts. ՚՛* The treaty 
' 2 Gervase Phill ips, Пе Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550 (Woodbridge: Boydel l 1999) p. 147. 
՚ 3 Julian Cornwall , The Revolt of the Peasantry 1549, (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1977), 
pp. 160-67; Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p. 73. 
՚ 4 J.B. Brown (ed.), 'The French Troops in the Borders in 1548', Transactions of the Hawick 
Archaeological Society (1905), pp. 35-45; Phil l ips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 250-55. 
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o f 1551 d id noth ing to shore up the border, w h i c h had suffered heav i l y i n the 
at t r i t ion, leav ing the c rown 's Nor thumbr ian subjects vulnerable to Scott ish raids. 
War was essential ly i l l def ined in ear ly m o d e m Europe. 15 The ve i l that 
separated war and peace was th in , and of ten f ront ier conf l i c t s immered even dur ing 
general truces. Th is was especial ly true for the mi l i ta r ised Engl ish borderlands: The 
Pales o f Calais and D u b l i n , and the Nor thern Marches. A r m e d conf l i c t essential ly 
def ined Marcher l i fe , as a l l three borderlands faced either wa r r i ng clans or 
professional armies o f England 's internat ional rivals. The Ang lo-Scot t i sh Marches 
faced both dur ing Ang lo-Scot t i sh wars when French forces made an appearance i n 
Scotland i n 1523 and again in 1548. El izabethan Ireland witnessed a desul tory 
Spanish intervent ion that sought to explo i t the I r ish rebel l ions led by Tyrone. There 
were no border clans i n Calais, but the presence o f a my r i ad o f soldiers ranging from 
freebooters to professional mercenaries gave the Engl ish forces a hodgepodge 
appearance. 
England's m i l i t a r y frontiers presented a un ique chal lenge to the Tudor 
government, but the Tudo r approaches to these problemat ic areas were remarkab ly 
s imi lar despite the d iv ides separating the I r ish Gael ic, Scots Gael ic and A n g l o -
Scott ish pol i t ies. Sixteenth-century England d id not yet have a central ised m i l i t a r y 
administ rat ion and instead w h o l l y rel ied upon regional structures o f command and 
logist ics. Spain, on the other hand, required m i l i t a r y bureaucracies to govern the 
areas such as the L o w Countr ies, so that b y 1600 there were m i l i t a r y structures i n 
place to streamline logist ics. '^ The Engl ish had no such burgeon ing m i l i t a r y 
organisat ion; the wars i n Ireland and i n the Marches were essential ly waged much as 
՚ 5 M.S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Oid Regime, !618-1Ш, (New York: St. 
Martm՝ร Press ， 1988), pp. 13-16 
I 6 I.A.A. Thompson (ed.), ' The European Crisis o f the 1590'ร: The Impact o f War ' , War and Society 
in Habsburg Spain, (Aldershot: Variorum, 1992), pp. 270-73. 
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they had been in the previous t w o centuries, even though the Tudor governments 
attempted some innovat ive approaches that never took root. Th is lack o f central 
command ef fect ive ly created separate m i l i t a r y governorships i n I re land, Calais and 
a long the Anglo-Scot t ish frontier. A n d w h i l e each regional conf l i c t had its o w n 
pecul iar i t ies and adaptations o f convent ional m i l i t a r y practice, the approach was 
essential ly the same. 
Geof f rey Parker suggests that the absence o f for t i f icat ions on some front iers 
forced rulers to re ly on cavalry, i m p l y i n g there existed two mu tua l l y exclusive 
methods o f border warfare: siege craft and set-piece battles on the one hand, and o n 
the other a more fluid approach that emp loyed raids and skirmishes o f l igh t 
cavalry. '^ The former method o f war fare has proved to be m u c h more attractive to 
histor ians, a l though this does not d im in i sh the important role that caval ry enjoyed 
dur ing the sixteenth century. Gervase Phi l ips has noted that studies o f the m i l i t a ry 
revolut ions o f the sixteenth century have ignored l ight cavalry: 'Despi te the scant 
attent ion that has been pa id to l igh t cavalry, they were an in f luent ia l factor in ear ly 
modern warfare. In reconnaissance, screening and ra id ing, an ef fect ive independent 
l ight cavalry arm added a new d imens ion to war fa re . ' ' ^ The European mercenaries 
w h o found employment on the Eng l ish front iers demonstrate that most nations were 
s t i l l us ing horse-based soldiers. French demi- lances, mounted Spanish in fantry , and 
A lban ian l igh t caval ry were used i n the Eng l ish borderlands to good effect. 
The development o f l igh t horse took occurred i n the front iers o f Europe. 
W h i l e typ ica l soldiery in the Aust r ian borders inc luded heavy mounted 
Kriegesknecht or Landsknecht in fant ry , a generous complement o f nat ive conscripts 
Parker, "M i l i ta ry Revolution", passim. 
Gervase Phill ips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513^50, (Woodbridge: Boydel l , 1999) p. 29. 
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and volunteers fo rmed non-t radi t ional companies. B y the midd le o f the f i f teenth 
century, A lban ian stradiot cavalry had proven the i r use in pat ro l l ing the d i f f i c u l t 
terrain o f the Habsburgs ' Ba lkan frontier.^^ Poland largely depended upon the horse-
based Cossack fami l ies for the defence o f the south-eastern Pol ish marches, w h i c h 
were exposed to the marauding Tatar and Tu rk i sh armies.^' The Hungar ian hussar 
was equal ly sk i l led i n expanding the range o f operat ion deep into Tu rk i sh territory.^^ 
The typ ica l l ight horseman carried a spear or j ave l i n , sword , and perhaps a 
miss i le weapon or f i rearm o f some sort. Th is a l lowed them to move ftxrther and 
faster than the heavy cava l ryman, and contr ibuted great ly to their ro le as raiders and 
scouts. The typ ica l stradiot was very much accustomed to the l i festy le o f border 
raids and ambushes, w h i c h depended upon their speed and 8ифП8е.^^ L i gh t l y armed 
w i t h a spear and a scimitar and sword , the stradiots usual ly preferred to ou t f lank an 
enemy and descend upon the rearguard in order to cause confusion i n the front 
ranks; dur ing the ensuing rout, they sought prisoners to ransom?"^ The development 
o f a l igh t cava l ry arm to pol ice the border and conduct raids against the enemy was 
thus a logical answer for m i l i t a r y prob lems b y ma in ta in ing an armed presence that 
cou ld act as an in i t ia l screen against invad ing armies using local resources and 
unconvent ional strategies. 
I r regular troops and l igh t cava l ry were i n use in a l l three Engl ish marches b y 
the sixteenth century and were essential ly the means b y w h i c h the Marchers secured 
themselves from both marauders and invad ing armies. Each region suppl ied the 
ร. Guldescu, The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom, 1526-1792, (The Hague: Mouton Press, 1970), p, 
62. 
ご Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, (London: Bodley Head, 1974), p. 152. 
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1993), pp. 1-26. 
22 Geza Perjeo, The Fail of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526 to Buda 154Լ 
(Boulder: Social Sciences Monograph, 1995). 
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Marcher lords w i t h a suitable body o f soldiers, w i t h the except ion o f Calais, w h i c h 
was staffed b y the retinues o f the Engl ish aristocracy that served as m i l i t a ry 
govemors.^^ In the I r ish Pale, the Ang lo - I r i sh Ear l o f K i İdare used his connect ions 
as ch ie f to raise troops, hav ing consol idated his lands. A l t hough the core o f the 
Ang lo - I r i sh defences remained ch ie f l y i n the hands o f the Engl ish retinues, the 
irregular I r ish border soldiers made up a substantial por t ion o f the Marcher levies.^^ 
B y tak ing t r ibute from al l the cheif taincies that bordered the Pale, K i ldare was able 
to fUnd a smal l a rmy from his border h o l d i n g s . G a l l o g l a s s and keme were 
increasingly re l ied upon to secure the borders o f the I r ish Marches, as Eng l ish 
retinues became too expensive.^^ L i g h t l y armed keme warr iors were much more 
suited to the internal c lan war r ing and ra id ing that characterised the Marches, despite 
the fact that they most of ten served as foot soldiers. A s the sixteenth century 
progressed they became adept at hand l ing firearms, probably more so than their 
Ang lo-Scot t i sh counterparts ma in l y due to the resources avai lable to the lords w h o 
employed them.^^ Moun ted irregulars ch ie f l y were the galloglass mercenaries that 
came f r o m the western Scott ish clans, and from the personal household o f the I r ish 
marcher lords. The kerne and galloglass were except ional march warr iors ; many 
found employment i n the Ang lo-Scot t i sh border wars o f the mid-century , and most 
standing pr ivate armi es i n Ireland were compr ised o f kerne who served under 
heredi tary captains.^*^ However , the vu lnerab i l i t y o f K i l d a r e ' ร t r ibute system was la id 
25 The defences o f Calais were more similar to those o f the French-Imperial border than to the 
Austro-Turtósh border. 
26 ร.G. Ell is, Reform and Revival: English Government in Ireland, I470-I534, (Woodbridge: 
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1994), pp. 56-57. 
30 Lennon, Ireland, p. 56. 
29 
bare when he rebel led in 1534, wh i ch consol idated most o f the I r ish m i l i t a ry 
resources i n the hands o f the rebel ร.^' 
The Calais Pale d i f fe red from the Cel t ic marches o f the Br i t i sh Isles, as there 
was no clannish border society l i ke that found in Ireland and Scot land; thus, the l ight 
skirmishers that operated i n France d i f fered from the Ang lo -Ce l t i c Marchers. 
I rregular t r o o p s ― " c r a c k e r s " or "k rekerร" as the French cal led t h e m ― in the Pale o f 
Calais were not an o f f i c ia l part o f the army but were groups o f mercenaries and 
adventurers w h o were attracted to the inherent ins tab i l i ty o f the Calais Pale, and to 
the opportuni t ies that i t m igh t o f fer the clever raider.^^ These groups acted as 
freelancing quartermasters fo r the a r m y but received no o f f i c ia l pay; instead, they 
subsisted on boo ty and the sale o f stolen goods. The i r presence i n the field gave the 
Engl ish a good supply o f scouts and skirmishers, since they fought more desperately 
than the average soldier d id . Such ruf f ians d id not dissipate when each o f f i c ia l 
Engl ish campaign had ended but cont inued to raid the surrounding French 
countryside. Persistent forays b y Engl ish freebooters plagued the French, who i n 
turn slaughtered the krekerร whenever the chance arose."*^ In spite o f the border l ine 
lawlessness that the irregulars int roduced into the Pale, the government d id not 
underestimate the value o f their services; licenses to h i re bodies o f soldier-
adventurers were granted to suitable captains un t i l the demise o f the Engl ish 
garrisons i n France.'''^ 
3 ' Ell is, Tudor Frontiers, pp. 210-226. 
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L i k e other l ight cavalry, Ang lo-Scot t i sh l ight cavalry֊֊often cal led Border 
or Nor thern h o r s e ― excel led i n smal l , tactical raids and ambushes. In October 
1543, Sir John W a l l o p boasted to Emperor Charles V that Nor thern horse cou ld 
outper fo rm A lban ian stradiots as skirmishers, and when the Emperor witnessed the 
Nor thern horse in act ion against the French, he qu i ck l y compared them to the l ight 
caval ry o f the N o r t h A f r i c a n Magfeeb.^^ A s ch ie f guardians o f the northern Engl ish 
frontier, border l igh t caval ry were useft i l i n reconnaissance and scout ing, and they 
o f ten p rov ided the Eng l ish w i t h a decent poo l o f l igh t cavalry fo r expedit ions in to 
Scot land. 
Nor thern horse were predominant ly recrui ted f r o m the rural parts o f 
Nor thumber land and Cumber land. Because the Eng l ish border magnates cou ld not 
exact t r ibute from their neighbours, recrui tment p roved more d i f f i cu l t than i n 
K i l d a r e ' ร I re land. M e n such as L o r d Dacre and John Heron used their local 
connections as a base fo r their ret inues, but had to forge m i l i t a ry connections 
through gui le , and sometimes through force. Dacre was Henry V I I F s most talented 
recru i t ing agent; i n his absence after his dismissal the c rown had to resort to 
garrisons o f southern m e n to secure the frontier since the Border clans w o u l d not 
f o l l o w an outsider.^^ The c rown cou ld not do w i thout these M a r c h troopers, so i t was 
more w i l l i n g to spend Engl ish co in for their services. The i r fami l ia r i t y brought a 
dist inct advantage to the Engl ish since the boggy and steep mounta in terrains o f the 
Cheviots were treacherous to the stranger. I n this respect, Ang lo-Scot t i sh marchers 
occupied a speci f ic n iche. The Eng l ish government appreciated this, and of ten lured 
the m i l i t a r y services o f re i v ing clans w i t h pensions or rewards. Another practice 
enticed Scots Border clans; this was k n o w n as "assur ing", whereby a head o f each 
-" Letters and Papers [LP]. Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Нету vni, XV I I I ( 2 ) , no. 291. 
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f a m i l y w o u l d o f f i c i a l l y register their support for the k i n g , i n exchange for protect ion 
f r om the Scott ish govemment.^^ Clans such as the Liddesdale Armst rongs and the 
Threapland Grahams were induced to prov ide m i l i t a r y service for the Engl ish 
c rown. Th is paral leled the practice o f 'տսՄ6ո06ք and regranť i n I reland, w h i c h 
helped to re-establish the Engl ish m i l i t a ry presence after K i İdare's rebel l ion. I n this 
exchange o f favours, the Engl ish c rown w o u l d forgo its ancient一and 
unrecognisable֊cla ims wh i l e the Cel t ic chieftains agreed to ho ld their land from 
the Eng l ish , usual ly as a new ly created lo rd or earl . The upshot was that the lo rd 
w o u l d supp ly the Eng l ish w i t h soldiers, and he w o u l d have to organise the socio­
economic з ЇшсШге o f his lands a long Eng l ish l ines. Th i s meant obey ing Eng l ish 
musters, and speaking English.^^ Under th is arrangement, the O 'Ne i l l s became earls 
o f Ty rone , and the O 'Br iens became the earls o f Thomond . These new magnates 
raised k e m e warr iors fo r service i n Scot land, w h i c h cleared the country o f d isrupt ive elements, and demonstrated the good will of bo th lords, but the aՄangement was 
short- l ived.^^ Bo th schemes in Ireland and Scot land u l t imate ly fai led due to 
misg iv ings on bo th sides. B y 1543, Henry was forced to abandon the practice o f 
surrender and regrant. In s imi lar fashion, the Scots clans were par t icu lar ly 
discouraged from upho ld ing their end o f thei r assurances when the Eng l ish cou ld no 
longer a f fo rd them protect ion after 1550, when the last o f the Engl ish garrisons i n 
Scot land fe l l into Franco-Scott ish hands. Plus, the Scots were never o f fered Eng l ish 
t i t les and lands, even though some lairds were weal th ier than many Scott ish nobles 
were. T h e Eng l ish assimi lat ion o f Cel t ic clans echoed the practice o f registrat ion 
that other cont inental governments employed, suggesting that the expediency o f 
" Marcus Merr iman, "The Assured Scots," Scottish Historical Review, vol . 47 (1968), pp. 10-34. 
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h i r i ng border troops was not lost upon armies that were more sophisticated.'*^ There 
was a pract ical angle; the Ang lo-Scot t ish practice o f assuring Border h igh land clans 
placed the defence o f the vxilnerable frontier i n the hands o f those who stood to 
benef i t most from a secure border; consequently, they fought w i t h more conv ic t ion . 
Ye t when this scheme fa i led, i t opened the frontier to raids and predatory elements. 
The sixteenth-century Nor thumbr ian cavalryman was not an ent i rely new 
m i l i t a r y development i n the Br i t i sh Isles. D u r i n g the fourteenth-century A n g l o -
Scott ish wars, the Eng l ish pol iced the Borders w i t h hobelars, a class o f soldier 
s imi lar to sixteenth-century l ight cavalry. Hobelars in i t i a l l y were conscripted from 
the moors o f I re land, a l though they later became a c o m m o n fixณre i n the 
Nor thumber land d a l e s / ' Even though J.E. Mor r i s readi ly equated the hobelar w i t h 
Border horse, i t is unclear i f indeed the hobelar evolved into the Border horse. It is 
certain that l igh t horse patro l led the Ang lo-Scot t ish borders more ef fect ive ly , but 
hobelars were more ak in to mounted in fantry , and probably d id not scour and pr ick 
as M o r r i s has c la imed. I t is more l i ke l y that the Border horse o f the sixteenth 
century were b o m o f the fifteenth-century re iv ing fami l ies who required speed and 
m o b i l i t y when s t r ik ing into rivals' terr i tor ies. L i k e the hobelar, the Border horse 
cou ld st i l l d ismount to fight, as they d id at the batt le o f A n c r u m M o o r (1542),"^^ but 
their p r imary ro le as fast and mob i le skirmishers separated them from mounted 
in fantry . Indeed, they proved ef fect ive i n their ab i l i t y to surprise and ra id, bu t 
Robson notes that at the sk i rmish at M i и stanes Edge i n 1546, the Eng l ish defeat was 
attr ibuted to the absence o f heavy cavalry, ind icat ing the vu lnerab i l i t y o f l igh t 
40 Only Cossacks who were granted the right to appear on the register o f the Polish government could 
bear arms and enjoy the privileges o f tax exemptions. F. s у syn, "The Problem o f Nobil i t ies in the 
Ukrainian Past: the Polish Period 1569-1648," in I.L. RudnytsKy, ed., Rethinking Ukrainian History 
(Edmonton, 1981). 
41 M .c . Prestwich,Medieval Warfare: The English Experience, p. 52. J.E. Morr is "Mounted Infantry 
in Medieval Warfare", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd ser., v i i i (1914), pp. 77 -84 . 
4 2 LP, XX(1 ) , no. 332.For a description o f this battle, see the end of this chapter. 
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cavalry.'^^ It should not be forgot ten, though, that on ly th i r ty- three years earlier 
dur ing the batt le o f F lodden, Sir Edmund Howard's beleaguered in fant ry was saved 
b y a t ime l y charge o f l igh t horse, under the command o f L o r d Dacre and John 
Heron, ' the Bastard o f Crawley'.՚^՛^ The heavier demi- lance cavalry on l y became 
more important i n Engl ish armi es after 1547/^ al though the Border horse retained 
thei r e l i te, " l i gh t " status throughout the sixteenth century. 
Specialised troops cal led for special t ra in ing. M i l i t a r y advances such as 
gunpowder weaponry in the ma in bastions cal led for practised gunners. A s w i t h al l 
successfi i l innovat ions o f this per iod, this required the establishment o f t ra in ing 
garrisons in the Hapsburg քաոէւ6քտ.՛*^ Garrisons were useful not on l y for po l i c i ng 
their neighbourhoods, they also prov ided raw recruits w i t h a chance to fami l iar ise 
themselves w i t h weaponry and tactics. T ra in ing i n tactics and instruct ion i n d r i l l 
and combat d isc ip l ine became a typ ica l reg ime for al l new inductees."^^ I n 1534 
Francis I o f France was able to re-organise and t ra in some o f h is troops as 6,000-
men legions, and by mid-century the French had equipped many o f their companies 
w i t h trained l igh t cavalry."^^ However , i n England there were not the extensive 
m i l i t a r y reforms as witnessed o n the cont inent, p r imar i l y due to the costs o f t ra in ing 
and main ta in ing a m o d e m army. Engl ish garrisons at Be rw ick , Carl is le and D u b l i n 
43 Ralph Robson, The Rise and Fail of the English Highland Clans: The Tudor Solution to a Medieval 
Problem, (Edinburgh: Donald Press, 1989), p. 203; LP, X X I ( l ) , no. 58. Robson does not 
acknowledge that Scots l ight horse defeated the English, and that heavy cavalry would have been too 
encumbered to escape their pursuers, 
CSP, Venice, Vo l . I I , 134. 
4 5 Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 203. The French commander and mil i tary author Mart in du 
Bellay considered demi-lances as part o f the light cavalry. See Philips, Anglo-Scots Warfare, p. 27. 
4 6 G.E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-17^7, (Urbana: บ o f l Press, 
1960). The Spanish were the first to develop a system through which garrisons served a two-fo ld 
риф05е: training and providing local defence. 
47 Parker, "M i l i ta ry Revolution", p. 40. Wi th a new emphasis upon training, the Hapsburg armies 
were able to enact a tactical revolution that employed shot, pike and art i l lery in a co-ordinated 
fashion that improved upon the earlier tactical models using the same weaponry. The efficiency o f 
this system provided the Austrians and the Spanish wi th a formidable army that dominated the 
mil i tary scene throughout the century. 
4 8 Arnold, Renaissance at War, pp. 70-73; Potter, Picardy, pp. 159-62 
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were re lat ive ly smal l . The on ly except ion was Calais, but on ly because fo re ign 
mercenaries made up the bu lk o f the a r m y ― a n indulgence that the Engl ish 
government could scarcely սքքօէժ. ՛*^ 
I t is d i f f i cu l t to determine i f the Nor thern horse were professional soldiers i n 
the t radi t ional sense. A l though they were of ten denied pay,^*^ wh i ch suggests that 
they were not a part o f the professional so ld iery o f England, thei r tendency to pursue 
the Ang lo-Scot t i sh conf l ic t i n an independent manner gave them more bat t le f ie ld 
experience than most professional garr ison troopers enjoyed.^^ There is no direct 
evidence regarding the fo rma l or o f f i c ia l t ra in ing o f Nor thern horse, w h i c h again 
places doubt on their professional stams. The i r t ra in ing was most l i ke l y haphazard. 
Mos t began as young men,^^ riding on forays and pursuits o f stolen property, k n o w n 
i n the Borders as the "ho t t r od " . W h i l e most o f these act ivi t ies d id not invo lve 
combat operat ions, the younger men most l i ke l y used these opportuni t ies to hone 
their equestrian ski l ls . The i r k i n probably taught the young men mart ia l sk i l ls such 
as swordsmanship and the handl ing o f lances and staves, especial ly i f the f a m i l y 
belonged to an act ive re iv ing surname or grayne. M a n y o f the young men w h o 
attended musters had already fami l iar ised themselves w i t h basic combat techniques, 
though they were most l i ke l y unable to a f fo rd arms and armour. Th is accounts for 
the large number o f young Nor thumbr ian men who were 'hable w i t h no harnesses' 
at the m u s t e r s . T h e Borders lacked any other fo rma l t ra in ing fac i l i t y for l igh t 
cavalry. 
49 M.B. Davies, 'Boulogne and Calais form 1545 to 1550，， Foitad I University Bulletin of the Faculty 
of Arts, vol. 12 (1950), pp. 1-90. 
f See chapter five regarding the remuneration given to march soldiers. 
5 ' See chapter four lor crown policies regarding the use o f Northumbrian bands. The crown often 
gave the March Wardens and the bands o f l ight cavalry a free hand in raiding into Scotland, 
especially during the conflicts o f 1542-1547. 
52 Young men generally were eligible for mi l i tary service at age 16. 
5 3 Northumberland Record Off ice MSS (NRO), Z A N M . 15/D. 15. 
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In the wastes o f Nor thumber land, the government subsequently mou lded its 
pursui t o f border warfare to suit the avai lable m i l i t a r y resources. A l t hough they were 
a cheaper alternative to heavy-armoured cavalry, l ight cavalry st i l l required 
special ised equipment and horses. I n 1522, their typ ica l equipment and c lo th ing 
consisted o f a St. George'ร Cross o n a wh i te tunic ( for o f f i c ia l campaigns on ly ) , 
w h i c h went over a jack , another sleeveless tunic usual ly o f leather but w h i c h 
occasional ly had i ron p la t ing sewn into the panelร.^'^ Steel caps were the choice o f 
protect ive headgear, a l though these cou ld range from the standard bul let cap to the 
expensive mor i on (a heavier helmet that protected both the neck and the face).^^ 
Weaponry consisted at very least o f the border lance, a weapon that cou ld either be 
couched for use on horseback or deployed as a p ike. Some border soldiers also 
carr ied bows and b i l l s , mainstays o f the Eng l ish a r s e n a l . D e s p i t e the prevalence o f 
f i rearms i n England b y 1485,^՛՛ the use o f handguns and other personal firearms was 
scarce i n Nor thumber land and Cumber land i n !536.^^ Few borderers carr ied them, 
except for gent lemen who sometimes carried a dag or a pistol o f some var iety. T h e 
t ra in ing garrisons at Car l is le and Be rw ick , on the other hand, usual ly t rained gunners 
and harquebusiers, so that they had a smal l compl iment o f mounted harquebusiers/^ 
It is l i ke l y that at least some Marchers were able to receive some firearms t ra in ing at 
Be rw i ck or Car l is le, a l though they w o u l d prove the except ion to the no rm . 
Gunpowder weapons were more prominent amongst the royal garr isons, as i t was 
reported after A n c r u m M o o r that the Engl ish had lost a wagon laden w i t h 
LP, III (2), no. 2525. 
55 Professor Duns "Notes on a Helmet found at Ancrum Moor," Proceedings of the Society of 
Antiquaries of Scotland, vol. 6, Ser. (1895-96) pp. 317-322. 
5 6 D . L . พ . Tough The Last Years ofa Frontier, (Oxford: OUP, 1928), p. 89. 
57 Anthony Goodman, The Wars of the Roses, (London ：Routledge, 1991), p. 173. 
2 George MacDonald Fraser, The SteeLBonnets, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 88. 
59 Phil ips, Angio֊Scots Wars, pp. 158-159. 1,000 kerne warriors were shipped from Ireland to the 
Scottish Borders in May і 544 and were trained to use the harquebus in about three weeks. 
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harquebuses, probably for the gunners f r o m No rham and Be rw ick w h o had 
accompanied Sir Ra lph Eure across the border.^^ The average borderer cou ld not 
a f fo rd expensive f i rearms, and since bows were easier to obtain and main ta in , the 
longbow remained the ch ie f miss i le weapon i n Nor thumber land for the rest o f the 
сепШгу.^' 
Destr iers, or heavy warhorses, were also uncommon , as most o f the Border 
horses were nags o r fleet-footed ponies, wh i ch were unshod i n order to 
accommodate boggy ter ra in ; nags were on l y thir teen hands h i gh , re lat ive ly short for 
a warhorse.^^ The Borderer 'ร preference for the nag is demonstrated b y the l ist o f 
pr ized horses taken f r o m the Scott ish a rmy after i t was routed f r o m Flodden——nearly 
a l l o f L o r d Dacre 'ร Marcher cavalry had captured Scott ish Border nags for 
themselves.^' ' Nags were more useft i l when per fo rm ing feints, since they were not 
aggressive l i ke stal l ions and heavy warhorses were. The nag's tendency to wheel 
and turn i n the face o f enemy posit ions meant that the pr icker or scourer cou ld never 
trust that h is horse w o u l d not take h i m in to the midst o f the enemy. 
Overa l l , the tactics and equipment o f Borderers mi r ro red that o f other types 
o f l igh t cavalry and m u c h l i ke them, the Nor thumber land Border horse was a 
product o f bo th geographical forces and m i l i t a r y necessity. A l t hough the wastelands 
o f the Borders were not as conducive to w ide cavalry manoeuvres as were the 
steppes upon w h i c h the A lban ians and the Poles operated, the Ang lo-Scot t i sh terrain 
was open and desolate enough to encourage horse-based operations. L i ke their 
6 0 Bri t ish L ibrary [ B L ] , Add. MSS, 32656 f. 195; Х Х { 1 ) , no. 1046. The English also had 
arti l lery w i th them as wel l as carts and sheaves o f arrows, all o f which was lost. 
6 ' In 1592, 1000 bows were sent to Berwick, whereas there were only 600 firearms in the shipment. 
This indicates that firearms had become more prominent, although the bow sti l l held a firm place in 
the Border garrisons. Calendar of Border Papers [СВР], Vo l . Cno. 744. 
6 2 B L , Càlig. В I f. 131; Tough, Frontier, p. 90. J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army (London, 
^^Public Record Off ice MSS [PRO], E 36/254 ff. 110-135, {Book of Horses). 
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European counterparts, the Border horse o f Nor thumber land was p r imar i l y used i n 
raids, some o f w h i c h were large enough to dep loy thousands o f men. They were 
most ef fect ive i n smal l groups, as the eyes o f any invad ing army.^'^ R. Robson 
counters that they were 'some o f the claws as w e l l , ' po in t ing to the numerous 
instances where the l ight horse acted as ef fect ive screeners and as the army's " f i re 
br igade," rescuing units that had blundered into ambushes.^^ Feints were also 
popular amongst the riders, as Eure'ร over land invasion i n 1544 w i t h 2000 o f the 
best Nor thumber land and No r th Yorksh i re horsemen was meant to distract from 
Hert ford 's amphibious assault near Edinburgh.^^ Ambushes were also c o m m o n , as 
Wharton 's shock ing charge into the flanks o f the Scott ish army at So lway Moss 
underscored the pr ickers' ax i om o f speed and 8ифгІ8е, Such characteristics were 
also good for pursui t ; after P ink ie, the border horse had a f ie ld day har ry ing the 
routed Scott ish soldiers, seeking prisoners fo r ransom when they could find the 
opportunity.^^ Adept at incursions and even more talented at extract ing themselves 
from unfavourable situations, the Nor thern horse proved lethal i n their capacity for 
war craft. 
Border horse shared much in common w i t h other continental l igh t cavalry, 
a l though there is reason enough to treat the Nor thumbr ian soldiers as unique. 
F i rs t ly , the Border soldier cou ld not evolve as he d id dur ing the sixteenth century 
w i thou t the mi l i ta r iza t ion that characterised much o f Nor thumber land society. 
Tudor po l i cy sought to augment the m i l i t a r y power o f the Borders, but i n do ing so, i t 
^ Fortescue, British Army, vol. I, p. 114. 
Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 188. 
66 LP, X I X ( l ) nos. 335 and 531. Euro's force was mostly traditional Border horse, although the few 
hundred mounted demi-hackbutters were probably f rom Yorkshire, where there was less aversion to 
maintaining expensive firearms. 
6 7 W i l l i am Patten observed.that the Border soldiers were heavy wi th booty, and were always seeking 
to take prisoners rather than k i l l . See Wi l l i am Patten, T h e Expedition into Scotland, 1547' In A.F. 
Pollard, (ed,) Tudor Tracts ¡532-1588 (Westmmster: Constable, 1903). 
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inadvertent ly created a society that w o u l d have the m e a n s ― a n d the w i l l i n g n e s s ― t o 
turn its m i l i t a ry power upon the c rown 's subjects. Heidsmen and captains o f the 
bands became the foc i o f the Border soldier's loya l ty , w i thou t w h i c h there could not 
have been any cohesive author i ty to b ind together the various uni ts that guarded the 
front ier. Mos t o f a l l , the Anglo-Scot t ish border soldier of ten considered his local 
po l i t ica l power, whether sumame, constable or Warden, to be the sole author i ty i n 
the region. In i den t i f y ing w i t h such powers, the Nor thumber land soldiers developed 
a fierce po l i t i ca l ident i ty that was characterised b y local interests.^* St i l l very m u c h 
independent i n a m i l i t a r y sense, Nor thumber land society o n l y began to appreciate 
the presence o f roya l garrisons when Nor thumbr ian h igh land fami l ies treated thei r 
Engl ish neighbours more rougMy than the Scots ever d id . 
Border War fare and Marcher Society i n the Br i t i sh Isles and the A n g l o -
Scott ish Marches 
W h i l e border warfare i n the Ang lo -Scot t i sh Marches shared s imi lar i t ies w i t h 
other European border conf l ic ts , i t was st i l l a breed apart from the set piece battles 
and sieges o f the cont inent. An thony Goodman has stated the Engl ish armies o f the 
late f i f teenth century blended both t radi t ional and more m o d e m approaches to 
w a r f a r e . T h i s tendency to innovate, wh i ls t s t i l l preserving t radi t ional practices, 
rel ied heav i ly upon the country's ab i l i t y to a f fo rd technologies that were more 
advanced. Marchers overal l were wary o f such modernisat ions, and i n that respect, 
Border warfare can be seen as be ing somewhat conservative i n its approach. The 
practices o f ambush and camisado, w h i c h the French and Eng l ish had used du r ing 
the Hundred Years ' War , were w ide ly used in the Nor thern Marches. The 
6 8 The mil i tarization o f Northumbrian society is discussed in more detail in chapter seven. 
Anthony Goodman, The Wars of the Roses (London: Routledge, 1981), pp. 161-195. 
™ Ibid^ pp. 177-78; Phil l ips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 27-30. 
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Nor thern Bands were steeped i n the art o f sk i rm ish and ambush, w h i c h earned them 
a place as some o f the most fo rmidab le cavalry in Europe. 
Anglo-Scot t ish warfare developed an almost id iosyncrat ic dependence upon 
large raids, coupled w i t h an ef for t to avoid large batt les. L i ke the Franco-
Burgundian Wars in the 1470'ร, burn ing and p i l l ag ing marked most o f the A n g l o -
Scott ish w a r s / * A l t hough cross-border ra id ing was commonplace throughout the 
sixteenth century, l i t t le detai l has been lef t beh ind, except for passing comments 
from observers. The raids at Haddon R i g g i n 1542 and at A n c r a m M o o r i n 1545 
were the on ly exceptions to this lacuna o f in fo rmat ion , bu t on l y because these both 
ended in defeat for the Engl ish. Bo th t y p i f y the large, chevauchée-style technique 
that the Engl ish had developed in the Hundred Years War , w h i c h was used to good 
effect by England's Burgundián all ies. A s Perjeo Geza has observed in his รณdy o f 
the Hungar ian f ront ier , there was usual ly a po l i t i ca l object ive to the border foray.^՜՛ 
A t Haddon R igg , the a i m o f the marauders was to p rovoke Scot land in to an act o f 
aggression so that Hen ry V I I I w o u l d have a pretext for an invasion. Sir Robert 
Bowes commanded about three thousand men on this occasion, a substantial force. 
A t A n c r u m M o o r , the Engl ish object ive was again provocat ion , w i t h s imi lar 
numbers o f men. 
Mos t o f the border clashes were in fact no th ing but cavalry skirmishes or 
runn ing batt les, though thei r effects were fe l t b y both Scott ish and Eng l ish 
governments. These skirmishes were no less devastat ing than Haddon R i g g or 
A n c r u m ; had they seen higher casualties, the death o f a s ign i f icant Marcher , o r had 
caused a panic i n the P r i vy Counc i l , they w o u l d probably have been deemed battles 
74 
二' Potter, Picardy, p. 33. 
ᄀԼ For a description o f the battles, see the Appendix I I . 
7う Geza Perjeo, Medieval Kingdom of Hungaդ, p. 49. . rd . 
7 4 Gainsford Bruce, T h e English expedition into Scotland in 1542', Archaeologia Aeliana, y series, 
vol. і і і (1907), pp. 194-95. 
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by historians, and earned a place on the Ordnance survey maps. However, the 
remarkable frequency of such small military actions, when combined with their 
ostensibly desultory results, has helped to obscure their real significance. For 
instance, Sir Robert Bowes' raids in the summer of 1545 wrought so much damage 
on the harvest that the Scots were unable to organise any effective opposition in the 
East and Middle Marches for over a year. Nonetheless, in the autumn of 1545, the 
Scots worsted the English Border cavalry at Millstanes Edge just outside of 
Hermitage. It is likely that the Scots employed heavier cavalry this time, perhaps 
even French mercenaries, demonstrating that the Scots still had some defensive 
capabilities in their West March while disrupting Sir Thomas Wharton'ร plans to 
garrison Caerlaverock Castle/^ Soon the English learnt how to use their light 
cavalry more effectively against the Scots and their heavier-armoured French allies. 
In 1557， Sir Henry Percy met a group of Scottish raiders and French heavy cavalry 
at Grindon in the East March and inflicted a defeat on them, pairing this with 
another successftxl action near Swinton in the Scottish East Marches.These 
defeats forced the Franco-Scottish forces to a stalemate. 
Rearguard actions also saw more successes on the English side, which thus 
boosted the morale of the Northumbrians. At Famington Crags in 1546, the 
Borderers under Sir Robert Bowes split into two formations: one group to escort the 
livestock taken during the raid, another to dismount and guard the first as it forded 
the Tweed. This might have resulted in another defeat similar to Haddon Rigg, were 
it not for the archers in the English company who managed to inflict 200 casualties 
on the Scots, while taking another 200 prisoner. When coupled with the harm 
7 6 PRO, SP 15/8/88; Raphaell Holinshed, English Chronicles, vol. 3 (London, 1808), pp. 581-86. 
Information on the raid at Grindon is sparse, but it appears to have been a noted success. 
7 7 L P , X X I ( l ) , no. 700; B L , Calig. в V f. 1. 
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from the destructive raids рефеШаЇесі by the English in 1544 and 1545/8 the 
damage wrought by the English at Famington meant there was little activity from 
the Scots Borderers of Jedburgh and Teviotdale until the battle of Pinkie in 
September 1547. Thus while the individual raid held little consequence for either 
side, multiple successes could produce an aggregate (albeit temporary) victory. 
Both English and Scottish military leaders were on a steep learning curve, so 
much so that each side required professional mercenaries from the continent. The 
game of one-upmanship to employ increasingly deadlier force was measured in 
small increments, but the lessons learnt from each raid were never wasted. Despite 
this, the military deadlock was never truly broken, even in 1560 when the English 
claimed political victory after starving the French garrisons into submission, an 
after-effect of the disastrous siege of Leith. 
Outside the military arena, three major factors affected the Marchers' ability 
to wage Border warfare: terrain, social and economic factors. Sixteenth-century 
Northumberland possesses notable topographical features, with the Cheviots 
marking the north and west frontier, while the Pennineร run north-south to divide the 
county from Cumberland. Much of the county is upland and heath-covered, 
reminiscent of the Scottish highlands and the Cumbrian fells. The Cheviot range, 
running on a southwest - northeast tangent, peaks at 2,600 feet, dividing Coquetdale, 
Redesdale and Tynedale from the Scottish dales of the Teviot, Tweed and Liddel 
rivers. For the sixteenth-century traveller, Northumberland presented many barri ers 
that made passage difficult. Sir Robert Bowes remarked that the Cheviots were 
largely impassable due to the brushy and boggy terrain, save for the routes known 
For a description o f Hertford's raids during 1544-45, see chapter 
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only to the localร.^'^ In this respect, the mountain range served as a natural barrier to 
prédations by the Scots, as few raiders were willing or indeed able to negotiate the 
treacherous bogs. The steepness of the hills on the Scottish side of the frontier also 
posed a formidable barrier to any advancing army, as steep drops and precipices 
characterised the north-west flank of the Cheviot range. 
Berwick did not enjoy the protection of the Cheviots and was more exposed. 
The coastal plain leading from Edinburgh allowed access for large armies marching 
in either direction. It guarded the main road that led south to Newcastle, thus 
forming an important strategic function; this made it an attractive fortress to both 
kingdoms. Berwick'ร history confirms its importance, having switched hands fifteen 
times since Edward I took possession of the town in 1296.^ ^ The importance of 
Berwick combined with its exposed position meant that the crown invested large 
sums of money in its defence. 
From the southernmost curve of the Cheviot range, the Tyne and Rede 
valleys provided the easiest access to England. The River Rede gently flows down 
from Carter Fell, which demarcated the Anglo-Scottish border, past Bymess and 
Otterbum, taking a sharp southerly turn to join the North Tyne near Bellingham. 
The Tyne branches include the South Tyne, which flows north from the highlands of 
the Palatinate through Allendale to join its sister just to the west of Hexham. The 
North Tyne curves down from the fell tops of the Larriston hills, which form the 
easternmost ridge of Liddesdale, through the fells around Falstone, Tarset, and 
Bellingham, where it meets the Rede. Al l of these rivers provided some access, but 
since the area was populated with reiving clans, any travel through the area usually 
required the co-operation of the chieftains. The tangle of deep forest and boggy 
7 9 John Hodgson, A History of Northumberland. 111(2), (Newcastle, 1820-25), p. 203. 
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ground required scouts who had intimate knowledge of the terrain. The rivers that 
flow from the northeastern slopes of the Cheviots into England have comparatively 
shallower vales, although most were much more settled in the sixteenth century, 
since they possessed rich soils and adequate provender for grazing. The Coquet, Aln 
and Till river valleys cut their way through the more settled countryside of the 
eastern coastal plains of Northumberland, bringing an adequate water supply for 
farmers. Even these areas were remote, full of bogs and steep hills. They were far 
enough away from most of the action to encourage more agriculture, but this did not 
mean that they were more accessible. 
This maze of rivers and becks in the Cheviots and above the dales hindered 
cross-country military actions since much of the ground was too soft for carriages 
and heavily laden carts. The only successiu! military units to manoeuvre the 
landscape were light cavalry and infantry, so long as there was no supporting 
artillery train. The reiving families were particularly adept at raiding from late 
summer through early winter, when the nights were longer and the ground hard from 
winter frost. The unshodden Border nags used by light cavalry could easily negotiate 
softer ground. Swollen rivers still hampered the reiving families of 
Northumberland, as it did for the outlaw William Charlton in 1528, whose escape 
route from the Percys' officers was cut off by the swollen South Tyne at Haydon 
Bridge.*' 
The primitive road system provided armies with their only access to the 
frontier, which was along the old Roman roads, and even these depended upon 
8 ° John Sadler, Border Fury; England and Scotland at War, ¡296-1568, (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), p. 
396. , 
B L , Calig. В V I I I f. 112. W i l l Charlton o f Shitl ington was cornered and wi led largely due to his 
inabil i ty to escape through the locked gatehouse on the Haydon Bridge, the only safe passage over 
the river. The earl o f Northumberland captured and executed both o f his colleagues. 
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82 temperate weather to keep open the fords, as bridges were nearly non-existent.**^ In 
1542, heavy rains and high river levels hampered the Duke of Norfolk's expedition 
into Scotland.^^ The main roads that armies used avoided river crossings wherever 
possible, although the general west-to-east flow of Northumbrian rivers meant that 
any road running north-to-south required multiple fords between Newcastle and 
Berwick. The main highways leading north, the Great North Road or the Devil's 
Causeway, were thus very much at the mercy of the weather. Roads running to the 
west generally fared better, especially the Carelgate, the old Roman route that 
followed Hadrian's Wall to Carlisle, but this was of little use except for shifting 
troops between the west and the east. Dere Street, which fed in from the Palatinate 
at Corbridge, ran to the east of the Rede and thus avoided most river crossings, and 
then cut over the highlands at Gammelspath to drop steeply into Scotland, making it 
a frequent inroad into Scotland for both the Northumbrian garrison troops and the 
reiving clans of Redesdale. Bogs at the fell tops above Redesdale often meant that 
even this route was impassable after heavy rain. From each of these roads ran a 
number of byways and drove roads for alternative use in case of flood or washout, 
although Northumberland's primitive byways turned into a quagmire with the 
slightest rain, which impeded the advance of any army. 
The geographical difficulties presented by the Northumbrian frontier were 
partially responsible for the county being split into two military districts. This was a 
military expediency, since the elongated border that separated Northumberland from 
Scotland required more attention than a single Warden could give. By the sixteenth 
century, Northumberland had been divided into the East and Middle Marches, each 
[I Hodgson, Northumberlandpt. I l l , p. 191. 
8 3 See Gainsford Bruce, T h e English Expedit ion into Scotland in 1542，， Archaeologia Aeliana, 
Series, vol . i i i (1907). Phił l ips, AnglO'Scots Wars, pp 148-49. 
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controlled by a separate Warden and his deputies.*"* Although the River Tweed 
defined the northern borders of the East March, the southwest border was a vague 
line; it followed the River Aln for about half of its course, then traced across the 
southeast foothills of the Cheviot,*^ and finally met the Scottish border just south of 
the асШаІ peak.86 Despite its smaller size, even this March was not easy to patrol. 
On its north and west flanks the East March bordered Scotland, and there were many 
opportunities for thieves to operate over the Cheviot, i f they knew of an open 
pathway. Glendale and Wooler were both common passages for the Scots.^ ^ Bowes 
noted in 1541 that the area of Glendale was open country that was prone to 
predatory raids, which caused the population to flee.^* When the Scots invaded in 
1513, James IV followed the River Til l past Glendale, destroying many principal 
forts and towers along the way to his eventual defeat at Flodden. By 1540, the East 
March was relatively quiet. 
outside the East March. The southern chain of the Cheviot Hills formed the March 
border with Scotland, while the Saughtree and Larriston fells separated its western 
border from Scottish Liddesdale. Despite the impassability of the border hills, the 
March was much more conducive to cross-border raiding. Over three-dozen fords 
and crossings lay between the Cheviot and Kershopefoot, the westernmost boundary 
of the March. R. Robson has counted eight principle routes: Kershopefoot; 
Saughtree Fell to the upper Teviot; Saughtree Fell to Note ๙ the Gate Pass and Rule 
Water; Deadwater Marshes along the Wheel Causeway; Reidswyre at Carter Fell 
8 4 As the Midd le March contamed the problem districts ofTynedale and Redesdale, the crown usually 
appointed a governor, or Keeper, for each dale, to act as an assistant to the Warden in ensuring the 
quietude o f the population. These offices are explained in more detail in chapter four. 
8 5 The line began to blur when moving south o f Middleton Hal l . Nor th and South Middleton 
mustered wi th the Middle Marches in 1595. СВР, vol . і і , 169; Tough, Frontier, p. 5. 
8 6 Tough, Frontier, p. 3. 
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into the Jed Vale; the highland route over Gameľs Path into the Jed; Harbottle along 
Clennel Street; and Wark up the Tweed Vale.^^ The last of these was in the East 
March, although it could be used to strike westwards into the Kelso-Roxburgh 
neighbourhood, (as Sir Ralph Eure did during the destructive raids of 1544).*^ *^  The 
Redesdale men had access to most of these, while the Tynedalers preferred the 
routes that led over the border fells into the Liddes and Teviot watersheds. These 
are just rough approximations; in reality, there were dozens more varying routes that 
one could take across the frontier. Thus the open frontier of the Middle Marches, 
with its many fords and wastelands, was perfect country for light horsemen to 
operate. 
The defence of the frontier required above all a large number of men to act as 
a conscripting pool, and supplies. However, the population of Northumberland was 
relatively sparse, reflecting the undeveloped network of communications and the 
generally wild character of the landscape, s J . Watts has used muster геШгпร to 
estimate that roughly 75,000 people lived in Northumberland during the mid-
sixteenth century.^* Southern Scotland, on the other hand, was much more 
populous. The majority of these practised agriculture for a living, although the harsh 
weather and the short growing season meant that wheat was not able to grow 
efficiently in the Border counties; instead, oats and barley were the predominant 
cerealร.''^ Wheat for the garrisons and soldiers often originated either from the 
Baltic, or from the southern counties via the ports of Newcastle or Berwick.*^^ 
C.J Bates, The Border Holds of Northumberland (Newcastle, 1891), p. 33. 
ԷԼ PRO, SP 1/169 ff. 19-54 (Bowes Survey of 1541). 
Լ Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 101; LP , X V I I I (2) no. 538. 
91 S J . Watts, From Border to Middle Shire: Northumberland I586-I625, (Leicester, 1975), pp. 40-
4 1 . 
92 F. Grainger, * Agriculture in Cumberland in Ancient T imes' , Trans. Of the Cumberland and 
Westmorland Archaeological and Antiquarian Society, New Series I X (1909), pp. 129-31. 
9 3 J. Thirsk, (ed.) The Agrarian History of England and Wales. IK 1500-1640 (Cambridge: CUP, 
1967)， p. 20; LP, X V I I I ( 2 ) no. 195. 
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Berwick, though, was close to the rich, com growing area of the Scottish East 
Marches, and it was suggested to the crown in 1542 that it build a market house for 
Scottish merchants in Berwick so that a permanent supply of grain for the garrison 
might be 6տէսեԱտհ6(1.՛՛՛՛ During the escalations in the conflict of 1542-60, this source 
of grain dried up as Scottish merchants were prohibited from trading with the 
English under pain of death. When the English armies that mobilised in 
Northumberland stretched the meagre resources, the food supply consequently 
reached a critical low, usually just before invasions ofScotland."^^ The lack of 
sufficient farms in Northumberland often was to blame for the dearth, which only 
furthered the idea that the county was both poor and economically backward. 
Before efficient methods of pasture management allowed for settled farming, 
most Northumbrian husbandmen, including those who resided in the remote dales of 
the Palatinate, practiced transhumance.*^^ With the spring thaw, shepherds drove 
their animalร into the uplands for grazing, where they erected temporary huts, or 
shielings, that protected their family from the elements, allowing them to tend their 
flocks without commuting from the lower dales. The sheer number of shielings that 
have been unearthed by archaeologists suggests that whole families shieled together, 
and that the uplands of Northumberland would have contained a dense population 
during the long summer months.^^ This was probably a protective measure, so that 
surnames might defend their flocks against theft. Despite the natural resources that 
could support transhumance, the end result of exposing sheep to the extremities of 
the fells was that their wool was of a poorer quality, which sold at a lower price than 
9 4 P.G. Boscher, To l i t i cs , Administrat ion and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scots Border, 1550-60/ 
(Durham University Ph.D., 1985), p. 6; PRO, B L , Calig. V I I I в f. 106. 
95 See Bruce, "Engl ish Expedit ion", passim. 
96 Hodgson, Northumberland, 111(2), pp. 221-30; СВР, I， no. 421 . J. Linda Drury, 'More Stout Than 
Wise: Tenant Right in Weardale in the Tudor Period' in D. Marcombe, ed., The Last Principality: 
Politics, Religion and Society in the Bishopric of Durham, 1494-1660, (Nottingham: University o f 
Nott ingham, 1987), pp. 7 1 - 100. 
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the wool of the southern counties/^^ Still, livestock remained the driving force 
behind the economy of Northumberland, even i f the produce from regional animals 
fetched a lower price on the markets. 
The economy of Tudor Northumberland was second poorest to that of 
Cumberland amongst all English counties.^^ D.L.พ. Tough contended that the 
'รณdy of inventories as a whole gives a man a very low idea of the civilization of the 
north even when compared to the contemporary south.'՚*^^ There was no singular 
reason for the backwardness of the economy, although the sparse populations 
coupled with the inhospitable environment were most likely root causes. Unlike the 
gentry, the lower ranks of Northumberland society had difficulty turning profit from 
their farms, and were thus cut from the land market. Part of this could be blamed 
upon partible inheritance. Quite often, a father split his parcel amongst all of his 
heirs; this partible inheritance remained a problem as it slowly impoverished a 
family over the generations.'^* Consequently, theft became a secondary industry in 
Northumberland, as did counterfeiting.'**^ 
The outcome of poverty was fewer military resources. Yet the Borderers cut 
their cloth accordingly. The nags they rode were inexpensive when compared to a 
warhorse. Most were unbarded, to keep them light. The equipment of each Borderer 
was less sophisticated, since few could afford firearms or articulated armour. The 
Border lance, the English bill and the longbow predominated, though some had 
fancy, basket hilt swords. Any extravagant piece of weaponry or armour was most 
likely pilfered, or recovered from the battlefield. Out of sheer necessity, the 
97 H.G. Ramm, R. w. McDowa l l , and Eric Mercer, Shielings and Basties, Royal Commission on 
Historical Monuments, (London: H M S O , 1970). 
： Watts, Middle Shire, p. 51 ; CPR, Edward VI， V， p. 397. 
: 9 Watts' Middle Shire, p. 39. 
Tough, Frontier p. 45. 
'0' The Border Papers: Calendar of Letters and Papers Relating to the Affairs of the Borders of 
England and Scotland [СВР], (Edinburgh ： н. M . General Register House, 1894-1896), I I , no. 267. 
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Borderers innovated, and in doing so managed to become useftal soldiers in spite of 
their economic poverty. 
Unlike the commoners, the aristocracy was much better off. Maureen Meikle 
maintains that the Northumberland gentry enjoyed an increased prosperity, 
especially after the dissolution of the monasteries, when they were able to swallow 
up lands that had formerly belonged to the Catholic Church. ՚^ ՛^  They were a small 
class, numbering less than 1% of the population, about 600 members altogether, ՚*^ ^ 
but the near simultaneous decline of the Dacres and Percys in the 1530'ร forced the 
crown to rely upon former Percy servants and northern gentry to serve as March 
officers. This gave the acting gentry a sizeable amount of military power that 
they had not seen previously, although many of the Border gentry were not of high 
enough social status to serve effectively as Warden. ՚*^ ^ As M.E. James and Michael 
Bush have noted, the gentry nevertheless served the king as rising members of a 
service-based aristocracy.'^^ Yet many of these officers were not from 
Northumberland. North Yorkshireman Thomas Wharton, who had served the 
Percys, became deputy Warden of the West March, and would become ennobled in 
1543. Robert Bowes, who later filled multiple positions in border administration, 
：그 Tough, Frontier, pp. 47-50. 
'03 Sadler, Border Fury, pp. 556-59. 
'M M. Meik le, * Lairds and Gentlemen: A Study o f the Landed Families o f the Anglo-Scottish 
Borders, l 5 4 0 - ! 6 0 3 / (Edinburgh University Ph.D., 1986), pp. 206-221. 
This is a rough estimate that Boscher has produced, created by taking the number o f gentry 
mentioned in Bowes' survey——roughly 】50 gentlemen—and using Lawrence Stone's mult ipl ier o f 
4.11. See Boscher, To l i t i cs and Administrat ion, ' p. 13; and L. Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 
(Oxford: OUP, 1965). This method has many problems, mainly that the survey o f 1542 only covers 
part o f Northumberland. Stone's formula is also problematic in that the gentry households o f 
Northumberland tended to split into 'graynes', or separate branches, so that there were many lesser 
gentry who did not appear on Bowes' list. However, the number coincides w i th more reliable 
estimates f rom Cumbria, so we can accept it as a rough figure. For Cumbria population estimates, 
see C.M.L. Bouch and G.p Jones, A Short Economic and Social History of the Lake Counties, 1500-
1830 (Manchester, 1961). 
'O 6 M.L. Bush, "The Problem o f the Far North: A Study o f the Crisis o f 1537", Northern History 
'07 Hodgson, Northumberland, 111(2), pp. 193-94. 
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was from Durham, as was William Eure, whom Henry created deputy Warden of the 
East March and Lord Eure.'*^^ The ennobling of the gentlemen Wardens during the 
1540'ร seems to have had some effect in providing the Border gentry with more 
support for the office, but only because the Wardens had a war chest to hire men 
who formerly answered the call freely."*^ Without increased lands, or the power of 
the royal coffers, the new breed of gentlemen Wardens of Henry v i n and his 
successors had fewer connections and tenants with which to protect the border. R.พ. 
Hoyle notes that titles that were bereft of military connections made for useless 
military leaders.*'^ 
The ties of kith and kin that ԱՈՃ6Փ1ՈՈ6(1 the Northumbrian military 
community complicated the gentry'ร participation in county military leadership. As 
the great houses fell, the gentry paterfamilias filled the void."^ As an insular society, 
most families were interrelated so that the tie of blood relationships was the essential 
lynchpin of Northumbrian society. For the gentry and their extended families, blood 
relationships resulted in increased familial defence networks, as families called upon 
their kith and kin during feuds, which were plentifial in the Borders/'^ This military 
made them attractive leaders, but most were tapped for secondary roles. As deputies 
and constables, the Northumbrian gentry were able to serve in a degree of 
competence since their familial connections gave them enough sway in their own 
district. The Herons of Chipchase were thus suited to police North Tynedale, which 
lay only a few miles from their castle. On the other hand, Sir Reynold Camaby, who 
'OS Bush, "The Problem o f the Far Nor th " , p. 63; also see M.E. James, Family, Lineage and Civil 
Society: A Study of Society, Politics, and Mentality in the Durham Region, 1500Ί640, (Clarendon: 
Oxford, \9ΊΛ),passim. 
'09 James, Family, p. 45. 
：:? Bush, "FarN^^ p. 52. 
I I ' R . พ . Hoyle, "The Duke o f Cumberland: A Reputation Reassessed" Northern History vo l , 22 
(1986), pp. 66-67. 
James, Family, p. 187. 
I ' 3 Meikle, 'Lairds and Gent lemen/ pp. 368-408. 
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114 had no connection to North Tynedale, was a disastrous governor of that district."^ In 
fits and pitches, the Northumbrian gentry served the burgeoning 'civil society' of the 
Tudors, but their means by which they did so were still very much rooted in their 
lineage. 
This social bond also made the reiving families of Tynedale and Redesdale a 
powerful military entity. Often referred to as dalesmen or 'surnames', a title that 
denotes the strength of their kinship, the families that occupied the highland zones of 
Northumberland came to depend upon their sheer numbers to defend family interests 
against outsiders. Their clannishness developed as an extension of the Anglo-Scots 
wars that had recurred since the last years of Edward I. The ineffective support that 
they received from the English crown during times of Scottish aggression meant that 
the families had to look to themselves for mutual defence. It is for this reason that 
families such as the Charltons and Dodds of North Tynedale, and the Reeds and 
Halls of Redesdale, came to form loose confederations based upon intermarriage and 
muณal military support. Bowes observed that for 'every sumame their be sundrye 
families or graynes as they call them of every which theire be certayne headsmen 
that leadeth and answereth for the rest, and doe lay pleadges fro' them when neede 
requireth for goode rules of the countrey.' ' ' 5 
Although their society had its own conception of order, the surnames of the 
Northumberland dales often threatened the peace and stability of other 
neighbourhoods with their military power. This in part was a necessity. Sir Robert 
Bowes reported that the ground of Tynedale was well fertile enough to provide for 
profitable farming were the land not so overpopulated. Redesdale was not as fertile, 
but the people there were comparatively richer in livestock than the surnames of 
I ' 4 For the feud that arose between the Herons and Camabyร in the race to control Tynedale, see 
Chapter four. 
I ' 5 Hodgson, Northumberland, 111(2), p. 230 
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Tynedale were. ' '6 Farming was not a possibility in either locale due to their 
vulnerability to raids, and without many prospects for local employment, the 
surnames often resorted to theft for subsistence. The surnames often preyed upon 
their English neighbours, taking livestock or blackmail, a term that has its origins in 
the Borders.' '7 These thieving activities strengthened the ties of the surname group, 
as it allowed the power structure of the clan society to reinforce itself with military 
prestige, which was realised by the services that each member of the grayne 
rendered to the heidsman. 
Although the riding surnames also practised transhumance in the summer 
months, most spent the winter months raiding. The raiding season typically lasted 
from October to the end of March, although there were varied accounts about the 
high raiding season. It was suggested that the most opportune period for thieving 
was from October to mid-November, as the fells were typically drier and better 
suited for herding cattle.^Coupled with the longer nights that afforded cover, this 
seems to have been one of the most active periods, according to the Wardens and 
March officers. Criminality in the Marches was one of the largest problems for the 
March officers, paradoxically so since the Borderers were all supposed to have the 
resources to defence their lands. However, the small and isolated vills of 
Northumberland simply did not contain enough men to repel a large raid. Raiding 
often went unchecked, and in the early winter and late fall, the thieves demonstrated 
their unwillingness to give up the activity that was in part necessary for their own 
subsistence. 
I ' 7 Webster's Dictionary defines blackmail as thus: Чса. 1552) a tribute anciently exacted on the 
Scottish border by freebooting chiefs for immuni ty f rom pil lage.' Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary, (Springfield: Merriam-Websters, 1987), p. 156. 
' ' ^ C 5 P , I , n a 746โ 
П , no. 1121. 
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Although lawlessness was problematic in the Marches, the Wardens had at 
their disposal the power to try certain offences that were unique to the Marches. 
The terms "Border Treason" and "March Treason" had previously applied only to 
those treasonous acts that directly involved practising with Scotsmen, but 
strengthening of the code throughout the sixteenth century widened the definition to 
include association with criminals who had conspired to commit such crimes. 
Consequently, Border law increasingly enforced domestic security, providing 
assurance when the itinerant courts could not stem the tide of violence that ebbed 
and flowed over the frontier. It also provided an alternative to launching police raids 
into the dales, which most often ended either in disaster or in failure to сарШге the 
culprits. 
To the Wardens, Border Law was at best a problematic archive of ancient 
treaties and laws designed to enforce the Warden'ร military governorship. The Irish, 
too, had their own version of March law, and this proved equally difficult to 
navigate.'^' Both versions essentially performed the same task: to regulate legal 
relationships between two political forces. In reality, March Law was a lengthy 
compilation of customs formed by the instability that had plagued the Marches since 
the reign of Edward I. As Tough has observed, there were four sources for Border 
Law: Acts of Parliament; codes compiled by Border officers; statutes of Berwick 
and Carlisle; and the customary March Treasons that were subject to Wardens* 
justice.'^^ Acts of Parliament and Statutes were patent enough, as these defined the 
powers of the Wardens and sheriffs of the Border counties. Yet, the ordinances 
drafted by the Wardens themselves, and the enforcement of customary March Laws 
' շ 0 C.J. Nevi l le has written the only current work on March laws. See C.J. Nevi l le, Violence, Custom 
Ellis, Tudor Frontiers, pp. 38-39. 
• Tough, Frontier, p. 147. 
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were more problematic as their constant state of revision and reform at the hands of 
those in charge created confusion. Although there had been significant attempts to 
codify border law in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, '23 these had 
become either lost or obscured by 1540， ftirther complicating mat ters /Border law 
and its implications were enigmatic to the Tudors, and the crown endeavoured to 
comprehend this strange set of customs that had both checked and guided the 
behaviour of the border families. This confusion hampered the government'ร ability 
to work effectively in the Marches; it also contributed to certain misunderstandings 
between the crown and those who lived in the Borders. 
Fortunately, both Henry VII I and Thomas Cromwell saw the pressing need 
to catalogue border law and custom. In 1533 and again in 1534, Border 
commissioners from both kingdoms drew up laws regarding punishment of raiders 
and their abettors, although the treaty was coterminous with the lives of the current 
kings, or for one year after the death of the first monarch. As deputy Warden-
General of the Marches in 1552, Thomas, Lord Wharton improved Border laws for 
the benefit of the other Wardens and royal officers who resided in or near the 
Marches.'^^ Proceedings for enforcement of March law also received some 
restructuring. Sir Robert Bowes, who had traded his Wardenship of the East and 
Middle Marches for a much more prestigious counsellor'ร post in 1552, released a 
commissioned report in 1553 that regulated the proceedings during days of redress 
123 There might have been an attempt to codify Border Laws in the thirteenth century, as a copy o f a 
code exists in the Bel l MSS. However, Nicholson considered it to be a forgery as the identity o f 
some o f the signatories was questionable. See Bell MSS, Carlisle Dean and Chapter Records, 
Cumbria County Record Off ice, Carlisle, f. 7 and J. Nicholson, Leges Marchiarum, (London, 1747) 
pp 1-7. 
Most o f the previous codes were stopgap measures designed to quell hostilities between the two 
warring kingdoms. Tough, Frontier, pp. 96-97. 
՝է Foedera, X I V , ff. 480 and 529; mchohon. Leges, pp. 45-55; Bell MSS, ff. 45-60. 
՚ 2 6 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth Լ ІбОЇ-ІбОЗ, with Addenda 1547-1565 [Addenda], 
ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, (London: Longman, 1870) IV， no. 14 and 17. 
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and established juries for trials.'^^ By Mary Tudor'ร reign, the March wardens who 
had spent most of their professional lives serving along the Borders managed to 
complete a working copy of March law, which formed the basis of Bell's exhaustive 
work in the last years of Elizabeth I, and Nicholson's compilation in the early 
eighteenth century. 
In its more obvious applications, March law attempted to curtail common 
crimes that were prevalent throughout the marches. Theft of goods was probably the 
most commonly committed crime, and was dealt with through days of redress when 
the Wardens would exchange bills of complaint that victims had filed. Because 
Border outlaws and rebelร usually supported themselves by theft, it was a felony to 
aid and abet any thief, as well as failing to report any knowledge of theft or stolen 
goods.L ikewise, it was considered a felony to traffic in stolen goods. Through 
suppression of theft and black market dealings, the government thought that it might 
stab at the heart of the reivers' livelihood. This particular hope was dashed 
repeatedly. Tynedalers and Redesdalers accordingly viewed theft as a legitimate 
means of acquisition, since it provided a driving force behind their local economy, 
and when required by their local governors to pay compensation to their victims, 
they groused at having to disgorge even one-third of their ill-gotten wealth. ՚^ ՛՛ 
Reiving and cattle rustling created its own hierarchy, with stronger families taking a 
larger share, which was thus divided amongst their tenants and dependants. The 
social importance of wealth in moveable goods therefore prompted numerous thefts 
each year, so that there was little respect for any law that forbade domestic or 
129 
՝Լ Addenda, V I I , no. 6. 
Nicholson, Leges, p. 127. 
12' PRO, SP 1/178 f. 85 (May 25, 154Ҙ) Lord Parr noted տ 1543 that the impoverished dalesmen 
reived out o f necessity since there was no adequate means o f support. 
™ B L , Calig. В I I I f. 239 (March 17, 1539). 
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international theft. *՜՛՛ Another common crime in the Marches was the theft o f grain 
that served as victuals for the English garrisons. The scarcity o f grain in the north 
made the enforcement o f this law a necessity, for any grain that went unguarded was 
quickly pilfered by outlaws and even leading lords, or destroyed through their 
actions. ՚^^ ^ Any disruption of grain supply could essentially quash a military 
campaign in the North. In 1549, the Earl o f Rutland observed that the English 
effort to garrison the Scottish border would collapse without adequate protection o f 
grain, which was indicative of the ongoing problem.'^"* 
The list o f March treasons in the Bell Manuscript and Leges Marchiorum 
demonstrate the unique needs o f Marcher justice, which the days o f redress and 
Wardens courts were supposed to address. More often than not, outlaws were taken 
alive in order to face their accusers, although some were ki l led by their would-be 
captors. The dangers o f keeping prisoners were clear enough, so the Warden's 
court was designed to deliver justice in a more expedient manner. Yet, Warden'ร 
courts differed from the eyre courts in that they heard all pleas ranging from land 
disputes to treason, within one session. A roll for a warden'ร court shows four 
scheduled arraignments for various complaints and crimes at Alnwick castle, the 
seat o f the Warden o f the East March. Bowes has given us a remarkable insight into 
'^' In one raid alone in 1541, the men o f Tynedale managed to l i f t over £120 worth o f goods, along 
wi th numerous cattle and horses. PRO, SP 49/5 f, 29 (Dec. 1541). 
՚ 3 2 PRO, STAC 2/29/60. Lord Ogle and Lewis Ogle stood accused in the Star Chamber for removing 
£30 worth o f grain f rom Priory lands at Ell ington. 
' " In 1544 and ใ 545 the English cancelled several chevauchées due to lack o f grain. Thus, grain theft 
undermined any mil i tary effort in the marches. Theft o f coin was also a problem, especially since 
stolen coin usually enaed up in Scotland, in the hands o f English rebels or Scottish reivers instead o f 
the soldiers for whom it was intended. Soldiers in the marches often went months without pay simply 
because i t was too risky to set up regular payment deliveries that outlaws could easily intercept; i f 
their pay were pilfered, it meant another long wait unti l they could receive the gold to supplement 
their meagre rations. The Earl o f Southampton wrote to the king in 1542 praising the northerner*ร 
abilities to withstand privation, concluding that "how il l-furnished we are for their needs would make 
your heart bleed." {LP, X V I I , no. 828). 
' 34 The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Rutland, vol. 4, Historical Manuscripts Commission 
(London, H M S O , 1905), pp. 192-93. 
Robert Dodd was ki l led as he struggled with his captors in 1528. PRO, SP 1/47 ff. 14-15 (Feb. 25， 
1527/8). 
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the theoretical procedure for such occasion.'^^ Before the court was proclaimed, the 
Warden attached all known suspects before they fled to the outer dales. When the 
court was proclaimed, all chief men and freemen qualified to hear the trial were 
summoned. The jury was empanelled, with at least fifteen but no more than two-
dozen selected from dependable men. Bowes noted that unlike the common courts, 
the defendant could challenge none o f the jury who were assembled for the inquest 
although Bowes cautioned the Warden not to staff the jury wi th any enemies o f the 
accused.'^^ After the case had been heard, the jury deliberated the evidence then 
read its verdict. A verdict of guilty was immediately followed by the forfeiture o f 
the convicted man's property, unless he lived in the liberty o f Tynedale or 
Redesdale,'^^ in which case his next o f k in inherited everything. The convict's 
comparatively merciful execution by beheading followed the verdict/ 
Aside from Wardens' courts, the March officers could also arrange days o f 
redress with the Wardens o f the Scottish Marches as a means o f settling differences 
without having to resort to military action. Days o f redress were essentially 
conducted much like Wardens' courts, although the punishment meted out was 
usually financial compensation for the bereaved, at 'double and sawfey\ or three 
times the declared value. Such meetings could be problematic, especially i f one 
side held out, which would prorogue any meeting.''*' There were times, such as in 
1537, when days of truce and redress occurred on a regular basis. Surviving records 
indicate that the gentry o f Northumberland were active participants during the 
՚ 3 6 BL , Càlig. V I I I f. 106. (Bowes 5Штеу of 1551). Also in Nicholson, Leges, p. 120; Bell MSS, f. 166. 
՚ 3 8 Seventeenth-century sources indicate that confiscation o f land did not apply in the Liberties. 
PRO, E 134/18James I/Easter no. 13. 
՚ 3 9 Regular felons by comparison were hung, while those convicted o f high treason faced a more 
gruesome ordeal. 
BL , Calig. V I I I f. 106. 
՚ 4 ՛ PRO, SP 1/131 f. 167. 
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redress, often acting as representative instead o f the Wardens. During a series o f 
meetings that took place at Coldstream, Sir Roger Gray o f Chill ingham, a leading 
military leader in the East March, acted as judge pro tempore for the English despite 
that Sir Wi l l iam Eure was the deputy Warden o f the East March at the time. ' 4 2 
Other representatives for the English party included John Carr, the Captain o f Wark, 
and Lionel Gray, the gentleman porter for the Berwick garrison. The presence of 
active soldiers at the truce is striking, especially since they were supposed to be 
peaceful encounters. However, this might have been a strategy to familiarise the 
soldiers wi th some o f the worst offenders in Scotland. It is apparent from the bil ls 
presented at the truces that the victims were already familiar wi th the men who had 
raided their property, thus underscoring the existence o f cross-border ties. 
March law remained a powerful tool for law enforcement in the Border 
counties, and only died when the Border counties became the middle shires o f Stuart 
Britain. Its relevance to the pursuit o f Border warfare was plain enough when it 
enforced military duties such as watch and ward. Yet its greatest contribution to the 
war effort was the stability it supposedly brought to the frontier. A stable March 
society was better able to pursue the Anglo-Scottish conflict since fewer resources 
would be needed to guard against theft and raids by fellow Marchers. The 
enforcement o f March law at times detracted from the conflict wi th Scotland, 
although transgressions committed by the Northumbrians could always be either 
ignored or pardoned in order to pursue the war effort. ՚՛^ ^ 
There were many hurdles in defending the Northumbrian frontier. Roads 
and fortresses suffered in the weather, which hampered logistical necessities such as 
PRO, E 36/254 ff. 245-81. 
See Chapter 4 for royal pol icy regarding the pol icing o f the border. 
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the transportation o f food for the garrisons and building supplies for castles and 
towers. The barrenness of the landscape and the poor growing conditions only 
aggravated the problems faced by the garrisons' supply lines. The relative poverty 
o f the Marches undercut military strength as few could afford modem weapons. The 
population was also edgy from constant conflict. Outlawry hindered the 
organisation o f armies as troops were often diverted to keep the Northumbrians, 
especially the dalesmen, in check, thus borrowing against any future military 
епЇефгі8е into Scotland. It is for this reason that the Tudor government allowed the 
March officials a great deal o f latitude in organising Northumberland society for 
defence. 
At the centre o f the conflict lay the Marchers. It was logical that the Tudors 
would press their advantage by using Northumbrian families to police the Marches, 
as well as raid into Scotland. Their excellent horsemanship compensated for the 
average Marcher'ร lack of sufficient modem weaponry. Although the military 
revolutions o f the sixteenth century produced armies that were more extravagant, the 
average March soldier was not entirely ignorant o f mil i tary art and science. 
Ambushes and raids were carried out wi th a finesse that suggested a fair amount o f 
ski l l . Marchers were predominantly irregular soldiers and as such, their arms were 
more primitive, but they were innovators when it came to tactics. Marchers enjoyed 
a large degree of mobil i ty to serve as raiders and scouts, much like hussars o f later 
armies. Above all, the Marchers were able to form a military community that 
mirrored elements o f a proper mil i tary organisation. The social bonds o f ki th and 
kinship created networks upon which the defence of the local community rested. 
Most mil i tary activity would not have been possible were it not for the Marchers' 
abilities to call upon distant relatives for military aid. Wi th this, Northumberland 
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produced a decently sized mil itary community during the rough wooing and into the 
fol lowing decade. 
Northumbrian soldiers played a vital part in the English war effort. March 
solders also wielded political power. Their role in the Anglo-Scottish conflict that 
followed the risings o f 1536 was not solely as royal servants; March soldiers also 
served their own interests, sometimes at the expense of royal policy. The fol lowing 
chapters discuss the relationship shared by the crown and this military community. 
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Chapter 3: Northumberland and the Wars with Scotland 
War provided Henry V I I I the means of reaching his political goals. The final 
phase o f the Anglo-Scots Wars was a part of the Henrician strategy to rekindle the 
effort to re-conquer France. The desire to secure England'ร northern border was 
initially an example o f Thomas Cromwell's designs rather than those o f Henry, who 
was incapable o f realising such policies, according to JJ . Scarisbrick.* However, 
Elizabeth Bonner has shown that while Cromwell preferred diplomacy to secure a 
marriage between Prince Edward and the Scottish princess Mary, Henry favoured 
the use o f force to pursue this goal, which was disastrous.^ Henry's stratagem―to 
provoke James into war so that Francis I would fol low suit, so that Henry might take 
'some notable enterprise against France/^ i f we are to believe Scarisbnck and 
ВоппеИ ——was chief amongst the root causes of the coming conflict, although the 
lack o f redress from the Scottish March officials was also a casus be lli.^ After 
Cromwell 's execution, Henry was free to force the Scots to assent to the marriage. 
This led to the period in the Scottish Wars known as the 'rough wooing' , which 
ended in ultimate defeat when the English garrisons in the Scottish lowlands were 
finally eradicated by 1551. This strategy had a direct effect on the East and Middle 
Marches, which served as the springboard for the king's plans. Regardless o f the 
political aims of Tudor policy, the result signalled the coming o f total war to the 
Borders. By the end Border society felt the exhausting effect o f the extended 
conflict. 
' J.J. Scarisbrick, Нету VIII, (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1968), pp. 423-27. 
ᄂ Jb.A. Bonner, 'The Genesis o f the Rough Wooing, ' Northern History, vol . 33 ( !997) p. 53. 
J Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 425. 
4 Bonner, *Rough Wooing, ' p. 50. 
5 Few authors have regarded the lack o f Scottish law enforcement in the borders as an underlying 
cause o f the Anglo-Scottish wars o f the 1540'ร, although Robson acknowledges the significance o f 
problems caused by the Scottish clans and their ineffective governors. 
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The English campaigns marked a substantial turning point for warfare in the 
Borders, as most chevauchées into Scotland were accompanied now with at least 
some artillery.*^ Geoffrey Parker and David Eltis have both dismissed Anglo-Scottish 
warfare as primitive, but clearly the two countries possessed many modem 
accoutrements of war.7 Although field artillery was still undeveloped, the English 
and the Scots were able to assemble a formidable pool o f artillery and firearms. 
Flodden began with an artillery duel, while the English and Scottish troops at Pinkie 
fought with a well-balanced force o f light cavalry, shot and pike. The fort at Holy 
Island, which dates to roughly 1547, sports an angled wall consistent wi th sixteenth-
century mil i tary technology. This change in tactics mirrored those o f James I I I and 
James IV, who were able to raid into England with artillery, doing considerable 
damage to the fortif ied houses o f Northumberland in the early years o f the sixteenth 
century. 
The fact that the English now sent expensive artillery into the field suggests 
that Henry was raising the stakes in securing the Northern borders. In general, the 
English armies were becoming more lethal as they acquired modem firearms and 
artillery, and Henry was anxious to introduce his enemies to his increasing arsenal. 
Coincidentally, the government pursued a strategy that sought to crush the Scottish 
armies wi th one decisive blow. 8 This bid for a pitched battle not only required a 
sizeable army, but an army that could keep pace with the growing military 
technology. The resulting strain upon mil i tary resources guaranteed that 
' Gervase Philips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-}550, (Woodbridge: Boydel l , 1999), p. 142, 
7 See David Eltis, The Military Revolution of Sixteenth Century Europe (Oxford: OUP, 1995); 
Geoffrey Parker The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 蘭 ) , p. 32. 
See Marcus Merr iman, The Rough Wooings: Maty Queen of Scots, 1452-1551 (East Linton, 2000); 
In keeping wi th the traditional campaigns o f Hal l idon H i l l and Flodden, the Tudors were looking for 
decisive action to secure the borders against their Scottish neighbours. 
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Northumberland would have to provide a significant amount o f men for military 
operations against the Scots. 
The anarchy and armed risings that had descended upon the Marches in early 
autumn o f 1536 was especially wony ing for the Privy Council since Scotland posed 
a major threat to Northumberland, despite the current peace treaty. The earlier 
English victory at Flodden in 1513 had only provided the Borders with short-term 
security, as war wi th Scotland loomed again by 1522. Despite the tremendous 
endeavour to field yet another army,^ the Tudor war effort could only manage 
enough power to subject the Scottish marches to a series o f raids and sieges. In 
1523, the Earl o f Surrey crossed the Scottish borders, and besieged the castles of 
Cessford and Femihurst. Both o f these sieges were met with spirited defence, and 
the campaign was ultimately fruitless.'° For the next fifteen years, the Borders 
remained a theatre for low-level conflict, despite the tenuous peace that kept 
England and Scotland from open war. 
In the years fol lowing the Pilgrimage o f Grace, England's relations wi th 
James V gradually deteriorated, despite the Scottish king'ร promise to refuse any 
military aid to the rebels. His alliance wi th France and his adherence to Catholicism 
naturally set James at odds with the Tudor Government. Although James had made 
overtures to entreat the English, there seemed little effort to expel the English rebels 
who had resettled in Scotland, while France pulled Scotland into its struggle to 
subdue the last English possessions on French soil. Paul Hammer is thus correct in 
suggesting that Henry was 'spoiling for a fight' after suffering James' insistent 
alliance with France, 11 and his apparent lack of control over the Borders. Henry 
9 Jeremy Goring, 'The General Proscription o f 1522,' The English Historical Review, vol . 86 (1971) 
^° LP I I I (2) no. 3039; Phil l ips, Anglo Scots Wars, pp. 142-43. 
" Paul E.J. Hammer, Elizabeth 'ร Wars (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2003), p. 
10. 
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deliberately provoked the Scots wi th a series o f raids and military actions, and the 
uneasy truce wi th Scotland was starting to suffer. By 1540, hostilities with the 
Scottish king were beginning to undermine the fragile peace that had previously 
secured the frontier from open war. Although Scotland's alliance with France,'^ or 
the Scottish raid upon Haughton in Tynedale and the subsequent slaying of several 
Fenwicks in 1541,'^ have been cited as principal causes, it was a combination o f 
both localised and international tensions that resulted in conflict. In addition, the 
failure o f the Scottish crown to control its Borderers and the clumsy diplomacy by 
both sides only worsened the Anglo-Scottish relations. 
In response to fai l ing diplomacy, the English government was determined to 
strengthen its mil i tary position in the North. In 1541, Sir Rafe Ellerkar and Sir 
Robert Bowes received special instructions to take stock of all fortresses, barmekinร, 
and strong houses that were used in the defence o f the Marches.'"* In a striking 
parallel, the government's troubles in Ireland also prompted them to make a similar 
survey there. Both Marches suffered from the neglect o f landlords and were thus 
treated similarly by the English crown. For the Scottish survey, the king specifically 
named Ellerkar and Bowes, as neither were officers, yet both were experienced 
soldiers. The manors o f Northumberland that had been depopulated teough 
centuries o f Anglo-Scottish warfare also received attention so that the wastes might 
be farmed once again/^ The commission revealed the desire o f the king to 
repopulate the waste areas o f Northumberland with mil i tary tenancies, a practice that 
PhiWips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 145-47. 
' 3 Ralph Robson, The Rise and Fall of the English Highland Clans: Tudor Responses to a Mediaeval 
Problem, (Edinburgh: East L inton Press, 1989), p. 93. According to Robson, the actions o f the 
dalesmen from both sides o f the frontier became a casus belìi for both crowns. 
1 4 StP.y, no. 384; LP, X V I nos. 1205 & 1206; B L , Add. MSS 32646 f. 229. Bowes and Ellerkar 
were issued an additional commission to retain 100 men each for protection. 
：우 S.G. Ell is, Tudor Frontiers, Noble Power (Oxford, OUP, 1995), p. 29. 
に Northumberland suffered heavily in the early fourteenth century » when Robert the Bruce razed the 
Borders after his success at Bannockbum in 1314. Continual deprivation further depopulated many o f 
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had been used in the Marches since the Yorkist administration of Edward I V . ' A l l 
the waste groundis endlonge oure Borders or frounter', o f which there was plenty, 
were in need o f replenishment wi th 'able men', or men who were strong enough to 
wield a weapon with a degree o f proficiency, and who were 'suffincientlye horsede 
and hamessede','^ and held by military tenure, like most other Northumberland 
tenancies. 
When completed. Ellerkar and Bowes' survey o f the wastelands contributed 
a 61 -page report on the defences o f Northumberland, and indicated that there were 
many forts and towers that had indeed decayed, whose owners were ordered to 
repair and re-inhabit them.^^ The mil itary significance o f this survey has been 
somewhat misinterpreted,^' as it has been used as a barometer to measure the decay 
o f the Northumberland frontier. While the survey reported much decay, it also 
contributed to a renewed effort to buffer the Marches, and was a precursor to five 
years of Tudor mil i tary success. 
Rather than merely reporting military decline, the survey invoked the 
'wisdomes, polleces, and discrecions' o f the Marchers to install a program o f 
military reform. Firstly, this account implicit ly condemned the trial-and-error that 
had occurred in the North since the Pilgrimage o f Grace, hinting that i f the king had 
spent more time building up the defences of the Northumbrians then the Scots and 
the Northumbrian manors. See A . c . K ing , *War, Politics and Landed Society in Northumberland, 
C.1296-C.1408' (Durham University Ph.D., 2001). 
[I CRO, D/Lons/ L M D D65. 
[Ist.p.y, no. 384. 
NRO, MSS 1147/f.9. 
29 LP, X V I no. 1399; B L , Calig. в V I I I , f. 63. The preamble to the commission suggests that Bowes 
and Ellerkar should report any fertile ground. Indeed, they found unoccupied, arable land, most o f it 
in Glendale near Wooler. This area was the normal invasion route o f the Scottish armies, so any 
settlement here would have been unproductive. The towers that overlooked the dale were all in ruins, 
'cast down by the Scotts' during the campaigns o f the 1490'ร and 1513. 
21 For instance, D.L. พ . Tough says that Bowes and Ellerkar omitted 'the whole o f the West and 
parts o f the other two Marches* (Tough, The Last Years of a Frontier, [Oxford: OUP， 1928]. p. 1). 
However, the commission from Henry in 1541 specifies a survey o f Northumberland only, and o f that 
only the areas that were close to the frontier. 
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border clans would not have been so bold.^^ Moreover, the report was critical o f the 
amount of land that had gone to waste, when it could have supported a military 
tenant had the gentry not fled the area. According to Bowes, in order to reinvigorate 
Marcher defences it was thus necessary to order the gentry back to their dwellings.^^ 
However, Bowes did not explain how this would generate enough military tenancies 
in order to support the amount o f armed men necessary for the defence of the 
frontier. Problems stemming from such arrangements were already evident in 
Northumberland, as the custom o f gavelkind had split the former mil i tary tenancies 
of the Yorkists into small, unsustainable farms, where a formerly single tenement 
was now split between as many as eight different holdings.^*^ Although gavelkind 
was practiced in Northumberland until the seventeenth century, the Tudor 
government was anxious to scoop up the տսփ1ստ of horsemen that populated the 
dales in the first half o f the sixteenth century and place them on sustainable farms, 
which would have stemmed reiving. Bowes was dubious, as most dalesmen would 
resist any attempt to resettle them outside the d a l e s . E v e n though Bowes' answer 
to Henry's query was not as simple as was hoped, the fact that the crown wished for 
a recovery o f its mil i tary tenancies in Northumberland is unmistakable. To fill these 
tenancies, the crown first looked to the surnames, despite the label o f 'evyl to worse' 
that they earned from Bowes. This perception of the surnames as wi ld and criminal 
led Bowes to believe that moral decay was responsible for military decline.^^ In fact, 
22 PRO, SP 1/179 f. 151. Bowes suggested that major castÎes, especially Wark and Harbottle, were 
key to the rel ief o f the surrounding neighbourhoods. Оусфори іа і іоп was the main problem, though, 
and it seems that many o f the young men without land found employment in the garrisons o f 
Northumberland. See chapter 5. 
" PRO, SP 1/179 f. 151. Bowes went as far to melude a sample letter in his survey that ordered the 
receiver back to his March holdings. 
24 Ibid. The tenure o f gavelkind that had been practiced in the dales had l imited the amount o f income 
each tenant received, thereby affecting his abil i ty to both arm and feed himself and his family, 
without resorting to theft. 
2 5 Ibid. Part o f their boldness came from strength in numbers, according to Bowes. 
2 6 El l is, Tudor Frontiers, pp. 59, 76 & 263. 
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the real problem was that there was a lack o f a formal military organisation that 
policed the Borders not only as a check to reiving, but to ensure that the 
Northumbrians were fu l f i l l ing their requisite mil i tary roles. 
Despite the decrepit state of its military resources, Northumberland witnessed 
the opening act of Henry'ร martial policy. Beginning in 1541, the principal officers 
o f the East and Middle Marches^^ were immediately impressed into service and 
ordered to expel all Scots írom Northumberland, the first step o f Henry'ร aggressive 
new campaign to subdue Scotland. Because the English Wardens had stepped up 
their raids across the frontier and had recruited the services o f Scottish outlaws, the 
Scots began to take stock o f their own forces. The Scottish parliament met in 
October 1540, and the re-strengthening of the army took up the majority of the 
business that was conducted."^^ Rumours began to circulate that a massive Scots 
army was on the move, intending to invade England.^*^ In January 1541, Henry 
ordered a muster in the Border counties, taking the time to specify the amount of 
light cavalry, archers, and bil imen requ i red .The Scots, however, were nervously 
anticipating Henry'ร next move, since diplomatic relations had turned for the worse. 
King James complained that certain Englishmen, most l ikely the Keeper of Tynedale 
and his bands o f Tynedale and Redesdale horsemen, were on the border, 'raising fire 
and slaughter'.^' The Scottish Wardens eagerly sought to placate the English as the 
raids into Scottish Teviotdale revealed the military weakness o f the Scottish frontier. 
The し a ฬ o f Femihurst gave a bond, promising hostages as insurance for good rule 
o f the Borders, and Wharton and Lord Maxwell exchanged pledges, presenting lists 
2 7 SP 1/167, ff. 68-9.This included Eure, Radcliff, Sir Ralph Ellerkar, Sir Robert Bowes, Sir John 
Widdrington (demoted from the Wardenship o f the Middie March to the captaincy o f Berwick where 
Eure C O ฟ d supervise him), John Heron, Sir Robert Col l ingwood, and John Horsley. 
LP, X V I nos. 120 and 322. 
LP, X V nos. 634 and 709. 
30 LP, X V I no. 497. 
なՐ, X V I no. 1279. 
68 
of murdered subjects and their alleged m u r d e r e r s . A s redress continued, the 
Warden o f the Middle March informed the Privy Council that the Borders had 
become notably quiet, though this lul l was probably spent preparing for the coming 
conf l ic t . " 
Despite the best attempts at preserving the peace, war was a fait accompli. 
Henry'ร pursuivant in Scotland, Henry Rae, reported that most of Scotland was in 
armร,^'* which was confirmed by Eure.^^ This news prompted the king to strike a 
defensive posture, which subsequently empowered Norfolk to array the martrede o f 
Northumberland, including Newcastle, along with Cumberland, Yorkshire, 
Westmoreland, and Durham for the invasion of Scotland.^^ Henry stepped up 
preparations for war and warned the Earls of Westmoreland and Cumberland to be 
ready to serve Norfolk since Scottish light cavalry had grievously raided Houghton 
in Tynedale; he complained additionally that the Scots Council was acting in a 
duplicitous manner, suing for peace yet preparing for war.^^ The king and the Privy 
Council, distraught by events in the Marches and panicked by rumours o f a Scottish 
invasion, set o f f on a royal progress to the North, which the Scottish lords could 
only have interpreted as an act o f -war,^^ although Henry had previously invited 
James to attend him at York.^^ 
Despite the preparations, it appears that Henry was not quite wi l l ing to engage 
the Scots in all out war, but was probably waiting on the opinions o f his March 
officers. In general, most o f Henry'ร March officials did not believe that the Scots 
were preparing to invade England. Wharton advised the Privy Council that James V 
LP, X V I nos. 1 շ 9 8 & 1 ^ ^ 
" LP, X V I no. 1443. 
I] LP, X V I no. 946. 
" LP, X V I no. 638. 
LP, X V I no. 780. 
" LP, X V I no. 843. 
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had claimed that the army he had raised was for his own բէօէշշՍօո^՛^ Sir Wi l l iam 
Eure, the Warden of the East March, and Sir Cuthbert Radei i f f , the new Warden o f 
the Middle Marches/ ' found no evidence that suggested a Scottish invasion.''^ 
Instead, the problem o f Scottish incursions was the fault o f ineffective Scottish 
Wardens and rogue Scots lords who clamoured for war wi th England, not the 
Scottish crown. Even James V, upon hearing o f the king'ร coming northwards, 
indicated that peace should be preserved with all 6քքօւէտ.՛*^  Realising James' 
peaceful intentions, the March wardens agreed to a parley with the Scots, hinting 
that i f the Scottish wardens had done their part, then potential conflict with England 
could have been avoided.՚*՛՛ Arrangements were immediately made for a diplomatic 
mission to entreat the English, and it was rumoured that the king o f Scotland himself 
might confer with Henry. In the meantime, the Scottish council promised Radcl i f f 
that they would investigate the Scottish Marches.45 Their letters to Lord Maxwell 
provoked an immediate response: the Scottish warden could not keep the peace 
because Sir Thomas Wharton was hiding Scottish rebels and using them to harry 
Լւմճ€տճ316.՛՛^ Wharton was indeed protecting several o f the Graham sumame, who 
were involved in a feud with the Armstrongs, and it was his intent to back the 
Grahams to counterpoise the power o f the Liddesdale clans一a blatant violation o f 
38 Hamilton Papers, I no. 98. James expressed alarm that Henry was in York, far away from 'parties 
quhare ye ar accustummit most to be', implying that the king had come to make war. 
39 LP, X V I no. 990 (part 5). 
4° LP, X V I no. 832. 
" 'Ratc l i f fe 'ร commission in listed in the LP X V I as Patent Rolls, Henry VIII p. 6, m. 24. (October 1, 
42 LP, X V I no. 982. 
ปี LP, X V I no. 983. 
" LP, X V I no. 1003. 
LP, X V I no. 1029. "Чл X V I no. 1039. 
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March Law. 47 Despite this, Maxwell agreed——reluctantly so——to attend a day o f 
redress at Jedburgh/^ 
Upon the Privy Council's arrival in York, the first order o f business was to 
hear any complaints regarding o f the Council o f the Nor th /^ although the rumblings 
of war no doubt occupied most o f the business. Most l ikely, it was here that Henry 
decided for war wi th Scotland, especially since James had snubbed his invitation to 
come south for conference.^^ Although it was too late to plan an expedition for the 
year, preparations for the fol lowing year ensued. His proximity to the Borderers and 
the March Wardens allowed fresh intelligence to arrive on a daily basis, and it is 
l ikely that the invasion plans had been drawn up. Henry also conferred wi th 
gentlemen Borderers to hear their complaints concerning Scottish reiving.^' The 
largest complaint seems to have stemmed from Scots Borderers illegally pasturing in 
and ploughing up English common pastures, a total o f less than three hundred acres 
in Northumberland. Sti l l , this was a great irritation to the king, and he wasted no 
time in complaining directly to James v . 5 2 Worse news arrived when the king learnt 
o f a Scots raid that slew several Fen wicks and burned the bams o f Sir Wi l l iam 
Musgrave, another one o f Henry's Border pensioners.^^ Wharton's intelligence was 
also noted that Lord Maxwell actively connived against English interests by 
populating the debatable ground, an area with both English and Scottish claims, and 
allying wi th the Fosters, men who were supposedly tendering their submission to 
Wharton. To make matters worse, Maxwell was quarrelling with the laird o f 
ひXVI no. 1134. 
なՐ, X V I no. 1054. 
なՐ, X V I 1190 and 1191. 
ご Hamilton Papers, I no. 84. 
ԼՐ, X V I 1211 
52 Lp[ X V I nos. 990 and 1207. 
LP, X V I no. 1203. The man responsible, Anton Armstrong, who was a member o f the powerful 
Bewcastle Armstrongs, had fled from Gilsland and resettled wi th the Armstrongs o f Liddesdale when 
the Earl o f Cumberland was the Warden. 
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F emihurst, Warden of the Scottish Middle Marches, thus undermining any efforts to 
re-establish order in the Scottish Borders. 
The violence o f the West Marches had direct ramifications for 
Northumberland. Violence supplanted diplomacy and bloodshed coloured royal 
policy in the Marches for the rest o f the year. Sir Wi l l iam Eure suspected that his 
disorganised Scottish neighbours were in fact preparing for an attack, ostensibly 
without the permission o f the Scottish 1{1Ո§;^՛* the Warden duly received letters 
commanding him to set extra watches on the borders. Berwick was to be victualed, 
and raids were to be conducted through blood and fire, 'three hurts for every one. ，55 
In August 1542, Sir Robert Bowes along with a significant host o f regular soldiers, 
or 'whitecoats', and irregular Northumberland light cavalry, foraged into the 
Scottish Marches on a covert raid, one with which Henry was all too familiar, since 
he had planned the raid himself.^^ Although Gervase Phillips comments that the aim 
o f this raid was probably limited in its scope,^^ it is more l ikely that the raid was 
used as a pre-emptive strike into the Scottish frontier. The Duke o f Norfolk was 
already in the Borders preparing to invade Scotland with a regular army. Bowes' 
raid was most l ikely meant to soften the Borders for the Duke o f Norfolk's invasion 
force that was supposed to be gathering in Northumberland.^^ Bowes' raid had yet 
another purpose: to draw out the Scottish Border forces, and to destroy them with 
one swift blow. Initially, the raid went wel l . However, the Scots only appeared 
after the English assumed that they had no fight in them, so that Lord Huntley's 
Lowland forces materialized when the English were split into smaller raiding 
5 4 LP, X V I no. 622. 
56 BL'， Royal MSS X V I I I в V I f. 75. James V was able to determine that Henry had foreknowledge o f 
the "ra id" , thus proving that this was no ordmary "Wardens rood". Also printed in St.p., y , no. 393. 
" Phill ips, Anglo-Scottish Wars, p. 148. Phillips makes the claim that this raid was part o f a 
protracted campaign o f ra idmg, rather than in teφre tտg it as a probe for a large-scale invasion. 
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groups. The resulting English defeat at н addon Rigg was a giant blow to the 
invasion plans for 1542, and the Duke of Norfolk spent most of his time bargaining 
for the release of the English captains imprisoned in Scotland, instead of planning 
for the invasion. 
In turn, Norfolk's invasion in the fall of 1542 was a fiasco. Not only had he 
lost most of his Northumberland officers at н addon Rigg that August, the heavy 
rains and a dearth of cereal for rations hampered his efforts to muster an army. For 
most of September, he tried in vain to get victual sent up from the south.^^ Too few 
bakeries and breweries in the Marches only compounded the problem. In his 
desperate bid to seek open battle with the Scots before he was forced to disband his 
army, Norfolk crossed the Border in the rainy days of October 1542, with little 
ability to take Edinburgh, the much-coveted goal. In fact, Norfolk only succeeded in 
burning Kelso, the long-suffering seat of the Scottish Middle March. Roxburgh 
castle was also besieged, but after six days the English had already run out of food. 
The foragers had no success, primarily because Bowes' raiding had already 
destroyed so much com earlier that August. When the game was up, Norfolk ran 
back to England without having achieved his objective, only to be served an angry 
letter from the king on October 26, which blamed Norfolk for bringing the crown 
into disrepute.^" Because the Northumbrians had suffered heavy casualties at 
Haddon Rigg, Norfolk's army was left without foragers and prickers to scour the 
countryside ahead of the army. Light cavalry, an essential element to Border 
warfare, was simply not present in sufficient quantity, and as a result, Norfolk had 
limited effect in reducing the Scottish Borders. 
5 8 Gainsford Bruce, "The English Expedition into Scotland in 1542," Archaeologia Aeliana 3rd 
Series, vol. 3 (1907). Bruce is the only other author, aside from Philips, who has addressed the failed 
campaign o f 1542 
5^  Bruce, 'Expedit ion, ' pp. 199-204. 
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In the end, it was James of Scotland who had delivered Henry his wish for 
open battle, by invading the West March of England in November 1542. Although 
Sir Thomas Wharton was under prepared for the invasion, and outnumbered more 
than nine to one, he routed the Scots at Solway Moss. This was ultimately a hollow 
victory, as the Scottish Earls who were captured were already showing interest in 
subscribing to English authority.^' Of the Scottish footmen, thousands had drowned 
in the boggy ground and in the Esk, though many were able to make good their 
escape, and were able to fight another day. Despite the government's perception of 
an overwhelming victory, Scotland remained free of English soldiers, as Henry did 
not follow up his success.^ ^ This probably was due to the death of James V in 
December 1542, which undoubtedly lured the English into complacency. Instead, 
Henry vainly focused his sights upon conquest in France. 
The king*ร successive lieutenants, the earl of Hertford and Charles Brandon, 
the duke of Suffolk, were invested with definitive authority in Scottish affairs and 
were more than willing to take the place of the ailing Norfolk. Thereafter, Norfolk's 
authority in the North was eclipsed by their elevation, while his family's misfortunes 
in court undermined his credibility. In ill-health, and surrounded by rivals at court, 
Norfolk had seen the last of his military career in the North. Although the king gave 
Norfolk the chance to redeem himself against the walls of Boulogne, the ageing 
duke could no longer summon the energy that he had thirty years earlier at 
Flodden.^^ Henry now put his hopes in the Seymours and Suffolk to deliver a grand 
battle to overawe the Scots. In spring 1543, Suffolk received orders to prepare for 
war with Scotland and possibly snatch the young Scottish Queen Mary from her 
6 : Philips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p. 153. 
6 2 Bonner, 'Rough W o o i n g / p. 52; A.F. Pollard, T h e Protector Somerset and Scotland,' English 
Historical Review, X I I I (1898), ρ ρ ^ 6 4 - 6 7 . 
6 3 Phill ips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p. 155. 
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protectors in order to marry her to Prince Edward. In August, the king authorised 
the assembly of a 16,000-man army comprised of Northerners, many of them from 
Northumberland, for burning a swath through the Scottish Marches, and Suffolk 
wasted no time in criticising this plan. As usual, the main complaint was lack of 
victuals. Henry's reply was รһаф, demanding an immediate invasion, but it later 
softened when the deputy Wardens and their subordinates reported a sharp downturn 
in the weather that destroyed much of the grain and horses in the marches. Suffolk 
was thus able at least to help quell Henrys more reckless policies, especially when 
his deputies confirmed his opinion. For the rest of 1543 and in to 1544, Lords 
Wharton and Eure, along with Sir Cuthbert Ratcliffe, successfully raided throughout 
the border, while repelling Scottish incursions.^^ Suffolk, who was more 
accustomed to and desirous of the style of warfare he had experienced on the 
continent, received instructions to repair south to accompany the king on expedition 
to France. This left the Earl of Hertford, arguably one of the most effective generals 
of Henry's reign, in sole charge of harrying the Scottish. 
Henry'ร increasing interest in having his armies fitted with able mounted 
skirmishers should only have meant that he would come to value the martial talents 
of the Northumberland horsemen. The initial strategy laid out by Henry in 1544， 
according to the Privy Council, was to subdue Scotland quickly so that the Marchers 
would have been free to serve in France.^^ The king personally demanded that 
Hertford release 400 Border horse for service in France, and replace them with Irish 
mercenaries who would then defend the Marches.The interchangeable use of 
March soldiers between Scotland and Ireland only underscored the Tudors' casual 
" LP, X V I I I ( l ) nos. 342 and 409. 
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approach to frontier warfare. This policy of recruitment clashed at times with the 
opinions of the Lieutenant Hertford and the Warden-Generals Parr and Lisle, all of 
whom were experienced enough in warfare to recognise the value of the Northern 
light cavalry. Although the dalesmen had been used in warfare against the Scots 
many times before, Henry's attempt to use the light Border horsemen in his 
Boulogne campaign sparked a debate that showed the fragility of the English 
military system, which could not muster enough troops for France without pillaging 
the garrisons of its other theatres of operation.^^ This was one of the traps of an 
official policy that placed continental ambitions over Scottish ones: it was far too 
easy to be caught unexpected by Henry's military policies, which at the time were 
given to fits of serendipity as the 1544 Boulogne campaign has shown. 
Henry'ร ambitions in France proved to be a stumbling block for Hertford, 
who stood between the king and Borderers, There was a substantial drain in 
manpower from the Borders to the garrisons of France.''' In light of his proposed 
invasion of Scotland, Hertford vowed that all Northern levies would stay under his 
control, unless by special letters from the king himself. The deputy Wardens also 
disapproved of the king's plans; the Northern horsemen were not suitable for sieges 
and continental warfare. Many of the Northumberland officers duly voiced their 
displeasure at sending away their best light horsemen as they were most effective 
means for keeping their own surnames under check; although Sir Ralph Eure and his 
men were willing to serve the king in the Marches, they opposed their 
accompanying any expedition to France.''^ Lord Wharton also grumbled that the 
스 This is treated in chapter 5. 
™ Phill ips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 154-55. Phillips remarks that the entire епїефгізе to capture and 
maintain Boulogne was haphazard. 
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absence of his best horsemen left the West Marches depleted.^^ The king responded 
that he would rather temporarily sacrifice his ambitions in Scotland in order to 
capture Boulogne, but still ordered Hertford to proceed against Scotland. 74 In the 
end, some Border officers campaigned in France, and some of those earned a notable 
position for themselves. Sir Robert Bowes became comptroller of the armies in 
France for a short time, eventually becoming a Privy Councillor/^ Others were not 
so fortunate. Sir Ralph Ellerkar, Bowes' partner, died in a minor cavalry skirmish in 
the sands near Boulogne in April 1546, a clear waste of martial talent according to 
those who lamented his death. 
At the same time that the crown drew upon the horsemen of Northumberland 
for its French campaign, the irregular Northumberland light horse became a source 
of manpower for regular garrison duty along the Border, which raised some 
controversy amongst the Border officers. The Earl of Hertford objected most of all 
to placing dalesmen in garrisons since their sole рифозе was to serve the Keeper or 
Warden in policing, repelling raids, or in brief, two-day excursions. In 1544, the 
Lieutenant reported that 700 Borderers served in garrisons with wages, despite the 
conditions of their tenure, which left fewer men to follow 'hot trods' and to guard 
the more remote da les.Such objections offended some members of the Privy 
Council, who felt that Hertford and his captains had abused their position. Sir 
William Paget, Henry's secretary, wrote Hertford to mend the situation quietly in 
order to avoid offending his friends or the crown/^ The king was at times in concord 
՜՛Լ LP. X I X ( l ) n o . 562. 
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with Hertford, and was anxious to keep the men of Tynedale and Redesdale from 
joining the garrisons of Northumberland, where they would receive regular pay in 
lieu of their obligation to serve free of c h a r g e . A t the same time, there was the 
need to conscript displaced and virtually landless men into the garrisons in order to 
keep them from spoiling their neighbours. 
In theory, the garrisons were designed to prevent Scottish raiders from 
entering the vicinity, and it was widely believed that garrisons provided a decent 
deterrent.^ *^  When the feud did erupt, as it did between Tynedale and Liddesdale in 
1543,^' a large, albeit temporary, garrison in the dales proved to be an effective 
deterrent to the Scots.^ ^ Having the clansmen as regular soldiers had positive results 
in subduing Henry'ร enemies, as it was noted that 'neither so many, nor yet so 
notable exploits had been done in Scotland as hath been.,83 However, staffing a 
garrison with men who feared the deadly feud with their Scottish neighbours did 
have its drawbacks. Garrisons staffed by Northumbrians were often reluctant to sally 
out of their blockhouses, as the Wark garrison was in September 1542 when they 
failed to pursue a raiding party that had struck into their neighbourhood.Despite 
the spectre of the deadly feud and the occasional setback, the desire of the surnames 
to serve the crown as soldiers marked a significant change from the years just after 
the Pilgrimage, when there were all too few veteran garrisons and the surnames 
enjoyed their quasi-militaristic role to regular soldiering. That the companies of light 
cavalry which took part in the 'rough wooing' were all from Northumberland 
demonstrates the dq)endency of the crown upon the Northumbrians to persist 
： This issue o f Border service is covered in Chapter 5. 
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against Scotland.**^ The Wardenships of the Eures and Bowes enjoyed the co­
operation of the dalesmen, who provided much-needed resources where the crown 
could not afford regular garrisons. Prolonged war with Scotland had brought much 
opportunity to the clans, and their talents as light horsemen and border soldiers, the 
raison d'être of their original tenures.86 The Tudors certainly did not forget their 
service as regular soldiers during the preceding three years. When Scottish raiders 
struck down one of the Robson heidsmen in July 1546, he was eulogised as one of 
the more loyal servants in the dales. 
With the start of the 'rough wooing' in 1544, Northumberland was used once 
again as a staging ground for more devastating raids, which increasingly came under 
the direction of surnames in the king's pay.ss The deputy Wardens received their 
orders, to bum the Scottish borders during seedtime in order to induce famine 
amongst the Scottish garrisons.^^ Hertford and Suffolk quickly used their positions 
as the king's Lieutenants to fiirther the modernisation of warfare along the Borders, 
which was designed to bring about a devastating defeat of the Scots.^ *^  Firearms, 
heavy cavalry, large artillery trains and foreign mercenaries soon made an 
appearance in the Marches, which undoubtedly looked out of place next to the 
lightly armed Northumberland cavalry. With this impressive arsenal, Henry 
instructed his generals to engage in what could only be termed as total war, 'putting 
man, woman and ehilde to fyre and รพoorde, without exception where any 
resistence shalbe made agaynst you.'^^ Hertford could only agree, and his campaign 
B L , Calig. B. V f. 1. 
8 6 Chapter 5 discusses the mil i tary obligations o f the Marchers, although Chapter 7 discusses the 
networks that allowed the Northumbrians to enter royal service. 
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of 1544 was one of the bloodiest that the Tudors effected. This plan was put into 
action and completed with alarming success; by the end of the summer, Hertford and 
his new lieutenants, the earl of Shrewsbury and lord Lisle, completely sacked 
Edinburgh and the major Scottish border towns, with the help of the deputy Wardens 
and newly deployed Irish mercenaries.^^ Edinburgh, Leith and Fife were all scenes 
of rampant destruction, but with little overall effect since the Scottish garrison in 
Edinburgh castle reftised to give battle. Instead, the English waged their war on the 
civilian population, in the hopes of enticing the Scots to give battle. James never 
gave the orders for muster, although there was a desultory attempt by Lord Home 
and Earl Bothwell to confront English whitecoats, their army scattering in the face 
of the approaching English. The Scots were indeed wise in keeping themselves from 
certain defeat, and the English contented themselves with destroying Haddington, 
Dunbar and Jedburgh.The bloodiest stage of the 1544 campaign occurred in June 
when Border horse under the command of the Warden of the Middle March, Sir 
Ralph Eure, sacked Jedburgh. Upon returning, Eure and his Northumbrians 
ambushed a Scots raiding party that had just completed a foray into 
Northumberland. The Borderers, many of them former outlaws, netted hundreds of 
prisoners, many of whom they ransomed for hefty rewards.^ "* 
However, 1545 began on an ominous note for the Northumbrians when they 
suffered heavy casualties at Ancram Moor whilst accompanying the royal army; Sir 
Ralph Eure, the Warden of the Middle March, and Sir Brian Layton, the Captain of 
Norham Castle, fell in battle, and up to 1,000 Northumbrians either perished or 
92 LP, X I X { 1 ) nos. 472, 575, 601， 762, and 96. This marked the first time that the Tudors employed 
foreign mercenaries in the North. 
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surrendered themselves.^^ Despite the setback, the preparations made by Hertford 
and Shrewsbury left Northumberland ready to face the Scots by the end of July, 
although the army still lacked 2,000 pikes, which were immediately requisitioned 
and sent from the south in August.*^^ The Northumberland and Durham levies 
prepared to fortify Berwick within short notice, but a lack of intelligence kept 
Henry's generals second-guessing themselves.^^ Stragglers returning from captivity 
in Scotland, who could afford new harness within eight days, were reassigned to 
garrison, in order to limit the levies required from the North Riding and Durham. 
This marked the beginning of a newer strategy. Seeing that the North alone 
could not cow the Scots, Henry opted to use deadlier force. Foreign mercenaries 
arrived in April, when news of an impending Scottish invasion caused concern 
amongst the Wardens. The king personally sent north 1500 Spaniards, 4000 
Germans plus several hundred horsed harquebusiers and lances, and demanded that 
Shrewsbury take stock of his supplies and store grain for the approaching army.^^ 
The mercenaries brought with them firearms and tactics, from which the English 
would learn and reinforce their own military knowledge. From this point, 
mercenaries would play a critical role in support of the Northumbrians. The muster 
of a further 30,000 men, the majority of whom were to come from Shrewsbury's 
jurisdiction, was in motion, although there were some doubts as to whether more 
than 25,000 ftilly harnessed men could be raised in the North. Worse still, 
Shrewsbury was quite adamant that the north held insufficient amounts of grain for 
уісШаІ.^ *^ It was assured to the king that the Spanish would find the fiimiture in the 
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northeast wholly inadequate.Money was a рефеЇиаІ problem, hindering the 
officers' progress in the towns along the frontier. There was not enough to pay the 
Spanish mercenari es, who had to rely upon the sorely pressed inhabitants of 
Newcastle to supply them with food and shelter.'* '^ The Privy Council was 
repeatedly cautioned of this problem, which answered that the Spaniards knew of the 
pay arrangements before they set forth from Calais.'**^ 
The Privy Council met on May 7 to discuss the defence of the realm, 
including the Marches. The landing of 3,000 Frenchmen in Scotland gave the 
English a sense of urgency in their planning.'"^ It was concluded that new surveys of 
the fortresses should be compiled, and that the Earl of Hertford should remain on the 
borders, where he would have again the same powers that he exercised in the 
previous year; Sfeewsbury also remained in the region, as a member of the Council 
of the North."''* Victuals and manpower seemed to be the prime concern for both 
men, for it was thought again by the government that an army of 30,000 could be 
raised by the combined efforts of Hertford and Shrewsbury; the former spent most of 
May and June reminding the Privy Council that nothing could be done without food 
for the troops. ՚*^ ^ At the end of May, the king ordered all gentlemen who lived 
beyond the Trent to repair home, to be at the commandment of his Lieutenant. 
Furthermore, Hertford soon issued his own order that no former English prisoner 
should return to captivity in Scotland, unless by license of the king.'**^ This indicated 
that Hertford still mistrusted some Borderers, fearing that their familiarity with the 
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Scots might induce them to divulge intelligence, although the order violated the 
terms under which many of the Borderers had earned their freedom. In August, a 
Scottish army was rumoured to be drawing to the borders; Hertford sent 3,000 men 
from Durham and the Middle and Western Marches, which was performed as Border 
service at no charge to the king.'^^ 5500 Yorkshire levies also went north, albeit at 
the King'ร expense.'^^ In order to prevent any repeat of Sir Ralph Eure'ร fatal 
mistake, Hertford and Shrewsbury warned the Wardens to exercise caution until the 
rest of the army assembled in September.***^  
With another sizeable force, again many of which were from 
Northumberland, Hertford once more crossed the Tweed in September, sacking 
Melrose and Dryburgh. When they reached Kelso, the English assaulted the abbey, 
whose monks รณbbomly held out until they were slaughtered by the Spanish 
mercenari es. ''l At the same time, Sir Robert Bowes and his band of Marcher 
horsemen razed the area around Jedburgh, using their customary heavy-handed 
tactics."^ Once Kelso and the surrounding areas were in his hands, Hertford 
rip on the area, 
rather than Kelso, which would need a significantly stronger garrison than 
Roxburgh."^ It would soon come to light, however, that destruction of the Scottish 
borders was almost complete, and so once more the English were convinced that 
they had finally gained the upper hand. By the end of the month, Hertford was 
ready to dismiss 1200 Englishmen from service, along with all foreign mercenaries. 
Despite this reduction of force, Hertford, Wharton and the king hatched a plot to 
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take and garrison Caerlaverock Castle with the power of the Western March. "՚* This 
last scheme, like many others, was scrapped when the castle was razed to prevent 
any fiirther English foothold in the Western March. 
As before, no defending army materialised to confront the English, despite 
the Scots' obvious ability to raise a large army."^ Once again, the Scottish lords 
refused to take Hertford's bait, instead sacrificing their Borders in order to keep the 
rest of Scotland in their hands. On the whole, Henry's policy for overawing 
Scotland with military force was somewhat of a failure in that he never brought the 
Scots to battle. The raids had devastated large tracts of the Scottish Borders, but 
these were always quick to rebound; the Scots simply moved back into the Marches 
once the English left. 
In Scotland, a civil war bloomed between pro-English and pro-French 
parties; Henry wished to exploit this but resisted sending his Border troops to aid his 
Scottish allies who were besieged within the castle of St. Andrews. ' ՚ 6 The 
following year did not see another invasion of Scotland, although there was 
significant English activity in the West Marches of Scotland, most of which had 
been subdued by Wharton and his assured Scottish allies."^ Sir Robert Bowes kept 
the Northumberland horsemen busy, raiding up the Tweed in April 1546."^ The fact 
that he only took 2,000 men suggests that the English were now aware that Scotland 
was either unwilling or unable to defend its own frontier. 
War with Scotland loomed again in 1547, despite the death of Henry VI I I in 
January, as Hertford, now Protector Somerset, sought to finish the business that he 
had started. There was a newer turn in policy; the traditional method of invasion, 
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battle and retreat gave way to garrisoning, as Somerset was able to fully concentrate 
his military resources on Scotland without the distraction of France, since Boulogne 
was already well-fortified and garr isoned.M.L. Bush has noted that unlike Henry, 
Somerset did not prioritise French possessions, instead focusing upon ridding 
Scotland of French influence, and having the Scots join the English as subjects of 
the same crown. Somerset was obsessed with Scotland so that he preferred to 
relinquish Boulogne in order to pursue his single-minded task of garrisoning the 
Scottish Pale. にG This policy was to bring about Scottish subjection, for which Henry 
had hoped, though unlike Henry's approach these were not meant to oppress the 
Scots, but to intimidate them into accepting English rule. Somerset also used 
garrisons in Ireland, which suggests that his strategy was not enlightened but a 
continuity of the tendency to treat frontiers in like fashion.'^' Somerset's policy 
sought to place English garrisons at Hume, Roxburgh, Eyemouth, Castlemilk, and 
Moffat, thereby creating a buffer for the English borders. Other garrisons were 
planned for the east coast as far north as Dundee. The proximity of the Borders to 
the garrisons meant that they would again play a large part, and that March officers 
would have to contribute their efforts to supporting the garrison effort, however 
reluctant they might be to do so when garrison service became largely unpopular 
amongst all who served. 
Musters took place in all counties in April 1547, which commanded the 
levies to be in Newcastle by August 12.122 However, the government and the March 
officials experienced some reluctance amongst the Borderers to serve in forays 
against Scotland, although this was limited to the West March. The Council sent 
I ՚ 9 M.L. Bush, The Government Policy of Protector Somerset (London: Edward Arnold, 1975) pp. Β­
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Lord Dacre a warning regarding his tenants' reluctance to serve with the king's 
army, which suggests that not all Borderers were as anxious to receive the king'ร 
pay as the men of Northumberland were.'^^ In September 1547, the invasion took 
place, and an English army invaded eastern Scotland through combined naval and 
land action, soundly defeating a combined Scottish and French army at Musselburgh 
(Pinkie). This battle, deemed by some military historians as one of the most 
significant Scottish defeats,՚ ՛^* only marked the beginning of Somerset's plan, as 
Wharton kept busy on the West March, extending English influence across the 
border. By October, more than 2,600 Scottish Borderers served under his banner. 
Somerset's obsession with garrisoning the Borders and the Lowlands began to 
colour his policies, and for the soldiers of Northumberland steady employment lay 
ahead, as it was Wharton's opinion that the Borderers would be more appropriate for 
garrisoning in Scotland, since other Englishmen might not be so keen to leave the 
comfort of the South.'^^ 
The establishment of an English pale in the Scottish Lowlands was the next 
phase of Somerset's plan. From westernmost Castlemilk to easternmost Eyemouth, 
the English set up garrisons, many of which employed Borderers as well as assured 
Scots, who continually swelled the garrison ranks.'^^ In reality, the Scots suffered a 
crushing defeat at Pinkie, but they managed to maintain at least a semblance of an 
army. Until the utter collapse of the English garrisons in 1551, the English troops 
suffered siege after siege by the reformed Scottish armies, their French allies, and 
the ravages of famine and the weather. Garrison service also proved to be hugely 
unpopular, probably since pay was often in arrears while victuals were often of poor 
֊չ Phill ips admits ľhat the defeat for the Scots was not total {Anglo֊Scots Wars, pp. 199-200). 
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quality, and desertion became a problem with the English and Scottish surnames. 
It was easier for the Borderers to escape, as the protection of kith and kin lay just 
across the frontier, and in some cases, in the Scottish dales. Conversely, the 
Northumberland troops who managed to stay in their home county performed well 
in providing supporting actions for the garrisons. In one such operation, Sir Robert 
Bowes raised horse from both Northumbrian Marches and burned the area around 
Edinburgh, earning praise from his fellow o f f i ce rs .Tha t activity of the light 
cavalry meant that Northumberland and the other northern counties were 
temporarily safe from Scottish incursion, but when the last English troops retreated 
home after their grim experience in the garrisons of Scotland, the Borders once 
again brimmed with the violence that was so remarkable before 1546/7.'՜^ *^  
Until Elizabeth's reign, very little could be done against the Scots. 
Somerset's ambitious scheme had failed when he did not utterly annihilate Arran and 
his allies, and the resulting garrison plan was both expensive and risky. In the end, 
Somerset did not have the military resources to fol ю พ up on his victory at Pinkie, 
which allowed the Scots to fight another day. Pinkie was tantamount to just another 
raid, albeit a large-scale one, France still held sway over Scotland, and the garrison 
effort drained £600,000 from the treasury.*^' 
For the next six years, policy towards Scotland was one of appeasement, 
which was complicated by religious strife in both England and Scotland; regardless 
of confessional differences, Northumberland was once again part of the front line, 
despite the Treaty of Norham in 1551, which supposedly guaranteed peace along the 
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Border. ' 3 2 French troops, who had been responsible for the demise of the English 
garrisons in Scotland, were still present in Scotland when Mary Tudor became 
queen. In December 1554, Lord Conyerร reported that the French captain at Dunbar 
and Blackness had requested a fresh supply of troops from the French crown, a 
cautionary move since France had opposed Mary's accession due to her ties with the 
Hapsburgs.'^^ In a gesture of English good wil l , the extra garrisons at Berwick were 
reduced for the winter, with some of the soldiers skipping town before settling their 
debts. ՚՜^ ՛* The excuse was that the French threat was not immediate, and the Lord 
Warden saw no point in retaining troops that would not be needed until the 
following spring; but that February, French troops prepared to sail from Dieppe, 
even as the young Scottish Queen arranged for peaceftil redress along the borders. 
However, justice and redress could not appease the ambitions of the Stewarts and 
the Valois. In May 1557, it became clear that military action would be needed to 
suppress French garrisoning in Scotland. The northern magnates who could 
significantly contribute men for an army received commands: Westmoreland for the 
forward, the Earl of Derby for the rearward, Northumberland as Marshall, 
Cumberland for the foot, and Lord Talbot for the horse.'^^ Shrewsbury'ร 
conspicuous absence from this list was compensated by his power to appoint officers 
as he saw fit, using the crown'ร suggestions as guidelines.'^^ It appears that this 
army was not intended for invasion, but for the defence of the Borders, as the queen 
received a recommendation that the musters stay put in their own counties, and only 
՚ 3 2 Foedera, X V , ff. 265-l\; Leges, ff. 56-70; P.G. Boscher, To l i t i cs , Administration and Diplomacy: 
The Anglo-Scots Border, 1550-60', (Durham Ph.D., 1985), pp. 117-131. 
' 3 3 Boscher, To l i t ics , Administration and Diplomacy', pp. 186-87. 
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proceed to the Borders when and i f the enemy invaded. '^^ What looked l i ke 
imminen t war amounted to a series o f border raids i n the end, and b y September, the 
c rown made preparations for a peace treaty w i t h the French and the Scots. ՚^ ՛^  
Hedg ing its bets, the government bus i ly augmented the manpower a long the 
Borders.' '"^ Several m i l i t a ry experts went nor th to supervise the Wardens o f a l l three 
Marches, b r i ng ing w i t h them their knowledge o f French warfare and tactics. ՚՛*՛ Six 
hundred horsemen, from outside the Borders and the Bishopr ic , re inforced the 
garrisons in the Marches, at the counc i l ' ร orders, wh i l e the levies o f R i chmond and 
Nor th Yorksh i re were ordered to ready to march to Be rw ick at one hour 'ร not ice. 
Three hundred addi t ional archers from Lancashire and Cheshire, under the 
l ieutenancy o f the earl o f Derby , and another 100 from Not t inghamshi re also 
reinforced the East March . ՚՛*^ Direct orders were also issued to the of f icers o f the 
borders who were absent from their o f f ices, to return to them immedia te ly upon pain 
o f loss."* ' 
M i l i t a r y organisat ion was st i l l looked after even after i t became apparent that 
war w o u l d not material ise. Du r i ng the summer o f 1557, the Talbots came to contro l 
v i r tua l l y a l l o f the Nor thern levies, w i t h Shrewsbury appointed as the Lieutenant 
General for the Nor thern parts. ՚՛ ՛ ՛ ՛ Westmore land, despite h is power in the border 
counties, was ordered to reside jus t outside the East and M i d d l e Marches so that he 
could be used in case o f emergency.' ' '^ The Scott ish Borderers, who had replenished 
their strength since the early 1550'ร, made impressive inroads a long the marches, 
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fo rc ing the Percy Ear l о f Nor thumber land to propose the utter wastage o f Scot land 
w i t h a great army, a hark back to the o ld strategy o f annih i la t ion. Despite such 
ef forts, the Engl ish were powerless to stop the Scots from ra id ing the border, as they 
d id in August . Even w i t h a dashing counter-raid made b y Sir Henry Percy, ՚ ՛ ՛^ his 
brother the earl begged more men f r om the Lieutenant, despite the fact that he raised 
1 ООО men for Be rw ick jus t a few days later, a l though he d id po in t out that in do ing 
so he weakened the rest o f the county since none w o u l d be le f t to guard the remote 
areas o f the frontier.'"*^ Such p inpr ick raids b y the Scots created invas ion scares, 148 
and the Counc i l wor r ied that constant alarms w o u l d excessively burden the m i l i t a r y 
infrastructure. ՚՛*^ Thus most o f the levies that had been raised i n the summer o f 1557 
were sent home. '^ " Th is caused a commot ion amongst the M a r c h of f icers, who 
appealed to the queen for an army. The request was granted i n September, a l though 
Shrewsbury was caut ioned not to raise an army un t i l the Scots had mater ia l ised. '^ ' 
Throughout the conf l ic ts o f 1557-60, i t is apparent that the Marchers p layed 
a m i l i t a ry ro le that was steadily becoming irrelevant. Nor thumber land on l y 
contr ibuted 1 ， 2 0 0 men to El izabeth's war e f for t , many o f them as foot , a marked 
change from their predominant ro le as l igh t cavalry. '^^ Part o f the demise o f the 
l igh t horse was due to the m i l i t a r y revo lu t ion that was occur r ing on the Cont inent 
and i n the Br i t i sh Isles. B y the 1550'ร, the m i l i t i a reforms o f Hen ry ' ร ch i ld ren had 
begun to eclipse the l igh t horse i n favour o f the more versati le demi-lancer. '^^ 
Equipped w i t h three-quarter length armour and h igh riding boots, the demi- lancer 
T h i s r a i d was repor ted i n A u g u s t 1557 . T a l b o t M S S D . f. 7 4 ; Addenda, V I I I , no . 5 2 ( 2 ) . 
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there m i g h t be a l and ing at B e r w i c k . 
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was heavy enough to contend w i t h men-at-arms, but also flexible enough to act as a 
scout; most o f a l l , his armour was much cheaper. W i t h the passing o f the W a r 
Horses act in 1542, the demi- lancer began to overtake most forms o f cavalry, 
inc lud ing tradi t ional men-at-arms. '^ ' ' O f the four thousand heavier cavalry that had 
accompanied Her t fo rd to Pink ie, Patten comments that the ma jo r i t y were i n fact 
demi-lancers. '^^ T w o thousand l ight horse cavalry, most o f w h o m were undoubted ly 
from the Borders, also accompanied the force, and the day before B lack Saturday 
they dominated the Scots l ight cavalry at Fawside Brae. '^^ Ye t their ro le was q u i c k l y 
ecl ipsed. I t was clear as early as November 1547 that Somerset intended to demote 
his l igh t cavalry on the borders when he ordered Lo rd Grey to audit the Border 
soldiers who resided w i t h i n his j u r i s d i c t i o n . ' " A s Nor thumber land soldiers began to 
fill the garrisons i n Scot land, the t r i umph o f the Border horse at Fawside Brae began 
to fade, their obsolescence hav ing been reported to Somerset in 1549.'^^ The 
m i l i t a r y reforms that had taken place on the cont inent finally reached the Borders. 
A l t hough l ight cavalry s t i l l had a role to p lay, i t was obvious that i n order to 
counteract the French, then the Engl ish w o u l d have to place more emphasis upon 
heavier cavalry that were designed to move qu ick ly , but engage enemy forces as 
w e l l . Th is was the crux o f the l igh t cava l ry 'ร decl ine, since the border foray had 
l i t t le po l i t i ca l use after the ' rough w o o i n g ' had fa i led. 
Beg inn ing that year, the Wardens o f the Marches were ordered to examine 
whether or not pensioners and dalesmen serving as l ight horsemen on the Borders 
were an unprof i table burden, ind icat ing that the government saw no further use for 
՚ 5 4 J o h n G o r i n g , ' T h e M i l i t a r y O b l i g a t i o n s o f the E n g l i s h Peop le , 1511-58 ' ( U n i v e r s i t y o f L o n d o n 
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1588 (Wes tm ins te r : Cons tab le , 1903) , p p . 7 7 - 8 . Pat ten l is ts the 4 , 0 0 0 m o u n t s unde r the c o m m a n d o f 
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'^''Addenda, I , no . 52 . 
91 
the Nor thern horsemen.'^^ There was also a cal l fo r the refonฑร o f any abuse 
regarding soldiers. In A p r i l , L is le issued a proc lamat ion fo r the re fo rm o f a l l l igh t 
horse o f the Borders, accusing them o f breaching ' the auncient d isc ip l ine o f war . ' 
Re iv ing , cor rupt ion, and derel ic t ion o f du ty were a few o f the speci f ic charges, as 
w e l l as accusations against the of f icers who refused to reside i n their distr icts. 
These reforms suggest that by 1549, Nor thumber land was in a state o f m i l i t a ry 
decl ine, i f not disorder, consider ing the signs o f decay in m i l i t a r y leadership. 
Th is tendency became more pronounced, especial ly when war w i t h Scot land 
loomed as i t d id dur ing M a r y s re ign. Her marr iage to Ph i l i p o f Spain brought the 
England into the Habsburg-Valo is conf l ic ts , so that the French were forced to 
redouble their efforts i n Scot land. M i l i t a r y aid f r o m Spain, on the other hand, never 
mater ia l ised; instead, much o f England 's m i l i t a r y resources went to the cont inent to 
aid in Ph i l ip 's wars there. In 1554, Border instabi l i ty once again had worsened when 
French troops were once more act ive i n Scot land; M a r y sought to keep her borderers 
in a constant state o f readiness, '^ ' but shortage o f ftxnds meant that there were fewer 
Border horse i n wages than before. That A p r i l , Ralph Grey received from the c r o w n 
an indenture for the barony, castle, and manor o f Wark , agreeing to keep eight 
soldiers and two gunners, to serve according to the "customs o f the borders," 
meaning that they were most l i ke ly serv ing w i t h either for reduced pay or gratis 
Consider ing the importance o f Wark , this was a pathet ical ly smal l garr ison, 
compared to the fifty-five regular mounted soldiers and fo r t y - two i r regular Border 
cavalry that comprised the constable's ret inue i n the late 1530'ร."^^ 
՚ 5 8 B L , A d d . M S S 3 2 6 5 7 f. 5 2 . 
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The desire to imbue the Engl ish w i t h a m o d e m mi l i t a r y precluded the 
dalesmen from any Engl ish m i l i t a ry re fo rm, a l though they were st i l l expected to 
per fo rm Border service. Despite their d im in i sh ing ro le, the c rown st i l l employed 
Nor thumber land troops as late as 1557. Near ly 1200 troops f r o m the East and 
M i d d l e Marches were serving under the Wardens, 450 o f wh i ch were despoi led 
Marchers co l lec t ing I2d. per day. The rest earned 9d. per day, a considerable 
sum.'^"^ However , many o f these men were also l i ke l y f r o m the settled areas that the 
Scots wasted w i t h their increasing raids, as there was a renewed cal l fo r 
Nor thumber land Borderers to be kept from w a g e s , i n d i c a t i n g that the c r o w n was 
at tempt ing once again to avo id emp loy ing dalesmen. 
Throughout the summer and fa l l o f 1557, the employment opportuni t ies for 
the Nor thumber land soldiers fluctuated. D u r i n g the summer, Percy compla ined that 
the garrisons o f the East and M i d d l e Marches, w h i c h used to number 2,500 men , 
were on l y number ing 1150. The Border horsemen were w o r n and wasted, wh i l e few 
could a f fo rd to serve any further for that year. I n November , the Pr i vy Counc i l 
ordered the garrisons to ref i t w i t h soldiers who d id not owe Border service, except 
fo r 300 young men who lost a l l ho ld ings and farms due to Scott ish ra id ing and 
wastage. A s costs rose, the government became adamant that the gent lemen 
Marchers force their tenants into render ing defensive services gratis, a move that 
w o u l d have proved vast ly unpopular since i t w o u l d have forced the surnames to 
th ieve once again fo r thei r maintenance. A l t h o u g h the earl proposed us ing the 
sher i f f to enforce the slackness o f the nor thern gent lemen, he caut ioned that do ing so 
migh t make the pos i t ion o f sher i f f unpopular. 
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Logist ics and manpower proved to be s tumb l ing b locks fo r the c r o w n , and 
focal points for disagreements amongst its of f icers for the remainder o f the 
campaign season. Nor th Yorksh i re , w h i c h was p r ima r i l y responsible for sending 
horsemen to the Earl o f Nor thumber land, was able to supply on l y 300 o f the 400 
soldiers that the queen and Counc i l had requested. The queen was adamant about 
her or ig ina l orders: 400 horsemen f r o m Yorksh i re w o u l d be sent to the borders, 
regardless o f Shrewsbury 's fear that there w o u l d be a general shortage o f equipment. 
The earl compla ined to his subordinates about the free-holders―the suppl iers o f the 
h o r s e m e n ― w h o lacked 'not ab i l i t y but good w i l l . ' Percy also thought that some o f 
the fore ign mercenaries com ing to the nor th w o u l d lack suf f ic ient horses, render ing 
them useless for raids and border warfare, unless they were p r imar i l y used as 
garr ison troops in keeps and towns. '^^ Logis t ica l prob lems, coupled w i t h the loss o f 
Calais in January 1558, prompted the Counc i l to redouble their ef for ts i n the No r th 
from fear that the French w o u l d do l i kewise w i t h their garrisons in S c o t l a n d / A 
commiss ion fo r invest igat ing the decay o f the Border service was also suggested, 
and it was again encouraged to ' retayne as fewe o f them [Borderers] as may be 
consider ing that they have at al l tymes served when soever they are cal led, for thei r 
owne defence, w i thou t charg ing the Prynce.''^*^ In order to enforce such po l i cy , the 
Counc i l suggested Wark castle as the residence fo r the Warden , for the surety o f the 
area and to remind the inhabitants o f their m i l i t a r y ob l igat ions. '^ ' Add i t i ona l 
mercenaries also came to Newcast le from Flanders, number ing 3,000 and, under the 
auspices o f an Eng l ish muster-master, f i t ted in to the northern m i l i t a r y apparatus at 
great cost.^^^ B y Ju ly 1558, near ly 9,000 able-bodied soldiers were present i n the 
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Borders, aí a m o n t h l y cost o f over £10,000, w h i c h the c rown cou ld not a f fo rd as 
wages were in arrears since the previous Ap r i l . ' ^ ^ The cost was jus t i f iab le , though, 
since no real invasion ever mater ia l ised due to the clear deterrent. Instead, bo th 
sides resorted to h i t and run tactics, so that the desul tory raids marked the o n l y 
s igni f icant m i l i t a r y ac t iv i ty versus Scot land i n Mary 's re ign. 
It was not unt i l 1560 that the Eng l ish had the strength to invade Scot land 
once again. Th is t ime i t was against Le i th , and the presence o f M a r y o f Guise, who 
ru led i n the stead o f M a r y Stewart. A g a i n , logis t ica l problems undermined the 
Engl ish determinat ion to b r ing the Franco-Scott ish forces to battle.*^"* W h e n a par ty 
o f Scots and French began to re - fo r t i f y Eyemou th , the Warden o f the East and 
M i d d l e Marches, Sir Ra lph Sadler, urged the young Queen in to act ion. '^^ 
Nor thumber land once again prov ided the stage fo r the batt le. I n December, the 
Queen dispatched 4,000 men to Be rw i ck , and sent a fleet w i t h arms and prov is ions, 
w i t h the naive hope that perhaps the navy m igh t catch the French ships unaware and 
w i n the much-needed v ic to ry at sea, rather than on land.*^^ 
The campaign o f 1560 had begun to show the effect o f the wars upon the 
Nor thumbr ians. I t was arguable whether the men o f Nor thumber land were go ing to 
be o f much use i n the invasion. '' A l r eady they had sl ipped from the crown's 
payrol ls in 1557 since their use as l igh t cavalry had been ecl ipsed b y the heavier 
demi- lances that the fore ign mercenaries p rov ided. Since they were unable to 
prov ide the expensive armour that cou ld counter that o f the French, Border cavalry 
was useft i l fo r l i t t le else other than scout ing and reconnaissance. The i r numbers o f 
men w i t h adequate arms and mounts had already begun to s l ip , and i t was reported 
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that many had resorted to theft once again, pre fer r ing the soft money that marauding 
and b lackmai l brought. '^^ 
A t the same t ime, Sir James Crof tes, the Captain o f Be rw ick , marked the 
excel lent horsemanship o f the Nor thumber land ա շ ո . ՛ ՛ ՛ ^ Th is no doubt encouraged 
the El izabethan government to enter some Nor thumbr ians on the payro l l fo r the 
upcoming campaign.'***^ The ro le that they p layed is unclear, a l though they most 
l i ke l y prov ided a caval ry screen for the advancing army. Once at Le i th , they were o f 
l i t t le use in the siege i tself , except to act as foragers and scouts i n case the Scots 
m igh t t ry to rel ieve the siege. The siege i tse l f was bo th cost ly and b loody , and for 
the Engl ish , i t was a m i l i t a r y defeat, a l though the French garr ison eventual ly 
surrendered after be ing starved into s u b m i s s i o n . T h e on ly soldiers w h o seemed to 
have executed their task we l l were the Nor thumber land men , so much so that their 
of f icers once again praised their mart ia l acuity. '^^ Th is cont ingent o f No r thumbr ian 
Border cavalry, many o f them from fo rmer th iev ing fami l ies w h o now depended 
upon legi t imate so ld ier ing as a l i ve l i hood , was the last to fight in an o f f i c ia l war 
against the Scots. 
War fare w i t h Scot land dur ing the m id -Tudo r dynasty was at best a messy 
af fair . For m u c h o f the t ime, Henry V I I I had v ied to b r i n g the Scots to batt le, 
scheming w i t h the Nor thumber land men, especial ly the surnames, to aid h i m i n his 
endeavour to have Scot land fo r h is o w n . For the men o f Nor thumber land in general , 
their role i n war fare on l y par t ia l ly d imin ished when the c rown decided to allocate 
enough funds to b r ing i n a more m o d e m army. The l ight horse o f the 
Nor thumber land dales was real ly o f no use i n a siege env i ronment , unless used as 
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escorts as they had been dur ing the Bou logne campaign o f 1544, but the siege o f 
Le i th proved that they s t i l l had a place i n the m i l i t a r y schemes o f the Tudors, i f on l y 
as scouts. Ye t despite the successes o f the Eng l ish Border caval ry at So lway Moss 
and Pink ie , there was enough fight lef t i n the Scots to ensure that the men o f 
Nor thumber land were not adequate for conduct ing protracted, m o d e m warfare. 
Worse s t i l l , the Tudor ef for ts to promote guerr i l la warfare in the borders brought 
about the u l t imate demise o f the m i l i t a r y power o f the Engl ish surnames, w h o , after 
accustoming themselves to roya l wages f r o m 1540 onwards, soon found themselves 
w i thou t the protect ion o f the roya l garr isons, w h i c h the c rown cou ld scarcely a f fo rd 
after 1560. There was no so lu t ion to the m i l i t a r y decay that had set into the Borders 
after 1560, as the ind ignat ion o f the Scots Borderers had become aroused, wh i l e 
m o d e m f i rearms and equipment remained far too expensive for the average 
Borderer. In their fu ry , the Scots began to despoi l Nor thumber land i n a manner not 
seen since the days o f Edward I I . The reasons fo r increasing Scott ish success are 
rooted in demography as much as po l i t ics . First , the Scott ish Borders were more 
populous, and there was much more husbandry than i n the wastes o f the Eng l ish 
borders. However exhausted the Engl ish Borderers m igh t have been i n terms o f 
manpower and money , the Nor thumber land defences were not lef t ent i re ly decayed. 
The m i l i t a r y infrastructure o f the Marches went th rough considerable reforms i n the 
m id -Tudor dynasty. 
Castles, Towers and For t i f icat ions 
The approach to f ront ier warfare in the Br i t i sh Isles was un i fo rm in that i t 
depended upon manpower and blockhouse-sty le defences. Since there was no real 
strategy o f co-ord inat ing the use o f soldiers and for ts , every th ing was accompl ished 
on an ad hoc basis. That said, the Engl ish expended vast amounts o f money and 
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e f for t i n in t roduc ing m o d e m for t i f icat ions i n the Border. The earthen ramparts o f 
Somerset 's garr isons were ample enough to wi thstand ar t i l lery, but this was not 
enough. D a v i d р arrot i has noted that for t i f icat ions were s imp ly useless i f there was 
no means o f at tacking the besiegers. I n other words , w i thou t a re l ie f army, new 
for t i f icat ions were jus t as l i ke l y to be overrun b y the enemy since m o d e m siege 
techniques were ef fect ive even against ramparts and bastions.'^^ The po l i cy o f 
re f i t t ing medieval wa l l s that were vulnerable to the new forms o f ar t i l lery m igh t 
ftirther suggest that the Eng l ish were naïve regarding m o d e m m i l i t a r y techniques. 
The Engl ish were on a steep learn ing curve, and knowledge o f for t i f icat ions 
gradual ly seeped into the Ang lo -Scot t i sh borders, but there was l i t t le in the end that 
was accompl ished i n terms o f bu i l d i ng new for t i f icat ions. 
Gunpowder arms in general were qu icker to take root i n Ireland and Calais 
than i n the Nor thern Marches, and the for t i f icat ions erected ref lect the g r o w i n g use 
o f guns. However , the I r i sh Marches were m u c h more fluid than those o f Calais 
were. The four loya l count ies o f I r e l a n d ― D u b l i n , K i ldare , Lou th and Meath created 
a core Engl ish Pale, bu t the Marches and their abut t ing wastelands stretched to the 
west coastline, through the foreign, Gaelic-Speaking lands o f the Cel t ic I r ish. U n l i k e 
Calais, whose borders were internat ional demarcat ions, the Ir ish Marches were 
marked b y ch ie fdoms whose loyal t ies o f ten wavered. A s a result, the I r ish Marches 
swel led du r ing t imes o f peace, but o f ten shrank back to the Engl ish P a l e ― a n d 
sometimes ñ i r t he r—dur i ng open rebel l ion. The lawlessness o f fifteenth-century 
I reland prompted the Y o r k i s t and early Tudor administrat ions to concentrate on the 
containment o f the Gael ic border chieftains v ia the use o f strongholds. 
For t i f icat ions around the Pale were used to re-strengthen the I r ish marches, w i t h 
I 8 3 D a v i d Par ro t t , ' T h e U t i l i t y o f F o r t i f i c a t i o n s i n E a r l y M o d e m E u r o p e : I t a l i an Pr inces and T h e i r 
C i t ade l s , 1 5 4 0 - 1 6 4 0 ' , War in History, v o l . v i i , p t . շ ( 2 0 0 0 ) pp . 1 2 7 - 1 5 3 . 
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new ly erected towers in No ragh , Lackay and K i l k u l l e n protect ing the exposed areas 
o f the K i l da re lordship. ՚^՛՛ The earl o f K i l d a r e was p r imar i l y responsible for the 
security o f these t roubled borderlands, yet i t a l lowed h i m a free hand in local 
pol i t ics. U l t imate ly , bo th the k i n g and the al l ied Ang lo - I r i sh nob i l i t y were 
dependent upon each other; the regional nob i l i t y sought to leg i t imise their 
consol idat ion o f power and found a convenient avenue i n the service o f the Engl ish 
k ing , whose power in tu rn rested in the presence o f a co-operat ive local magnate. 
Magnates l i ke K i lda re bu i l t fortresses w i t h roya l l icense and used the oppor tun i ty to 
expand their power at the expense o f the Gael ic chiefs. 
Calais re l ied more on m o d e m fortresses for its defences, as the Ang lo -French 
conf l ic t had introduced England m o d e m f i rearms and art i l lery. The Pale o f Calais 
was also c lear ly def ined, un l i ke its I r ish соип іефа і і . bistead o f re ly ing upon frontier 
barons to po l ice Calais, the governor was of ten chosen from the Eng l ish 
aristocracy.'^^ We l l -a rmed castles and blockhouses created the f ront ier that 
surrounded Calais, w h i c h i tse l f was we l l - f o r t i f i ed w i t h th ick wal ls and art i l lery. '^^ 
The for t i f i ca t ions o f the Pale served as a screen for the ma in fortress at Calais, 
thereby g i v i n g the Eng l ish commander mu l t i p le l ines o f defence. U n l i k e I re land and 
Scot land, the p r o x i m i t y o f Va lo i s garrisons meant that l igh t cava l ry were reserved 
for forays and ambushes, and the occasional raid.^^^ 
՚8** ร . G . E l l i s , Reform and Revival: English Government in Ireland, 1470֊Ì534 ( W o o d b r i d g e : 
B o y d e l l , 1986) . p .59 . 
՚ 8 5 Char les C r u i c k s h a n k , Henry VIII and the Invasion of France ( S t r o u d : A l a n Su t t on , 1990 ) , pp . 2 0 -
23 
' ^ ^Dav id G r u m m i t t , " T h e D e f e n c e o f Ca la i s a n d the D e v e l o p m e n t o f G u n p o w d e r W e a p o n r y i n 
E n g l a n d i n the L a t e F i f t e e n t h C e n t u r y " War in History, v i i ( 2 0 0 0 ) , pp . 2 5 3 - 7 2 . Cru íckshank» 
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England 's lack o f m i l i t a r y resources set Engl ish strategies apart from those 
o f European m i l i t a r y theorists. The Nor thumbr ians ' dependence upon l ight cavalry 
to patro l the borders ref lected s imi la r practices i n I reland and o n the c o n t i n e n t , b u t 
un l i ke European armies, the Ang lo-Scot t i sh Marchers general ly were not inc l ined 
towards sieges, w h i c h cont inental m i l i t a ry theorists saw as central to v ic tory . 
Instead, Marchers re l ied upon the terrain for much o f their defence, as most o f the 
ground in the wastes o f the frontiers w a s ― a n d st i l l is to this day֊an impassable 
maze o f quagmires and steep fel ls. However , m i l i t a r y practices began to change i n 
the mid-s ix teenth century. A r t i l l e r y and siege craft p layed a large role dur ing the 
' rough w o o i n g ' , and was indispensable i n reducing the Engl ish garrisons that 
Somerset had erected. The Nor thumbr ians found that their niche as l ight caval ry 
made them l iable fo r m i l i t a r y service outside their t radi t ional theatre, and rather than 
serv ing as Border guards, they prov ided pickets for besieging armies, escorts for 
ar t i l le ry trains and as re l i e f co lumns for besieged Engl ish garrisons. 
The instab i l i ty o f the Borders and the war w i t h Scotland meant that the other 
ma in concern o f the Tudor government was the re- for t i f ica t ion o f the No r th , 
especial ly the Borders, the coast o f Nor thumber land and Nor thern Yorksh i re . 
W i t h o u t sturdy bu i ld ings to accommodate the garr ison troops o f C r o m w e l l and 
Henry , defending the Marches w o u l d have been much more d i f f i cu l t . The surveys 
commiss ioned b y the government encapsulated Henry V I I F s plans for the nor th : a 
st r ing o f fo r t i f i ca t ions w i t h new, angled wa l ls i n the cont inental fashion. Ye t these 
for t i f icat ions served another purpose: they were symbols o f Henry 'ร author i ty , and 
were meant to in t imidate and overawe, thereby deterr ing rebel l ion or invasion. First 
C r o m w e l l and then the k i n g act ive ly governed the re- for t i f ica t ion o f the nor th , so 
՚ 8 8 T h o m a s A r n o l d , The Renaissance at War, ( L o n d o n : Casse l l , 2 0 0 1 ) p. 112. 
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that any imper fec t ion or hindrance could be sw i f t l y dealt w i t h . Th is strategy 
assumed that the government w o u l d have means by w h i c h i t could assert i tself: 
garrisons (castles and keeps), and of f icers, who w o u l d col lect fines and sureties f r o m 
the local borderers, bo th as an assurance o f good behaviour, and as a means to 
f inance local defences. However , the c rown wou ld have to subdue the areas that had 
s ign i f icant ly contr ibuted manpower to the rebel l ion. M a n y o f these were in the 
t rouble areas o f the Marches, especial ly Tynedale and Redesdale. Henry V I I I 
sought to put these w i l d areas under his firm cont ro l , b y re in forc ing exist ing 
bastions, and creat ing new strongholds. 
In the spr ing o f 1537, the Pr ivy Counc i l commissioned a handfu l o f Nor thern 
gent lemen to take surveys o f the fortresses and castles o f Nor thumber land, and to 
g ive speci f ic details and reports o f the their condi t ions. Even Yorksh i re came under 
scrut iny as the P i lg r image rebelร had besieged Sk ip ton Castle; the Earl o f 
Cumber land 's survey o f Knaresborough castle suggested that the c rown ought to use 
i t as a staging po in t fo r a l l m i l i t a ry ac t iv i ty i n the area.'^^ Letters patent gave the 
keepership o f Scarborough castle to Sir Ra lph Eure, who reported that the outer 
wa l ls had been shot d o w n J For the most part, though, the c rown and the Counc i l 
concentrated their ef for ts w i t h i n the Marches. For the rest o f the year, the 
government i n the south was busy w i t h execut ing the remainder o f the rebels i t had 
captured, wh i l e bus i ly deal ing w i t h the m i l i t a r y surveys that began to f i l ter i n from 
the Border counties. 
In the spr ing o f 1538, the Counc i l o f the N o r t h surveyed the castles at 
Harbot t le , A l n w i c k , Bamborough, Dunstanborough, and W a r k w o r t h for their 
m i l i t a r y wor th . Dunstanborough, ro t t ing and col lapsed, no longer held any m i l i t a r y 
[LP, X I I I ( l ) n o . 2 8 6 . 
'LP, X I I I ( l ) n o . 4 5 . 
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value, but the others of fered strategic posit ions and intact structures. ՚՛^՛ W a r y o f 
expensive repairs the Counc i l o f the No r t h reported that no castle in Nor thumber land 
needed attent ion, except for Wark , and that no castle needed any garr ison beyond 
that o f a constable and his command, or rough ly fifty men. '^^ The northern 
government was w a r y o f the f inancial burden that a large garr ison force w o u l d 
impose on the region. Moreover , they were wa ry o f the heavy costs that re-
fo r t i f i ca t ion w o u l d b r i ng to the impover ished Nor thumbr ians, a sign that they were 
already w i l l i n g to enforce an agenda that d i f fe red from that o f the c rown. 
Nevertheless, the Counc i l o f the No r t h cou ld not ho l d out for long. W h e n Robert 
Hors ley repaired to his command at Bamborough, he found i t w h o l l y unusable due 
to water leakage. He immedia te ly requested instruct ions from the k i ng , and what he 
should do w i t h his men un t i l the castle underwent serious repairs.'^^ Henry ' ร 
react ion was surprise at the cond i t ion o f the fortress, as he was forced to send 
a n o t h e r ^ r v e y around the N o r t h to examine the castles and make cert i f icates o f 
repairs. Th is smal l misstep by the Counc i l probably contr ibuted to Robert Holgate, 
B ishop o f L landaf f , replac ing Cuthbert Tunsta l l , B ishop o f Du rham, as President o f 
the Counc i l i n June 1538.՚՛^՛* Th is year saw more concern for the castles w i t h i n 
Yorksh i re , ind ica t ing the paranoia o f rebel l ion that f o l l owed in the wake o f the 
Pi lgr image. Sir Marmaduke Constable and Sir Rafe El lerkar surveyed Picker ing 
castle, and made an addi t ional report on the state o f Scarborough castle and its lack 
o f guns.'*^' Lo rd Scrope o f Bo l t on and L o r d Conyerร made addi t ional surveys o f 
R ichmond and M i d d l e h a m castles, tak ing note o f the m i l i t a ry value o f the bu i ld ings 
and the number o f guns avai lable to the castle defences. The fact that guns were 
2 LP, X I I I ( l ) n o . 3 3 5 . 
LP, X I I I ( l ) n o . 60 . 
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included in this m igh t suggest the m i l i t a ry machinat ions o f Henry, who was most ly 
interested in seeing his armies f i t ted w i t h m o d e m weaponry. ՚*^ ^ It was most l i ke l y 
that Henry was conf iscat ing pr ivate ar t i l lery col lect ions in the aftermath o f the 
rebel l ion. Such guns w o u l d be useful i n any campaign against the Scots, and w o u l d 
prov ide counter-battery support in any siege. The Counc i l o f the Nor th compteted its 
compend ium o f the castle surveys b y the summer o f 1538 and prov ided the Pr ivy 
Counc i l w i t h a l ist o f p r imary and secondary for t i f icat ions. Those structures that 
were most needed fo r defence were foremost i n the counc i l ' s report, but the l ist also 
inc luded castles and towers needed for rule o f the country and for royal progresses. 
Secondary l ines o f defence against Scott ish incursions were also l is ted, but these 
were g iven the least pr ior i ty . '^^ 
The t w o ma in bu lwarks o f the Borders, Car l is le and Berw ick , received 
special commissions fo r repairs i n 1537. Because o f thei r inherent importance, the 
repairs i n both cit ies took several years, w i t h each castle ga in ing an outer rampart 
and wa l l i n the cont inental fashion, or trace italienne. In Be rw i ck , the Captain o f the 
castle. Sir Thomas C l i f f o r d , who pet i t ioned the k i n g to compensate the expenses that 
he had paid out o f his o w n pocket, c losely supervised the construct ion. '^^ The new 
wal ls o f Be rw i ck accompanied stricter rules for protect ion o f the t o w n , w h i c h were 
personal ly wr i t ten up b y Thomas C r o m w e l l . These inc luded reforms o f the t o w n 
garr ison, w h i c h ensured that each soldier resided in the t o w n and was competent i n 
h is craft. The n ight watch was to be enforced, and no l ivestock were a l lowed near 
the new wal ls . The lands assigned to Be rw ick were also insuf f ic ient for support ing 
I n fact , the l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y r e v o l u t i o n that occu r red i n E n g l a n d d u r i n g th is t i m e was no t 
necessar i l y c o n f i n e d p r i m a r i l y to the sou th , as Pro fessor Parke r has suggested. M a n y o f the castles i n 
the n o r t h appear to have c o n t a i n e d w e a p o n r y that was as m o d e m as tnat o f sou the rn for t resses. 
B e r w i c k a n d Ca r l i s l e espec ia l l y had m o d e m a r t i l l e ry . 
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the garr ison; these were augmented by statute.'^"* Finances for Carl is le were also 
paid straight f r om the k i ng ' ร cof fers, and the k i n g took a vested interest in seeing the 
for t i f icat ions bu i l t i n a t ime ly manner. B y 1541, progress on Car l is le 'ร outer wal ls 
had s lowed; there was news that Sir Thomas Wen twor th , the keeper o f the castle, 
had supposedly interfered w i t h the engineer, Stephan von Haschenberg. Th is 
angered the k i ng , whose ensuing letters demanded more cooperat ion amongst his 
of f icers, and a special commiss ion was designed to oversee the progress o f the 
e n g i n e e r s . H e n r y ' ร attentions were focused p r imar i l y upon Be rw i ck and Car l is le, 
and he was content to f inance those operations d i rect ly from his coffers. 
Throughout the rest o f the Marches, though, f inances for the ref t i rb ishment o f the 
major forts were to be raised loca l ly , from the prof i ts o f the sher i f fwickes.^^ ' In 
Nor thumber land, D u r h a m , and Cumber land, responsib i l i ty for augment ing the 
fo r t i f ied manors and towers that dotted the landscape rested squarely upon the 
shoulders o f the local gentry who either owned or resided i n castles. 
A l t hough Bowes ' ethnography o f the surnames comprises the bet te r -known 
part o f his surveys o f 1541 and 1551, the ch ie f subject o f bo th projects was the state 
o f for t i f icat ions. Bowes also prov ided a statement o f ownership o f each pele and 
castle that was w i t h i n s t r ik ing distance o f the f ront ier so that the Counc i l were 
apprised o f w h i c h gent lemen Marchers had fu l f i l l ed their m i l i t a ry obligations?*^^ 
Th is survey reveals to a large extent the numerous fo r t i f ied dwel l ings in the 
Marches: l i te ra l ly dozens o f peles and barmk inร , many o f w h i c h were in need o f 
= LP, X V , no .465 ( parts 2 and 3 ) . ՜շ LP X V I no . 9 5 9 . 
20: E l l i s , Tudor Frontiers, p. 54 . 
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ent i re M a r c h , 
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repairs. Of the principal border fortresses一w ark, Ford, Norham, Etal, Chillingham, 
Harbottle, Simonbum, Chipchase, Halton and Haughton一three needed repairs. 
Etal, which Lord Tailboyร owned, was the most decayed. Harbottle was a close 
second, but Bowes placed more importance upon this structure because of its 
traditional role in policing Redesdale. The Duke of Suffolk seconded Bowes' 
opinion regarding Harbottle in 1543, when in yet another survey of the East and 
Middle Marches, he suggested to the king that chiefly Harbottle castle ought to be 
rebuilt due to its strategic importance.^ *^^ Haughton was also decayed, having just 
been ransacked by the Thorlieshope band of Liddesdale. 
Fortification of the Marches continued with varying degrees of success in the 
1540'ร. As the new Warden in 1546, one of Bowes' chief responsibilities was to 
ensure that the primary castles of the Middle Marches, Wark and Alnwick, were in 
defensible array.^*՛՛* Harbottle castle still stood in ruins, and the Wardens plotted to 
have the owner pay for immediate repairs.^^^ New fortifications in Tynemouth 
needed 200 men and a captain for the garrison, along with artillery pieces from 
Newcastle, something that required a bit of a scramble on the part of the 
govemors.^ *^^ In the West March, the continuing fortification of Carlisle was in 
temporary disorder as Shrewsbury wrote that there were no statutes for the order of 
the castle, town, or citadel?^^ Although Hertford had used his power to install a 
newly appointed gunner, Robert Sutton, this appointment was hampered by 
differences of opinion between the chief officers of the town.^°^ Sir John Lowther 
and Lord Wharton were quarrelling over where the guns of Carlisle might be 
' LP, XV I I I ( 2 ) no. 538. 
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positioned, and ultimately who controlled the fortifications, a debate that required 
the Earl of Shrewsbury's interference. Some of the ordinance in Carlisle was rotten, 
and most lacked sufficient shot, the supplies being used by the military activity of 
1544-45， and both officers blamed the other for its state. Progress with the city walls 
and the new citadel had slowed so much that Carlisle was ordered to be abandoned 
in the face of any great Scottish army that might present itself before the walls, 
although this plan was discarded when the inhabitants demonstrated their 
willingness to defend the town by giving aid for the construction of new 
fortifications, which needed only a small amount of hard cash for edification."^ ^^^ 
Berwick, on the other hand, held better-quality artillery, but still lacked the stores 
sufficient for defending the Eastern March.^*^ Improvement on the buttresses was 
dragging, though; Thomas Gower wrote that work on the castle went slowly for lack 
of carriage.^" Near the end of June 1546, the crown received another report of the 
main border fortresses: Wark, Berwick, and Carlisle. Berwick, as it turns out, was 
already in the market for new, Italian-Style fortifications.^'^ Berwick castle was also 
to receive a new brewhouse in order to better accommodate the gathering army.213 
The death of Henry in 1547 did not put an end to the fortress building in 
Northumberland. It was under his son, Edward VI , that the gun-fort at Holy Island 
was built.^'"* Although much of the war effort in Scotland detracted from the 
edification of fortresses in Northumberland, there was still concern for the state of 
the March castles. This was the cause of Bowes' new survey in 1551, which 
reported that the castles had lapsed even further into a state of decay. The weather 
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of the Borders necessitated yearly repairs on all fortress walls, a practice that had 
slipped since operations had shifted north into Scotland. The former fortresses of 
Harbottle, Etal and Wark had all fallen into such disrepair due to the owners' 
inability to maintain the expensive repairs that they could scarcely house small 
garrisons.^Ultimately, it was Queen Mary who had to deal with the state of decay 
in the Northumberland castles, a direct result of the policies of her father and his 
immediate successors. 
It was hoped in 1554 that the restoration of Wark castle to Ralph Gray might 
improve the state of the castle, by giving it a resident landlord. The order for Gray's 
restoration as the rightfiil owner indicated that the crown was reluctant to hand over 
an important Border castle, one that it had invested heavily in over the years. 
Considering the good service that his relatives had rendered in defending the border, 
the Queen could not justify placing the control of the castle in her hands.^'^ 
However, Gray was bound over for £500 to insure that he continued to see to its 
repair.^This was not seen through, as in July 1557 there was astonishment in the 
court regarding the un-preparedness of Wark castle; a sharp letter to Wharton 
followed shortly thereafter, ordering him to put the Marches in readiness for their 
defence, and to cause the captain of Wark to return to his post.^'* It is unclear what 
happened to Wark that year, but evidence suggests that it was subjected to a raid by 
French troops and ru ined.^The Percy earl begged the Queen to take charge of the 
castle, as Gray had proven himself as inadequate for the upkeep of such an important 
''՝^Addenda. I l l , no. 21 . 
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stronghold.^^^ Much like her brother, Mary found the upkeep of the Northern castles 
both expensive and daunting, and very little was done in the way of substantial 
repairs during her reign. 
Border forts were still an important factor in royal policy during the early 
years of Elizabeth I. However, the problems that plagued the earlier reigns were still 
extant. Sir John Forster, captain of Bamborough, received a rebuke for refusing to 
reside at his office, and for the general dilapidation of the castle itself. Regardless of 
the castle'ร uselessness in terms of its defensive properties, the crown still urged 
Forster to reside in his office in order to at least keep a royal presence in the area.^ *^ 
This is quite telling of the state of the castles in the North: ancient, decrepit and 
rapidly losing any functional capability. Berwick was the only castle to receive any 
modifications that allowed it to fiinction within the bounds of sixteenth-century 
warfare.^^^ 
Fortresses and castles were perceived as being critical for establishing royal 
control in the North just after the rebellion of 1536. Many of these had weathered 
years of Border warfare. Some, like Ford, were beaten down during Scottish 
campaigns, only to be rebuilt by their owners. Others, like Etal, suffered heavily 
and were consequently ignored by their owners. The Tudor policy of keeping the 
forts in a functional state was inseparable from the policing that the Marches 
witnessed in the later years of Henry VII I . However, the difficulty that the Tudors 
had in maintaining a strong presence in the form of castles not only reveals the 
startling weakness of the crown's position in the Marches, but also demonstrates the 
difficulty that the Tudors experienced in imposing their will upon the Marchers of 
Northumberland. 
[Addenda, V I I I , no. 52. 
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As the following chapters will show, improved responses to military 
obligation, better-defined military leadership and overall acceptance of the king as 
overlord imbued the Northumberland Marchers with a military identity that attached 
itself to the burgeoning Tudor state, so that the Marchers would never again be the 
utterly alien creaณres and rebels that they had been during the depredations of 1536-
37. 
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Chapter Four: Policing the Anglo-Scottish Frontier 
During the Anglo-Scottish conflict that lasted nearly three hundred years, 
Northumberland provided England with front line soldiers for the Anglo-Scottish frontier 
defences. Every segment of Northumbrian society furnished soldiers for military service in 
the Borders: the burgesses of Newcastle and Berwick, the rural gentry and their tenants, 
and the surnames֊֊clannish, militarised highland families who occupied the upland dales 
of North Tynedale and Redesdale——led by their heidsmen, or chieftains. As Gervase 
Philips has noted there is no doubt that the Borders provided Henry VIII with an excellent 
source of Įight cavalry. ' Yet the Percys and the Dacres, arguably the two most powerful 
families in the North, fell from power by 1536, which meant that the crown no longer had 
the leading March nobility to maintain the defence of the Borders. The armed rising of 
1536 known as the Pilgrimage of Grace underscored how weak the king's military 
presence in Northumberland had grown, while the looming war with the Franco-Scottish 
alliance threatened the stability of the English Marches. By summer of 1537 there began a 
massive effort to resuscitate military power, and to rebuild the crumbling edifices that once 
guarded the frontier. 
Local studies of the Marches during the Anglo-Scottish wars have divided 
Northumberland into two distinct societies: the clannish, militarised families of Border 
reivers who operated between the uplands and the remote dales, and the settled families of 
the lower dales and coastal plains, who formed part of what M.E. James has termed 'civil 
society'.^ However, the interaction between the crown and the English border clans during 
' Gervase Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550, (Woodbridge: Boydell 1999), PP- 86-87. 
՚ See M.E. James, Family Lineage and Civil Society: A Study of Society, Politics, and Mentality in the 
Durham Region, 1500-16Җ (Clarendon ： Oxford, 1974). 
по 
the wars has been subject to differing іпіефгеїаііопз. Unfortunately, the most recent 
studies of the Pilgrimage of Grace have almost entirely neglected the Marches, thus 
missing the opportunity to understand the divided nature of March society, and its 
relationship with the Tudor government. 3 Yet Sheila Dietrich and Ralph Robson have shed 
some light on the connection between the reiving clans and the Engłish war effort. Robson 
has argued that employing the dalesmen kept them from mischief, concluding that the 
honest money of regular soldiering vastly reduced reiving and օոաւոՅՍէյ՛.՛* Dietrich, 
though, has countered that Henry V l l ľ s overt favouritism of the 'civil ' gentry drove a 
wedge between them and the 'rebellious commons' by granting to the former group 
pardons and official positions and fees, while throwing the clans and their heidsmen only 
the occasional bone.^ 
The emphasis upon salary clouds what really mattered to the surnames: military 
power and prestige. This prestige was coveted so that lesser heidsmen were willing to turn 
on their rebellious kin in order to secure a position as chief heidsman. Active military 
service, either as a bounty hunter in the dales or as a captain of a band of Northern horse in 
the Scottish wars, was desirable, and it was the conveyance of these rewards that allowed 
the Tudors the best access to the Border families. Weaknesses in the surnames' networks 
provided Henry VII I and his officers the perfect opportunity to display this patronage. 
Their ultimate goal was to bring most heidsmen into royal service, and do away with the 
more recalcitrant members of this insular, upland society, but the cultural divide that 
3 These include R . พ . Hoyle, The Pilgrimage of Grace and the Politics of the 1530ร, (Oxford: OUP， 2001); 
and M.L. Bush, The Pilgrimage of Grace: A Study of the Rebel Ar mies of October 1536, (Manchester: MUP, 
1996), 
4 R. Robson, The Rise and Fall of the English Highland Clans: Tudor Responses to a Mediaeval Problem, 
(Edinburgh: East Linton Press, 1989), chapters 15-20. 
5 ร.c. Dietrich, ՝Liberties and Lawlessness: Reiver Society in Tudor Tynedaie and Redesdale', (Cornell 
University Ph.D., 1973), p. 75. 
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separated the Border reiver from 'civil society' and the Tudor court was not easily 
overcome. 
The problems that faced the Tudor Marches, namely the violence brought by feuds 
and marauding, were already centuries old. Although the Northumbrian gentry had feuded 
regularly in the fourteenth and fifteenth сепШгу, the reiving clans of the dales did not folly 
develop as a military force until the advent of the Tudor dynasty, after the ancient manorial 
system of Northumberland had already begun to decline significantly. The strucณre of the 
manors had fostered at least a nominal amount of stability in the dales, but without 
manorial courts to settle disputes, the already militaristic Northumbrian turned to violence 
as the only means to settle their differences. The thieving clans of Tynedale and Redesdale 
were supposedly subject to the justice courts of a royally appointed Warden or Keeper, but 
their officers often protected them from the king's justices. The Herons of Chipchase, the 
Lisies, and even the Dacres of Gilsland֊prominent families of Border gentry who served 
the crown―were all accused of winking at the disorders of the Marches during the first 
three decades of Henry's reign,^ an affinity that undoubtedly was reinforced by the 
essential military power that only the thieving clans could provide. Such protection often 
encouraged the Marchers, especially the inhabitants of Tynedale and Redesdale, to erupt 
into periodic episodes of rebellion and violence. 
Northumberland was first to witness the first sparks of rebellion in September 
1536, when the priors of Hexham took up arms and chased away the commissioners sent to 
dissolve the Abbey.7 The military organisation of the rebels suggested that the rising was a 
^ PRO, SP 1/10 f. 18; SP 1/7 f . 3 8 1 ; BL Add. MSS 24965 f . 4 1 . 
ᄀ The best narratives for the Northumberland uprisings are in M.L. Bush, Durham and the Pilgrimage of 
Grace; M.H. and R. Dodds, The Pilgrimage of Grace, vol. I I (Cambridge: CUP, 1915); and John Hoagson, A 
History of Northumberland in Three Parts (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1820-1825). 
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result of detailed planning,^ and a royal servant who was witness to the uprising informed 
the Privy Council that there were 'many good archers and good horsemen' amongst the 
rebel host.9 Despite its eventual defeat, the rebellion revealed the military vulnerability of 
the Marches——and the entire North for that matter——when outnumbered garrisons kept to 
the safety of their castles and walled towns as rebels devastated large swaths of 
Northumberland. More importantly, the size of the rebellion indicates that the policing 
arm of the Tudor state had utterly collapsed in the Marches by 1536, providing the unruly 
Northumbrians an opportunity to strengthen their independence. Still, the king was 
insistent in maintaining his chief supply of border soldiers, preferring 'their reformación 
than their utter destruction., ' 1 
At first, Henry'ร policy in the years immediately following the rebellion was to 
ensure the collection of sureties and pledges to keep the clans in check. The principle of 
coHecting pledges was that the surnames would surrender some of their kin to a March 
officer, their lives acting as guarantee for good behaviour from the rest of their clan. Large 
bonds, some as high as £2,000, were also taken as surety.'^ This entailed a dramatically 
larger workload for Tudor officials, since the March officers would have to collect sureties 
and hostages from the very men who formed the majority of the Northumbrian military 
community. The motivation for this was plain enough: pledges and sureties resulted in 
royal pardons to the clans that co-operated, which kept the crown's border tenants in the 
fields and out of the gaols, where they were a burden to the royal coffers and of little use in 
^ R O , SP 1/106 f. 256. 
^PRO, SP 1/107 ff. 89-90. 
：Y PRO, SP 1/112 f. 216. 
' ' PRO, E 36/119, f. 137; Robson, £ng/is/ī Highland Clans, p. 149. S.J. Gunn, Early Tudor Government, 
ì485-ì558 (Houndmills and London: Macmil lan Press, 1995) p. 64. 
Often pledges would be executed or otherwise punished for the misdeeds o f their surname. See PRO, SP 
1/136, ff. 217-18; ibid. SP 1/120 ff. 146-47. 
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defending the frontier from the Scots c lans.The dalesmen were left to the control of the 
Wardens and the Keepers instead of the gaolers, an arrangement that left the officers 
exposed to depredation and violence since most had only small armed retinues with which 
they could enforce the king's policies. This was underscored by the murder of 'Hodge' à 
Fenwick, the Keeper of Tynedale and Redesdale, when he demanded that Edward 
Charlton, laird of Hesleyside, and his subordinate dalesmen surrender hostages along with 
all property they had seized during the rebellion. When they reftised, Fenwick indicted 
them on felony charges, thereby hastening his own death since he had no military 
resources to ensure his own security. ՚՛* 
In general, the taking of pledges was at best a mixed bag. Firstly, it was never a 
guarantee of restraint. In 1539, it was reported that the surnames continued in their 
criminal behaviour without regard for the surety of their pledges.'^ Taking pledges also 
required the co-operation of the clans. Heidsmen almost always would refuse to give as 
many pledges demanded by royal officers, often refusing to hand over any at all.'^ When 
they did, the pledges would often escape from the creaking, dilapidated jails, leaving the 
March officials without any bargaining power. '7 
Pardons were also used as an inducement, though this fuelled a cycle of recidivism. 
An exemplary stroke of fickle law enforcement can be seen in the case of Little John 
Heron of Chipchase, a royal Border pensioner who, despite a general pardon, was the 
13 Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 167. Robson's curious argument that this was their reward for 
somehow preventing more Northumbrians from jo in ing the Pilgrimage should be treated with some 
scepticism. He reasons that by using the rebellion as a chance to plunder, the Highlanders tied down a 
significant section of the population that would have otherwise marched with the rebels to Doncaster. 
'4 BL , Caiig. В I f. 133. Fenwick was vict im o f the age-old Marcher ambush, where he was set upon at night 
in order to conceal the identity of the attackers should the attack have failed. 
'^BL, Calig. В I I I f. 98. 
' 'PRO, SPI/117 ff. 228-29. 
'^PRO, SP 1/140 ff. 77-8. 
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subject of an ongoing investigation for his direct involvement in the Pilgrimage. Heron's 
family was also implicated in the murder of Hodge à Fenwick in 1537, พЫсһ was too 
much for the crown to bear. It was deemed necessary to remove this thorn.Cuthbert 
Charlton, son-in-law to Little John, was summarily executed for his indirect role in the 
murder as well as treason, while the Duke of Norfolk, Henry's temporary Lieutenant in the 
North, hounded the laird of Hesleyside and John Heron of the Hall Bams, both of whom 
had abetted Fenwick'ร murderers. Little John read the writing on the wall and duly 
surrendered to the Duke of Norfolk, and was brought to London in chains, his life bound 
over to insure good behaviour from the rest of his family and tenants; his son, Giles, was 
also laid in as a pledge.So monumental was the investigation into Heron that it used up 
most of Norfolk and Camaby'ร meagre resources, and in the end the principle murderers 
were never brought to justice.^^ Little John duly received the benefit of doubt from the 
Privy Council since no Northumbrian in their right mind had the gall to bear witness 
against the Herons. However, the execution of his son-in-law and the outlawing of his 
bastard son prompted Heron to co-operate with the crown. In a troublesome move, the 
crown eventually released him from prison with a pardon, albeit under sureties, and 
promoted him to the Keepership of Tynedale and Redesdฝe.^' The fact that Heron was 
never convicted demonstrated the hesitancy of royal justice to prosecute its best source of 
border soldiers. Plus, the Herons were the only family left in North Tynedale that was 
capable of controlling the powerftil Charlton clan, and this certainly worked in Little 
's PRO, SP 1/116 f. 219; Ibid. SP 1/119 ff. 94-104; The murderers o f Fenwick were connected or related to 
the Hesleyside Charltons, who in tum were connected to Heron through his cousin, the Laird o f Hesleyside. 
'^PRO, SP 1/119 ff. 54-5; ibid. 1/125 ff. 21-22 and f. 65. 
շ0 The evidence is scanty, but it is likely that the murderers were reconciled to the crown. See Robson, 
English Highland Clans, p. 170. 
֊' Heron's career as Keeper o f Tynedale and Redesdale after his release from prison is detailed in chapter 6. 
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John's favour. That he was a prime agitator of the Pilgrimage of Grace who was also 
involved indirectly in the murder of a royal officer went ignored, so long as he comported 
himself properly as Keeper. Giles Heron was also released from acting as pledge for his 
father. 
Overtures of loyalty from the dalesmen who were anxious to distance themselves 
from their more rebeUiouร relatives provided a better opportunity for the government to 
hand out more pardons and rewards. Hodge à Fenwick'ร fatal bungle demonstrated that 
better results came from the crown's direct involvement with the dalesmen, rather than 
through the interlopers that served as officers. This was a considerable step forward for the 
government as more surnames sought the emoluments of rewards and immunity from 
prosecution. In taking advantage of family rifts, the government guaranteed the rebellious 
dalesmen enough harassment to decamp from Northumberland, so that the crown was able 
for a short time to pair a successful policy of entanglement along with that of taking 
sureties. In employing the Wark and Boughthill sub-chiefs֊often referred to as 
'graynes'֊of the North Tynedaie Charlton clan as bounty hunters, the Tudor government 
effectively pursued the Hesleyside Charltons, who were responsible for supplying Heron 
with most of his men during the rebellion, and for abetting Fenwick's murderers?^ 
Enrolling the dalesmen in royal service, and using them to police their own was also more 
appropriate considering the cost of a sizeable garrison. All that was required was an oath 
of fealty to the king, and each complicit heidsman was eligible to receive a bi-annual 
"PRO, SP 1/116քք. 178-79. Many o f the Tynedalers who entered royal service had previously joined Heron 
in the Pilgrimage. However, they turned against his favourite, Edward Charlton o f Hesleyside, in order to 
distance themselves from any involvement in Fenwick'ร murder. In addition, the arrival of the Duke of 
Norfolk in the Marches just after the rebellion signalled that military operations against the dales could 
happen at any time. 
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payment of £5， which was less than the typical sum offered to the gentry.^^ Followers of 
the heidsmen received no pay from the crown, as their pay came from the dividends of 
spoiling the lands of outlawed Northumbrians. Such service reformed the reputation of the 
Tyne-and-Redesdalers, at least for the time being. The deputy Warden of the East March, 
Sir William Eure, reported that the Northumberland borders were in relatively good order 
as a result of the services rendered by the heidsmen and other Աշոէւյ.^՛^ In 1537, Gyb 
Charlton of the Boughthill, known participant in the earlier rebellion, was listed amongst 
others as one of the 'persons of Tynedale of good estimation' for his services to the 
crown.^^ 
Still, these men were still suspect, especially to Sir Reynold Camaby, the Keeper of 
Tynedale since Fenwick'ร murder, who did not trust any of the sumames,^ ^ so that even 
loyal heidsmen were still expected to surrender pledges, despite being pardoned by the 
king. In 1537, Gyb Charlton served as a pledge for his grayne, having already entered 
royal service just after the Pilgrimage.^^ Some officials argued that such men were of better 
use in their homeland, as their influence over their kinsmen could prevent them from 
aiding or abetting criminals and rebels. Younger kinsmen of the loyal heidsmen were 
more suitable pledges, as young men were hot-blooded and prone to provoking the deadly 
feud.^* With them safe in custody, the loyal heidsman could operate more effectively. 
Still, some officials thought that the taking of pledges from the penitent Tynedalers was 
2 3 PRO, E36/12I f. 32. Feeing in general was a new approach for the Tudors. The typical Cumbrian Marcher 
received £10 or less (BL, Calig. в II f. 263), while the Northumbrian pensioners, except the heidsmen, 
received as much a £20 (Ibid, Caligula в III ff. 203-5). 
-ЧР, Х1Щ1)т. 990. 
PRO, SP 1/116 f. 219; SP 1/111 ff. 200-201. 
֊չ PRO, SP 1/126 ff. 180-81. 
֊1 BL, Calig. В III f. 239; PRO SP 1/126 ff. 180-81. 
2 8 PRO, SP 1/131 ff. 56-7. 
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seen as a further guarantee of their good behaviour and a token of their reform.^^ Despite 
their grumbling at surrendering pledges, the loyalists acted as an effective royal whip on 
some of the Tynedaie outlaws. The Hesleyside grayne was pursued throughout 1537 and 
for the next two years, although in the end the loyalists suffered more since the outlaws 
had the backing of the powerful Armstrongs of Liddesdale.^^ This folly eventually 
deteriorated into a brief, violent episode, as the Redesdalers and the Tynedalers polarised 
and inflicted upon each other a series of raids and counter raids, while completely ignoring 
their obligation to attend their Keepers.^ * Nonetheless, there was at least some effect in the 
tempting offer of royal employment, since some of the dalesmen came over to the 
legitimate side, having seen Little John, their former shepherd, led away to an uncertain 
fate in the Tower of London. 
Henry's policy of personally appointing Northumberland gentry to March offices 
was expedient for administration, but the reality was that few of his appointees were able 
to enforce royal authority or policy in an advantageous manner. There was also very little 
attempt by some of the officers to take a softer approach with the dalesmen; in turn, this 
had a sour effect on Tudor governance in Northumberland. Sir John Widdrington, the 
recently appointed Warden of the Middle March, was already proving ineffecณal in 1537 
as the violence in Redesdale exploded, earning him the disgust of the Duke of Norfolk.^"^ 
Frustrations within the Privy Council continued to mount as the appointed Keeper of 
Tynedaie, Sir Reynold Camaby, temporarily vacated his post to attend court,^^ although he 
was likely petitioning the king in person for more direct action against the Charltons and 
-շ PRO, SP 1/136 ff. 217-8. 
-^ " PRO, SP 1/131 f. 167. 
3 I PRO, SP 1/132 ff. 25-26. 
" St. բԼ V， pp. 104-5; LP, XI I (2) no. 650. 
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Robsons. Sir Reynold left no vestige of royal authority in the area, except for his son, 
Gilbert, the Constable of Langley, who now had to look after his father'ร charge.^ "* The 
absence of royal officers exacerbated the problem, but in fact, Camaby'ร absence really 
meant that there was no one to stir the hornets' nest. In his father'ร absence, Gilbert 
Camaby did not actively pursue the Hesleyside gang, so that most of the quarrels that kept 
the surnames at odds began to die out. Heidsmen of Tynedale and Redesdale mended their 
rift in Sir Reynold's absence, so that when he returned to Tynedale his redoubled efforts 
fiirther alienated the surnames that had tendered their submission.^^ Although R. Robson 
has made much of his absence,^ ^ it is likely that the dalesmen were already irked by 
Camaby'ร increasing insistence that they make reparations for their speilings in 1536-37, a 
demand which had precipitated Fenwick'ร murder. 
Moreover, Camaby'ร insistence on more hostages from all graynes of each surname 
damaged the ties that the councils in York and London had forged since the end of the 
rebellion. When Caraaby returned to the dales late in the summer of 1538, he summoned 
the loyal heidsmen to Chollerford, whereupon he seized amongst others Gyb Charlton of 
the Boughthill and Gerald 'Topping' Charlton of Wark, and sent them off to the prison at 
Warkworth as hostages.^ ^ This led to a complete breakdown of the highlanders' confidence 
in the king'ร officers, as the custom of safe conduct to such parleys was abrogated by 
Camaby'ร zeal. Camaby never reasonably explained his rationale for seizing men, most of 
whom a few months earlier were listed as being of good esteem. Part of the problem lay in 
" L P . XI I I (ใ ) no. 366. 
BL, Càlig. В I I I f. 246. 
3 5 This rapprochement was predicted by Norfolk, who commented that it was relatively impossible for the 
graynes to fall out irreparably with each other. PRO, SP 1/126 f. 13. 
3 6 Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 85. 
3 7 BL, Calig. В I I I ff. 251-3; PRO, SP 1/136 ff. 217-8. 
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the fact that many of the new officers had suffered under the surnames, and viewed them 
as irredeemable, further underscoring the сиішгаї divide that separated the clans from civil 
society. Despite the turning of some of the unruly Northumbrians, the gentry of 
Hexhamshire liberty, which sat next to North Tynedale, had very little trust in the 
surnames. It was clear to the loyal heidsmen that they were still regarded as thieves by 
Camaby and his ilk: even the report of the official muster of 1538/9 listed the loyal 
surnames as 'thieves'.''^ Given such attitudes, there was little to be done for reconciliation. 
Zealous officers thus undermined Henry'ร conciliatory approach, ironically so since they 
were only trying to assert the king'ร authority in the dales. The result was a very muddled 
policy of persecution and pardon bisected by violence, bribery and conflicting familial 
loyalties. 
The reiving clans, frustrated by contradicting overtures from the King and their 
Keeper, threatened the officers who attempted to collect reparations and enormous 
sureties.^ ^ Despite the fact that Norfolk released most of the hostages when he returned to 
the Marches as the king'ร Lieutenant in early 1539,"*^  the damage was already done. Such 
inconsistent treatment of the dalesmen no doubt weakened their faith տ the king's ability 
to make good his own promises, especially since the bailiffs and sergeants who enforced 
royal authority did so in such arbitrary fashion. 
Violence had already escalated in the dales in the summer and autumn of 1538. The 
small revolt一led by surnames that began to become wary of royal authority in the liberty 
3 8 NRO, MSS Z A N M. 13/ D. 15. 
3 9 PRO, SP 1/136 ff. 217-18. A l l the while, many of the surnames began once again to entreat with the 
Scottish surnames of Liddesdale in the hope of reviving their old confederacy. 
PRO, E 36/40 f. 29. It is likely that the men were released for the mobilisation that occurred shortly 
thereafter, as their military experience was invaluable to Norfolk. 
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o f Tynedale֊created a situation that grew swi f t l y out o f contro l . Wi thou t any reckoning 
o f the assurance o f their relatives held as pledges, troublesome clansmen qu ick l y used the 
breakdown o f royal authori ty to conduct raids against their neighbours and across the 
Scottish border into Teviotdale. The situation qu ick ly deteriorated as the men o f Scottish 
Liddesdale began to make retaliatory forays into England w i t h the help o f their Engl ish 
kinsmen. Richard and Gi lbert Camaby֊respect ively brother and son o f Sir Reynold 
Camaby, the truant keeper o f T y n e d a l e ― a n d 26 other men chased one such raid f rom the 
Barony o f Langley back into Liddesdale. Upon crossing the Kershopefoot B u m , Scots 
Borderers captured al l the Engl ishฑen, who were at length ransomed by Sir Thomas 
Wharton, the deputy Warden o f the West March . 4 ' The Counci l o f the Nor th reported that 
the k ing 's po l i cy o f appeasement and conci l ia t ion had fa i led, and it was soon apparent that 
the government wou ld have to resort to mi l i ta ry action in the dales since the dalesmen 
refused to make restitution^^ The Warden o f the Engl ish M i d d l e March , Sir John 
Widdr ington, opined that ex-rebels f rom the Pi lgr image were the cause o f the trouble in 
Tynedale and Redesdale, thus underscoring the need for po l ice act ion, though as winter 
approached i n 1538， plans for a raid into the Marches had to be postponed. " 
I t was not unt i l the summer o f 1539 that the government drew up new plans for a 
raid on Tynedale and Redesdale. Sir Rejo io ld Camaby was, unsuφr is ing ly , the first o f the 
"new m e n " appointed after the Pi lgr image to suggest pol ice act ion on the dales. He made 
two br ie f incursions into the dales in 1537 and 1538， wh i ch d id l i t t le to ca lm any th ieving. 
Instead, his actions encouraged the Charltons and Robson to a tryst w i t h the Armstrongs o f 
4' LP, X I I I ( l ) no . 1493 and ibid., no . 115(part 2 ) , 
4 2 L P , X I I I ( l ) no . 1235. M i l i t a r y ac t ion against the dales was no n e w approach to p o l i c i n g ; i n the 1520 'ร 
there was a cons iderable e f fo r t to p lace a gar r i son o f archers at Tarset cast le, a l t hough th is met w i t h disaster. 
LP, X I I I ( l ) n o . 1366. 
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Liddesdale."*^ In 1539, Sir W i l l i a m Eure, the Vice-Warden o f the East March , suggested 
stronger action. First, i t was proposed that a pardon be granted to those inhabitants who 
were not direct ly involved w i th cr iminals, in order to distance any potential allies the 
rebels might have. A t harvest, a raid f rom al l points o f the compass wou ld beset Tynedale, 
execute all men, and arrest all women and օհՍ(1ք6ո.՛ ՛^ The plan never came to f ru i t ion, as 
the logistics proved to be too much for complet ion by the end o f the fa l l . Most 
important ly, Henry really showed l i t t le support for an al l out invasion as he thought it 
might further alienate the mi l i ta r i l y signif icant fami l ies o f Northumber land. A t a t ime 
when the k ing faced invasion f r om France, Scotland, and the Habsburg Empire, al l mi l i ta ry 
resources were needed. Thus, Henry had str ict ly forbidden the use o f fire against his 
Nor thumbr ian subjects to ' b u m their houses l ike as in extreme war between strange 
realmร.''*^ Wi thou t the authori ty to raid in to the dales, l i t t le act ion occurred in Tynedale 
that year. Further complicat ions arose when Camaby and nineteen o f his retainers were 
Wdnapped by the very men w h o m they had imprisoned after the ChoUerford parley,"*** men 
who were supposed to have tendered their submission to the k ing were it not for Sir 
Reynold 'ร ham-fisted law enforcement. 
The Robsons o f Falstone and 'Topp ing ' Charl ton thus forced the k ing 's hand. In 
January 1540, the government f ina l ly granted the authori ty to the new Keeper, L i t t le John 
Heron (who was freshly sprung f rom the Tower ) , to b u m certain houses, but on ly as a last 
resort i n a siege. 49 This signalled the first true mi l i ta ry action in Tynedale in many years, 
4 5 PRO, SP 1/126 ff: 148-49İ ibid., SP 1/136, ff. 161-64. 
* i P , X I V ( l ) n o . ! 3 0 3 . 
P R O , SP 1/157 f f . 67 -8 . 
* Th i s occur red i n Ju ly 1539, and was no doubt l o o k e d upon the by the k i n g as the final s t raw i n a l ong l is t 
o f fa i lures. De ta i l s o f the abduc t ion are l is ted i n P R O , SP 1/152 ff. 215 -7 . 
LP, X V no . 85 . 
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although the k ing was much more interested in seeing the malefactors brought to just ice 
than k i l led in the taking. L i t t le John helped plan the expedit ion, most l ike ly w i t h the 
assistance o f his o ld fr iend, Edward Charl ton o f Hesleyside, who had managed to wrangle 
a pardon for his role in Fenwick 'ร murder, in exchange for his help in br inging the 
kidnappers to justice.^^ 
In their descent upon Falstone, wh ich was a mere stone's throw f rom Hesleyside, 
Heron 'ร troopers managed to capture some prisoners, but the expedit ion on the whole was 
unsuccessful in scouring Tynedale.^^ Most o f the rebels targeted in the raid had already 
fled to Scottish Liddesdale, wh ich was under the ineffectual Wardenship o f Lord M a x w e l l . 
The c lumsy advance o f the Engl ish througř 
given them ample warning to flee from their shielings and lairs. The Warden o f the West 
March, Sir Thomas Whar ton, who was directed b y the government to help in the co­
ordinat ion o f the raid, was plaint ive about the lack o f results. In addit ion, Wharton resented 
that Heron had acted in v i r tual secrecy due to the powers as Keeper, wh ich the k ing had 
personally given to him.^^ Given the lack o f response f rom the k ing and Cromwe l l , 
Whar ton lost interest as he was chasing ftigitives in his own jur isd ic t ion for most o f 
1540.^^ That Heron in due course secured a pardon for the Falstone gang no doubt 
infuriated Whar ton. 
E d w a r d Cha r l t on was pa rdoned f o r h is ro le in the P i l g r i m a g e w i t h a b lanke t pa rdon , w h i c h took except ion 
to the actual F e n w i c k murderers- not the i r abet tors-and C a m a b y ' ร captors. C h a r l t o n also he lped to secure the 
release o f C a m a b y , and he ob ta ined a pa rdon fo r a l l the o f fenders . P R O SP 1/152, f f . 215 -17 . 
LP, X V no . 120. 
52 LP, X V no . 119. H e r o n was o f f i c i a l Keepe r o f Tyneda le and Redesdale, w h i c h gave h i m a uni la tera l powe r 
to deal w i t h a l l o f the c lans. I t is l i k e l y that H e r o n saw W h a r t o n as too ex t reme i n his en fo rcement , as the 
Keeper was m u c h more c o m p l e m e n t a r y o f the k i n g ' s p o l i c y o f indu lgence and len iency. 
ひp、 X V nos. 1 3 1 , 160, 175-6 , 191， 198, 219 and 384. 
" BL， H a r l . M S S 6 9 8 9 f. 88 . 
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In the end, the k ing and Pr ivy Counc i l grew t i red o f chasing outlaws and were able 
to save face w i th a direct audience w i t h the offenders. Several o f the chief heidsmen, 
including those responsible for k idnapping Camaby, travel led south to London and 
tendered their submission in person, and the k ing was al l too ready to indulge them.^^ Such 
a volte-face came more f rom a concern w i t h keeping the dalesmen in l ine, so that they 
might be o f use dur ing the impending conf l ic t w i t h the Scots. Of fe r ing pardons was the 
only workable opt ion to subduing the surnames, and this was done from t ime to t ime so 
long as they submitted and professed their loyal ty to the crown.^^ Such reluctance to 
persecute the clans d id not sit we l l w i t h the gentry, whose tenants clamoured for redress. 
This never material ised, as the k ing insisted on sending pardons to the dalesmen v ia the 
Lieutenant Nor fo l k , Heron and Sir Cuthbert Radcl i f fe , who had recently replaced the 
ineffectual Widdr ing ton as V ice Warden o f the M idd le Marches . " Overal l , it was a c lumsy 
approach to establishing royal authori ty in the Marches, but the c rown really had no other 
opt ion since it was p la in ly dependent upon the Marchers for security in the frontier. 
When Engl ish brigands and their Scottish al lies bestrode the frontier in 1540, it was 
clear that law enforcement i n Tynedale wou ld necessarily invo lve operations across the 
Border, wh ich dangerously courted war w i t h Scotland. However, since the surnames 
usually had cross-border relations who wou ld give them shelter, the Tudor government d id 
not see another opt ion other than tactical pol ice raids. The clans, especially the Charltons 
o f Hesleyside, formed the Schwerpunkt o f the Engl ish pol ice effort i n 1540-41. Their 
usefulness in the coming actions was most l i ke ly a direct result o f L i t t le John's return to 
55 LP, X V I nos. 172 and 780 ; Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, v o l . 7 ed. S i r Har r i s 
N icho las ( L o n d o n : H M R C , 1831) pp . 6 6 - 8 . 5 л Р . , I , p. 652 . 
5 6 K.J . Kesse l r ing , Mercy and Authority in the Tudor State, ( C a m b r i d g e : C U P , 2003) p. 192. 
5 7 В Ц H a r i . M S S 6989 f. 87. 
124 
Chipchase. N o other Keeper could c la im a prominent heidsman as a relative, and Heron 
used his Charl ton relations to good effect.^^ The first strike init iated by Heron came as a 
raid, a 'smal l matter ' in wh ich his probationary Keeper and other assorted off icers k i l led 
two suspected Scottish liaisons to the Nor th Tynedale rebels, confiscated fifty cattle, and 
burned three houses. 59 The l im i ted results suggest that Heron and his i l k were unw i l l i ng to 
fu l l y engage the Scots o f Liddesdale, since the Robsons, Dodds and Charltons enjoyed a 
work ing relationship w i t h most graynes o f the Armstrongs and El l iots. Most l ike ly goaded 
onward by their governor, the clans o f Tynedale and Redesdale instead burnt two towns in 
Scottish Teviotdale as a means o f def lect ing any action against their all ies, now motivated 
by the k ing 's demand o f ' three hurts for OOIไ๙ against the Scots and the resettled English.^^ 
This infuriated the local Scottish lords, who clamoured for war w i th England. No t to be 
outdone, elements o f Liddesdale, most l i ke ly the El l iots o f Thorl ieshope who had protected 
the Engl ish fugi t ives, passed through Nor th Tynedale unmolested and burnt L i t t le 
Whi t t ing ton , near Hal ton castle.6' 
In response, Henry and Sir W i l l i a m Eure devised a scheme to bribe the loyal 
elements o f Tynedale and Redesdale to murder prominent Liddesdale heidsmen.^^ L i t t le 
John Heron thought this was a fool ish endeavour; being f rom Tynedale, he knew that the 
surnames wou ld rather betray their governor than spark a deadly feud w i t h the mi l i ta r i l y 
5 8 P R O SP 1/116 f. 2 1 9 ; I b i d . SP 1/119 ส. 9 4 - 1 0 4 . The L a i r d o f Hes leys ide was related to H e r o n th rough 
Cuthber t C h a r l t o n , w h o had mar r i ed H e r o n ' s daughter . T h e Fenw icks , w h o had served as Keepers, were a 
p rom inen t surname in the i r o w n right, a l t hough i t was repor ted that they were prone to squabb l ing and 
feud ing amongst themselves, w h i c h undercu t t he i r power . 
59 BL， A d d . M S S 32646 f. 238 ; LP, X V I no. 1250. 
В L A d d . M S S , 3 2 6 4 6 f. 2 3 7 ; B L , A d d . M S S 3 2 6 4 6 f. 251; LP, X V I no . 1202. 
B L , A d d . M S S f. 2 3 7 ; LP, X V I no. 1259. 
に There was no accepted conven t i on f o r such ac t i on , w h i c h was c lear ly outs ide the accepted boundar ies o f 
s ix teenth-century a r m e d con f l i c t . T h e assassinat ion o f p rom inen t Scots borderers was p robab ly v i ewed as an 
easier so lu t ion to open war fa re , and H e n r y w o u l d not have been the f i rs t European monarch to order the 
k i l l i n g o f a t roub lesome rival. 
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power fu l Armstrongs and El l iots o f Liddesdale, w i th whom both the Robsons and 
Charltons already shared an alliance.^^ The Engl ish dalesmen preferred to continue raiding 
into Teviotdale since the Scots there were not al l ied w i th them, wh i le Heron was already 
entreating the Liddesdale men as a means o f br ing ing the rest o f the Falstone Robsons and 
Dodds back into the ք օա .^ ՛ ՛ Heron 's precarious arrangement wou ld suffer f rom any 
incursions into the Armstrongs' terr i tory. A l though the confederation o f the three dales一 
Tynedale, Redesdaie and Liddesdale一would have brought the Tudors signif icant mi l i tary 
resources, the monarch clear ly disapproved o f any all iance when Liddesdale men 
slaughtered a group o f Fenwicks who had ridden in pursuit o f stolen property.^^ The 
government 'ร attempts to divorce the Northumbrians f rom their Scottish ties, and to br ing 
them into royal service, were at this point on ly part ia l ly successful because the k ing and 
his off icers had underestimated the strength o f the cross-border bonds. A t the same t ime, i f 
Henry was to have a decent supply o f Border horse for the looming war, a certain amount 
o f indulgence towards the clans and their Keeper was required. 
Nonetheless, cross-border violence b y the Scots gave the Engl ish commissioners a 
reason for decisive action against Liddesdale. In November 1541 a group o f Liddesdale 
men一most l i ke ly supported by the men who had connections to Heron֊֊burned W i l l i a m 
Camaby 'ร hay and bams at Hal ton, escaping into Scotland. T w o royal commissioners, Sir 
Rafe El lerkar and Sir Robert Bowes and their sizeable armed retinue, happened to be տ the 
v ic in i t y compi l ing a survey o f the Nor thumbr ian defences. Bowes and EUerkar used the 
power o f their commission to order L i t t le John Heron to gather the loyal men o f Tynedale 
" L P , X V I no . 1264. 
6 4 B L , A d d . M S S 32646 f f . 235 -237 
« Ζ λ x v i nos. 1203 and 1 2 1 1 ; N i c h o l a s (ed . ) . Proceedings. V I I , pp . 248 -249 ; B L , A d d . M S S 32646 f. 2 5 1 . 
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and Redesdale by f i r ing one o f Heron 'ร abandoned bams, creating a beacon in the night 
sky.^^ B y b laming the conflagrat ion upon the Liddesdale men, they were able to arouse the 
indignat ion o f locals and muster a sizeable force. A quick raid into Liddesdale against the 
Thorl ieshope El l iots produced the overal l results that the Counci l had anticipated. No 
fewer than thirteen for t i f ied houses were destroyed, the inhabitants o f wh ich either 
perished from exposure or were captured, al though the action appeared to the Counci l as 
somewhat restrained.^^ Amongst the v ic t ims were most l i ke ly some o f Heron 'ร allies and 
double agents. S t i l l , these were expendable colleagues, especially since the Counci l 
required quotas. The raid had another effect that wou ld soon come to l ight: it precipitated 
an end to the Tynedale-Liddesdale confederation, as the clans o f Liddesdale blamed the 
Ha l ton raid on the Tynedalers, who they c la imed had harboured the real рефеЇгаЇ0Г8.^^ 
A f te r the raid, El lerkar and Bowes rode back into Northumber land, w i th the success 
o f their mission br inging them accolades f rom the 'honest denizens o f the county ' , and 
forc ing reconci l iat ion between Heron and the Camabyร, who had been rivals since the 
rebel l ion o f 1536.^*^ Above al l , the government had unwi t t ing ly prevented the Tynedalers 
f r om maintain ing their confederacy w i t h the Liddesdale heidsmen, an arrangement that 
probably wou ld have resulted in more prey ing upon the Marcher gentry. Henry 's ult imate 
goal, the subjugation o f Scotland and the removal o f French inf luence in Scottish pol i t ics, 
was dependent upon the co-operation o f his subjects in Northumber land; hence, the pol icy 
o f placating the dalesmen complemented the Tudor dr ive to bu i ld national defence. B y 
LP, X V I no . 1404. 
67 LP, X V I no . เ 4 0 4 . O d d l y enough , there were no Scot t ish casualt ies repor ted , on l y pr isoners, w h i c h 
angered the c r o w n . T h e C o u n c i l was expec t i ng at least some casualt ies amongs t the L iddesda le he idsmen, 
and p r o b a b l y wan ted to engender a dead ly feud i n o rde r t o j u s t i f y an invas ion . T h e lack o f casualt ies a lso 
suggests that H e r o n was not w i l l i n g to engage i n such ex t remi t ies . 
= BL， A d d . M S S 32646 f. 270. 
69 LP, X V I no . 1404. 
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tasking the surnames w i th mi l i tary duty, the c rown achieved more order in the Marches, 
yet it was not a guarantee o f good behaviour f rom the surnames, especially now that their 
former Liddesdale accomplices wou ld be looking for revenge. 
Re iv ing was sti l l a problem, though, the blame for wh ich was placed squarely upon 
the shoulders o f L i t t le John Heron.^^ Heron had formed ties in Liddesdale, wi thout wh ich 
his efforts at law enforcement wou ld have collapsed. This technical ly was treason since it 
was done clandestinely wi thout the express permission o f the k ing . A l though there was 
never any real ind ic t ing evidence, there was enough circumstantial proof to condemn 
Heron for going too far w i t h his t r ys t s / ' The chief accuser was no less than 'Topp ing ' 
Charl ton, brother to one o f the Fenwick slayers, and a chief supporter o f the Liddesdale 
all iance, who c la imed that Heron intended to use the confederation as a means o f sparking 
a war f rom wh ich he wou ld prof i t . The counci l was wary o f Charl ton's accusations, as it 
was possible that his test imony could have been fabricated in order to seek better favour 
for his out lawed brother. It is thus impossible to determine the extent o f Heron's gui l t , and 
R. Robson'ร account gives no real insight since he assumes that the singular testimony o f a 
th ie f has me r i t / ^ Lo rd Dacre'ร pl ight in the 1520'ร already demonstrated that i t was 
unrealistic to expect ch ief March off icers not to entreat Scottish clans, as most were in 
league w i t h at least some Engl ish Border famil ies. Regardless, the Tudor government 
could not stomach the means by wh ich L i t t le John had achieved stabil i ty in the 
Nor thumbr ian dales. But before he could be arrested. Heron was captured at Haddon Rigg 
in 1542， along w i t h one o f his ch ief accusers, Sir Robert Bowes. His removal , along w i th 
70 BL， A d d . M S S 32646 f. 259 . I t was men t ioned as ear ly as a u t u m n 1541 that the ra id i ng was most l i k e l y 
done w i t h the f u l l k n o w l e d g e o f H e r o n . 
St.F, V， p. 203 . 
ᄀ、- See R o b s o n , English Highland Clans, p. 93 . 
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that o f his son George, who stood in disastrously as a replacement Keeper for 1542-43/՝* 
a l lowed Sir Ralph Eure to step into the of f ice. Problems w i t h cr imina l i ty died seemingly 
down, but on ly because Eure was in the posit ion to indulge the Engl ish clans and turn them 
fu l l y against the Scottish Borders.^"^ 
When L i t t le John was eventually ransomed f rom capt iv i ty in Scotland, he and his 
son were put into house arrest in Northumberland whi ls t the k ing prepared to make an 
example o f h i m once and for a l l . The ex-Keeper was accused o f treating w i t h K i n g James 
V and Lord M a x w e l l , the Warden o f the Scottish M idd le March, wh ich amounted to the 
capital cr ime o f March treason. Charges never materialised into a tr ial since it was found 
that no j u r y wou ld convict either father or son for fear o f the Herons' Tynedale allieร7^ 
The two Herons nevertheless were incarcerated unt i l the intervention o f Sir Robert Bowes, 
who found them 'not so culpable as was reported. ，76 
The government had demonstrated the l imi ts o f its patience regarding acceptable 
behaviour from the Northumbrians. The dismissals o f Sir Reynold Camaby and Sir John 
Widdr ing ton in 1540, and those o f the Herons and Sir Cuthbert Ratcl i f fe in 1543, 
demonstrated Henry 's tendency to blame off icers for any disorders under their watch. 
Henry V l l ľ s largesse towards the dalesmen o f Northumber land and Cumbria, and his 
frustrations towards the off icers, who could not keep them under contro l , on ly exacerbated 
the cultural d iv ide between highlander and lowlander. Many o f the men in royal pay were 
at one t ime impl icated in serious crimes, on ly to have their transgressions pardoned by the 
" LP, X V I I no . 808 . George H e r o n ' s tenure as Keepe r saw a b r i e f exp los ion o f chaos af ter the a f te rmath o f 
the disastrous H a d d o n R i g g ra id . Th i s is t e l l i ng o f L i t t l e John 's ab i l i t y to con t ro l the c lans, even i f he was 
g u i l t y o f r ece i v i ng s to len p roper ty and reset t ing fug i t i ves . 
" St.p., V， p. 295โ Parr repor ted to the C o u n c i l that any c r i m e in the dales was "pon ishe the as 8һафеИе as 
the cace do th r e q u i r e " b y Eure and his deput ies. 
ᄀչ B L , A d d . M S S 32651 f. 247 . 
7 6 P R O , SP 1/227 f. 79 . 
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k ing. Justice was sacrificed for mi l i ta ry power, and Bowes g r im ly remarked that this on ly 
encouraged lawlessness in the king's so ld iers . " 
B y incoφorat ւng the Border horse into the armies that invaded Scotland, Henry 
temporar i ly solved the problem o f royal power in the Marches. Af te r Hertford's campaigns 
o f 1544-45, there was a notable decrease in negative reports regarding the dalesmen, as 
many o f them had become royal soldiers for the t ime being. L i t t le business was o f much 
urgency to report to the k ing , although some o f the surnames were st i l l raiding their 
Engl ish neighbours, and using the dales o f Scotland to hide their stolen goods7^ 
Appeasement in the end was more effect ive in establishing royal control , as the crown 
s imply d id not have the resources to keep Northumber land in check by force. To some 
extent, the Tudors were forced to g ive in to the mi l i tary power o f the Northumber land 
yeomanry, as the surnames s imply outnumbered the Warden's men. Wardens were usual ly 
a l lowed a retinue o f on ly one or two hundred men,^^ wh ich meant that when the cal l to trod 
went unheeded there was l i t t le mi l i ta ry action that the Warden or his men could effect. 
Accord ing to Bowes, the dales o f Northumberland could y ie ld h u n d r e d s i f not 
thousands֊of horsed men, clearly outstr ipping even the escorts o f Her t ford and Suffolk.*" 
Yet, i n taking royal pay, the surnames in turn yielded some o f their independent mi l i ta ry 
power, for they were then f i rm ly under the yoke o f their Keepers and constables. 
Henry 'ร death in January 1547 meant that he d id not enjoy the re-established order 
in the north for long. Roya l control o f the Marches resumed under his son, Edward V I , 
and the Protectorship o f Hert ford, who had recently received the t i t le o f Duke o f Somerset, 
B L , C a l i g . В V I I I f. 106 ( B o w e s ' Survey o f 1551) . 
； LP, X X I ( I ) no. 9 4 0 
' P R O , E 36/173 f f . 114-15. 
՝ LP, X V I no. 1399. T h e musters o f 1539 show that at least 500 da lesmen had answered the roya l muster. 
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along w i th a promot ion to Earl Marshal l .^ ' Wharton immediately asked the Pr ivy Counci l 
about their plans for the Marches, and was quick to of fer some suggestions regarding the 
strengthening o f the borders in order to keep the surnames active as royal servants.^^ The 
reply was amenable, demonstrating their ini t ial fai th in his abil i t ies. Langholm, a key 
posi t ion in the Scottish West Marches, held the Counci l 's interest, and they authorised 
Whar ton to occupy the keep.83 Most important to the Counci l was that Wharton should 
convince the Scots Borderers in those areas to serve the Engl ish crown,^"* A l though the 
letters do not specify what remuneration they might receive, the counci l was clear that they 
wou ld support any Scottish subject who served England. 
Throughout 1547-51, the Northumbrians and their al l ied Scottish Border horse 
served in Scotland as garrison troops, and as escorts for supply trains that struggled to 
reach the remoter Engl ish garrisons. W i t h the collapse o f the garrisons in Scotland in 
1549-50, and the eventual retreat o f the Engl ish troops back to their native soi l , the 
dalesmen who had once found careers as soldiers resumed their o ld ways when mi l i tary 
l ive l ihood faded. Bowes' survey o f 1551, which was essentially a re-commission o f his 
earlier survey, again condemned the activit ies o f the Nor thumbr ian dalesmen, who again 
were reportedly confederated w i t h some elements o f Liddesdale. W i t h the disappearance 
o f the stabi l i ty that the soldier's salary brought to the dales, violence was once again a 
problem, but one should not overestimate the problem,^^ as the violence was nowhere near 
SP 10/1/10. 
• Addenda, I , n o . l . 
' APC, 1547-50 , P.690 and pp. 699 -700 . 
[ Ma rcus M e r r i m a n , " T h e Assured Scots" , The Scottish Historical Review, v o l . 67 (1968 ) pp . 142-155. 
； B L Ca l i g . В V I I L f. 106. 
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the levels that i t reached jus t after the Pilgrimage. There were no more power fu l Charlton 
or Dodds heidsmen; after 1547, the heidsmen who had served the c rown no longer appear 
in the records. It appears that the surnames had begun to fracณre in the aftermath o f their 
heyday, wh ich made the depths o f their cr iminal i ty less offensive than they had been in the 
1530'ร and early 1540's. There was also a sincere interest on the part o f both crowns to 
keep the peace along the borders, so the approach to law enforcement was not as 
mil i tar ist ic as the punit ive raids o f the later 1530'ร. 
W i t h the minor upswing o f violence in the dales since 1551， Border law became an 
obsession o f the crown throughout the 1550'ร, signal l ing wi l l ingness by the crown to 
ensure effective just ice for al l Marchers. This code o f laws essentially dealt w i t h days o f 
redress, guid ing off icers such as Lo rd Eure dur ing the truces o f 1539 and 1540. A t the end 
o f Edward's reign, Thomas Whar ton, deputy Warden-General, sought to codi fy and 
enforce border laws, proc la iming harsh penalties for transgressions and out l in ing specific 
crimes that entailed March treason.^^ Most were concerned w i t h border security, and 
keeping o f the watch along the border. Sir Robert Bowes, who had traded his Wardenship 
for a much more prestigious counsellor 's post, released a commissioned report in 1553 that 
attempted to regulate the proceedings dur ing days o f redress, as wel l as the establishment 
o f jur ies for trials.^^ The f ixat ion w i th border law was jus t i f ied since rebel l ion was seen as 
a constant threat in the Nor th , but i t seems that the crown was much less w i l l i ng to take 
mi l i ta ry action against the dales after 1550. Border law thus became increasingly the 
8 6 Robson has dedicated a w h o l e chapter to the supposed " re lapse" in to c r i m i n a l i t y that was a consequence o f 
the end o f Ang lo -Sco t t i sh war fa re . H o w e v e r , the ev idence is o n l y spot ty, suggest ing that perhaps the author 
had overes t imated the r e c i d i v i s m o f the c lans. 
Addenda, IV， no. 14 and 17. 
88 Addenda, vn， no. 6. 
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means by wh ich the Northumberland dealt w i t h the problems o f re iv ing. It was also 
cheaper than prov id ing assurance through the use o f garrisons. 
Co-operation w i th Scottish wardens was most important since it prevented the type 
o f feuds that had precipitated war, as in 1542, so that just ice became more o f a deterrent, 
despite the prevalence o f per jury and false swearing dur ing the m e e t i n g s . T h r o u g h o u t 
1555, both Wharton and Lord Conyerร attended redresses at Rid ingboume, wh ich seems to 
have defrayed any war.^^ Dur ing the next year, the power o f redress was in the hands o f the 
Border Commissioners, who in October 1556 created a list o f instructions for the 
wardens.^* In February 1557, Wharton held Warden Court at A lnw i ck , del iver ing four 
indictments for March treason. The o ld l iberties o f Wark , Tynedale and Redesdale were 
now much more subject to royal just ice as we l l , their resumption by the crown more 
apparent in the regularity o f the Wardens' Court. 92 A l though itinerant assize courts were 
st i l l unwiUing to venture into such dangerous places. Wardens courts and redresses under 
M a r y became increasingly scrutinised by the c rown and Counci l , p rov id ing more just ice 
than they had done since the decline o f the Percys. 
Complement ing the change in law enforcement methods was a shif t o f power f rom 
Tynedale to Redesdale. More fert i le than the Nor th Tyne, the River Rede had always 
supported a healthier economy.^^ This translated to more horses and anฑour, especially 
after 1550 when the Halls became more volat i le. Bowes Гфо і іес і i n 1551 that several 
8 9 B o w e s noted that pe r j u r y was a p r o b l e m at redresses, w h i c h had unde rm ined the Wardens ' j us t i ce in the 
past. The re was more st r ingent burden o f p r o o f af ter 1552, a l though the Scots were s t i l l accused b y the 
E n g l i s h o f filing false с I a ims , o r "back b i l l i n g " . See T o u g h , Frontier, Chapter 4 . 
Addenda, V I I , no. 36 & 4 1 . The frequeฑсу o f the days o f redress appears to have shot up d u r i n g the 1550'ร, 
i nd i ca t i ng that the W a r d e n s ' Cour ts were ga in i ng m o m e n t u m . 
" Addenda, V I I , no. 54. 
92 T h e issue o f the l iber t ies is t ied c lose ly to the po l i t i ca l i den t i t y o f the surnames, and is discussed i n m o r e 
detai l i n Chapter 7. 
93 LP, X V I no . 1399. See Chapter 2 f o r a descr ip t ion o f the economy o f N o r t h u m b e r l a n d . 
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94 graynes in Redesdale were already at odds w i t h each other for unresolved slaughters.' 
More disturbing was the col lusion they enjoyed w i t h the local garrisons, some o f the 
soldiers no doubt being k i n o f the surnames. In 1553, the Scots accused the Captain o f 
Harbottle o f br inging Redesdale men into Scotland,*^^ wh i le ten years later the same parties 
l i f ted f ive score o f cattle and several hostages f rom Uddasdale^^ Ensuing violence along 
the borders occurred main ly in the Redesdale and Coquetdale districts dur ing the spring o f 
1557, beginning w i th the increase o f Scottish raids into the Marches, wh ich had already 
despoiled Northumber land o f nearly £11,000 wor th o f moveable g o o d s . T h e Percy 
brothers retaliated in k ind when they inf l ic ted considerable damage upon the Scottish 
garrison o f Langton. This was welcome news in the south, although it signalled the 
possibi l i ty o f another war.*^* 
Lawlessness was st i l l an issue in Tynedale and Redesdale, to the discomfi ture o f 
the Counci l , although it d id not reach previous levels. M u c h o f the upland clans' power 
had been undermined in the wars, especially after the Thorl ieshope raid, wh ich ushered in 
the downfa l l o f the Herons. Regardless, there were st i l l active reivers operating in the 
dales. It was also rumoured that the Percy Earl was unpopular w i t h the whole o f 
Northumberland, and this might have contr ibuted to his lack o f authority i n the dales o f his 
earldom.' ' ' 'Again, the Marchers whose lands abutted the dales compłained that their 
neighbours handled them more roughly than the Scots d id . Royal displeasure w i th both 
B L , Ca l i g . В V I I I f. 106. 
" Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 1 ( 1 5 4 5 - 6 9 ) , John H i l l B u r t o n (ed . ) , (Ed inbu rgh : H M Genera l 
Regis ter House , 1877 ) , pp. 148-50. 
CSPF, (ed . 1869) no. 602 (5 ) . 
Addenda. V I I I , no . 10. 
= Addenda, V I I I , no. 88 & 93 . 
" Addenda, V I I I , no. 92 (par t і і ) . 
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Warden and Lieutenant was apparent, and it was suggested that both men put things right 
in the border and appoint suitable off icers although the Counci l on ly went so far as to 
deliver vague threats i f just ice were not served in the future. "^^ B y June 1557, the crown 
was aware o f a deepening d iv is ion between some o f the prominent famil ies o f 
Northumberland, inc luding the Percys, and W i l l i a m Lord Eure, '^ ' the current Warden o f 
the East March. O f part icular interest was the violence that had been l inked to the Herons 
o f Ford and the Carrร, two o f the most powerfu l (and therefore rivals o f each other) Border 
famil ies that served the Engl ish crown. ՚*^ ^ This was to be settled outside the Wardens' 
courts, albeit through t r ia l , and the Master o f the Rol ls , Sir W i l l i a m Cordel l , was 
commissioned to make an accord between the two families.'^^ The breakdown o f authori ty 
in the M idd le March reached on ly problematic levels when the crown commissioners went 
north to mend the r i f ts between the clans so that the violence between the Engl ish 
Borderers wou ld cease. Tynedale and Redesdale at one point appeared poised to war w i t h 
each other when the latter assisted men o f Liddesdale in retr ieving cattle that Tynedalers 
had lifted/^^* Thus internecine border violence, wh ich constantly seethed, remained a 
problem despite Lo rd Wharton 's administrat ive capabil it ies as the leading March of f icer 
dur ing most o f the decade. 
However, there are signs that some o f the clans had begun an irreversible march 
towards permanent employment by c rown. The dalesmen were not utter ly left out in the 
cold when the mi l i ta ry ambi t ion o f a subjugated Scotland disappeared. In the m i d 1550'ร, 
՛ շ Addenda, V Ï I I , no . 9 1 . 
10' Th is was the second L o r d Eure, son o f S i r R a l p h Eure and grandson o f the first L o r d Eure . 
Mau reen M e i k l e , ' N o r t h u m b e r l a n d D i v i d e d : A n a t o m y o f a S ix teen th -Cen tu ry B l o o d f e u d / Archaeologia 
Aeliana 5 th series, v o l . 20 (1992 ) , pp . 79 -89 . 
Addenda, V I I I , no . 106. 
'^^' CSPF, (ed . 1865) no . 426 . 
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the Charltons oversaw the watch o f Nor th Tynedale no less, the residents o f wh ich were 
co-operative w i t h their Keeper, the rehabil itated George Heron, son o f the irascible L i t t le 
John.'^^ A Ha l l o f Ot terbum was in fact Keeper o f Redesdale for a br ief t ime in 1558, 
mustering 300 horsemen for the royal musters, thereby demonstrating the mi l i tary power 
that the Redesdalers had retained.'^^ Tynedale, on the other hand, never recovered its 
former mi l i ta ry power after the fa l l o f the garrisons in 1551; part o f this was due to the 
sheep slump that witnessed a drastic fal l i n the price o f mut ton, upon wh ich the Tynedale 
economy thr ived, whi lst com prices rose/^^ Many o f the clansmen also began to emigrate, 
as many o f the Robsons moved to the areas around Coquetdale.'^^ However, most o f the 
blame for the mi l i tary decline, and the subsequent inabi l i ty to wage either deadly feud or 
legitimate warfare was blamed squarely upon the system o f customary tenure, gavelk ind, 
wh ich had thoroughly impoverished Tynedale by El izabeth's reign. ՚*^ ^ Wi thout the pay o f 
the garrisons, wh ich disappeared completely after 1560， the Tynedalers were left to their 
own devices. Rather than turning back to theft, wh ich some did/10 many Border surnames 
remained 'good true and suf f iyc ient m e n ' / * ^ essentially trading their mi l i ta r ism for a less 
hosti le l ive l ihood. Such a twist on ly inv i ted trouble. Beginning in 1568, the La i rd o f 
Buccleuch began a pattern o f revenge by wh ich the Charltons and Robsons suffered for the 
rest o f the century. ' '2 The remaining TynedaÌQ Robsons soon reaped their w h i r l w i n d at the 
hands o f the Liddesdalers; probably a knock-on effect o f the Thorl ieshope raid that 
W i l l i a m N i c h o l s o n , Leges Marchianm or Border Laws, ( L o n d o n , 1747) , pp . 260 -62 . 
CScotP, V I I I no . 653 . 
Peter B o w d e n , 'Ag r i cu l t u ra l Pr ices, F a r m Pro f i t s and Rents ' , i n Joan T h i r s k (ed . ) , The Agrarian History of 
England and Wales, Volume IV: 1500-1640 (Cambr idge : C U P , 1967) , pp . 593 -695 . 
СВР, l i n o . 913 . 
СВР, I I , no. 267 . 
'° B L , H a r l . M S S 643 f. 225 . 
' - Robso i ì , English Highland Clans, pp . 218 -220 . 
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из witnessed the end o f Heron'ร attempted confederation.""^ But despite the apparent 
vulnerabi l i ty that rode on the coattails o f their newfound honesty, Tynedale, Redesdale and 
Coquetdale were reported to have made contributions o f 700 horsemen to the 1569 
uprising.""^ Some Marchers paid dearly for the treachery o f the few participants, especially 
the Barony o f Langley at the geographical confluence o f Tynedale and Al lendale, where 
' f i ve score and o d ' tenants were no longer able to f ind horse and harness after having their 
holdings despoiled by royal troops in the aftermath o f the rebel l ion, further decaying the 
mi l i ta ry capabil i t ies o f the Nor thumbr ian u p l a n d s . ^ T h e i r part ic ipat ion in the abortive 
rebel l ion, though, was by this t ime an aberration, and it is l i ke ly that the c rown v iewed it as 
such; as Robson has noted, no clansmen were indicted for their role. 1 ' 6 For their part, the 
clansmen had become more fami l iar to the crown after their increasing role in Marcher 
defences/*^ and the occasional bl ight by the minor i ty was in no way a sour ref lect ion o f 
the services rendered by the more respectable heidsmen. It was for this reason that 
Warden'ร courts and days o f redress marked the sole intervention o f the c rown for the 
remainder o f the sixteenth century. 
B y El izabeth's reign, the Marches, although st i l l vulnerable to v io lence from w i th in 
and wi thout , were signi f icant ly reduced in their ab i l i ty and eagerness to threaten the 
crown's off icers. It was clear that the heidsmen could no longer fob o f f royal authority, 
although Sir Ralph Sadler complained that there were st i l l 'naughty, ev i l , unru ly and 
misdemeaned' elements in the shire. Such behaviour, according to Sadler, was a direct 
Ibid. 
Sadler Papers, I， pp. 38-55. 
Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 205. 
^ԼշՏշօէԲ[ճ\\Լ no. 31 . 
Sadler Papers, I I , p. 16. 
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result o f the unscrupulous border off icers that served Dacre and the Earl o f 
Northumberland, who forced the clans into th iev ing through their rapine. ' '9 Compared to 
the chaos that plagued the Marches after the Pi lgr image, things were relat ively quiet. Th is 
was the result o f three distinct phases o f royal pol icy: the taming o f the Nor th from 1536֊ 
42; the instal lation o f mi l i tary organisation from 1543-1547; and the emphasis upon 
Warden's courts rather than provocative armed conf l ic t from 1552 onwards. A l l phases 
contributed to the fa l l ing independence o f the surnames, but the most effective was 
undoubtedly the flow o f royal money into the dales, wh ich cut short the temptat ion to 
pi l lage the surrounding countryside. On the other hand, the strengthening o f Marcher law 
in the 1550*ร a l lowed the Wardens to apprehend al l those who d id not answer the f ray or 
respond to musters, wh i ch forced even the most reluctant persons into the hands o f the 
local off icer. The courts o f the Wardens and the Keepers aided in securing more peace, the 
condi t ion being entirely dependent upon the abil i t ies o f the local off icers to enforce laws, 
and the effectiveness o f the local courts. The mi l i tar ised northern society was st i l l separate 
f rom southern society, but the installation o f royal off icers, ranging f rom the Lo rd 
Lieutenant o f the Border counties, to the deputy wardens o f the marches, brought the north 
under a semblance o f pol i t ica l control . The w i l d and untamed areas o f the borders st i l l 
presented some problems to the wardens who resided there, but b y 1560， there were clear 
legal apparatuses at the Wardens' disposal that could contain border violence. These were 
certainly not as ef fect ive as the Wardens wanted them to be, as Ralph Sadler had reported 
in 1559.'^** But after Elizabeth's first few years as Queen, the c rown and its off icers could 
act much more decisively against disorder, and in t imes o f crises, as they d id dur ing the 
Ibid, pp. 441-44. Tough, Frontier, p. 190. 
' CSPF, 1559, no. 1409. 
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rebell ion o f 1569, although the defeat o f the Northern Earłs was most l ike ly due to the 
mi l i tary decay that had set into the Borders in the years that immediately fo l lowed 
Somerset's retreat. In part, the Highlanders cr ippled themselves in keeping such a closed 
society, but effect ive royal po l icy succeeded in p ry ing open the gates o f highland culture. 
B y handing the heidsmen the power to pol ice the dales, the Tudors succeeded in 
іпсофога Ї іп§ the once independent clans into royat service, thereby making them 
dependent on royal commissions, and eventually, royal t roops '^ ' for their o w n surety. 
СВР, I, no. 162. 
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Chapter F ive: M i l i t a r y ObĮ jga t ion and Service in the Borders 
John Gor ing ' ร thesis has remained a cornerstone i n the study o f Tudor 
m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion since its comple t ion near ly f i f t y years ago. Go r i ng argued that 
wh i le a universal m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion existed for a l l o f England it was rarely invoked 
on a nat ional scale. The county m i l i t i a , w h i c h was the basis o f national defence, was 
not mustered on a sweeping scale but instead d rawn from a poo l o f active men. 
W h i l e the m i l i t i a served w i t h i n the county l im i t s , either mustered as a response to 
insurrect ion or invas ion scare, the m i l i t i a was not ob l iged to serve overseas as i t was 
not a professional force. ' Thus the m i l i t i a was o f l i t t le use against large invasions or 
massive armed risings, such as the P i lg r image o f Grace. In such instances, the k i n g 
raised a rmi es b y letters signet, a 'quas i - feudal ' system that ut i l ised the tenants o f 
major landowners. 2 Mos t studies o f Tudor armies have іпсофога іес і Go r i ng ' ร thesis. 
e . G . Cru ickshank 'ร w o r k on the El izabethan armies supports Gor ing 'ร thesis, 3 as 
does Gervase Ph i l l i ps ' w o r k on Ang lo-Scot t i sh w a r f a r e / However , some scholars 
have noted that a d i f fe rent style o f m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion existed in the borders. D .L .W. 
Tough has descr ibed b r i e f l y the nature o f border tenure, ma in l y that al l tenants, 
whatever their tenures, were l iable to f igh t for their lands.^ Thomas Rae also 
suggested that a s imi la r f o r m o f tenure existed i n the Scott ish Marches, a l though 
feudal m i l i t a r y dut ies seem to have been much more prevalent there than in the 
Engl ish borders. 6 S t i l l , the requirement o f al l able-bodied men between the ages o f 
' John Goring, 'The Mi l i ta ry Obligations o f the English People, 1511-1558,' (Univ. o f London Ph.D., 
1955), passi/พ. 
՜ Gonng, 'M i l i ta ry Obligations', pp. 279-80.This two-fo ld system, the "nat ional" system―through 
the commissions o f array一and what Goring described as the "quasi-feudal" system, whereby leading 
members o f the aristocracy mustered their households and their tenants for mi l i tary service, often 
clashed. This double system was a product o f custom, parliamentary law and royal prerogative; by 
no means was it a Tudor invention, instead it was a practise that had evolved for centuries. 
' e.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth 'ร Army, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966). 
^ Gervase Phill ips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, ¡513-1550 (Woodbridge: Boydel l , 1999). 
5 D.L.W. Tough, The Last Years ofa Frontier, (Oxford; OUP, 1928), pp. 57-8. 
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16 and 60 to serve in the m i l i t i a dur ing t imes o f crisis prov ided an overal l structure 
for m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion in the Marches. Ye t un l i ke the c rown 's subjects in southern 
areas, Borderers owed m i l i t a r y service on a regular occurrence; al l men were 
expected to serve i f they he ld land. Th is is a complex prob lem that was pecul iar to 
the Marches, one that T o u g h described as a 'special and реф1ех іп§ subject, any 
detai l o f w h i c h is outside the prov ince o f general h istory. '^ Consequent ly, Tough 
avoided the subject almost ent i rely. 
Nevertheless, the Tudors remained aware that Nor thumber land owed m i l i t a r y 
service beyond that o f general ob l igat ion. Th is chapter analyses how Border m i l i t a ry 
obl igat ions evo lved over a per iod that witnessed the administrat ive efforts o f four 
successive monarchs. It w i l l discuss the unique f o r m o f m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion w i t h i n 
the Marches, w h i c h was preserved b y the inherent ly conservat ive Marchers, and it 
w i l l assess the overa l l effect iveness in p rov id ing England w i t h a suitable defence 
against its enemies. Th i s chapter w i l l examine the obl igat ions o f the three sections 
o f Nor thumbr ian society that fo rmed the basis o f the m i l i t a r y commun i t y : the k i ng ' ร 
pensioners and gentry, their tenants, and the sumame groups that inhabi ted the 
uplands o f the Marches. Each o f these fo rmed its o w n dist inct m i l i t a r y group, and i t 
is w i t h this d is t inc t ion i n m i n d that this chapter w i l l treat the effectiveness o f border 
service and Marcher m i l i t a r y obl igat ions, as w e l l as addi t ional obl igat ions that were 
placed upon the Marchers b y the Tudor monarchs. In the end, i t w i l l demonstrate 
h o w this t r i furcated system o f m i l i t a r y service both complemented and clashed w i t h 
the Tudor ef for t to ut i l ise the m i l i t a r y ski l ls o f the Marchers. 
6 Thomas Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 
6-8 
ᄀ D. L. พ . Tough, The Last Years of a Frontier, (Oxford: OUP, 1928), p. 57. 
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Loca l studies have argued that the requirements o f an armed f ront ier 
necessitated forms o f m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion that were qui te d i f ferent from those o f 
southern England. K n o w n as border service, i t ob l iged al l Marchers to serve against 
the Scots at their o w n charge, at the pleasure o f the Warden. Ye t how ob l iga t ion was 
assigned has provided good ground for debate. R . พ . н Oyle contends that border 
service was not an impor tant feature o f border tenant right, w h i c h was on ly a recent 
development. Instead, border service was a local custom based i n the c o m m o n law 
ob l iga t ion to defend the border . 8 J.A. Tuck argues that constant ra id ing and feud ing 
changed the nature o f Border society b y 1500, creat ing a mi l i ta r ised area in the 
uplands o f the M i d d l e and West Marches, where al l tenants owed mi l i t a ry service as 
a part o f thei r tenure.^ M ichae l Bush refines these assertions b y demonstrat ing that 
m i l i t a r y service was spl i t in to t w o camps: freeholders who owed service through 
coraage, and customary tenants who owed through tenant right. For the former, 
m i l i t a r y service was but an ob l iga t ion ; for the latter i t was an intr insic part o f their 
tenure since non- fu l f i lmen t o f m i l i t a r y obl igat ions resulted i n eject ion. '^ J. L inda 
D r u r y has shown that this practice extended to the remote dales o f the B ishopr ic o f 
D u r h a m , w h i c h were subjected to raids, a l though on a lesser scale than the 
Nor thumber land f r on t i e r . " 
Absent from these wo rks is a detai led explanat ion regarding the necessity, 
and the speci f ic requirements, o f Border service. The need for border service is p la in 
enough. The s luggish system o f county commissions o f array, w h i c h gave the 
8 R. พ . Hoyle, ' A n Auncient and Laudable Custom: The Defini t ion and Development o f Tenant right 
in North-Westem England in the Sixteenth Century,' Past and Present 116 (1987), p. 25, 
^J.A. Tuck, "War and Society in the Medieval Nor th, " Northern History 21 (1985). 
'G M.L. Bush, Tenant Right in Tudor England: A Revision Revised' Bulletin of the John Rylands 
Library 77 (1995), p. 166. 
1 ' J. Linda Drury, More Stout than Wise: Tenant Right in Weardale in the Tudor Period," The Last 
Principality, ed. D. Marcombe (Nottingham: UNP， 1987). This issue o f mi l i tary obligation and tenant 
right in the sixteenth-century Borders has been only br ief ly discussed in this article. Also see Tough, 
Frontier, pp. 57-8. 
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government a body o f fencib le, i f unprofessional , soldiers, was far too impract ica l 
for the Ang lo-Scot t i sh Marches, where troops o f experienced men were o f ten 
needed w i thou t delay. I f Tough is correct, then perhaps the complex i t y o f the subject 
has proved daunt ing to scholars. N o doubt the scarcity o f source mater ia l i n the 
Nat iona l Arch ives has also discouraged any invest igat ion into the mechanics o f 
border m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion , and even the records that have surv ived suggest a 
confused practice. Tudor statesmen w ide l y debated the part iculars o f border service, 
and government records suggest that this f o r m o f m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion was any th ing 
but systematic. Mos t o f these debates were l i ke l y to have taken place in f ron t o f the 
Counc i l o f the N o r t h , the records fo r w h i c h are now lost. In an era when England 
was purpor ted ly re fo rm ing its m i l i t a ry , Marcher m i l i t a r y obl igat ions of ten 
befudd led, and even contradicted the m i l i t a r y schemes o f the c rown. 
Pensioners and Gentry 
That the pensioners were created l ong before the fa l l o f the Percys i n the m i d 
1530'ร suggests that the k ing ' s enl istment o f the gentry was not necessari ly paired 
w i t h a po l i cy o f undermin ing the Nor thern magnates. '^ Rather, i t appears that they 
were tapped in order to assist leading of f icers i n their funct ions. Pensioners were 
newcomers to the Marches, in terms o f m i l i t a r y organizat ion. The Cot ton M S S , 
Cal igu la B. I I and I I I conta in the State Papers that bear the earliest evidence o f the 
pensioners, the first o f such appearing in 1512. Mos t were prominent gentry. 
Pensioners came from the Marcher gentry fami l ies, such as the Herons, Camabyร, 
Ogles, Delavals, Horsleys, Co l l i ngwoods and Ratc l i f fes, amongst many others, and 
their numbers fluctuated throughout the wars w i t h Scotland. A l ist d rawn up i n 
1528 numbered rough ly fifty men, amongst w h o m were Lo rd Ogle , John 
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Widd r i ng ton , Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe , Reyno ld Camaby and Sir John Heron o f 
Chipchase. '^ 
The Wardens he ld u l t imate author i ty i n m i l i t a r y matters, except i n the 
1540'ร, when Warden-Generals began to a p p e a r , b u t the k ing ' ร pensioners were 
u l t imate ly ob l iged to serve as the immediate leaders o f the general populat ion o f 
Nor thumber land. Mos t pensioners were freeholders in the Marches, and were 
in t r icate ly t ied to the men that occupied their lands. Yet the m i l i t a ry ob l iga t ion o f 
the pensioners, w h i c h was essential ly to serve the k i n g in al l manners m i l i t a r y at any 
t ime, d i f fered from the m i l i t a r y ob l igat ion o f their tenants. Rather, the pensioner 
acted much more l i ke a mercenary or armed retainer, rece iv ing money for his 
assurances o f loya l ty and service. There is no evidence to indicate that this affected 
his tenure. Instead, his services fu l f i l l ed the duties imposed upon h i m b y comage. 
In deve lop ing pensioners to serve as m ino r m i l i t a ry leaders, the Counc i l i n 
London catalogued its resources i n order to keep better contro l over disbursements. 
The fluctuation o f the pensioners' numbers suggests that this group was managed 
w i t h some detai l . ๒ 1540, a c rown o f f i cer completed a book o f tenures that l isted 
al l p r inc ipa l landholders i n the county o f Nor thumber land, the ove rwhe lm ing 
ma jo r i t y o f w h o m had served as pensioners or off icers.*^ Th is document is 
important i n understanding the паШге o f m i l i t a r y service for the Marcher gentry 
since i t speci f ica l ly described that each freehold was st i l l bound by m i l i t a ry service. 
The preamble states that a l l major tenures, those o f the baronies and lordships, were 
M.L. Bush, T h e Problem o f the Far North. ' Northern History, vol. 6 (1971), pp. 42-3. 
' ^ B L , Calig. B. I l l f. 65. 
՚ 5 B L , Càlig, В. I I I ff. 203-4. In 1528， there were fifty pensioners on the payroll. By 1536, the crown 
had a body o f only thirty pensioners in the Northumberland Marches, a fluctuation that was most 
l ikely a result o f the truce wi th Scotland. 
՚ 6 NRO, MSS 1147/f,9, Book of Tenures, c. 1540, This fol io was prepared in the wake o f the fall o f 
the Percys. Most entries list the manor or locale, and the surname of the individual who held it. The 
identity o f the author is unknown, although Sir Wi l l i am Eure or Sir Cuthbert Ratcliffe, the current 
March Wardens, probably produced it wi th the aid o f their officers or Warden clerks. 
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freeholds that owed service d i rect ly to the c rown. Freehold ing guaranteed the 
m i l i t a ry ascendancy o f the k ing ' s pensioners, as they held the responsib i l i ty for 
muster ing al l o f the tenants w i t h i n their hold ings. A s tenants-in-chief, they prov ided 
the c rown w i t h a connect ion to Borderers who held land from them. M o r e detai led 
muster l ists complemented the l is t o f tenures.'^ In th is fashion, the c rown was able 
to keep an accurate total o f the po l i c ing force for Nor thumber land. Such record 
keeping faci l i tated m i l i t a r y administrat ion and i t presaged the better m i l i t a ry 
organisat ion that w o u l d take root under El izabeth. '^ 
The pensioning scheme further guaranteed that the pr inc ipa l landowners 
w o u l d render their m i l i t a r y service as required. It m igh t suggest that the k i n g needed 
to pay the gentry to per fo rm what they ought to have per formed freely, under the 
ob l igat ion to defend the realm. In the end, a l l i t was a means o f subsidis ing the 
Warden, whose salary had been drast ical ly cut du r ing the first Tudor 
administ rat ion. '^ W i t h the Tudor government pay ing the salary o f the pensioners, i t 
reduced the need fo r the Warden to fee the gentry. That they were to a id the Warden 
is p la in enough i n Hen ry ' ร exhortat ion to al l gent lemen o f the Nor thumber land 
Marches to 'considre h o w and i n what sorte you be bounde to serve Us b y the 
dewt ie o f your al legiaunce, ' and ' gyve your attendaunce uppon hym'.^*^ As ide from 
leading landowners and landlords, there were also roya l o f f icers in the f o r m o f 
March Wardens, the Governor o f Tynedale and Redesdale, and the captains o f the 
major castles and towns o f the East and M i d d l e Marches, al l o f w h o m wie lded the 
" Most are located either in PRO E/101, various accounts, or in E 36/173. 
18 Paul E.J. Hammer, Elizabeth 's Wars, (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave-MacMil lan, 2003), 
1 9 ^ . L. Storey, The Wardens o f the Marches o f England towards Scotland 1377-1489', English 
Historical Review, L X X I I (1957), p. 615. 
-° StP, V， p . l l 4 . 
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author i ty to cal l upon the services o f the pensioners as w e l l as the entire gentry.^' 
Thei r sole рифозе was thus mi l i ta ry . 
A l w a y s ип0еф іпп іп§ the incent ive o f salary, though, was the direct 
relat ionship that the pensioner shared w i t h the k ing . The k i n g of ten created new 
pensioners as a reward for service, their remunerat ion coming d i rect ly from his 
coffers. In 1528, many o f the pensioners who had helped to quel l L is le 'ร revol t i n 
Nor th Tynedale were g iven a fee ranging from ten to twenty marks.^*^ O f the rough ly 
two-dozen men l isted as pensioners in 1537, over h a l f were either current or filture 
of f icers. 23 Robert Co l l i ngwood served as constable o f W a r k in the late 1530'ร,^'^ 
wh i l e co l lect ing a pensioner 'ร salary ofSL6s,Sd, L o r d Ogle received 50/. i n 1537, 
hav ing already contr ibuted as a m i l i t a ry leader in 1533 dur ing a dar ing raid.^^ In 
1543, he served as v ice-Warden to Sir Ralph Eure, a l though it is unclear whether the 
k i n g personal ly appointed him.^^ Another reward for the pensioners was first choice 
for o f f i c ia l appointments, usual ly as Warden or Keeper, w h o m the k i n g personal ly 
selected after the down fa l l o f the Dacres and Percys. Th is royal patronage no doubt 
boosted the cred ib i l i t y o f the k ing , more than the combined benefact ion o f N o r f o l k 
and C r o m w e l l ; N o r f o l k s imp ly despised the Marchers, w h i l e C r o m w e l l never real ly 
had their f u l l trust. O n the other hand, the pensioners answered d i rect ly to the k i n g 
for any shor tcoming i n their ob l igat ion. Whenever the gent lemen pensioners 
disappointed the k i n g i n m i l i t a r y leadership, h is approach was to leave them to the 
wolves. W h e n gent lemen regular ly refused to answer the cal l dur ing the fa l lout 
2 ' The major castles o f the East and Middle marches were Wark, Etal, Norham, Alnwick, Warkworth, 
Harbottle and Prudhoe. Bamburgh and the ramparts o f Holy Island defended the coastline, but the 
former was in a state o f severe decay. Other stronghouses included Ayden, Chipchase, Hexham, 
Elsdon and Wooler, but these were owned and admmistered privately by border families. However, 
it should be noted that all towers and fort i f ied houses were held o f the king by knight 's service. 
է LP՝ IV(2) no. 3689. 
BL , Càlig. В. I IL , ff. 203-5. 
= PRO, E 36/173 ff. 114-15. 
= BL , Càlig. В. V I I f. 264. 
-Чл XV I I I ( 2 ) no, 236. 
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between T y n ėdale and Liddesdale in 1543, the k i n g threatened to look the other way 
when their propert ies were ravaged.^^ 
Apar t from their o w n ob l igat ion to serve, they were obl igated to prov ide 
leadership. Pensioners were responsible fo r ensur ing the upkeep o f their tenants' 
m i l i t a r y obl igat ions according to the custom o f the borders. A l l o f these pr inc ipa l 
fami l ies enforced border service amongst their tenants w h i l e themselves serv ing as 
pensioners and of f icers , and i t was usual ly royal musters that empowered these men 
to gather thei r tenants for war. I n February 1541, a typ ica l muster cal led for 
pensioners to muster al l 'servauntes tenauntes and others w i t h i n any your rowmes 
and o f f i ces , ' and to be ready to march at an hour 'ร notice.^^ A s many as possible o f 
those mustered were to serve as cavalry, 'every horsman to have his spere o r his 
j a v e l y n , ' the rest as archers and b i l imen . 29 Overa l l , the m i l i t a r y leadership o f the 
pensioners was on l y determined by the obl igat ions placed upon them b y custom, o r 
according to their patents and commissions when they became of f i c ia ls . Thus the 
gentry who mustered their tenants became ' cap ta in ' o f that band, no matter what 
size. A typ ica l band, mustered b y John Og le o f K i r k l a n d , numbered on ly eight 
horsed and harnessed men , though Og le no doubt had immediate command over 
them even when fo lded into a larger number o f l igh t cavalry. Th is ab i l i t y to operate 
i n smal l , fami l ia r groups, either as a part o f large armies or smal l ra id ing uni ts , gave 
the pensioners' bands versat i l i ty. 
Pensioners prov ided t w o v i ta l funct ions: defence f r o m the Scots, and 
po l i c ing the uplands. Retained gent lemen guided strategic raids into Scot land, as 
they d id i n 1543 when they burned Kelso.^ ' The f o l l o w i n g year witnessed other 
" PRO, SP 1/178 f. 53 (May เ7, 1543). 
-շ StP., V , p. 184. 
; ' 5 ř P . , V , p. 184. 
1° PRO, E 36/173 ff. 114-15. 
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raids led b y pensioners, most o f wh i ch complemented the royal po l i cy o f the ' rough 
w o o i n g ' . I n organis ing their tenants in to smal l units o f l ight cavalry, they he ld the 
key to the defence o f the Marches against raids, even i f , l i ke Ogle, they on l y had 
recourse to a smal l handfu l o f men. Smal l units led b y loya l Marchers were more 
appropriate for counter ing m inor incursions as large units o f horse of ten proved 
unwie ldy , a l though smal l bands were o f ten more vulnerable. For the most part, 
pensioners were to assist i n po l i c ing operations. Apar t from o w i n g m i l i t a r y service 
through comage the pensioners were required to stand against the rebel l ious 
sumame groups. Large po l ice raids w o u l d require the combinat ion o f a l l bands, 
wh i ch required the permission o f the Warden or Keeper, at very least. As the royal 
governor o f Tynedale, Sir Reyno ld Camaby o f ten invoked the author i ty to conduct 
raids against Eng l ish rebels and their Scott ish al l ies, and he suggested that a l l 
gent lemen pensioners l i v i n g in the East and M i d d l e M a r c h should part ic ipate w i t h 
their tenants.^^ Large raids of ten took the f o r m o f a chevauchée, as of f icers usual ly 
used to cut a swath o f destruct ion through the removed parts o f Nor thumber land and 
Scott ish Liddesdale in order to counter the threats o f the rebel l ious sumame bands.^՚՛ 
The Counc i l o f the No r t h f u l l y backed the employment o f the k i ng ' ร pensioners to 
keep the inhabitants o f Tynedale i n check, as roya l retainers were supposedly 
avai lable to serve the Wardens and Keeperร.^^ The pensioners thus not on l y 
prov ided an act ive pol ice force for the area, but also were at t imes authorised to take 
pre-empt ive act ion against the opponents o f the c rown . These are but a f e w 
examples o f how the border pensioners funct ioned as a m i l i t a ry ent i ty. 
]] LP, XV I I I ( 2 ) nos. 209, 262, 263, 319， 339 and 422. 
" LP, X I I I (2 ) no. 371 ; B L Calig. B. I l l ff. 251-3. 
PRO, SP 1/152 ff. 215-7; В Ц Titus F I I I f. 97. 
" LP. X I I I (2 ) nos. 404,414, and 415. 
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However , the overal l effectiveness o f border pensioners dur ing the A n g l o -
Scots wars is questionable. Pay seems to have been one o f the largest obstacles. 
Expenses for main ta in ing the Marcher defences were supposed to come f r o m the 
k i ng , yet there clear ly was no standard for the disbursement o f pensioner wages, nor 
was there even a consistent wage fo r the k i ng ' s of f icers. The Keepership o f 
Tynedale was subject to vast wage discrepancies; in 1537, Roger ' 'Hodge " à 
Fenwick received on ly 40 marks fo r his o f f i ce , a th i r ty-percent decrease from ten 
years before, wh i l e i n 1541 John Heron o f Chipchase received 100 marks. A f t e r 
his dismissal from o f f i ce , Lo rd Dacre swore that he w o u l d rather Mose a f inger o n 
each hand than meddle w i t h Tynedale, ' not o n l y because o f the inherent danger but 
due to the enormous cost."^^ The death o f Sir George Lawson i n 1543 meant that 
there was nobody avai lable to pay the k ing ' s pensioners on the borders un t i l another 
treasurer cou ld be appointed, though the Counc i l had a l lowed his o f f i ce to lapse.^^ 
This caused some g rumb l i ng amongst the k i n g ' ร tenants, as they went w i thou t 
compensat ion for the extraordinary services that fe l l outside o f their customary 
obl igat ions. In tu rn , the poorest pensioners cou ld not a f ford to compensate thei r 
tenants, wh i l s t others dug into thei r o w n pockets. A t one po in t , Heron was o w e d 
over two mon ths ' wages for his th i r ty -man garr ison i n T>Tใedale/^ H is predecessor 
i n Tynedale, the inef fectual Sir Reyno ld Camaby , compla ined o f the great expenses 
that he was ob l iged to pay as a m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r . I n 1543, Sir Thomas W h a r t o n 
admonished the k i n g regarding the re fo rm o f the Marchers, wast ing no t ime in 
po in t ing to the relat ionship between inef fec t ive roya l servants and their poor 
I I PRO, SP 1/122 ff. 212-13; B L Càlig, в V I I I f. 63 (Feb. 12， 1541) 
I l PRO, SP 1/124 ff. 234-37 (Sept. 15" 1537). 
LP, X V I I no. 580. 
40 PRO: SPI/129 ff. 138-39 (Feb 27， 1538); ibid, 1/154 ff. 96-97. 
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salaries; Whar ton s imp ly suggested that h igher pay w o u l d produce better results 
from the gentry.՚^՝ 
There was yet another star t l ing weakness i n the pensioner scheme. Even the 
most act ive pensioners w h o also served as of f icers found i t d i f f i cu l t to enforce 
Border service amongst a l l o f their tenants. L o r d Ogle , who ranked amongst the 
wealthiest, was heav i ly endowed w i t h lands and manors֊֊over twenty smaller 
m anors throughout Nor thumber land , as w e l l as the Baronies o f Southal l and Hepple. 
His pos i t ion as V ice -Warden under the Percys should have further strengthened h is 
m i l i t a ry base. Ye t i n his barony o f Hepple, fewer than h a l f o f Og le ' s tenants were 
able men w i t h horse or harness."*^ W i thou t men who were able to serve or equip 
themselves w i t h proper m i l i t a ry equipment. Og le 's vast estates remained m i l i t a r i l y 
inadequate. L o r d Dacre, whose pr inc ipa l ho ld ings lay across the р ermines i n 
Gi ls land and the West March , he ld the impor tant Barony o f Morpe th , a long w i t h a 
col lect ion o f several other manors and tracts. Dacre 'ร tenants were no better armed 
than were those o f Lo rd Ogle. The Grays o f Ch i l l i ngham, w h o also accounted fo r 
large tracts throughout Northumberland,'*^ were also weak. Th i s is suqî r is ing, 
consider ing that Sir Roger Gray, the lord o f Ch i l l i ngham, was a leading m i l i t a r y 
figure in the East Marches, of ten representing the Engl ish du r ing days o f ք6ճք6տտ.՛*՛՛ 
Despite his po l i t i ca l c lout , muster retums from his lands were far in fer io r to the 
results from either Dacre o r Ogle. I n Woo le r , on l y 10 men out o f s ix ty - four were 
suitably equipped. Het ton was worse, as not one o f the eighteen men w h o appear i n 
4 2 John Hodgson, "Muster o fT inda le , Redesdale, Bambrough and Glendale Wards" printed in John 
Fenwick, ed. Tracts Relating to the Counties of Northumberland and Durham, vol. 4, (Newcastle, 
1856). ' 
4 3 These included Aykeld, Humbledon and the strategic tower o f Wooler. 
^ PRO, E 36/254 ff. 245-67. 
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the muster carried any weapons at a l l . The Gray manor o f Coupland fa i red the best, 
w i t h eight f u l l y armed men , and one unarmed tenant."^^ 
The Ratc l i f fes, Herons, and Lo rd Ta i lboyร also f igured i n the pens ion ing 
scheme as prominent landowners, w i t h each o f these fami l ies ho ld i ng lands scattered 
throughout Northumberland."^^ The i r tenants were s im i la r l y equipped, a l though their 
unconsol idated hold ings added yet another disadvantage. W h i l e the possession o f 
scattered lands is not untypica l o f the Tudo r aristocracy, i n a mi l i tar ised area l i ke the 
Borders i t became a l iab i l i t y . Smal l hold ings were easy prey, as demonstrated by the 
Liddesdalers' successfii l ra id against Capheaton i n 1543. The Fenwicks and 
Swinbums, the p r imary landowners, were powerless to stop the ra id , wh i le no t rod 
was organised. Th is encouraged a lady o f the M i l b u m ร , whose fa rm had been 
ransacked, to appeal to her k i n i n No r th Tynedale for revenge /^ Such smal l p iots o f 
land were d i f f i cu l t to defend against raids, and were unable to support the number o f 
horsemen that such defences norma l l y required, fo rc ing lords and tenants to depend 
upon their neighbours fo r m i l i t a r y support. 
Furthermore, a lack o f cohesion amongst the pensioners and gentry 
undermined the government 's attempts to raise armies in the Marches. W h e n i t 
came to broader issues o f nat ional securi ty, Border pensioners were o n l y somet imes 
able to leave aside their dif ferences and serve as thei r tenures had commanded. The 
enmi ty between Lo rd Dacre and Sir Thomas Whar ton d id not stop the men o f 
Bewcastledale and other Dacre strongholds from answer ing the cal l to arms i n 
October 1545."*^ Ye t musters took place i n a l l Border shires i n A p r i l 1547,"^^ w h i c h 
ご Hodgson, "Muster" , pp. 37-51. 
4 6 NRO, 1147/f.9. Book of Tenures, c. 1540. 
4 7 BL , Add. MSS, 32649, ff. 146 (December 12, 1543). The M i lbumร ranked as one o f the four 
surnames o f Nor th Tynedale. 
4 9 PRO, SP 10/1, no. 36; SP 10/2, no. 5. 
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many Marchers fa i led to answer; the Counc i l sent Lo rd Dacre a wa rn i ng regard ing 
his tenants' reluctance to serve w i t h the k i n g ' s army, w h i c h was an extension o f 
their hatred o f Lo rd Whar ton , w h o was L o r d Dacre 'ร natural rival.Neither was 
this was not the first occurrence. I n 1542, Whar ton t r ied to ecl ipse Dacre 'ร 
cont r ibut ion to the v ic to ry at So lway Moss, since Dacre had fa i led to muster fo r a 
ra id the week before, Thus the nature o f Border tenures, w h i c h necessitated the 
leadership o f an immedia te landlord or pensioner, cou ld be pu l led in to a feud, an 
inherent weakness in the m i l i t a ry strength o f Nor thumber land . 
W h i l e serving as pensioners, some o f these fami l ies conducted feuds w i t h 
each other; be ing far removed from any court , Borderers settled their d i f ferences 
through personal means, ranging from i n fo rma l meetings to out r ight v io lence, the 
latter be ing a preferred opt ion. The Heron-Carr feud o f 1557 is a p r ime example o f 
this as i t threatened to undo the who le o f Nor thumber land . In a b id to regain Ford 
castle from Thomas Carr, who had come in to possession o f Ford b y m a r r y i n g 
El izabeth Heron , the Herons o f Chipchase enl isted the help o f the constable o f 
Be rw ick , John D i x o n , an arrangement that was faci l i tated b y Gi les Heron , treasurer 
o f the Berw ick ga r r i son /^ The p lan was s imple : D i x o n and his men w o u l d fo rc ib l y 
evict Thomas Carr, and the Herons w o u l d march i n to regain possession o f their 
important fami l i a l seat. The dispute degenerated into v io lence, w i t h several deadly 
frays/^ B y the end o f the feud, Gi les Heron , the M a y o r o f Be rw i ck , and Thomas 
Carr were dead, and several important members o f the gentry were imp l ica ted , 
leav ing the defence o f the countryside w i d e open to Scott ish inroads. 
^' ร.G. Ellis, Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 247-48. 
Talbot MSS, V o l D. ff. 5, 6, 10. 
5 3 Maureen Meik le, 'Northumberland Divided: Anatomy of a Sixteenth-Century Bloodfeud. ' 
Archaeoiogia Aeiiana 5th series, vol. 20 (1992), pp. 79-89. 
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Sometimes, the gentry clashed w i t h each other when one party refused to 
carry out his obl igat ions as a pensioner o r lead ing person. In June 1543, Sir Rafe 
El lerkar and Sir Robert Bowes arrested the b a i l i f f o f Woo le r , Roger Gray, fo r 
refusing to issue musters as commanded.^"* Gray refused to cooperate since neither 
he nor his men desired to be conscripted for service in France. No t a l l the gentry 
were o f the same m i n d when i t came to m i l i t a r y service. 
Fear o f the deadly feud was equal ly deb i l i ta t ing to m i l i t a r y obl igat ions o f the 
gentry. D u r i n g the rampages o f the Hesleyside Char l tons and their L iddesdale 
friends dur ing the summer o f 1538, many o f the gent ry s imp ly abandoned the i r 
houses in order to keep out o f the feud.^^ M a n y also avoided their ob l iga t ion to 
f o l l o w the hot t rod, or even to see through w i t h the prosecut ion and execut ion o f a 
malefactor lest their actions or test imony engender a deadly feud w i t h the relat ives 
o f the persecuted individuals.^^ W h e n k insmen set Gerard Char l ton free du r ing a 
Hexham ja i lbreak i n 1538, i t was probably a l l owed to happen as the pensioners i n 
charge o f the watch d id not care to tangle w i t h a sumame that cou ld raise far more 
l ight cavalry than a l l o f the pensioners i n the South T y n e val ley. The i r comp l i c i t y in 
the ja i lbreak is on l y suggested b y their su rv i v ing the event unmolested,^^ as the 
surnames had a reputat ion for k n i f i n g uncooperat ive sentries.^* B y 1543, L o r d 
L is le , the Warden General , remarked that ' there is such envy, hatred, d isdain and 
mal ice amongst them that one o f them w o u l d see another 'ร throat cut rather than 
they w i l l rise to go out o f their doors to save their ne ighbour 'ร goods.'59 In part , 
^ 4 P , X V I I I ( l ) n o . 775 . 
[ [ P R O , SP 1/134 f f . 1 4 0 - 4 1 . 
B L , C à l i g . В . V I I I f. 106. 
5 8 P R O SP 1/5 ff. 229 and 7 3 0 ; B L , C a l i g . B. V I f. 4 0 7 . I t was repor ted af ter the bat t le o f F l o d d e n that 
the surnames had neu t ra l i sed E n g l i s h sentr ies so that t hey c o u l d s m u g g l e p r i soners from the E n g l i s h 
camp . T h e i r t rea tment o f the T y n e d a l e ga r r i son i n 1525 , i n w h i c h the en t i re g a r r i s o n was p u t t o f l i g h t 
and Tarset Cast le razed, gave the da lesmen a r e p u t a t i o n f o r k i l l i n g b o t h wh i tecoa ts and sentr ies. 
' ' L P , X V I I I ( l ) n o . 141 
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according to L is le , thei r feuds were responsible fo r thei r inact ion i f the Scots were 
target ing a rival. The i r o w n confession o f their i nab i l i t y to resist the Tynedale 
thieves is much more conv inc ing , as they wro te the Counc i l o f their 'pa ins ' suf fered 
from the 'ma l i ce o f the said Tynedales. '^^ The connect ion o f k i t h and k i n amongst 
the dalesmen thus gave them a dist inct advantage over the pensioners, and it was 
we l l k n o w n that their b lackmai l was much less pa in fu l than their wra th . 
There exist numerous other examples o f the m i l i t a r y inadequacies o f the 
pensioners. The numerous plots b y the surnames o f Nor thumber land of ten 
overwhelmed meagre resources. In late spr ing 1538, Sir Robert C o l l i n g w o o d and 
John Horse ly rode into Tynedale to reconnoitre the g r o w i n g unrest between the 
surname groups, on l y to report that the men res id ing there were w i l d , w i thou t ru le, 
and p lo t t ing against their keepers.^* In spr ing 1541 ， Sir John Widd r i ng ton was 
unable to repel immedia te ly a ra id at his castle at Hough ton , and a few weeks later a 
group o f Tyneda le rs―Char l t ons and probably their Heron a l l i e s ― g r i e v o u s l y 
assaulted W i l l i a m Camaby and t w o others.^^ These actions went unpunished. 
Further evidence suggests that the m i l i t a r y capacity o f the pensioners had 
suffered a decl ine i n the years leading up to the wars o f 1542-60. W i t h this decl ine 
came a breakdown o f law enforcement, as the k i n g ' ร pensioners were unable to 
control the m i l i t a ry m igh t o f the Border sumame groups. In 1538， the Warden o f 
the Engl ish M i d d l e M a r c h , Sir John W idd r i ng ton , reported that rebels f r o m the 
Pi lgr image o f Grace were the cause o f certain troubles i n Tynedale and Redesdale, 
wh ich was w i t h i n his j u r i sd i c t i on , yet no help f r o m his gent lemen pensioners ever 
materialised.^"^ W h e n Richard and Gi lber t Camaby a long w i t h two dozen members 
o f their household d id mob i l i ze against an incurs ion, a l l were taken pr isoner w h i l e 
6 0 R o b s o n , English Highland Clans, p. 124. 
6 ' L P , Χ Ι Π ( 1 ) η ο . 9 1 3 . 
LF, X V I nos. 843 and 982 . 
154 
they followed the trod; 64 it is improbable that the gentlemen pensioners o f the South 
Tyne val ley were eager to descend upon Liddesdale i n order to retr ieve them. Sir 
Reynold Camaby appealed d i rect ly to C r o m w e l l , and stated that the k i n g had been 
far too soft on the rebels and sumame groups, a l though the real i ty was that the 
pensioners had not made ef fect ive contr ibut ions to po l i c i ng for fear o f reprisals. Sir 
Reyno ld , ever the proponent o f pun i t i ve expedi t ions, was convinced that the 
surnames were hardened cr imina ls ; on ly a sw i f t and power fu l ra id w o u l d dislodge 
them from their fo r t i f i ed houses and hideouts.^^ The opposite occurred, as the 
surnames overpowered the gent lemen Marchers. The fact that the Char l tons cou ld 
spr ing Gerard Char l ton from j a i l at Hexham was an ind ic tment o f the pensioners and 
the watch that they were supposed to r e g u l a t e . E q u a l l y damn ing was the report that 
the hue and c ry had not been raised, a te l l i ng fa i lure o f the Marchers and their 
creaking system o f m i l i t a r y obl igat ion.^^ Acco rd i ng to the Ear l o f Westmore land, 
w h o helped lead a commiss ion to investigate the ja i lb reak, Camaby 'ร inab i l i t y to 
enforce any sort o f ob l iga t ion , as we l l as his o w n ignorance, was more to b lame than 
the actions o f a few outlaพร.^^ The inquest into the ja i lb reak at Hexham was stopped 
short when the Tynedalers abducted Camaby , a f ina l insul t to the man w h o cou ld 
not muster the strength o f the marches despite h is best ef forts. A l t hough he was set 
free at length, there arose serious doubts o f his ab i l i t y to contro l Tynedale.^^ 
The bung l ing that marred such affairs was a w ide r p rob lem than most 
Marchers w o u l d admi t to the k i n g and the Pr ivy Counc i l . T o be fair, Camaby was 
not alone i n his fa i lure to cont ro l the un ru l y elements w i t h i n his j u r i sd i c t i on ; Sir 
" ¿ p , x i n ( i ) n o . 1366. 
" LP, X I I I ( l ) no . 1493 a n d 115 ( v o l . 2 ) . A l l o f the E n g l i s h M a r c h e r s we re h e l d b y the L i ddesda le 
E l l i o t s and subsequen t l y r a n s o m e d b y S i r T h o m a s W h a r t o n , W a r d e n o f the E n g l i s h W e s t M a r c h . 
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John W idd r i ng ton was ut ter ly unable to exact any service from the pensioners in the 
distr icts o f Coquetdale and Redesdale, w h i c h were w i t h i n his o w n ju r i sd ic t ion . Even 
the Duke o f N o r f o l k jeered at their m i l i t a r y inadequacies: 
A l l the contres under m y commiss ion be aswel l ordered as I w o l d wisshe, save 
on l y Tynda le and Ryddesdale, w i c h be under the govemaunce o f Wedr ign ton 
and Camaby; and they so far owte o f frame that o f force I must ride to those 
parties. Wedr ing ton w o l d fayne do w e l l , but surely i t is not i n h y m . Camaby is 
so ferde o f his person that he dothe no th ing but кере the house. M e n dothe 
moche doubte o f his hardyness, hav ing yet shewed no parte o f manhode sithe 
his first c o m m i n g thi ther. I w o l d they were boothe in Paradise, so other good 
were in ther rowmes;™ 
Inevi tab ly , Camaby lost h is pos i t ion, replaced as Keeper o f Tynedale by L i t t l e John 
Heron o f Chipchase.^' 
Coord inat ion was the key to enforc ing m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion , but since the 
pensioners were separated b y distr ic t , and therefore answered to d i f ferent o f f icers , 
the surnames o f the Nor thumber land dales w o u l d a lways gain the upper hand. 
Heron 'ร appointment saw some re fo rm to the m i l i t a r y organisat ion o f the Marches, 
and a part ia l so lu t ion to this disadvantage. Heron sought to re l ieve some o f the 
probi ems related to the lack o f power amongst the pensioners b y res id ing i n the 
heart o f Tynedale w i t h a company o f l ight horse, o f fe r ing his o w n house at 
Chipchase, w h i c h was already fo r t i f i ed and suitable for such p u r p o s e s . H e r o n was 
also better-connected than the previous Keepers. H is numerous relatives inc luded 
the Herons o f the Ha l lbameร, Roger Heron o f Corbr idge, and the power fu l Herons 
՛՛Լ LP, X I V no . 50 . 
™ StP., V , p. 104. է LP, X V , nos. 57 a n d 94 . 
7 2 W h e n he t o o k leave o f h is o f f i c e , he w o u l d t r y to ar range f o r another house i n a " q u i e t e r " loca le , 
unde rsco r i ng the M a r c h e r g e n t r y ' s des i re to l i ve i n the m o r e set t led areas o f N o r t h u m b e r l a n d . 
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o f Ford.^^ Heron also bel ieved that the keeper o f Tynedale ought to act as the keeper 
o f Redesdale as w e l l , since he personal ly used Redesdale men to pol ice Tynedale, 
Fur thermore, he suggested that the l iber ty o f Tynedale should annex the Regal i ty o f 
Hexham, the Barony o f Langley, and Ridgedale in order to coordinate a l l m i l i t a r y 
act iv i ty and organize raids in a more coherent fashion/"^ H is words had some effect 
w i t h the P r i vy Counc i l , as he received the keepership o f Redesdale in summer o f 
1540, a l though the other lands remained out o f his grasp for the t ime b e i n g / ^ Thus 
the Keeper o f Tynedale and Redesdale e f fec t ive ly became the commander o f the 
largest cohesive body o f armed men in Nor thumber land. Th is arrangement o f doub le 
governorship surv ived Heron 's tenure, as Sir Ra lph Eure and Sir Robert Bowes 
became the successive governors o f bo th Tynedale and Redesdale. A s a result, larger 
bodies o f men were d r a w n into service, w i t h many o f the Tynedale and Redesdale 
serv ing as soldiers i n the k ing ' ร band.?6 Mos t impor tant ly , i t led to greater 
coord inat ion o f the gentry and pensioners fo r law enforcement, as the Keeper 
reported that he was now able to re ly on ' the most act ive m e n ' fo r the po l i c ing o f the 
dales.^^ 
A l t h o u g h the gentry and pensioners eventual ly experienced better 
coord inat ion o f their ef for ts , there was yet another aspect o f Border defence that 
some o f the gent ry had neglected. M u c h o f the Marcher gentry had ignored their 
imp l i c i t ob l iga t ion to keep their towers and barmk inร i n good repair for the benefi t 
o f their tenants. I n 1542, when Sir Ra lph EUerkar and Sir Robert Bowes returned the 
7 3 T h e H e r o n s were i n fact an o l d M a r c h f a m i l y , so the n u m e r o u s H e r o n g raynes that had set t led the 
N o r t h and Sou th T y n e and F o r d cast le p r o v i d e d an exce l len t n e t w o r k o f k i n s h i p . H o d g s o n ' s 
Northumberland con ta ins a c o m p l e t e f a m i l y tree o f the H e r o n f a m i i y . ：ご LP, X V no , 4 8 7 . 
7 5 LP, X V no . 9 8 7 . 
7 6 B o t h Eu re and B o w e s w e r e ab le to send la rge con t i ngen ts o f N o r t h e r n H o r s e to ga r r i son and to 
France. See LP, X I X ( l ) no . 2 2 7 and BL， A d d . M S S 3 2 6 5 4 f. 2 0 7 f o r a desc r i p t i on o f a t yp i ca l 
c o m p a n y ra ised i n the dales. 
" P R O , SP 1/158 f f . 72 -3 . 
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results o f their survey, i t ref lected a g r o w i n g trend o f decaying fortresses, 's The i r 
survey demonstrated the frustrat ions o f the gentry: most had abandoned their 
ho ld ings in the uplands and in the areas that were prone to raids, and had opted fo r 
the quieter and more settled areas o f the East and M i d d l e Marches. The hardest h i t 
area i n the East M a r c h were areas abut t ing Glendale and T i l lmou th . B iermore, 
Bar r ing ton , T w i z e l and Duddo towers were ut ter ly wasted, hav ing been destroyed b y 
the Scots. W a r k castle, the ' key to re l i e f and succour, ' according to the survey, was 
in ru ins. The areas surrounding the castle were 'u t ter ly was ted / wh i l e many o f the 
towers had been lef t to decay7^ Even Ford castle, the seat o f the Herons o f Ford , 
required repairs to its wa l l s , wh i ch were damaged i n the campaigns o f James r v . 
Ho r ton , Fenton and Nesbi t , a l l owned b y the power fu l Grays o f Ch i l l i ngham, were 
decayed despite their strategic va lue, and much to the d ismay o f Bowes. The 
depredations o f border warfare were the ma in cause for such wastage, and for the 
neglect o f the peles and stronghouses that had secured certain areas i n earlier years. 
A s a so lu t ion, Bowes suggested that the k i n g should order absentee landlords back 
to the strategic ho ld ings o f the uplands, so that the t roubled areas o f Tynedale and 
Redesdale cou ld be settled once again.^^ Bowes went as far as dra f t ing a letter w h i c h 
the k i n g m igh t send to h is pensioners, the gist o f wh i ch reminded the recipient o f his 
m i l i t a r y ob l igat ions as county leader.si The letter i tse l f does not invoke any specif ic 
ob l iga t ion ; i t s imp ly imp l i ed that al l M a r c h gent lemen, especial ly leading lords and 
pensioners, had a duty to keep their towers i n good condi t ion. However , that 
absentee landlords left their tenants open to the ravages o f border warfare led to 
78 LP, X V I no . 1399. A l s o see Chap te r 3 f o r a d i scuss ion o f t owers a n d f o r t i f i ca t i ons . 
Դ P R O SP 1/168՜ ff. 19-54 {Bowes ' Survey of the Borders, ¡541). 
8" I b i d . 
8 ' T h i s let ter was p e n n e d o n l y h a l f w a y է Խ օ ս § հ B o w e s ， c i r cu i t . I t seems that m a n y o f the towers i n 
the E n g l i s h coun t r i es oppos i te T e v i o t d a l e a n d T w e e d a l e had been abandoned af ter the A n g l o - S c o t t i s h 
c o n f l i c t s o f the ea r l y s i x teen th cen tu ry . 
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strained relat ionships between the pensioners and their tenants, causing breakdowns 
i n tenant ob l igat ions. 
The M i d d l e March fared much better i n Bowes ' assessments. Nevertheless, 
Harbot t le castle, w h i c h commanded the troublesome area o f Redesdale, was i n 
extreme ruins. L o r d Ta i lboyร , who held the castle from the k i ng as part o f the 
ancient บ m f r a v i l l e inheri tance, was ent i re ly absent from this upland ho ld ing , and 
had a l lowed the sur rounding area to become wasted over the previous two decades. 
Th is was the except ion as more active gentry and pensioners appear to have resided 
i n the M i d d l e Ma rch . Sir Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe 'ร towers at Car t ington and Throp ton 
were bo th i n good standing, as were the towers o f the Blekensopps and Th i r lwa ls . 
W i d d r i n g t o n strongholds o f Great Swinburne and Haughton were decayed, a l though 
Sir John's propert ies had been subject o f recent attacks. Of fse t t ing this b lemish were 
the towers at Har t ing ton H a l l , 'Sawnes' and Wa l l i ng ton , al l o f w h i c h Sir John 
Fenwick kept i n ' good repair ' . So w h y was the M i d d l e March so much better 
for t i f ied? Part o f the answer lies in its p r o x i m i t y to the lawless dales. Tynedale and 
Redesdale were a l l w i t h i n s t r ik ing distance, and it was general prudence that caused 
most o f the pensioners to keep their basties and barmk inร in reasonable good repair. 
The East M a r c h , on the other hand, had not suffered an invasion in almost th i r ty 
years, and a l though there was st i l l the threat o f Scott ish invasion, the area was much 
more stable, especial ly i n the coastal p la in , as Maureen M e i k l e has argued. W h i l e 
the Haughton ra id suggested a lack o f prepared defences amongst the gentry, the real 
culpr i ts were the magnates and the k i n g h imsel f , as the ma in castles o f Harbot t le , 
Etal and W a r k , as w e l l as the j a i l at Hexham were al l dangerously decayed. 
8 2 M a u r e e n M e i k l e , ' L a i r d s and G e n t l e m e n : A S t u d y o f the L a n d e d F a m i l i e s o f the Easter A n g l o -
Sco t t i sh B o r d e r s c. 1 5 4 0 - 1 6 0 3 . ' ( E d i n b u r g h P h . D . , 1988) p p . 1-8 
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Compla in ts regarding the pensioning system cont inued throughout the 1540'ร. 
In the Eng l ish East and M i d d l e Marches, an account o f the avai lable m i l i t a r y 
resources led to an examinat ion o f border service. The d ismant l ing o f the 
pensioning scheme was closely t ied to the occupat ion o f Scot land, when 
Nor thumber land ceased, albeit temporar i ly , to share a f ront ier w i t h Scotland. I t was 
clear as early as November 1547 that Somerset intended to ut ter ly re fo rm the 
pensioning strucณre when he ordered L o r d Grey de W i l t o n to audit the pensioners 
who resided w i t h i n Nor thumber land , resul t ing in their temporary dismissal.^^ The 
pensioning system seems to have been rev ived the next year, but in 1549, a l l 
Wardens were ordered to examine whether or not pensioners serv ing as l ight 
horsemen on the borders were an unprof i table burden, as the garrisons o f Scot land 
were then p rov id ing the screen for N o r t h u m b e r l a n d . T h e r e was also a cal l fo r the 
reforms o f any abuse regarding soldiers. I n A p r i l 1549, V iscount L is le vo iced his 
distaste fo r the pensioners, his op in ion in fo rmed by the dismal service they gave 
dur ing his service as Warden-General i n 1543. I n v o k i n g " the auncient d isc ip l ine o f 
war " , L is le refused to tolerate the slackness that had penetrated the garrisons, 
al though m u c h o f h is c r i t i c ism was aimed at in land men who had fled south to their 
home c o u n t i e s . A l t h o u g h the reforms suggest that the pensioners were no longer 
serving their purpose, i t is l i ke l y that most o f the e l ig ib le Nor thumbr ian gent lemen 
were exhausted b y the constant Anglo-Scot t ish conf l ic t . S t i l l , i n 1552, the gentry 
were warned for thei r uncooperat ive behaviour, ind icat ing that many were s t i l l 
u n w i l l i n g to fiilfil thei r m i l i t a ry duties. 
I] Addenda, I， no . 52 . 
Addenda, ԱԼ no . 55 . 
8 5 Pau l L. H u g h e s and James F. L a r k i n (eds. ) . Tudor Royai Proclamations, I I , L o n d o n : Y a l e 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964 ) ; G r a f t o n ' s P roc lama t i ons , 33v . and L o n d o n Journa ls , 16, 13. 
8り A P C , I I I , p. 4 7 3 . 
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A l t hough the gentry no longer received fees for thei r m i l i t a ry ac t iv i ty after 
1550, the system o f watch and ward prov ided a more ef fect ive substitute. A l t hough 
this was not regulated d i rec t l y b y the c rown , at least i t p rov ided the gentry w i t h a 
better-def ined j o b than act ing as a pensioner, and i t was better suited g iven the 
nature o f the Marches. The pensioning system was at first a workab le p lan, but the 
rift between the average Marcher and the gent leman who was supposed to ensure his 
support i n m i l i t a ry af fa i rs had g rown too w ide as a result o f the tension between 
royal service and local feud.^^ Whereas custom was the d r i v i ng force behind 
ob l igat ion, the pensioners w i t h their new ly created m i l i t a ry powers clashed w i t h a 
local commun i t y that was already gravely f racณred. Resentment towards the 
pensioners grew as many expected Border defence to be per formed b y those who 
had received the k i ng ' ร salaries, w h i c h caused many to forgo the ob l igat ion o f 
t radi t ional Border defence. However , the pensioners were not d i rect ly responsible 
for the decl ine o f Border defence, as has been claimed.^^ Border m i l i t a r y obl igat ions 
suffered most heav i ly f r o m both fear o f the deadly feud, and the асШаІ pursuit o f 
feud. The enmi ty that existed between some o f the pensioners, such as the feuds 
between the Herons and the Can*ร, i n part undermined the m i l i t a r y strength o f the 
Marches. Unde r l y i ng th is tension was that the pensioners rel ied ut ter ly upon their 
tenants, retainers and f a m i l y members fo r m i l i t a r y strength. Wi tness the d i f f i cu l t y 
that even the m i l i t an t Sir Thomas Whar ton had i n muster ing men from the lordships 
o f the Earl o f Cumber land and L o r d Dacre, both o f w h o m despised Whar ton for his 
ambi t ion and po l i t i ca l success w i t h the king.^^ Ye t , Dacre 'ร men had no object ion i n 
serving the next n ight w i t h Sir W i l l i a m Musgrave in the clash at So lway Moss. 
90 
こ: See Chap te r 7. 
88 M e i k l e , ' L a i r d s and G e n t l e m e n ' p . 183. 
8 ( ) LP, X V I I no . 1119. M . E . James, Change and Continuity in the Tudor North: The Rise of Thomas 
First Lord Wharton, B o r t h w i c k Papers, v o l . 27 ( Y o r k , \965),passim. 
なՐ, X V I I no . 1 1 2 1 . 
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Marcher loyal t ies cou ld be f i ck le . When loya l , marchers served their lords fiercely. 
A s rebels, they could spoi l the grand designs o f the counci l i n London . S t i l l , many o f 
the pensioners served du t i fu l l y , but their author i ty w i t h i n their o w n lordships 
decl ined whenever they pursued their o w n agendas. 
Retinues. Border Service and Tenantry 
Border landhold ing dictated the terms o f one's m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion i n the 
Marches. Even though al l men were expected to serve the warden dur ing b r i e f raids 
and to answer the cal l to the fray, this was not the sole foundat ion o f m i l i t a r y service 
i n the Marches. The on l y men w h o could be re l iably tapped on a regular basis for 
border service were the gentry and their tenants, and even this proved d i f f i cu l t as 
many tenants were too poor to a f ford arms, or were i n f i rm . Th is made it near ly 
impossible to raise forces by quota, so muster-masters were v i r tua l l y useless in the 
Marches, w h i c h meant that roya l musters made on ly rare appearances i n 
Northumber land.*" In general, the c rown was not as active in enforc ing m i l i t a r y 
ob l igat ion amongst the rank and file o f Nor thumber land since its p r imary concern 
was fo rg ing ties w i t h either the pensioners or gentry. Occasional ly , the Tudor 
monarchs made queries and cr i t ic isms regarding border service and tenure, a l though 
their part ic ipat ion i n the rout ine o f rais ing bands was l im i ted . Th is in turn gave the 
leading M a r c h of f icers a pr inc ipa l role i n ensuring compl iance, and a carte blanche 
to introduce new methods o f enforc ing border service. 
The p r imary mark o f qua l i f i ca t ion for m i l i t a ry leadership was a sizeable 
ret inue that one could raise at w i l l . A t the core o f each ret inue was the gentry 
household; the numbers o f fencib le men i n each household obv ious ly fluctuated, but 
" T h e M a r c h e s were gene ra l l y e x e m p t from mos t musters . T h e o n l y na t i ona l mus te r that i n c l u d e d 
N o r t h u m b e r l a n d was i n 1538/9 . See N R O M S S Z A N m . l 3 / d . l 5 . 
162 
in the Borders they rarely rose above f i f teen horsed and harnessed men. In the 1539 
musters, Sir Reynold Camaby 'ร household accounted for twe lve men , w i t h each 
man sui tably armed as a l ight caval ryman. Sir Cuthbert Ratei і f f e also produced 
twe lve fencible men in his household, but t w o , Thomas Marcam and Pat Hopk iss , 
were bo th unhorsed, but harnessed nevertheless.^^ Mos t o f the gentry had m u c h 
smaller households, w i t h correspondingly smaller retinues. The Captain o f Wark 
could c la im on l y five men i n his personal ret inue, wh i l e Lo rd Og le had on ly eight 
men. A l t hough each member o f the household was expected to j o i n his lo rd in the 
field, the overal l m i l i t a ry cont r ibut ion o f the gentry 's retinues o f the East and M i d d l e 
Marches was qui te smal l . O n roya l muster l ists, the gentry households looked smal l 
even compared to the smaller hamlets o f Nor thumber land, many o f w h i c h produced 
a dozen or more men. However , the muster o f 1539 showed that households were 
much better armed in general than the levies o f each township. The qua l i ty o f the 
soldiers that served in personal retinues o f the Nor thumber land gentry even 
8ифа88Є(1 the qua l i ty o f garr ison soldiers, as Lieutenant-General Her t fo rd noted that 
the retinues were better horsed. 
Retinues were comprised o f bo th f a m i l y members and tenants or neighbours. 
Included in Reyno ld Caraaby 'ร household were Gi lber t , An thony , and W i l l i a m 
Camaby. Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe 'ร household on l y contained one f a m i l y member, 
Edward , his eldest son.95 Instead, Ratc l i f fe ' s household ut i l ised connections to 
leaders o f local bands. I n the Tynedale wards, some o f the dominant fami l ies i n the 
musters inc luded the Gal lons, Shaftoes, and Harbott les. These fami l ies compr ised 
most o f Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe 'ร household, their ties g i v i ng Ratc l i f fe a substantial 
N R O M S S Z A N m . l 3 / d , 1 5 
9 3 N R O M S S Z A N m . l 3 / d . l 5 
LP, X V I I no . 1083. 
9 5 N R O , Z A N m . l 3 / d . l 5 
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mi l i t a ry base.96 I n the garr ison at w ark castle, the constable, John Can*, employed 
no less than seven f am i l y members, al l o f w h o m served as cavalry chiefs.^^ 
Retinues o f the Nor thumber land gentry thus appear to be typ ica l o f the Eng l ish 
gentry as a who le . The combinat ion o f immedia te f am i l y members and members o f 
local society prov ided an a f f in i ty , wh i ch equated to m i l i t a ry power. L i k e any armed 
ret inue, m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion owed to the ch ie f householder was heav i ly in f luenced b y 
this personal relat ionship. However , the d im inu t i ve retinues o f the Nor thumber land 
gentry meant that both pensioners and regular gentry looked outside o f their core 
retinue fo r broader m i l i t a r y support, when needed. 
Bo th the gentry and pensioners were mos t l y dependent upon their tenants to 
flesh out their muster returns. A large number o f tenants equated a larger poo l o f 
m i l i t a ry resources, wh i ch prov ided scattered results for Nor thumber land i n general. 
A n assessment d rawn up in the late 1530'ร shows that typ ica l band sizes for the 
Nor thumber land gentry dur ing this per iod ranged between five and 200 men , the 
upper number be ing we l l beyond what a mere household migh t supply.^^ The ch ie f 
of f icers o f the marches, namely the wardens and the sherif f , suppl ied upwards o f 
100 horsed men, most o f w h o m were part o f their permanent, fee 'd posses. Lo rd 
Ogle, one o f the wealthiest landowners i n Nor thumber land , cou ld also supply 100 
horsemen. Since Og le was probably on l y a m ino r o f f i cer at this time,^^ the ma jo r i t y 
o f these men were most l i ke l y his tenants w h o were not regular soldiers; 
nevertheless, they were st i l l l isted as be ing mounted, w h i c h suggests at least some 
level o f m i l i t a ry sk i l l . 
""Ibid. 
Hamilton Papers, 11， no. 4 3 1 . 
P R O , E 36 /173 ff. 114-15. T h i s d o c u m e n t is not da ted bu t l is ts S i r John W i d d r i n g t o n as the 
W a r d e n o f the M i d d l e M a r c h , a p o s i t i o n that he re ta ined o n l y three years: ไ 5 3 7 - 4 0 . I t is v e r y l i k e l y 
that th is l is t was created as a par t o f the 1537 su r vey o f the c h i e f N o r t h u m b e r l a n d cast les. 
R a l p h R o b s o n , English Highland Clans, p. 85 . L o r d O g l e was V i c e - W a r d e n under the Perc y ร i n 
the m i d - 1 5 3 0 ' ร . 
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John Ha l l o f O t te rbum, who in true Marcher fashion rode the fine l ine 
between ru f f ian and respectable, could muster on ly six men from his hold ings in 
1538. H is abi l i ty to cal l upon his k insmen and surname dur ing feuds made h i m 
much more power fu l than the l ist suggests, al though most riders i n Redesdale were 
already freeholders and answerable on l y to their governor for m i l i t a ry services. Thus 
when act ing as assistant to the Keeper o f Redesdale, Ha l l o f O t te rbum raised 300 
horsed men, fifty o f w h i c h were from his o w n sumame.'^** O n the other hand, 
m i l i t a ry of f icers such as the Captain o f W a r k were able to cal l upon the sur rounding 
country b y v i r tue o f their of f ices. Th is was a unique arrangement as i t was out o f 
place fo r men to serve a garr ison captain as part o f their tenancy. For ty - two 
horsemen from the Barony o f W a r k were answerable to the ch ie f o f f i cer o f the 
castle, aside f r o m the fifty-five men that he cou ld cal l from his o w n l a n d s / A later 
survey describes the ancient m i l i t a r y obl igat ions o f Harbot t le , whereby ' the tenants 
owe their service to Harbot t le castle to be commanded by the captain there fo r h is 
Majes ty 'ร service; to serve i n f i e ld , either on horse or foot , for the defence o f the 
border land. ，102 Th is evidence alone suggests the heightened m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion o f 
al l Marchers when even freeholders were responsible for furn ish ing at least one 
harnessed man when answer ing the fray. 
A l t hough the tenants o f the gentry fo rmed a decent sized body o f armed 
m e n ― s u f f i c i e n t at least for launching raids into S c o t l a n d ― t h e ma jo r i t y o f the 
borderers owed l im i ted service as a part o f their obl igat ions. The or ig ins o f this 
style o f m i l i t a ry service were re lat ive ly new, despite the Marchers ' insistence that 
CScotP, V I I I , no . 653 . 
T h i s d o c u m e n t enters R o b e r t C o l l i n g w o o d * ร con t i ngen t above the l i ne w h e r e the C a p t a i n o f W a r k 
is entered. A c c o r d m g to LP, I V ( 3 ) no . 2 8 3 0 , C o l l i n g w o o d h e l d the cap ta incy o f W a r k u n t i l 
D e c e m b e r 1538, w h e n he sur rendered the o f f i c e to J o h n Car r , T h e t w o ret inues w e r e n o d o u b t l i s ted 
separate ly i n o rder to d i s t i ngu i sh m i l i t a r y o f f i c e s from c h i e f l and lo rds , even t h o u g h the t w o w e r e 
o f t en one and the same. 
' 0 շ P R O , SP 14/10/59 {Border Survey of ¡604, f. 85 ) . 
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they were ancient custom. Since many tenants were customary tenants, and many o f 
those by tenant right, there was no ob l igat ion to serve as a freeholder. M . L . Bush 
suggests that border service was merely a f o r m o f comage that was extended to 
inc lude customary tenants. ՚*^ ^ G iven the necessities o f border defence, this 
assessment seems reasonable. 
Typ ica l l y , pay and even fresh mounts and armour were not af forded the 
Border soldier. Border tenants were bound to serve w i thou t wages in day long raids, 
or when answer ing the cal l to fray.'*^'* They cou ld not be expected to serve f ree ly in 
Scotland for lengthy periods. Instead, the duties were more akin to pol ice act ion. 
Custom obl iged al l Nor thumbr ian households to supply one sui tably horsed and 
harnessed soldier, an expensive burden; t yp ica l l y , this meant that a Nor thumbr ian 
was expected to prov ide horse, armour, bow , spear or b i l l , and f o l l o w the hue and 
cry w i t h i n an hour 'ร notice. '^^ For their l im i ted services, Borderers received certain 
advantages. The widespread practice in the sixteenth century was that Borderers, or 
those who owed Border service, served f reely i n exchange for tax exemptions. 
B o t h Henry and his ch i ld ren upheld this pr iv i lege, a l though the P r i vy Counc i l and 
the March of f icers constant ly debated the specif ic i t ies o f the exemptions and 
obl igat ions. Just before his ra id against Kelso i n ear ly fa l l 1542， the duke o f N o r f o l k 
reminded the Pr i vy Counc i l that the Borderers were bound to attend the Warden at 
their o w n cost i n al l sudden raids, and were thus exempt from al l Par l iamentary 
subsidies. I n 1543， Sir Thomas Whar ton suggested m a k i n g a catalogue o f men w h o 
were bound to serve so that the government cou ld a f f i r m their tax exempt ion. 
103 B u s h , T e n a n t right', pp . 166-67. 
X V I I no . 957 . 
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Such tenants fo rmed a special group o f soldiers that required careful 
considerat ion when incorporată into campaign armies. The D u k e o f N o r f o l k , as 
Lieutenant o f the Nor th , recognised their status and proh ib i ted a l l leading lords and 
landowners f r o m " m e d d l i n g " w i t h this group o f tenants, meaning that their rights 
should not be disturbed at the expense o f their services.'^^ Th is pr iv i lege led to much 
confusion dur ing the c rown 'ร complex schemes against Scot land, yet the Tudors 
were eager to exp lo i t this group; i n 1542, the k i n g wanted a complete l ist o f a l l 
' laws, const i tut ions and orders' o f the Borders, and h o w the inhabitants were bound 
to serve. Henry V I I I was more generous in supplement ing his borderers w i t h 
wages, ' ' ^ wh i l e h is heirs general ly t r ied to expand the l im i ts o f Border service to 
include al l m i l i t a r y service. Bo th Bowes and Whar ton , veterans o f Hen ry ' ร 
campaigns, knew from experience that at least some f o r m o f remunerat ion was 
ef fect ive treacle for augment ing roya l inf luence. 11 ' Bowes, though, was in favour o f 
extending Border service to cover seven nights and one day. 1 '2 Even he vaci l la ted on 
the issue, wh i ch caused f r i c t ion w i t h the government. W h i l e serving as Warden , he 
was cr i t ic ised b y Nor thumber land 'ร administ rat ion for a l l o w i n g the borderers to 
have wages dur ing the Scott ish wa rs . " ^ In general, i t was recognised that the c rown 
w o u l d have to pay for this service at t imes, as more of ten than not a m i l i t a r y 
operat ion cou ld last fo r any number o f days. W i t h o u t compensat ion, borderers 
w o u l d be reluctant to answer any cal l at a l l , and the k ing ' s of f icers knew this a l l too 
w e l l . " ' * Fai lure to answer the fray was rampant as many petty of f icers and 
pensioners were powerless to enforce this ob l iga t ion . It was on ly i n 1547 that the 
L P , X V I I no . 799 . 
'^^ L P , X V I I no . 1123. 
'10 H e n r y ' s tendency to t h r o w m o n e y at the Bo rde re rs f o r m i l i t a r y serv ice was m o r e p reva len t i n the 
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penalty o f death was proscribed for any fa i lure to answer the muster; i n 1552 fa i lure 
to answer the cal l to the f ray was made punishable b y death under March L a w , 
though later in the century this was commuted to fine and impr i sonmen t . " ^ These 
laws were, fo r the most part, created b y the Wardens as responses to the compla in ts 
made b y the Pr ivy Counc i l regarding Border service. Consequent ly, Border service 
remained an issue that was affected by both central and local agents. 
N o t al l m i l i t a ry service was g iven in the usual custom o f the Borders. The 
creation o f the royal bands in 1523 prov ided an oppor tun i ty to serve fu l l - t ime w i t h 
pay, w i t h some attending as l igh t Border cavalry, others as mounted f o o t m e n . " ^ 
Creat ion o f such bands was necessary as an alternat ive to the short, two-day service 
that l im i ted most border tenants. It was also a necessary step in order to g ive the 
pensioners and of f icers a pool o f men from w h i c h they could select their soldiers for 
lengthier raids. S ignal l ing the in t roduct ion o f m i l i t a r y bureaucracy, captains o f the 
bands now reported al l use o f their troops to the k i n g as a regular course, resul t ing i n 
exact records that detai l uni t strengths, leadership and movement . A l t hough the 
strength o f the bands fluctuated from season to season, each company contained 100 
men , led b y a captain who was of ten a pensioner. These numbers w o u l d remain 
faceless were i t not for the mon th l y musters that the k i n g required o f his fee 'd 
Border soldiers. In the early stages o f the 1542-1550 wars, Sir Rafe El lerkar and Sir 
Robert Bowes both led such compan ies . "^ E l le rkar 'ร service on the borders and in 
France eventual ly earned h i m the rank o f Captain-General o f the Nor thern 
Horsemen b y 1545 . " ^ Bowes earned d is t inc t ion as w e l l , serv ing as deputy V i ce -
Warden o f the East March in 1542， and becoming Warden o f the M i d d l e M a r c h after 
P R O , SP 1/124 ff. 6 7 - 7 2 ( A u g u s t 20， 1537) 
՝֊՝ N i c h o l s o n , Leges, pp . 1 4 3 - 7 ; N R O , M S S 1228 ; C R O , B e l l M S S , f f . 180-82 . 
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Sir Ralph Eure's death in combat. Du r i ng Her t fo rd 'ร invas ion o f Scot land in 
September 1545, Bowes led as many as 1000 men from his jur isd ic t ion. "*^ Roya l 
bands thus prov ided at least some mi l i t a ry power i n the Marches, especial ly i n 
turbulent t imes, when resources became scarce. 
Moreover , the sty le o f more permanent m i l i t a r y service g l immers through the 
muster l ists: Garr ison duty seems to have prevai led above al l other fo rms o f service. 
The need for stronger po l i c ing o f the borders resulted in an ove rwhe lm ing increase 
i n the numbers o f garrisons that royal o f f ic ia ls proposed to bu i l d . S t i l l , i t took the 
Pi lgr image to ensure that royal garrisons sprouted throughout the Marches, w i t h 
towers, castles and barmkinร used to house smal l uni ts o f cavalry. Marcher 
horsemen contr ibuted 700 men to Engl ish garrisons at W a r k , N o r h a m and Be rw i ck 
castles, and at Chipchase and Hal twhis t le in Tynedale, most o f w h o m served for 
wages despite their t radi t ional ob l igat ion to serve as an aux i l ia ry po l ice force that 
was o f f the o f f i c i a l payroll. '^** Engl ish Borderers from the M i d d l e and Eastern 
Marches also captured Kelso late in 1544, and i n January 1545, Sir Ra lph Eure sent 
a garr ison o f Marchers to occupy the t o w n and castle.'^^ In 1547, captains in the 
Eastern M a r c h received instruct ions to keep garr isoned those Borderers w h o had no 
home, thus reducing out lawry and mischief. '^^ 
The salary that came w i t h extended duties, either serv ing i n the bands or i n 
the garrisons, soon became fami l ia r to the Border soldiers. I t was not unheard o f to 
be pa id for service that was w i t h i n the l im i t s o f one's contract; Surrey and Dacre 
were we l l -no ted for g i v i ng pay to their m a r c h e r s . H o w e v e r , i t was a d i f ferent 
s iณat ion when one went into garr ison, or on an extended excursion w i t h the k i n g ' ร 
[I LP, XX(2 ) no. 603. 
ご Lp[ X I X ( l ) n o . 283. 
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bands. Even the wa r l i ke Sir Thomas Whar ton o f the West Marches was forced to 
concede that an i ron fist w o u l d not persuade men to serve beyond thei r normal 
obl igat ions; on one occasion i n October 1545, he brought satchels o f v ic tua l and 
wages to the muster ing point when he knew that a foray w o u l d run fo r nine days.'^"* 
Tak ing the conf l ic t to Scott ish soi l meant that borderers were necessarily tapped fo r 
lengthier service in Scot land, w i t h many go ing overseas to serve the k i n g at 
Bou logne and Calais. Putt ing borderers in to wages not on l y guaranteed the m i l i t a r y 
leaders a supply o f men ; i t gave the k i n g and his counc i l a more exact inventory o f 
the forces avai lable to them. Typ ica l garr ison pay was 6d. per day for each soldier, 
8 i / , i f mounted. Tempted by regular income, B o r d e r e r s ― i n c l u d i n g men from 
Tynedale and Redesda le― f l ocked to the garrisons. A l t hough i t was admit ted that 
the addi t ion o f Marchers to the garrisons gave the armies more o f an edge, Hen ry 
V I I I was displeased to see so many in w a g e s . B y 1545, there were many Border 
soldiers i n garrisons, the legal i ty o f w h i c h was debated b y Hen ry ' ร of f icers on l y 
haphazardly as they realised that pay was sometimes a necessity. Under M a r y 
Tudor , the government went as far as p roh ib i t i ng the reta in ing o f any Borderer b y 
the garr ison captains, ' uppon payne o f grevos punneshmente and w ante o f wages o f 
such persones shalbe retained. ' '^^ In January 1558, the government again changed 
its approach and a l l owed the garrisons to retain Borderers, a l though at two- th i rds the 
normal wage, and o n l y after ten days o f free service. 
A muster o f the Mar ian garrisons o f the East M a r c h , and o f Norhamshi re and 
Berwicksh i re i n Nor thumber land , reveals a typ ica l arrangement fo r Marcher 
companies.'^** M o s t were organized in to groups o f twenty , wh i ch suggests that the 
Դ LP, X I X ( l ) no. 293; PRO, SP 1/199 f. 161 (March 1545). 
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larger companies o f 100 contained ind iv idua l petty captains, софога їร or v intners 
that led each garr ison. W h i l e no garr ison he ld more than 80 men , the garrisons 
themselves peppered the map, g i v i n g each ne ighbourhood the support o f at least a 
fü l l company 'ร w o r t h o f troopers. A t t imes, a single garr ison i n t roubled areas l i ke 
Tynedale w o u l d swel l to 500 troopers 4o keep good ru le on the Borders. ' ' ^^ 
A l t hough the organisat ion o f the garr ison companies was not as layered as a more 
m o d e m uni t , the presence o f of f icers and petty of f icers demonstrated that the 
Engl ish Borderers had at least some knowledge o f m i l i t a r y organisat ion. 
When garr isoning efforts shi f ted nor th o f the Scott ish border in 1547, there 
was a drain on the amount o f troopers readi ly avai lable i n Nor thumber land , yet there 
was usual ly p rov is ion to a l l ow some to remain for defence against the renegades o f 
the dales, even i f i t on l y amounted to a few garrisons. For the most part, a l l m i l i t a r y 
resources in Nor thumber land were pr ior i t ised fo r the Scott ish garrisons. It was 
Whar ton 's op in ion that Borderers w o u l d be more appropriate fo r garr isoning i n 
Scot land, as other Eng l i shmen m igh t not be so keen to leave the comfor t o f the 
South.'^*^ A s more Marchers entered the garrisons, i t became obv ious that 
Nor thumber land cou ld not sustain the war e f fo r t b y i tself. B y November 1547, L o r d 
Grey de W i l t o n , Warden-General o f the Marches, compla ined o f lack o f money and 
muni t ions , as Newcast le d id not have enough i n its stores for a l l Engl ish garrisons, 
and l ike his predecessors, Grey asked for supplies from the s o u t h . B y November , 
the costs o f the garrisons became outrageous, w i t h the payment o f Engl ish garrisons 
some three months i n arrears. The u l t imate destruct ion o f the Eng l ish garrisons i n 
Scotland in 1550-51 meant the Borderers o f the Eng l ish Marches w o u l d once again 
：ご B L , Add. MSS 32649 f. 175. (Feb. 23, 1543) 
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serve in their o w n country , a l though the government 'ร upkeep o f its Nor thumber land 
garrisons slackened o f f , w i t h the except ion o f the Be rw ick garr ison. 
In m o d e m armies, such inconsistent payment and employment arrangements 
wou ld spark mass desertions and mut in ies, but the Border soldiers o f s ixteenth-
century England were d r i ven to their task b y an obsession w i t h plunder. O f ten the 
sole f o r m o f remunerat ion fo r thei r m i l i t a r y services, the c rown always indulged the 
Nor thumbr ians when they p lundered the Scots. A t t imes, p lunder was encouraged i n 
order to secure more Border horse for a ra id . W h e n Sir Ra lph Eure and Sir B r ian 
Layton raided Tev io tda le in February 1545, i t was w i t h the in tent ion o f carv ing out 
new lands for themselves, w h i c h the k i n g had promised to al l soldiers who w o u l d 
help quel l the Earl o f Angus. '^^ Such a perquisi te at t imes could outstr ip any pay 
from the k i ng ' ร cof fers. D u r i n g the 1544 siege o f Ed inburgh, i t was noted that the 
Nor thern Horse had amassed an obscene amount o f loot du r ing their over land 
forays. ՚՝՛՝՛ The ra id in to Jedburgh in the same year also garnered numerous catt le, 
horse and sheep fo r the maraud ing Border soldiers. ՚^՛՛ A s mot i va t ing as i t m igh t have 
been, the temptat ions o f moveable wea l th made some Border soldiers a l i ab i l i t y for 
the Engl ish commanders. A t F lodden i n 1513, the border horsemen were accused o f 
d isposing o f the Eng l i sh sentries, ransoming prisoners w i thou t the knowledge o f the 
Lieutenant-General , and ransoming the Engl ish baggage train. '^^ A g a i n at н addon 
R igg in 1542, the flight o f the Border horse from their commanders commenced 
on ly after their real izat ion that a l l o f their booty had been sent back into England. '^^ 
T o demand that soldiers serve w i thou t pay was out o f place i n sixteenth-century 
132 Philips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p. 170; Robert Lindsay o f Pitscottie, The Historie and Cronicleร of 
Scotland, vo l . I I , ed. A.J.G. Маскау, (Edinburgh: W m . Blackwood, 1899), p. 35. 
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warfare, but border war fare necessitated such practices, especial ly when the c rown 
could not a f fo rd to main ta in a standing army. Ye t , the dependence upon loot to 
of fset one's wage losses on ly served to destabil ise the Engl ish armies since there 
was no clear and consistent po l i c y com ing from either the government or the local 
M a r c h of f icers . 
One element o f Border service that d id not seem to interest the c rown , but 
w h i c h immeasurably concerned the local o f f icers was the watch and ward . Coupled 
w i t h the ob l iga t ion to answer the f ray and the hot t rod , tenants also per formed watch 
duties, serving as an aux i l ia ry po l ice force w i t h i n their o w n areas under the guidance 
o f the local gentry. However , watchmen were norma l l y pa id for their dut ies, 
usual ly f r o m the coffers o f the local gentry, but also sometimes from the townships 
that they guarded. ' ' ' * Wa tch duty was an essential m i l i t a ry func t ion o f the border 
tenant, especial ly after the decl ine o f the m i l i t a r y pensioners, as i t p rov ided a 
warn ing system against enemy incursions. Th is watch duty p rov ided warn ing 
against raids, and a l lowed the local popula t ion suf f ic ient t ime to safeguard their 
chattel from an impend ing incurs ion. L i k e the pickets that surrounded a b ivouacked 
army, the Nor thumber land watch took place at var ious locales that a f forded an 
unobstructed v i ew o f the surrounding area as i t was essential to main ta in v isual 
contact w i t h other nearby sentries so that warn ings could be raised throughout the 
v ic in i t y . Rel ics o f this system can st i l l be seen on m o d e m maps in numerous place-
names o f Nor thumber land . ' 
The effectiveness o f the watch and ward was sporadic. The first register that 
regulated the watch appeared, at the end o f Bowes ' survey o f 1541. ՚՛՛՛^ Sir Cuthbert 
" Nicholson, Leges, pp. 241-313. 
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Ratc l i f fe is credited w i t h the creat ion o f this catalogue, mak ing h i m the first to 
systemize the watch and ward o f Nor thumber land , al though the watch had been i n 
effect for some time.'"** A l ready the weaknesses o f the system were decried in the 
report , as local communi t ies were u n w i l l i n g to pay for the watch since the surnames 
o f Tynedale, Redesdale and Liddesdale were adept at s l ipp ing past sentries. 
A l t hough Ratc l i f fe stated that the watch was mandatory, the assessment in the 
survey was defeatist i n por t ray ing a system that was bound to disappoint. 
Due to the lack o f regulat ion b y the c rown , at t imes even the best-organised 
watch w o u l d fa i l either th rough the treachery o f the guards or through the actions o f 
others. Regardless o f its obv ious importance, many Borderers thorough ly ignored 
the watch dut ies i n 1542. The Ear l o f Rut land, as Lieutenant o f the N o r t h , found 
such disorder i n the ranks o f the Nor thumber land tenantry that he could scarcely 
recognise any sort o f system at a l l , since most tenants expected the pensioners to 
pe r fo rm the watch b y v i r tue o f thei r charge.'^^ The mu l t i p le ja i lbreaks from 
Hexham dur ing the sixteenth century were i n part due to a sympathetic watchman. 
A t the very least, the less v i l la inous members o f the watch casually looked on wh i l s t 
the j a i l doors were be ing k i cked d o w n ; sometimes the ja i lbreakers even abducted 
them i f they gave any s ign o f resistance. 
Despite large gaps in the early system o f watch and ward , i t was ef fect ive 
enough b y 1543, when i t prevented the thef t o f the Keeper 'ร livestock.''*'* In 
February o f the same year, the watch near T h i r l w a l l castle on the Cumbr ian -
Nor thumber land border repel led a Scott ish raid.''^^ The progressive pu l l o f the 
1 " The first mention o f the watch that I could find appears in PRO, SP 1/7 f. 281 (Feb. 27, 1514)， 
although it most certainly had existed for a long time before. 
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surnames into legi t imate service meant that the watch was less burdened b y the 
troubles o f Tynedale and Redesdale, a subsidiary effect o f royal indulgence towards 
the heidsmen w h i c h no doubt made the watch appear more ef fect ive b y the first 
years o f the ' rough w o o i n g ' . 
A l l ment ion o f the system accordingly disappears f r o m the records, unt i l the 
last years o f Edward V I . B y 1552, Border law mandated the sett ing o f each watch , 
naming each pr inc ipa l man as be ing responsible for sett ing watch and ward over his 
immediate area.'"*^ As deputy Warden-General o f the Marches, L o r d Whar ton was 
eager to underscore the duties o f each tenant, add ing the penal ty o f death for any 
watchmen who consorted w i t h k n o w n felons, or for fa i lure to answer the fray.'^^ The 
lack o f in tervent ion b y the c rown when it came to regulat ion o f the watch is not 
surpr is ing, g iven the local ised necessity o f the watch . Scrut iny o f border service 
was inevi table, but the watch was a matter for the M a r c h of f icers , especial ly since 
the Duke o f Nor thumber land had speci f ica l ly empowered Whar ton to act w i t h 
uni lateral author i ty . ՚՛^^ A s such, al l v io lat ions i n the sett ing o f the watch eventual ly 
became the concern o f the Wardens ' courts, w i t h each court session preceded b y 
orders to find al l w h o had fa i led to keep watch and answer musters, as w e l l as those 
who had otherwise interfered w i t h the hot trod.'"^^ The enforcement o f such service 
for those w h o were exempted from taxes demonstrates the seriousness w i t h พ Ы с һ 
M a r c h of f icers regarded tenant obl igat ions. Under M a r c h law, any person who 
refused to answer the cal l to fray or muster was declared a trai tor and tr ied w i t h i n 
the Wardens ' courts. B y 1560, when wars w i t h Scot land ceased to threaten the 
Borders, the system o f watch and ward concerned i tse l f more w i t h groups o f 
= Nicolson, Leges, pp. 241-314. 
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occasional marauders than w i t h the inroads o f Scott ish armies. Nevertheless, i t 
remained paramount i n guaranteeing the security o f the Marchers, and was upheld 
b y Warden and gent leman al ike, in spite o f roya l disinterest. 
B y contrast, the West M a r c h contained fewer tenants who owed service to a 
part icular land lord 's household, and more freeholders w h o were responsible for 
answer ing the royal musters. The West Marches also appear to have been more 
populous than their East and M i d d l e counterparts. Muster г е Ш т ร for the West 
Marches indicate that the c rown had at its disposal more than 8,000 men in 1584. 
Th is f igure is s ign i f icant ly greater than the numbers for the East or M i d d l e Marches, 
w h i c h numbered 3,000 and 7,600, respectively. Sumame groups were also very 
act ive i n the West Marches, ind icat ing fewer landlords, al though the inf luence o f the 
Dacres even after their disgrace was s t i l l s igni f icant . '^ ' Si r Thomas Whar ton , 
Warden o f the West M a r c h for much o f the per iod in quest ion, preferred the effects 
o f personal lordship rather than re ly ing upon the local gentry for manpower; i n 1544 
he requested that he be a l lowed to retain the best men w i t h i n the March for 
defence.'^^ Whar ton preferred to use musters to summon the power o f the Marches 
rather than the cal l to the fray; i n 1547, he reminded al l tenants who owed service to 
answer his musters under pain o f death,'^^ thereby suggesting that m i l i t a ry 
ob l iga t ion was now subject to March Laws. H is method o f Wardenship and the 
immedia te ava i lab i l i ty o f manpower in the West Marches meant that Whar ton was 
：:? СВР, I no. 255. 
ISI The Dacre fami ly was able to recover the Wardenship o f the Western Marches under Mary I , and 
they held it unti l Wi l l i am Dacre՝ร death in 1563. See APC, 1556-8, p. 373. Their influence did not 
end there, but declined gradually unti l Leonard Dacre'ร rebellion in 1570. See Tough, Frontier, pp. 
՚ 5 3 N R O MSS 1228, 77їе Letter Book of the West Marches. 
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overal l much more successfi i l i n rais ing troops w i t h i n his ju r i sd ic t ion when us ing a 
general muster. ՚^ ՛^  
Border service also existed in the uplands o f the Palatinate, most o f w h i c h 
was prone to raids and re i v ing b y the men o f Tynedale, Gi ls land and Liddesdale. '^^ 
Thus, the ab i l i t y to answer the cal l to arms was essential. Landlords were fa i r l y 
qu ick to dispossess the tenants who fa i led to render this v i ta l m i l i t a ry service. In 
1497, a group o f Weardale men were dispossessed for sh i rk ing the cal l to armร. '^^ 
The Lumleys , who were the m i l i t a ry power o f the county unt i l their fa l l jus t after the 
P i lgr image o f Grace, gave way to the adminis t rat ive talents o f B ishop Cuthbert 
Tunsta l l . A s an act ive member o f the Counc i l o f the No r th , Tunstal l recognised the 
value o f m i l i t a r y tenure i n the areas o f h is lordships that were essentially Marcher i n 
nature, i f not i n name. Even Whar ton d id not hesitate to consider the Palatinate part 
o f the Marcher defensive structure, as Du rham men of ten spent t ime in garr ison 
a long the border, some at their o w n expense.'^^ Certa in ly, there is a weal th o f 
evidence suggesting that parts o f the Palatinate were used to reinforce the defence o f 
the Marches against Scott ish aggression. A s early as 1543, Durham men had 
received instruct ions to part ic ipate i n raids into Scot land; the Pr i vy Counc i l urged 
the Marcher of f icers to emp loy them so that they m igh t become accustomed to 
act ive Border service.'^^ Durham levies prepared to fo r t i f y Be rw ick in 1545 and 
were already i n service i n some areas o f Scot land w i t h Hert ford. '^^ 
' 5 4 See James, Change and Continuity, passim. 
' 5 5 J. Linda Drury, 'More Stout Than Wise: Tenant Right in Weardale in the Tudor Period.' in D. 
Marcombe, (ed.) The Last Principality: Politics, Religion and Society in the Bishopric of Durham, 
1494-1660, (Nottingham: University o f Nott ingham, 1987)； D.D.R., c c 220198 f. 246. 
՚ 5 6 Drury, 'Tenant Right in Weardale/ p. 77; PRO, Durham Palatmate Records, Chancery Rol l , 
3/19 f. 74 (Fox ,s Halmote Court Book). 
157 Men from the areas near Allendale and Blanchland, although technically in the Palatinate, were 
responsible to the Warden o f the Middle March. 
'^^ I P . XV I I I ( 2 ) no. 324. 
'^^ LP. XX (1 ) no. 1246, and / Ш ( ү о 1 . 2) Ո0 .128. 
177 
Escalat ing tensions w i t h Scotland required the services o f Du rham, and 
tenures ref lected this need. In 1548, W i l l i a m H i l t o n was required as part o f his 
tenure to prov ide one Border horse, or t w o foot spears for service i n the garrisons o f 
Scotland.՚^*^ In 1551, John Vasey leased P in fo ld House w i t h the agreement that he 
w o u l d prov ide the service o f one horseman. '^ ' W i l l i a m C o m f o r t h received 
Westhopebum i n lease, and owed rent and the service o f one h o r s e m a n . T h e s e 
tenures are typ ica l o f those found w i t h i n the Marches, suggesting that even relat ive 
p r o x i m i t y to Scot land made a tenant e l ig ib le fo r m i l i t a r y service. Despi te these 
st ipulat ions, Durham 's role in Border defence was st i l l ambiguous. In 1557, B ishop 
Tunsta l l argued that the condi t ions o f m i l i t a r y service were st r ic t ly defensive, 
arguing that the 'cunt rey dothe deyne l y i n g in garr ions to tary the comyunge o f the 
enemye but whensoever th 'enemye doth invade the realme, they we l l upon warn yng , 
be reddy to go to repulse h i m o f theire o w n coste'. '^^ Even ef fect ive administrators 
were confounded b y the tenets that underwrote Border service. 
Service Abroad 
The value o f the Nor thern horsemen was k n o w n not on l y to the k i n g o f 
England but to the leaders o f the Cont inental armies as w e l l ; even Emperor Charles 
V had commented on their abilit ies.'^'* The i r prowess i n combat made them perfect 
skirmishers not on l y in the northern Marches, but i n the Pales o f D u b l i n and Calais 
as w e l l . Henry V I I I was al l too eager to use them in his m i l i t a ry ambi t ions across the 
sea, as he had du r ing his campaign o f 1513/^^ There were problems w i t h this 
arrangement, ch ie f l y that the borderers were not ob l iged to serve abroad; therefore 
1 ^ ^ Drury, Tenant Right in Weardale,' p. 82; PRO, Durham 3/77 m. 4 1 . 
D r u į , 'Tenant Right in Weardale, pp. 82-3; D.D.R., cc 190172 f. 9. 
' 6 3 Talbot MSS. D. f. 60; G. Scott Thompson, "The Bishops o f Durham and the Off ice o f Lord-
Lieutenant in the Seventeenth Century," English Historical Review, X L (1925), pp. 351-52. 
LP, X V I I I ( 2 ) no. 345. 
' 6 5 Phil l ips, Anglo-Scots Wars, p. 86. 
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they were exempted from most national levies. ^^՚^ In 1543, Hen ry sought to change 
this b y demanding a quota o f horsemen from the Border counties. A s southern 
gent lemen cal led for thei r northern tenants to serve across the Channel , the k i ng also 
cal led for 200 o f the best border horsemen to serve w i t h h im. ' ^^ In a short t ime, the 
k ing had doubled the quota to 400 border horsemen, despite the fruit less object ions 
o f Thomas Whar ton . T w o hundred soldiers o f the West Marches were requis i t ioned, 
wh i ls t the East and M i d d l e Marches were ordered to prov ide the remain ing 200. The 
letter exp l i c i t l y instructed that garr ison troops were to f u l f i l the quota, probably as a 
means o f keep ing more Borderers out o f the pa id , regular army. Conscripts from 
Durham and N o r t h Yorksh i re , or ' i n land m e n ' , replaced those who went to 
France.'^^ Because m a n y Border horsemen were too poor to prov ide suf f ic ient 
mounts for service, the k i n g of fered them fresh mounts from the commissariat, yet 
another vol te- face by the Tudor government regarding pay.*^^ B y 1543, the Counc i l 
i n London had begun to іпсофога їе them into the nat ional scheme. T Խ e e 
compani es o f border horsemen were sent to France i n June 1543, wh i l s t another t w o 
companies f o l l owed i n spr ing 1544.^^^ In 1546, another company j o i ned the 
Nor thern Horsemen at Calaiร.'^^ 
Some soldiers went w i l l i ng l y . Several prominent Marchers stepped fo rward 
to lead the bands, i nc lud ing Whar ton 's son, w h o m the k i n g ordered to remain i n 
England in the end.*^^ Rafe El lerkar, though, was more successful, as he made the 
rank o f Captain-General o f the Nor thern Horse b y 1546. H is ambi t ions earned h i m a 
st icky end in A p r i l 1546, when he was mor ta l l y gut shot in an ambush and 
I 6 6 Cruickshank, Elizabeth 's Army, p. 29. Cruickshank has noted that Northumberland, Cumberland, 
Westmoreland and Durham were exempt from musters for foreign expeditions. 
：: LP, X I X ( l ) n o . 2 2 7 . 
՚ 6 8 LP, XX (2 ) no. 96. 
' 7 0 PRO, SP 1/179 f. 1 (June 10， 1543); B L , Add. MSS 32654 f. 98 (Apr i l 14， 1544); LP X I X ( l ) no. 
271. 
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subsequently abandoned b y his comrades on the French sands. ՚^՝՛ For the more 
common soldier, there was money to be made i n France i f not prestige. The h igh 
rate o f pay for Eng l ish soldiers i n France was undoubtedly tempt ing w i t h horsemen 
receiv ing 9d. per day.'^"* They were o f considerable use, their wages re f lec t ing their 
value on the f ie lds o f Europe. Mos t were used as scouts and pr ickers, and many 
seemed to re l ish this ro le, but according to Edward H a l l , their u l t imate desire for 
booty and prisoners for ransom drove them to fore ign service: "d iverse tymes the 
Nor thern l igh t horsemen under the conduite o f Sir John Neve l i sk i rmished w i t h the 
stradiottes and take diverse o f the prisoners and brought them to the K y n g . " ' ^ ^ Thus 
some went to France seeking g lory , others go ing out o f obedience to their heidsmen 
and of f icers, but many stayed i n the Marches. 
The war i n France signal led yet another change for the m i l i t a r y resources o f 
the Marches. N o longer were the continental conf l ic ts a burden for the southern 
counties to bear; border counties now had to contr ibute more soldiers than ever. 
Nat ional m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion had always encroached upon the Libert ies o f the East 
and M i d d l e Marches, yet the Border soldiers had always been able to guard their 
tenant right, w h i c h gave them leave to remain i n their homelands. Th is precedent i n 
part s ignal led the end o f tenant right i n the Marches, as soldiers began to serve more 
frequently as regular " w h i t e coats" than as i rregulars, the latter be ing their normal 
custom. 
Surnames and M i l i t a r y Service 
The state adopted an ambivalent att i tude towards the Border clans; a l though 
their c r im ina l behaviour of ten warranted persecut ion, the concerns o f the state and 
^՝ LP. X X I ( l ) n o . 300. 
" I P , X I X ( l ) n o . 313. 
՚՚^ԼԲ, X X I ( l ) n o . 694. 
LP, X I X ( l ) n o . 273. 
Edward Hal l , The Triumphant Reigne of Kynge Henry VIII, vo l . 1 (London: Hack, 1901), p. 66. 
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its capabi l i ty to defend the Border was g iven more weight . Henry V I I I was insistent 
on pardoning members o f the Robson and Char l ton surnames on ly because their 
m i l i ta ry capabil i t ies had served the state, whereas their persecution w o u l d have 
placed the securi ty o f the Border i n per i l . M a r y Tudo r was even more protect ive o f 
the Grahams o f the West March , whose p i l lag ing i n part was responsible for the 
legacy o f v io lence that has been attr ibuted to the r i d i ng clans.'՚ ՛^ Even i f the cyc le o f 
pardon and rec id iv ism had become an empty po l i t i ca l ritual,'^^ the Tudors were not 
about to sacrif ice the securi ty o f their Borders over issues relat ing to stolen property. 
In October 1542, N o r f o l k summed up royal po l i cy regarding the employment o f 
cr iminals as soldiers: 'and as for the re format ion o f thof fendors in Nor thombre londe, 
we th inke i t not convenient tattempte the same at this tyme, the warre beyng so hote 
as i t is, but rather to w y n k e thereat for a tyme. ' ' ^^ 
Despite the seeming i m m u n i t y enjoyed b y some o f the surnames, the 
obl igat ion to serve the c r o w n i n warfare was always a cond i t ion o f pardon. M o r e 
impor tant ly , as subjects o f the c rown , the surnames were l iab le to the same 
obl igat ions that affected the rest o f Marcher society. In 1498, B ishop Fox o f Du rham 
reminded the c le rgy o f Tynedale and Redesdale that the tenants o f those areas owed 
service against the Scots, so that b y 1550, tenants from these upland val leys c la imed 
to ho ld their land through mi l i t a ry service to the c rown. ' ^^ Some o f the surname 
groups that inhabi ted the Nor th Tyne , Rede and Coquet val leys were technical ly 
landless, despite their radical not ions o f ownership and propr ie ty , and as such, they 
were rarely seen i n the retinues o f the gentry. However , their p r o x i m i t y to the 
Scott ish borders (some o f them l i v i n g l i tera l ly yards away f r om the recognized 
՚ 7 6 B L , Harleian 289, f. 58; P.G. Boscher, To l i t i cs , Administrat ion and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scots 
Border, 1550-60,' (Durham University Ph.D., 1985)， pp. 223-251. ' 
K J . Kesselnng, Mercy and Authority in the Tudor State, (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), p. 192. 
1 7 8 Hamilton Papers, I, no. 226. 
'Bishop Foxes Register", The Surtees Society, Vo l . 147(Durham， 1932), p. 111. 179 . 
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border) made them indispensable to the M a r c h Wardens fo r conduct ing pun i t i ve 
raids into the neighbour ing dales, especial ly since they were considered the best 
l ight horsemen in England. Thus the тนdors endeavoured to apply border service to 
the sumame groups in the Marches, whose habi tual re i v ing plagued the Wardens and 
of f icers. 
Border reivers gave the impression o f be ing 】OTdk^ incapable o f f o l l o w i n g 
m i l i t a ry d isc ip l ine, and therefore prone to out lawry . There was a keme l o f t ru th 
behind this observat ion. Un t i l the 1530'ร, the border counties had been under the 
inf luence o f two strong fami l ies : the Percieร in the East and M i d d l e Marches, and 
the Dacres i n the West March . B y a stroke o f mis for tune, bo th fami l ies suf fered 
from disgrace and a รһаф decl ine o f power. B y 1540, no northern magnate could 
gather the border fami l ies under a single standard, as Perdes and Dacres had 
par t ia l ly done. They had even bucked the Bishop o f Du rham and the Archb ishop o f 
Y o r k , their t radi t ional patrons. N o r t h Tynedalers and Redesdalers were i n the service 
o f the B ishop o f Durham by 1300， and even served i n his household as u l t ra-v io lent 
armed r e t a i n e r s , y e t b y the mid-s ix teenth century there was no vestige lef t o f this 
patronage.'^* The Archb ishopr ic o f Y o r k saw its power i n the Marches gradual ly 
wane when Hexhamshire fe l l in to the k ing ' s hands.'^^ W i t h that gone, the 
Archb ishop no longer exerted any inf luence over the surnames. Were i t not for the 
Nor thumber land g e n t r y ― t h e lengthy l ist o f V ice-Wardens, constables, sher i f fs and 
Keepers——there wou ld have been l i t t le means o f enforc ing m i l i t a r y service amongst 
the surnames. M i l i t a r y admin is t ra t ion in Nor thumber land ent i re ly depended upon 
county gentry, many o f w h o m had roots i n the border surnames. Nor thumbr ian 
' 80 Bishop Antony Век used North Tynedale Archers to assault his rival, the Pnor o f Durham, in 
1300. See C M . Fraser, History of Antony Век, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1957), pp. 130-64.. 
'81 J.A. Tuck, 'War and Society o f the Medieval Nor th, ' Journal of Northern ատէօդ, 21 (1985) p. 
69. ' 
՚ 8 2 This was f inal ly achieved through the dissolution o f the monasteries. 
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gentry such as Roger à Fenwick , John Heron o f Chipchase and Cuthbert Ra tc l i f fe , 
who had dealings w i t h the surnames, had entered roya l service as leading of f icers . 
There s imp ly were no other w i l l i n g and able men. Impor t ing leaders from the south 
was no real method o f ensuring the compl iance o f the dalesmen. W i l l i a m , Lo rd Parr 
and John Dud ley , Lord L is le , o f ten had l i t t le or no connect ion to the so i l , so that 
Borderers regarded them w i t h mistrust despite the power o f their patents and 
warrants. Lo rd L is le compla ined b i t te r ly to the k i n g when he discovered that certain 
gent lemen were pract is ing w i t h the men o f Tynedale and Redesdale, w i thou t his 
knowledge or his permission. '^^ Mus te r ing the surnames o f the uplands therefore 
required a sort o f d ip lomacy that some leading statesmen d id not possess. A l t h o u g h 
many o f the gentry were also comp l i c i i i n theft , k idnapp ing, extor t ion and murder, 
the fact that many came from re i v ing fami l ies gave them a superior edge when 
negot iat ing w i t h the heidsmen. " L i t t l e John " Heron o f Chipchase was one o f these 
gent lemen. ՚^՛՛ A f t e r spending two years clapped i n the Tower for his actions dur ing 
the rebel l ions o f 1536-37, Heron returned to the borders and was appointed Keeper 
o f Tynedale i n January 1540; later that summer, he snatched the Keepership o f 
Redesdale f r o m Sir John Widdr ing ton . ' * ^ D u r i n g his tenure, Heron used Tyne-and 
Redesdale horsemen as regular soldiers, leading over 1,000 dalesmen du r ing Bowes ' 
ra id upon Teviotda le in 1542.'*^ A s long as there were gentry w h o m the surnames 
trusted, they gave m i l i t a r y service qui te readi ly. 
The men o f the uplands were def in i te ly a part o f the Engl ish m i l i t a r y 
organisat ion o f the Marches by the beg inn ing o f the wars o f 1542-1560, and the 
rewards for their service are evident ia l o f their f u l f i l l i n g their obl igat ions. A s 
ment ioned i n the previous chapters, the k i n g developed a po l i cy o f emp loy ing 
LP. X V I I no. 1194. 
Heron was related to the Hesleyside Charltons through marriage. 
՚ 8 5 BL,Royal MSS 7/121 f. 136 (Jan. 2 1 , 1540); LP, X V no. 987. 
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surnames, w i t h some heidsmen becoming roya l pensioners who served under the 
Keepers and Wardens. Since Border soldiers f r o m the uplands played s igni f icant 
roles in the major campaigns against Scot land, some members o f the sumame 
groups served as roya l of f icers in posi t ions o f actual author i ty. I n the West M a r c h , 
an outnumbered body o f reivers who served under the Engl ish banner routed a 
s igni f icant ly stronger Scott ish army at So lway Moss in 1542. Jack Musgrave, the 
captain o f the border horse at So lway Moss, led a power f t i l sumame group from the 
area near Carl is le. I n 1596, this f a m i l y was able to lead a force o f 2,000 border 
horsemen into Scot land to retr ieve stolen goods, thereby demonstrat ing its ab i l i t y to 
field what amounted to a smal l army. The Musgraves went on to assist the c r o w n as 
royal o f f icers , eventual ly serving as Deputy Wardens o f the West Marches. '^^ In the 
Northeast, the Herons act ive ly part ic ipated i n raids against Scot land, when they were 
not feud ing w i t h their rivals, the Camabyร and the Carrร, bo th o f w h o m also served 
as roya l o f f i c ia ls , as prev ious ly ind icated. ' ** Even Arch ie D o d d , who was m i x e d up 
in a deadly fray at Hexham in 1543,189 served Sir Ra lph Eure as the underkeeper o f 
Tynedale on l y one year later. ՚^ *՛ A l l o f the above-ment ioned fami l ies and thei r 
border horsemen in t imidated the Scott ish borders w i t h good ef fect . '^ ' The i r 
obl igat ions to the c rown were clear, a l though the obl igat ions o f the rank and file o f 
the surnames remains obscured for lack o f evidence. 
A s a ru le, the p r imary ob l igat ion o f the Marchers, inc lud ing the bands o f 
surnames that populated the dales o f the Rede, N o r t h Tyne and Coquet rivers, was to 
= BL , Add. MSS 32647 f. 162 (Sept. 16， 1542) 
" Humphrey Musgrave was Warden o f the Western March in 1582. See СВР, I I , nos. 346 and 354. 
LP, X V I I no. 219. 
89 LP X V I I I ( l ) no. 957 and 964. 
2 Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 170. 
" John Heron, as Governor o f Tynedale and Redesdale, commanded a garrison o f fifty border horse, 
all o f whom were stationed at his house in Chipchase. These men were from his own landholdings, 
as he was one o f the few borderers fortunate enough to have consolidated properties that could 
support such a force. The Dodds had several members o f their family serve the Earl o f Hert ford, wi th 
John Dodd leading a company in the invasions o f 1544. PRO, SP 1/187 ff. 232-37. 
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render aid whenever there was an inroad by the Scots or by thieves, up to a length o f 
one day and one night. '^^ Such act ion d id not require the wr i t ten permission o f the 
c rown unless retal iatory raids were expressly forb idden, nor d id it require the 
lengthy t ime o f muster ing county levies. Instead, this system could func t ion freely 
w i thout the constraints o f court and county admin is t ra t ion, and i t seems that most 
m i l i t a ry service was rendered on an ad hoc basis. Mos t service appears to have been 
set by custom. When asked to account for the customary service o f the Tynedalers, 
John Mòr ra ley o f A lUerwash i n the lordship o f Wark - in -Tyneda le test i f ied ' a l l 
tenants and inhabitants i n the manor o f W a r k have attended the Keeper o f Tynedale 
and have ancient ly been at his command. ' ' ^^ The fact that this test imony was g iven 
b y a 104 year-o ld man in 1620 demonstrates the importance o f m e m o r y and custom 
to m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion in the Marches. Sumame groups v i r tua l l y ignored the fact that 
many o f the o ld Marcher l ibert ies were now i n the hands o f the k i ng , w i t h many st i l l 
c la im ing i n 1551 to serve i n the custom o f those ancient pr iv i leges. ՚^ ՛* Some 
surnames also indented w i t h members o f the Nor thumber land gentry, as d id three o f 
the Hal ls o f Redesdale w i t h Sir John Delaval . The i r oath to 'adde strength h i m and 
them so ferre as ther power maye extend to h i m and his heres,' essential ly enforced 
a pr ivate m i l i t a r y func t ion , a l though i t gave them some connect ion to the c r o w n , as 
Delaval was a royal pensioner.'^^ 
Surnames of ten found their way into the roya l musters, and in tak ing the 
k ing ' ร pay they ob l iged themselves to fight on his behalf. In 1539, a general muster 
o f the Nor thumber land martrede l isted nearly 400 'Nor the Tynde l l The i f s ' who 
LP, IV(2) , no. 4882; LP. X V I , no. 497. 
՝ շ PRO, È 134/18Jasl/Mich20. 
՚ 9 4 B L , Càlig. В . V I I I ff. 128; John Hodgson, A History of Northumberland in Three Parts, part і і і , 
vol . і і (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1820-1825), pp. 223-4. 
NRO, Delaval MSS, 17 В; BL , Càlig. в. I I I , ff. 203-5. 
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turned out for inspect ion, al l o f w h o m were horsed and sui tably arrayed. '96 In N o r t h 
Tynedale, the Charl tons and the Robsons were b y far the most power fu l , j u d g i n g b y 
their numbers in the muster ro l l , a l though leading the l ist as the p r imary gent leman 
was John Robson, most l i ke ly o f the Falstone.'^^ I t is remarkable that the Char l tons 
had formed such a substantial part o f the Tynedale musters, as they had proven to be 
the most troublesome sumame i n Tynedale. Ten years earlier, the Ear l o f 
Nor thumber land captured and executed a Char l ton heidsman and t w o o f h is 
Liddesdale al l ies for M a r c h treason. The previous year, Sir Reyno ld Camaby 
pursued and arrested several o f the Charl tons for fa i lure to lay in their pledges. ՚^ ՛^  
That the rest o f the clan turned out for the musters suggests that fami l i a l loyal t ies 
were not ent i re ly imperv ious, a l though this is probably ind icat ive o f the inherent 
dif ferences between the marcher brigands and the асШаІ clans, and the separation o f 
each o f the graynes that comprised a single sumame. 
The appearance o f a large band o f horsed Tynedalers also suggests that 
m i l i t a r y leaders who were eager to earn a place i n the royal armies had emerged 
f r o m the sumame groups. Th is probably came on the ta i l o f Henry pay ing £10 p.a. 
to each o f the loya l heidsmen who had acknowledged his supremacy.^^^ In tu rn , the 
heidsman col lected his tenants or f am i l y to f o r m a band that w o u l d serve the k ing . 
The temptat ions o f payment certainly made an impression upon John H a l l o f 
Ot te rbum, who was a recipient o f the k i ng ' ร annual gift.^^* H i s comp l i c i t y most 
l i ke ly ensured that the men o f Redesdale also turned out in force, p roduc ing near ly 
1^^ NRO, Z A N M.13/D.15. Robson has noted that this muster list also is listed m PRO, E 36/40 f. 29. 
* 9 7 Ib id. John Robson had just been released by the Duke o f Nor fo lk f rom Morpeth castle ja i l , Halls 
and Redes appeared at the head of the Redesdale muster 
：二 BL , Caligula в. V I I I , f. 112. 
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200 horsed and we l l -a rmed men , 'beside al l the foot theves.'^^^ However , the 
m i l i t a ry structure o f the clans is remarkab ly disguised due to tack o f hard evidence, 
as the muster does not l ist the leaders o f the surname bands. A t best, we can on ly 
suggest the means b y w h i c h members o f a sumame owed m i l i t a r y services to their 
heidsmen, but i t is clear f r o m the surv iv ing evidence that m i l i t a r y duties prov ided 
the heidsmen w i t h sizeable bands.^**^ A s such, i t was strategical ly prudent for the 
k i n g to a l low the dalesmen into roya l service; the sheer numbers dwar fed the muster 
returns from each o f the vi l lages and townships o f the settled areas. Even i f th is 
turnout was on ly a smal l por t ion o f the dalesmen, especial ly i f w e accept B o w e s ' 
estimate that Tynedale alone supported 1500 we l l -a rmed men,^*^"* i t s t i l l conf i rms 
that the c rown had at least some success i n recru i t ing regular soldiers i n the far-
removed areas o f the Marches, a l though on ly because the surnames stood to gain 
bo th prestige and regular income. 
Nonetheless, each band o f reivers also had its o w n Ach i l l es ' heel that 
undermined the surnames' ab i l i t y to act as l igh t cavalry. Border surnames closely 
guarded their customary practices o f tenure and warfare. Landho ld ing patterns were 
inf luenced b y gave lk ind, a fo rmu la for d im in i sh ing г е Ш т ร . In 1580, this pract ice 
was b lamed for the inab i l i t y o f the Tynedalers to serve the c rown as l ight cavalry, as 
they had done i n the past: 'D ivers are un f t im ished for they have ever had a custom i f 
a man have issue o f 10 sons, 8, 6, 5, or 4 and sits on a ho ld i ng but o f 6ร. rent, every 
son shall have a piece o f his father 'ร ho ld ing . The i r ch ie f service therefore is on foot 
as bowmen , the place serving w e l l fo r the same.'^^^ I t was certain that each surname 
also had foo tmen to accompany its riders, but the numbers o f mounted men fe l l by 
շ 0 շ NRO, Z A N M.13/D.15. Halls and Redes appeared at the head o f the Redesdale muster. 
շ 0 3 H.C. Ramm, R.W. McDowe l l , and Eric Mercer, Sheilings and Bastles, (London: H M R C , 1970), 
pp. 70-71. Most basties were in fact surrounded by shielings, which suggest that the poorer dalesmen 
looked to their social betters for protection. 
շ 0 4 See PRO, SP 1/168 ff. 19-54 (Bowes ， Survey ofthe Borders), 
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the end o f the sixteenth century so that by 1597 Lo rd Eure compla ined that 
Tynedale could not raise more than 100 men, and o f those less than 30 were 
horsed.^^^ 
Surname groups also seemed largely u n w i l l i n g to adapt to new mi l i t a r y 
practices. The riding fami l ies tenaciously c lung to their role as l ight cavalry, and 
al though they successftiUy served as such du r ing the 1560 campaign, thei r ro le on 
the bat t le f ie ld had been ecl ipsed b y the more m o d e m mounted arquebusier, and the 
demi-lance.^^^ I n 1580, despite the pro l i fe ra t ion o f firearms i n the regular Eng l ish 
armies, few dalesmen carr ied f i r e a r m s . A s late as 1597, Border surnames 
protested hav ing to pay £1 for a cal iver, i m p l y i n g that bows and b i l ls were st i l l their 
preferred weapons. They warned the queen that i f they were to buy firearms, many 
w o u l d have to g ive up their f a r m s T h e earl ier Tudors had avoided this p rob lem, i f 
on ly through their o w n innate m i l i t a r y conservat ism, b y a l l o w i n g the m i l i t a ry 
establishment to c l i n g to the longbow and the b i l l as p r imary in fan t ry weapons. 
The loya l ty o f the surname groups to their roya l keepers was a double-edged 
sword, and some regarded their obl igat ions as opt ional once thei r l ives were i n 
imminen t danger. M i l i t a r y disasters that fe l l upon the Engl ish at Haddon R i g g i n 
1542 and again at A n c r u m M o o r i n 1545 suggest that Border service d i d not b ind 
Marcher horsemen to their local o f f icers or lords. A t Haddon R igg , 'Riddesdale 
w i t h Sir Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe 'ร company were the first to f l y , ' ind ica t ing the Marcher 
pattern o f flight or p u r s u i t ^ " A t A n c r a m M o o r , some o f the d ismounted Eng l ish 
Borderers fled i n the face o f their Scott ish counterparts and in do ing so undermined 
-շ1 СВР, Լ no. 50. 
^^^С5ЛП,П0 .245 . 
20? PRO, SP 52/3/185 and 193; Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, pp. 23-30. ւ^չ СВР, Լ no 50, 
CRO, PR 122/51. 
2 ' 0 As late as 1544, Henry V I I I had reissued the statues o f Edward I I I that mandated the practice o f 
archery. 
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any attempt o f defence by their al l ieร.^'^ In the Eng l ish campaign o f 1547, W i l l i a m 
Patten witnessed the Nor thern Horsemen barga in ing for ransoms f r o m the Scots 
Borderers, rather than engaging them i n combat: 
Some o f their crosses [ o f St. George] were so nar row, and so s ing ly set on , that 
a p u f f o f w i n d migh t have b l o w n them from their breasts; and that they were 
found , right o f ten, ta lk ing w i t h the Scott ish pr ickers w i t h i n less than length 
asunder, and when they perceived that they had been aspied, they have begun 
to run at one another . . . they str ike a few strokes but by assent and 
appointment.^*^ 
Th is evidence suggests that the government 's interpretat ion o f m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion 
had d i f f i cu l t ies in overcoming the bonds o f k i t h and k i n in Marcher society. The 
performance o f the reivers at Haddon R i g g and A n c r u m M o o r also indicate that 
Borderers of ten pursued their o w n agendas even when serv ing under the k ing ' s 
banner. I t is possible that tact ical considerations may have guided the actions o f the 
border horsemen; most preferred the methods o f pursui t and ambush, rather than set 
battles. The i r smal ler ponies were also not desirable for charg ing the Scott ish 
schil l i rons, a l though any wise borderer w o u l d a l ight from his mount before engaging 
pikemen.^'"^ There were several battles where border horsemen d ismounted for 
combat, but were on l y successful i f they were organised. A t Haddon R i g g and again 
at A n c r u m , Engl ish borderers al ighted i n conf i is ion. Th is m igh t account for their 
f l igh t , yet i t s t i l l indicates that they were u n w i l l i n g to f o l l o w the orders o f their 
o f f icers , or to show concern for their p l igh t , when there was a sl ightest setback on 
the field. In al l instances where the Marchers fled the scene o f batt le, they lef t their 
leaders behind to be captured or k i l l ed , a tendency that garnered numerous cr i t ics o f 
2 ' ՛ Gainsford Bruce, 'The English Expedition into Scotland in 1542，， Archaeologia Aeliana, yd 
series, vol. 3 (1907), p. 195. 
2 ᄂ 3 W i l l i am Patten, The Late Expedition into Scotland, in A.F. Pollard (ed.) Tudor Tracts, 1532-1588, 
Westminster: Constable, 1903), p. 135. 
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the Engl ish h igh land clans. Thus the gentry 'ร co l lus ion w i t h the surname groups, 
wh i l e serv ing o n l y the narrowest strategies, resulted in a h i g h l y unstable source o f 
soldiers. Th is on l y fur thered the decl ine o f Marcher un i ty against a professed 
common enemy, who cou ld be pract ica l ly anybody. 
Since Tudo r po l i c y towards Border service in general was inconsistent, 
isolated p i aces l i ke N o r t h Tynedale and Redesdale experienced an ebbing and 
flowing o f Tudor author i ty . The most ef fect ive method o f cont ro l l ing the surnames, 
and ensur ing their cont r ibut ion to the war ef for t , lay in the combinat ion o f ef fect ive 
of f icers and loya l he idsmen. A l t hough there exists no record or surv iv ing document 
that w o u l d i l lustrate h o w surnames enforced m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion amongst 
themselves, the reports from the M a r c h of f icers indicate that most f o l l owed their 
heidsmen into batt le, and that the bands were organised b y f a m i l y groups. Bowes 
conf i rmed that surname groups mustered under their he idsmen, a l though there is no 
account o f any fur ther regimentat ion.^ '^ In a l l p robabi l i ty , none existed unt i l they 
mustered under thei r Keepers, as the bands were described on l y vaguely as 
conta in ing more than a good n u m b e r . ^ W h a t held them together as a uni t was not 
so much ob l iga t ion , but thei r direct ties o f k insh ip and k indred. No t even the 
encroaching Tudo r state cou ld fracture this t ie , a l though it cou ld be persuaded i f the 
rewards were prop i t ious. 
Despite the arrangement that al l tenants serve gratis, the m i l i t a ry qua l i ty o f the 
Nor thumber land tenantry began to sl ip behind more m o d e m approaches to warfare. 
The first ind ica t ion that the nor th had fa l len beh ind i n the m i l i t a r y revo lu t ion was the 
noted in fe r io r i t y o f the Nor thern Horsemen to the demi- lances o f the roya l armies. 
2 " During Haddon Rigg, it was reported that the English officers dismounted to face Huntley's 
infantry. See LP, X V I I no. 662 and 663; BL， Add. MSS 32747 f. 48 (August 24, 1542). 
2 ' 5 BL， Calig. B. V I I I , f. 106 (Bowes ， Survey of 1551). 
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The use o f heav i ly -armed landsknechts and Spanish cavalry i n the marches dur ing 
the last years o f the reign o f Henry V I I I heralded England 's acceptance o f the new 
style o f war fare that had already taken foot in Europe. For Her t fo rd 's last campaign 
in 1545, the k i n g personal ly sent north 1500 Spaniards, 4000 Germans plus several 
hundred horsed harquebusiers and lances, and demanded that Lieutenant-General 
Shrewsbury take stock o f his supplies and store gra in for the approaching army, 
w h i c h numbered almost sixteen thousand men.^*^ The presence o f mercenaries not 
on l y marked a shi f t i n tactics, but also demonstrated the Nor thumber land tenantry 
were inadequate fo r subduing Scot land b y themselves. I n 1545, when 600 l igh t 
horse o f the M i d d l e Marches received a thrashing at M i l l s tone Edge, their fa i lure 
was b lamed on a lack o f heavy cavalry that the fore ign mercenaries had prev ious ly 
s u p p l i e d . ^ B y 1557, i t was accepted as a fact that their heavier-armed comrades 
outmoded the l ight horsemen o f the borders.^ There was also a concern about the 
numbers o f l igh t horsemen that the Borders were able to furn ish. In order to 
supplement the Marcher forces, there began a po l i cy o f assuring Scots borderers 
dur ing the 1540'ร. Th is assurance brought over 7,000 Scots into Engl ish service, 
most o f w h o m Sir Thomas Whar ton had raised, al though their loya l ty was on ly 
guaranteed through the exchange o f hostages.^^^ Th is arrangement backf i red several 
t imes, as i t had at A n c r u m M o o r when the supposedly assured La i rd o f Bon jedward 
turned on Eure and Lay ton after things went awry.^^* 
B y the m i d -1540 'ร , Marcher of f icers began to develop new strategies for 
enforc ing border service and strengthening the overal l m i l i t a r y strength o f the East 
and M i d d l e March . W i t hou t the tenantry to serve, border service qu ick l y 
、 BL , Calig. B. V I I f. 440. 
' LP, XX (1 ) no. 436,513. 
' B L , Harl . MSS 643 f. 165 (July 11, 1557); Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 203. 
Addenda, 1, pp. 331-2. 
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disappeared f r om the map. The Wardens requested an act o f Parl iament and new 
for t i f icat ions for the borders that w o u l d put more Marchers into garr ison, thereby 
ensur ing their fulfilment o f m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion. A l t hough this act never mater ial ised, 
the k i n g was sympathet ic to Nor thumber land 'ร p l ight , w h i c h he b lamed upon the 
gent lemen who were s low to help their neighbours and themselves."^^^ The k i n g 
remained conv inced that any decl ine o f border service was a result o f the gentry 'ร 
squabbl ing and feuding. T o some extent, he was correct in that landowners w o u l d 
of ten sit b y wh i l e their neighbours suffered depredations at the hands o f Eng l ish and 
Scott ish reivers. 
Marcher of f icers also noted another d is turb ing development in the 
1 andhold ing patterns o f the Marches: the strength o f the county suffered great ly from 
the tak ing o f fines and gressoms, and increased rents, w h i c h lef t the tenants w i thou t 
money fo r horse and hamess.^^^ It was also sometimes d i f f i cu l t to eject a tenant for 
non- f i i l f i lmen t o f m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion . I t appears that some tenants could sell their 
m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion to others. I f this ob l iga t ion went unf t imished, the or ig ina l holder 
cou ld not be held responsible, and could not be evicted from his lands, nor cou ld his 
k i n be disinherited.^^^ Nicholas R id ley o f Eales commented under oath that Чһе 
tenants do not for fe i t their lands as refugees or for fe lony or treason. ' Instead, the 
lands w o u l d descend to the next heir, thereby keeping the tenancy w i t h i n the 
ґатхіу."^^^ There is no ind icat ion that lords attempted to amend this p rob lem, 
something that w o u l d have been quite d i f f i cu l t g iven the nature o f tenant r ight . 
Sir Thomas Whar ton suggested redef in ing m i l i t a ry ob l igat ion, arguing that the 
current pract ice d id not wo rk , and that i t on l y created ant ipathy between the 
LP, X I X ( 2 ) no. 625. 
- LP, X V I I I no. 567. 
' LP, X V I I I no. 800 and part 2 (same volume), no. 146. 
\CBP, II， no. 613 (4). 
； PRO, E 134/18Jasl/Mich20. 
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gent lemen and the poor. Instead he proposed that tenants who owed rents o f 2O5. 
and upwards should prov ide 'good geld ing, a harness, and a spear.' \0s.-20s. rent 
was responsible for p rov id ing horse, harness, bow and arrows, w i t h less than lOs, 
rent fu rn ish ing harness, b o w and arrows. I n turn, every landlord should keep horse 
and harness according to his lands. Whar ton expressly wished to fo rb id the fa rm ing 
o f duties and speci f ica l ly ou է law any tak ing o f gressoms from those tenants w h o 
prov ided m i l i t a r y service, and he requested an act o f Parl iament p roh ib i t ing any man 
i n the border counties (Durham, Westmore land, Nor thumber land and Cumber land) 
from tak ing f ines í r o m his tenants. Whar ton explained that this act w o u l d help 
Nor thumber land and the M i d d l e and Eastern Marches strengthen themselves. շ շ 6 
L i ke other Par l iamentary acts requested b y his colleagues, i t appears that this never 
passed. Whar ton was adamant about other issues. Those who reft ised to prov ide 
harness were to be evicted by their lords, thereby re in forc ing the relat ionship 
between border service and customary tenancies. Musters were to occur quarter ly, 
and a book made and del ivered to the Warden , w h i c h w o u l d have been a new 
development. U l t ima te ly , there is no evidence that much came o f this proposal, 
a l though Whar ton cont inued his determined, stubborn dr ive to upho ld the unique 
obl igat ions o f the Engl ish Marchers. Other makeshi f t measures attempted to bu f fe r 
the fa i l i ng system o f Border service, w h i c h , according to Whar ton , had witnessed a 
fou r - fo ld reduct ion in the numbers o f avai lable soldiers?^^ 
Evidence suggests that border service d id not fa i l inherent ly dur ing the wars 
o f 1542-1560; i t funct ioned enough to prov ide some security. A t t imes, though, i t 
cou ld disappoint . W h e n it fa i led, i t d id so miserably, to the d iscomf i ture o f entire 
wards. T o depend on the free services o f impover ished tenants whose on ly reward 
' LP, X V I I I no. 800 and part 2 (same volume), no. 146. 
' LP, X V I I I no. 800 and part 2 (same volume), no. 146. 
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was relief from taxes was an uncertain method of raising troops. Without money, it 
was difficult to secure any dependable military services from the Marchers. At the 
same time, the receipt of money set a precedent, and the border clans came to 
depend upon money to keep reiving from becoming a necessity. Bush claims this 
was a major reason why border service failed.^^^ Another problem was that the 
border pensioners were often not powerftil enough to put together a defence of a 
specific locale since their holdings in any one area were too divided. This hindered 
their ability to respond to the lightning raids from across the frontier. Quite often, 
by the time they managed to fire their beacons and assemble a sizeable force, it was 
too late and the damage had already been done. The only recourse they had was to 
launch a retaliatory raid, which only encouraged more violence and instability. On 
the other hand, the border surnames that owed service through their tenant right did 
not always ftilfil their obligations due to feuds with the local officers. The Charltons 
and the Halls were the principal offenders here, as they often reproved their Keepers. 
When an accord existed between the surname groups, the Halls and Charltons turned 
up for musters as a means of receiving the good graces of their governors. They 
played this card well.^^^ The bloodfeuds and antipathy that border warfare had 
engendered ensured a fractured military machine in the Marches, and the crown's 
policies of employing the sumame groups only fostered the violence that the 
government had sought to placate. By 1547, when the government began to take 
stock of the forces in the North, and with the escalation of warfare in 1547, they 
called for an army that the Marches could not possibly supply under the current 
practice of border service. Without the lure of pay, the Northumbrian bands that had 
1 Է Bush, Tenant R igh t / p. 184. 
2 2 9 The Duke o f Nor fo lk sought to pardon several surname groups for their service in the Marches in 
1540-41. His reasons were that in pardoning them, the crown would have recourse to more potential 
soldiers. These men, Robsons from Falstone in Tynedale, had been accused of sundry March treason, 
for which they could have been executed. 
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served Henry dw ind led shor t ly af ter his death, and their m i l i t a r y practices were 
rap id ly show ing their obsolescence on the field. W a r had taxed the Marchers beyond 
what they cou ld sustain i n terms o f manpower. I f on ly the Tudors cou ld have 
af forded the 11. per annum that a mounted soldier required, there w o u l d have been a 
great poss ib i l i ty for ra is ing and keeping a notewor thy standing army i n the Marches. 
Marcher m i l i t a r y ob l iga t ion was deeply characterised b y over t w o hundred 
years o f frontier v io lence. Marcher society was un ique ly mi l i ta r ised, w i t h practices 
that d i f fe red from the rest o f England. Beh ind the war l i ke demeanour o f the borders 
lay an acute sense o f memory and a deeply conservative be l ie f i n cont inui ty . Ye t the 
focus o f nat ional m i l i t a r y ob l igat ion, the percept ion o f a common enemy, was 
skewed throughout the dales o f the borders. For an Engl ish marcher, the enemy 
could be o f any nat ional o r ig in : Scott ish, French or Engl ish. Cross-border bonds o f 
k i th and k i n perverted any rampant hatred o f the Scots based on loya l ty to the k i n g 
in London . In addi t ion, the gentry were o f ten either related or lords to the quasi-
independent surname groups, thereby d raw ing the m i l i t a ry leadership o f the marches 
into the complex web o f feud and familias. These considerations must be weighed 
careft iUy when discussing any aspect o f Marcher history. 
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Chapter S ix : M i l i t a r y Au tho r i t y and Of f i ce i n the Marches 
The sixteenth century heralded the arr ival o f m i l i t a r y bureaucracy, and w i t h 
i t came the inevi table reg imentat ion that produced rankings and a vert ical chain o f 
command. W h i l e Engl ish armies were s lower to adapt such practices, i t is clear that 
even they fostered a g r o w i n g system o f regulated m i l i t a r y author i ty. e . G . 
Cruickshank has c la imed that the gap between the Eng l ish h igher command and the 
rank and file produced a weak cha in o f command , w h i c h was eventual ly improved 
by the addi t ion o f midd le - rank o f f i cers . ' For the Ang lo-Scot t i sh Marches, an 
altogether d i f ferent system o f rank existed, one that inc luded midd le - rank ing 
of f icers , a l though their author i ty was not part o f a vert ical m i l i t a r y hierarchy. The 
chain o f command in the Marches was loose. Th is was a result o f the extraordinary 
Nor thumbr ian m i l i t a r y ob l igat ions, w h i c h produced bands that were i r regular in bo th 
size and scope, some o f w h i c h were on l y w i l l i n g to f o l l o w a select echelon. M i l i t a r y 
author i ty u l t imate ly depended upon personal in f luence i n the Marches and 
іпЇефгеІаІ іоп o f one's dut ies, w h i c h resulted i n ambigu i ty instead o f a clear system 
o f rank. 
M i l i t a r y rank ing in the sixteenth century evo lved w i t h the creation o f 
regiments. In France, the o f f i ce o f colonel appeared i n the 1540'ร as a response to 
the rise o f standardised m i l i t a r y uni ts , wh i l e captains led companies o f 100 men, the 
compos i t ion o f w h i c h fluctuated w i t h the increasing use o f guns and l igh t cavalry.^ 
Spanish tercios witnessed a s imi lar development in m i l i t a r y hierarchy, so that by 
1600 there was a discernib le e f for t to create mu l t ip le tiers o f o f f ices in order to 
faci l i tate bat t le f ie ld leadership. The Engl ish m i m i c k e d their European neighbours to 
' e .G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (London: OUP， 1946) pp. 50-52. 
՜ David Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, I470-I560, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1993) pp. 162-71. 
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some extent, but in the Marches there was l i t t le vestige o f firm m i l i t a ry rank ing. 
Skip-echelon occurred frequently in the Marches.^ M a r c h adminis t rat ion witnessed 
many instances where deference was reft ised. Some Marcher of f icers took this to 
the extreme by feud ing w i t h f e l l ow of f icers. The prob lem had potent ial to worsen, 
especial ly after the fa l l o f the Dacres and Percys. A r m e d rising i n 1536 conf i rmed 
the complete b reakdown o f author i ty . A f te r 1536, Henry V I I I was especial ly keen 
to exert his personal author i ty i n Border af fairs, w h i c h resulted in a program o f 
rebu i ld ing the M a r c h of f ices. However , Henry made h imse l f part o f the p rob lem. 
M o r e of ten than not, the ab i l i t y o f an o f f i ce r to w o r k independent ly f r o m the 
supposed chain o f command came from personal arrangements w i t h the c rown . 
M o r e o f ten than not, leading M a r c h of f ices were po l i t i ca l arrangements that the k i n g 
bestowed upon court iers. Successive rulers also interfered w i t h the loose structure o f 
Marcher m i l i t a r y author i ty. N o adminis t rat ion prov ided much cont inu i ty f r o m the 
practices o f the previous admin is t ra t ion, w h i c h undermined consistencies in m i l i t a ry 
author i ty . Despi te the encroaching power o f the state, there was no successful 
restructur ing o f m i l i t a r y admin is t ra t ion i n the Marches. 
The c rown was ut ter ly dependent upon the Nor thumbr ian gentry to lead their 
m i l i t a r y commun i t y after 1536. M . L . Bush states that ' the C r o w n had mere ly 
groped for stop-gaps' when emp loy ing gentry of f icers , a l though this trend cont inued 
we l l in to the 1550'ร.'* However , Bush argues the appointment o f leading nob i l i t y to 
the overarch ing posi t ions o f Lieutenant o f the No r t h and Warden-General were also 
b o m o f necessity, since the c r o w n was unable to f i nd any w h o could fill the of f ice.^ 
The regular M a r c h c o m m a n d ― M a r c h Wardens, Keepers and Capta ins֊enjoyed a 
3 Ralph Robson, The Rise and Fall of the English Highland Clans: Tudor Responses to a Mediaeval 
Problem, (Edinburgh: East L in ton Press, 1989) p. 112. 
： M.L. Bush, 'The Problem o f the Far N o r t h ; Northern History 6 (ใ 971), pp. 43- 45. 
M.L. Bush, "Far Nor th" , p 52. 
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p ivo ta l ro le i n m i l i t a ry operations on l y under Henry V I I I and Protector Somerset. 
The i r status as m i l i t a ry of f icers was eventual ly downgraded, and b y El izabeth 'ร first 
year March of f icers were p r imar i l y po l ice o f f ic ia ls . The s low ly decreasing mi l i t a ry 
ro le o f the M a r c h of f icers in the Ang lo-Scot t i sh wars o f the Tudors coupled w i t h the 
distorted chain o f command to produce a very conf i ised picณre o f m i l i t a ry author i ty. 
Lieutenants and Wardens-General 
The Eng l ish c rown had appointed deputies to govern the Borders since the 
opening o f Ang lo-Scot t i sh conf l i c t under Edward I. Ear ly Wardenships and 
Lieutenancies were usual ly war t ime appointments, as most were designed to 
faci l i tate campaigns against the Scots. Thei r ad hoc nature meant that Lieutenancies 
lacked the de f in i t i on o f a more permanent administ rat ive pos i t ion. However , the 
o f f i ce o f Lieutenant o f the N o r t h began to take more shape under the Yo rk i s t 
admin is t ra t ion. Richard o f Gloucester served as Lieutenant in 1482, and was 
successft i l i n tak ing Be rw i ck from the Scots, w h i c h marked the last t ime the t own 
swi tched hands.^ Under the early Tudors , the Percys usual ly served as Wardens but 
the Howards c la imed a key role as the dynasty 'ร northern Lieutenants whenever war 
seemed inevitable.^ A f t e r the risings o f 1536, the cont inual presence o f a Lieutenant 
in the borders po l iced the dales and kept the surnames i n l ine. Th is was N o r f o l k ' s 
p r imary du ty i n 1537, when he promised to 'so s ing them such a song that the l i ke 
was not heard among them sith any o f them was b o m . ' ^ 
Wardens-General , on the other hand, were also act ive since the beg inn ing o f 
the fourteenth century. Th i s pos i t ion s imp ly coordinated the adminis t rat ion o f al l 
6 The best works covering Richard*ร Lieutenancy are in Rosemary Horrox, (Ed.) Richard ш and the 
North, Studies in Regional and Local History, 6 (Hul l : บทiversity o f Hu l l , 1986). 
ᄀ Gervase Phil l ips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, ¡513-1550, (Woodbridge: Boydei l , 1999), p. 112. 
8 PRO SP 1/116, ff. 108-111 (Feb. 24， 1537). 
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three Marches. L i k e the Lieutenancy, the o f f i ce in i t i a l l y went to a Prince o f the 
B l o o d , but then usual ly to either a Nev i l l e or a Percy.^ B y Henry V I I I ' s accession, 
the Dacres had gained contro l o f the o f f i ce , and they remained there un t i l 1525, 
when the o f f i ce went in to abeyance after Dacre was accused o f harbour ing Scott ish 
surnames. W h e n the o f f i ce was resurrected, i t was closely t ied to the Lieutenancy, 
in order to b r i n g i t under closer scrut iny o f the c rown and Pr i vy Counc i l . 
These of f ices were theoret ical ly the highest rank in the Marches, outst r ipp ing 
the author i ty o f the Wardens when commiss ions expressly a l lowed them to do so. 
L i ke thei r medieva l predecessors, the responsib i l i ty o f the Tudor-era Lieutenant or 
the Warden-Genera l was to supervise raids and lead armies across the Border in to 
Scot land. Th is task was more than daunt ing; gra in shortages, logist ical quagmires 
rang ing from lack o f suf f ic ient carts to def ic ient comed powder fo r the ordnance 
made this post a n ightmare at t i m e s . V i r t u a l l y al l o f the candidates for the h igh 
of f ices were greater magnates, though most were from southern areas. As cour t ly 
appointments, they could be h igh l y unstable due to changing forces w i t h i n the court. 
F r o m 1542 to 1544, there were no less than six d i f ferent magnates appointed to lead 
the Marches, some ho ld ing their of f ices concur ren t l y / ^ In 1557， the earl o f 
Shrewsbury, w h o arguably was one o f M a r y ' ร most experienced border 
commanders, was ecl ipsed by the appointments o f the earl o f Westmoreland and 
lo rd Dacre, whose Catho l ic leanings no doubt curr ied the favour o f the queen. Th is 
9 M.E. James, A Tudor Magnate and the Tudor State: Henry, the Fifth Earl of Northumberland, 
(York: St. Anthony 'ร Press, 1966), p. 14. 
к S.G. Ell is, ' A Border Baron and the Tudor State: The Rise and Fall o f Lord Dacre o f the N o r t h / 
The Historical Journal, vol . 35 (1992). 
" The Letters and Papers o f 1542 are quite tel l ing o f supply shortages. This was a burr that Nor fo lk 
continually griped about in his letters to the king. In the end, Norfolk's "invasion" wi th an army o f 
6,000 accomplished litt le more than most raids due to grain shortages. 
' These included the dukes o f Nor fo lk and Suffolk, the earls o f Rutland, Hertford and Shrewsbury, 
and lord Lisle. 
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compounded the mu l t ip le d i f f i cu l t ies o f the o f f i ce , as many northern gentry treated 
strangers and new appointees w i t h suspicion. 
Garr isons and musters fo r the Scott ish wars seem to have been the h igh 
command 's greatest wor ry , especial ly for the Wardens-General , from 1542 unt i l the 
end o f Ang lo -Scot t i sh warfare i n 1560. L is le 'ร p r imary duties i n 1542 were mon th l y 
accounts and musters o f the garrisons.'^ In A p r i l 1543, Lo rd Parr was to ld upon his 
arr ival i n o f f i ce to ensure that the garrisons were operat ing as ordered.'"* Throughout 
1544 and 1545, Shrewsbury constantly was remedy ing the lack o f pay to the 
garr ison soldiers, ' f o r the poure soudeours do not a l i t t le grudge and complayne fo r 
want o f theyr wages ' . ' ^ He was especial ly keen for more money after the defeat at 
A n c r a m M o o r i n February 1545, when many o f the soldiers came home 
'un f t im ished o f horses and hamays, ' fo rc ing the Marcher of f icers to cal l upon levies 
from Yorksh i re in order to f i l l the garrisons that had been depleted. '^ 
The Lieutenants were responsible for the muster ing o f forces that f i l l ed the 
garrisons. A s Lieutenant i n M a y 1547, Shrewsbury mustered 200 men from al l 
counties above the Trent , demanding that they send as many harquebusiers as 
possible to the Borders. '^ Ten years after the batt le o f Pink ie, the rev iva l o f the 
Franco-Scott ish al l iance required Shrewsbury to stand i n readiness w i t h 1,000 men , 
a move that p roved fh ļs t ra t ing as the Scots fa i led to material ise w i t h an army. '^ 
S t i l l , there was scare enough for a conference to be cal led w i t h Lo rd Whar ton and 
w i t h Lo rd Eure concerning the garrisons to be mainta ined along the borders. *^ It 
appears that he acted as a royal in termediary, deferr ing to the opin ions o f the 
Լ LP, X V I I no. 1064. 
Լ LP, X V I I I ( l ) nos. 464 and 468. 
5 Hamilton Papers, I I nos. 316 and 406. 
6 Hamilton Paperร, I I no. 423. 
I Talbot MSS, В f. 9. 
Լ Talbot MSS, D, ff. 251-252. 
9 Talbot MSS, D:, f. 256. 
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Wardens and never actual ly engaging in any sort o f direct m i l i t a r y ac t iv i ty w i t h his 
o w n troops. Th i s is a marked contrast to the tenures o f the Duke o f N o r f o l k and the 
Earl o f Her t fo rd , whose pun i t i ve expedit ions in to Scotland dur ing the 1540'ร marked 
how much m i l i t a r y power the Lieutenant cou ld w i e l d . Y e t b y the reign o f M a r y it 
became the du ty o f the Lieutenants to muster men w i t h i n al l counties nor th o f the 
Trent i n order to supply the Wardens w i t h a quota o f soldiers fo r the garrisons.^*^ 
The c r o w n held the highest command culpable fo r any logist ica l fa i lure, or 
any other setback that hindered m i l i t a r y operat ions. N o r f o l k endured sharp c r i t i c ism 
for his botched invasion o f Scot land i n 1542.^^ The defeat at Haddon R igg , where 
Sir Robert Bowes and L i t t l e John Heron were bo th capณred, had also occurred 
under his watch. N o r f o l k suffered l o w mora le i n his final m i l i t a r y campaign, o f ten 
compla in ing o f his misery;^^ thus, h is m i l i t a r y leadership was suspect. H i s m i l i t a r y 
inac t i v i t y in the N o r t h after the campaign o f 1542 was very much a result o f his 
fa i lure i n Scot land, though he went on to f u l f i l a b r i e f and unsuccessful ro le as 
leader at Boulogne. Shrewsbury, l i ke N o r f o l k , sank after defeat. The defeat at 
A n c r u m M o o r i n February 1545 took place wh i l e Shrewsbury served as Lieutenant 
and Warden-General . M o s t l i ke ly , this setback caused the Ear l o f Her t fo rd to return 
once again to the Borders.^^ Shrewsbury lost the L ieutenancy i n M a y 1545; the 
o f f i ce o f Warden-General was temporar i l y disbanded that Ju ly unt i l resurrected 
under Protector Somerset 's administration.^'^ Despite h is ostensible fa l l from power , 
Shrewsbury went on to become the President o f the Counc i l o f the N o r t h short ly 
20 Addenda, V I I I no. 31 . Dur ing the summer o f 1557, the Talbots controlled virtual ly all o f the 
northern levies, w i th Shrewsbury again appointed as the Lieutenant-General for the northern parts. 
2 ' Gainsford Bruce, 'The English Expedition into Scotland in 1542.' Archaeologia Aeliana Th i rd 
Series, 3 (1907), pp. 191-212 ; Philips, Anglo- Scots Wars, pp. 149-50. 
է LP, X V I I nos. 820, 866, and 940. 
" Hamilton Papers, I I , no. 436. 
24 Hist MSS Comm. Rutland, i, p. 33. The Earl o f Rutland was made Lord Warden o f the East and 
Middle Marches in Apr i l 1549, in a weak attempt to emulate the off ice o f Warden-General, but it was 
not unti l February 1551 that the Marquess o f Dorset was appointed fu l l Warden-General, 
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after his dismissal as Warden-General , and eventual ly regained the Lieutenancy, 
The Earl was also act ive i n Protector Somerset's campaign, and had sole command 
o f an expedi t ion in to Scot land in 1548， when i t became clear that new leadership 
needed to bolster the fa l ter ing efforts o f Lo rd Grey to re l ieve the siege o f the 
garrison at H a d d i n g t o n . A l t h o u g h Shrewsbury was able to rel ieve the beleaguered 
garr ison and force the French forces to retreat to Musselburgh, he was unable to 
engage the French commander in Scotland, Sieur D*Esse, and destroy his 
expedi t ionary force. H is fa i lure incensed the D u k e o f Somerset, so that Shrewsbury 
was e f fec t ive ly marg ina l ized fo r the rest o f the war. The consequences o f fa i lure 
of ten meant dismissal or disgrace. Th is was coupled w i t h the already daunt ing task 
o f runn ing the M a r c h defences, or command ing an army. 
The leading of f icers o f ten stumbled over themselves. Commiss ions fo r the 
post o f Lieutenant and Warden-General demonstrate the w ide- rang ing author i ty that 
was granted to the leading M a r c h of f icers, and h o w the of f ices over lapped each 
other. Henry ' ร in i t ia l Lieutenant in the Borders after the P i lgr image, the D u k e o f 
No r f o l k , was selected p r imar i l y to quel l the dalesmen, a l though his role rap id ly 
evolved over the next five years. In 1537, he was selected because o f his expert ise 
i n Border affairs,^^ wh i ch made h i m the perfect candidate to in i t ia te host i l i t ies 
against Scotland i n 1542. H is commiss ion i n 1542 was vague, g i v i ng h i m the power 
to raise al l o f the No r th , as w e l l as the power to create subordinate թօտէտ.^՛՛ Th is 
overarching m i l i t a r y power was typ ica l o f a Lieutenant.^^ 
2 5 G . พ . Bernard, The Power of the Early Tudor Nobility, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1985), pp. 124-
Է PRO, E 36/119 f. 137. 
-Լլբ, X V I I , по. 714(19) . 
28 Hamilton Papers, I I , nos. 290, 312. In 1544, the Earl o f Shrewsbury received virtual ly the same 
powers to raise the mi l i t ia o f all Northern counties, but it appears that he only did so when the king 
required him. 
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A t the same t ime the D u k e was appointed to his L ieutenancy, the Ear l o f 
Rut land was created Warden-General w i t h the power to raise al l o f the Marchers.^' ' 
The government d id not specify that Rut land was subordinate to N o r f o l k ; instead, 
they gave h i m a free hand to consul t w i t h leading Borderers i n organis ing raids in to 
ՏօօէւՅոձ.^ ՛ ՛ N o r f o l k ' s increasing i n f i rm i t y , a long w i t h his general administ rat ive 
i ncompe tence / ' meant that he was almost made redundant b y Rut land 'ร 
commiss ion. A t one po in t , the k i n g was eager to let Rut land lead the army into 
Scot land, demonstrat ing his lack o f fa i th i n N o r f o l k ' s leadership.^^ Henry ' ร fa i th i n 
his ch ie f o f f icers , inc lud ing Rut land, had also unravel led b y the t ime he appointed 
first the D u k e o f S u f f o l k , " and then the Ear l o f Hertford,^՚ ՛ to replace Rut land and 
No r fo l k . The latter t w o stayed i n the Borders to he lp ease the t ransi t ion, but the 
presence o f Her t fo rd and Su f fo l k created some friction w i t h N o r f o l k , whose plans 
for a raid on Liddesdale were ut ter ly rejected by Her t fo rd for be ing far too 
reckless.^^ A l t hough the c rown attempted to sort the chain o f command b y reca l l ing 
Her t ford and N o r f o l k and leav ing Su f fo lk as the Lieutenant i n January 1543, this 
manoeuvre fa i led to g ive the L ieutenancy any super ior i ty over the Warden-Genera l , 
or vice-versa. 
W h e n Lord L is le came to the Borders in November 1542 to replace Rut land, 
he had l i t t le to do w i t h the Lieutenant No r f o l k , and when Su f fo l k entered o f f i ce , 
' ' 5 řF . , vo l . V， no. 395. 
^ ฯ b i d . _ 二 
3 ' Nor fo lk was designated to lead an army into Scotland in the summer o f 1542. Delays caused by 
logistical problems hampered the a rmy 'ร departure, which did not happen unti l mid-October. 
Norfo lk 's bungling cost the invasion t ime, so that in the end, al l that could be managed was a six-day 
raid. See LP, X V I I , nos. 75 Լ 786, 800, 820， 866， 919, 940， 953 975， 996, 1000 and 1031. 
LP, X V I I , no. 778. 
33 LP， X V I I , nos. 654 and 764. Hertford was probably meant to replace Sir Robert Bowes and Sir 
Cuthbert Radcli f fe, both o f who were sti l l captive in Scotland. 
34 LP， X V I I , no. 1002. Hertford refused the Wardenship, on the grounds that it was impossible for a 
southerner to lead Border soldiers. Instead, he appears to have acted as assistant to Warden-General 
Suffolk, although there was no conunission drawn up for h im during his br ief stay from October to 
November. 
LP, X V I I , no. 1031. 
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U s l e tended to w o r k independent ly o f him.^^ L i s le ' ร commiss ion gave h i m 
author i ty over a l l the garrisons, and the ab i l i ty to wage war i f he saw the need to do 
so, w h i c h d i rect ly clashed w i t h Su f fo l k ' s author i ty to do the same.^^ A s Warden-
General, L is le took advantage o f h is author i ty to essential ly run the Borders on an 
almost uni lateral basis, wh i l e Su f fo l k mere ly sent reports to the Pr ivy Counci l .^^ 
This tangled web o f leadership was a direct result o f the government 's po l i c y 
o f appoin t ing addi t ional of f icers when one proved incompetent or unable to lead. 
Over lapp ing author i ty was f requent ly wr i t ten expressly in to the commissions o f the 
men. I n contrast, commissions cou ld be so vague that their recipients w o u l d need the 
guidance and op in ion o f others to k n o w the l im i ts o f their o f f i ce . In June 1543, 
B ishop Tunstal l had to remind L o r d Parr, the recent ly appointed Warden General , 
that the Lieutenant 'hath the ch ie f charge not one ly in al l p i aces o f his commiss ion 
w i thou t your wardenrye, but also w i t h i n the same, and muste g i ve accompte to the 
K inge for the hole countre; wher as your Lordsh ip onely is charged w i t h your 
wardenrye.，39 The on ly real so lu t ion to this over lap was p lura l ism, w h i c h occurred 
when the Earl o f Shrewsbury was first appointed Lieutenant to rel ieve Her t fo rd , and 
then Warden-General to rel ieve Parr."^** 
To some extent, the c rown expected the h igher command to ru le b y counc i l . 
A s such, the L ieutenancy after 1546 became increasingly ident i f ied w i t h the o f f i ce 
o f L o r d President o f the Counc i l o f the No r th . That the Lieutenant had become 
administrator to the m i l i t a r i l y act ive garrisons par t ia l ly explains Shrewsbury's 
36 LP, X V I I , no. 1081; SJ.Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk Ì 484-1545, (Oxford: Blackwel l , 
1988), p. 188. The king personally instructed Hertford to stay เท the Borders and coach Lisle in his 
first weeks o f off ice. 
LP, X V I I , no. 1064. 
38 LP, X V I I Ï ( l ) nos. 1-435, passim. Lisle essentially ran all March business during his tenure. This 
may have been the result o f his appointment in January 1543 as Lord Admira l (see ibid., no. 19)， 
which might have outstripped Suffolk 's Lieutenancy. 
^^^5//^., V , no. 438. 
40 LP, X I X ( l ) , no. 656 & 671. Hertford and Lisle were recalled for service in France. 
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benching dur ing a proposed invasion o f Scot land i n M a y 1557, though his ecl ipse by 
Cathol ic Nor thern magnates was probably more a result o f M a r y ' s re l ig ious 
preferences. The northern magnates who cou ld s ign i f icant ly contr ibute men for an 
army received commands: Westmoreland for the fo rward , the Earl o f Derby fo r the 
rearward, Nor thumber land as Marsha l l , Cumber land for the foot , and L o r d Ta lbo t 
for the horse. The Earl o f Shrewsbury 's conspicuous absence from this l ist was 
made up b y his power to appoint of f icers as he saw fit, us ing the c rown 'ร 
suggestions as guidelines."^' The rule b y counc i l he ld certain disadvantages when the 
Lieutenants were unable to assert their author i ty . 
A s southern magnates predominant ly f i l l ed the o f f i ce , the Nor thumbr ian 
of f ic ia ls were bound to treat them w i t h suspic ion in i t ia l l y , so that rule b y counc i l 
sometimes resulted i n the higher command be ing either ignored or overwhe lmed. 
The Duke o f Su f fo lk , one o f Henry's best commanders, had experienced t roub le i n 
cont ro l l ing the Wardens in his command."^^ Su f fo l k , who was b r i e f i n h is ro le as 
Lieutenant from January 1543 to March 1544, remedied the p rob lem w i t h a l iberal 
approach that made h i m seem superf luous at t imes, though it has been noted that 
Su f fo l k was par t ia l ly successful because o f h is consul tat ive approach."^^ Even the 
Earl o f Her t fo rd , arguably the most power fu l o f any Lieutenants, experienced 
trouble in b r ing ing about a consensus regarding the fo r t i f i ca t ion o f the Borders. 
Rule by counc i l also marked Shrewsburys career, w h i c h lasted on and o f f 
Addenda, V I I I , no. 8. 
4 2 M.E. James, Change and Continuity in the Tudor North: The Rise of nomas First Lord Wharton, 
Borthwick Papers, vo l . 27. (York, 1965), p. 4 1 . 
43 Gunn, Charles Brandon, p. 190. 
" LP, X I X ( l ) , no. 223. During his first meeting wi th his Border officers, Hertford experienced some 
dissention coming from his constables, notably Sir Brian Layton, Ralph CoUingwood and Sir John 
Horsely. Al though they were evenณally quieted, the event itself speaks o f a general mistrust 
amongst the Borderers. 
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throughout 1544֊1560.՛*^ Shrewsbury knew enough o f Marcher pol i t ics not to 
meddle in the Wardens' affairs too much , so that the Wardens received some par i ty 
in m i l i t a ry matters. W i t h i n a few months o f rece iv ing his first commiss ion , 
Shrewsbury cal led them fo r a meet ing i n М о ф е Л / ^ where the topic o f conversat ion 
centred on neutra l iz ing the La i rd o f Bucc leuch, Oone o f the K inges majestés 
greatest ennemyeร in Scotland'.՚^^ Shrewsbury spent much o f h is t ime w r i t i n g reports 
o f actions and inroads per formed b y the roya l garrisons on the borders, and i n 
general, his conc i l ia t ing approach worked on l y b y defer r ing to the Wardens."^^ 
However , i n December 1557, Shrewsbury clashed w i t h the Earl o f Nor thumber land 
and Lords Eure and Whar ton regarding reinforcements for the Marcher garrisons.'*'^ 
Shrewsbury was near ly powerless to prevent the Warden from protest ing to the 
Pr ivy Counc i l . Nor thumber land 'ร t r i umph in the matter resulted in a dramat ic 
increase o f Marcher garrisons,^*^ wh i ch Shrewsbury w o u l d have to administer, but i t 
also demonstrated that the h igh command d i d not have u l t imate author i ty i n matters 
o f Marcher defence. H i s replacement as Lieutenant b y the Ear l o f Westmore land i n 
1557 signal led the end o f an era i n Marcher administ rat ion.^ ' A f te r 1560, peace w i t h 
Scotland meant that the posi t ion o f the Lieutenant o f the N o r t h was eventual ly 
shelved and replaced b y the g r o w i n g impor tance o f the Lords Lieutenants.^^ 
45 Shrewsbury'ร lengthy career was tied to the fortunes o f the English efforts on the Border and in 
Scotland. Despite setbacks, Shrewsbury continued this role as the head o f the war council i n the 
North, at times serving as President o f the Council o f the Nor th , at times as the King's or Queen's 
Lieutenant, unti l his death in 1560. 
= Hamiiton Papers, I I , no. 307. 
Hamilton Papers, I I , no. 311. 
Hamiiton Papers, I I , nos. 301 , 310,312, 313. 
4 9 PRO, SP 15/8/41; Talbot MSS. D ff. 271-72. 
so PRO: SP 15/8/46. 
sı Addenda^ V I I I , nos. 76 & 8 1 . The appointment o f the Earl o f Westmoreland as Lieutenant-General 
o f the North was probably not the result o f the queen's dissatisfaction wi th Shrewsbury's 
performance, but rather a product o f Westmoreland's presence ๒ court and proximi ty to the queen. 
52 See Gladys Scott Thomson, Lords Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Centiig: A Study in Tudor Locai 
Administration, (London: Longmans-Greens, \91Ъ)^passim. 
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Even as the L ieutenancy became increasingly or iented toward an 
administrat ive ro le, the role o f the Warden-Genera l retained its m i l i t a r y fonction, 
al though the o f f i ce i tse l f remained re la t ive ly i l l def ined and weak. M u c h o f the 
problem w i t h the o f f i ce o f Warden-General lay i n its inab i l i t y to appoint Wardens 
for each March . Henry V I I I , or at least the P r i vy Counc i l , had named each o f the 
successive Wardens after 1537, so that Wardens-General were almost always 
govern ing strangers. Her t fo rd thought that no southerner or stranger w o u l d ever 
serve ef fect ive ly w i thou t be ing al l ied w i t h the Wardens.^^ Lo rd Parr, the Warden 
General appointed i n 1543, compla ined b i t te r ly that the Wardens Eure and Whar ton 
were ignor ing h i m and refus ing to i n f o rm h i m o f thei r explo i ts , con f i rm ing 
Her t ford 's trepidations.^'^ Th is practice o f thrast ing strangers together began to 
change under Protector Somerset, when the Marqu is o f Dorset was created Warden-
General w i t h the power to create new Wardens, a l though this power was 
undermined when the Pr i vy Counc i l ordered h i m to appoint Lo rd Og le to the M i d d l e 
March and Sir N icho las St i r ley to the East March.^^ 
When Somerset's Scott ish ambi t ions cost h i m his head, this signal led yet 
another change i n March adminis t rat ion. W h e n the D u k e o f Nor thumber land became 
Warden-General in October 1551 , h is patent also empowered h i m to appoint 
Wardens, but this is no surprise since he he ld penul t imate power at court, d i rect ly 
under the king.^^ N e w roya l patents were issued to the incumbent Wardens, a 
practice that Henry had embraced, but this t ime the author i ty o f the Warden-Genera l 
was exp l ic i t l y preserved. Wardens were now barred from any act ion w i thou t the 
" LP, X V I I , no. 1002. 
[ЧР. XV I I I ( 2 ) , no . 146 
55 APC, I I I , p. 262; C H . Hunter Blair, "Wardens and Deputy Wardens o f the Marches," Archaeologia 
Aeliana, Fourth Series, 28 (1950), pp. 65-7. 
^^APC,m,pp. 379 and 385. 
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express author i ty o f the Warden-General when he was present in the M a r c h e s / ^ 
Dud ley , though, cou ld not upho ld his border responsibi l i t ies, especial ly after the 
absolute fa l l o f Protector Somerset in autumn 1551 , w h i c h led h i m to appoint Lo rd 
Whar ton as deputy Warden-Genera l i n Ju ly 1552 . 5 8 Combined w i t h the patronage 
o f the leading Pr i vy Counc i l l o r , Whar ton 's pos i t ion a l lowed h i m the greatest amount 
o f author i ty that the o f f i ce had witnessed. A complete overhaul o f the code o f March 
Laws and the submission o f the M a r c h of f icers were hal lmarks o f Whar ton ' s tenure, 
and for the t ime be ing the o f f i ce o f Warden-General was secure in its near uni lateral 
author i ty. However , the o f f i ce was i n abeyance after the accession o f M a r y Tudor.^^ 
Mos t o f this was a result o f the strengthening o f the pos i t ion o f Warden,^^ w h i c h no 
longer needed an overseer i n the f o r m o f a Warden-Genera l . 
A l t hough the of f ices o f Lieutenant and Warden-Genera l were eventual ly 
separated by the m id -Tudo r administrat ions, their re fo rm d id not secure their 
surv iva l . The of f ices, l i ke others, were heav i l y dependent upon the wars for their 
signif icance. W i t h the d iss ipat ion o f Ang lo -Scot t i sh war , and the rise o f the power 
o f the Wardens, the o f f i ce became superf luous, and the j o i n t cont ro l o f the Borders 
was once again discarded for the ind iv idua l Wardenships. O f more cont inual 
importance was also the Counc i l o f the N o r t h , w h i c h Shrewsbury h imse l f had 
guided when he was not act ing as Lieutenant. I ts quarter ly , mon th - long sessions 
were more than adequate in over tak ing the role o f the Lieutenant after 1560. The 
of f ices o f the regional m i l i t a r y h igh command, w h i c h for more than twenty years 
" CPĶ Edward ¥Լ IV， pp. 128-29; 184-85; 186-87. 
5 8 Wi l l iam Nicholson, Leges Marchiamm or Border Laws, (London, 1747), p. 208; James, Change 
and Continuity, p. 3 1 . Wharton was dismissed as Warden o f the West March in 1548, when he fell 
out o f favour wi th Somerset. This drew h im closer to Dudley, who used Wharton against Lord Dacre, 
Somerset's Lord Warden o f the West March. 
PRO, SP 11/1/5. 
60 P.G. Boscher, To l i t i cs , Administrat ion and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scots Border, 1550-60.， 
(Durham University Ph.D., 1985), pp. 210-11. 
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had guided the Engl ish borderers dur ing the conf l i c t w i t h Scot land, thus became a 
re l ic o f the past, v ic t ims both o f po l i cy and o f their o w n special izat ion. 
Շ օ ռ ւ ա յ տ տ յ օ ռ տ and Counc i l lo rs 
From t ime to t ime, the c r o w n designated special posi t ions for i ts border 
of f icers in Nor thumber land . Th is staณร removed the o f f icer from the standard 
hierarchy compr is ing the higher command, Wardens and their sergeants. A d hoc 
m i l i t a ry commanders in the Ang lo -Scot t i sh borders were a cur iosi ty , but they were 
also rare. Special commiss ions were of ten granted as a means o f f i l l i n g the 
vacancies caused b y logist ical h iccoughs, especial ly in the confus ion that re igned in 
1542, when cross-border ra id ing marked the beginnings o f war w i t h Scotland as the 
k ings o f Scot land and England accused each other o f v io la t ing the abstinence. W i t h 
the earl o f Rut land, the act ing Warden-Genera l , absent from the borders, the king's 
desire to pun ish the Scott ish Borders for recent actions against the Nor thumbr ian 
Borderers was essential ly shelved un t i l a temporary replacement cou ld be found. Sir 
Robert Bowes was the immedia te and natural choice. A l t h o u g h Bowes came from 
the southern Durham and N o r t h Yorksh i re border, w i thou t hold ings or tenant-
soldiers i n the Border area, Sir Robert was already an accompl ished M a r c h 
administrator. He was a natural spokesman for the rebels i n 1536-37,^' hav ing 
received a pardon for h is ro le, since now the K i n g saw further use for h i m . Sir Rafe 
El lerkar, the co-author o f Bowes ' survey, also enjoyed the pr iv i lege o f royal 
commiss ion. In 1541, he and Bowes obtained a commiss ion to act as a 
6 ' Bowes was one o f the men who met wi th the Privy Counci l and the K ing to present the list o f rebel 
demands. He later escaped from the rebel camp when it became clear that their cause was crumbling. 
It is most l ikely that Sir Robert was forced into his role, although he most certainly identif ied wi th at 
least some o f the rebels' complaints. See c. Newman, The Bowes ofStreatlam, Co. Durham: A Study 
of the Politics and Religion о f a Sixteenth-Century Northern Gentry Family (London: Bri t ish 
Library, 1991), and M.L . Bush, Durham and the Pilgrimage of Grace, (Durham: Durham County 
Locai History Society, 2000). 
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reconnoi t r ing force along the Tweed,^^ a charge that they executed w i t h some flair.^^ 
Th is , at least, was how Sir Robert Bowes earned the pr iv i lege to lead troops into the 
Scott ish borders. They received an addi t ional commiss ion to retain 100 men each for 
protect ion, ma rk i ng Bowes ' first o f f i c ia l m i l i t a r y соттапс!.^** 
The results o f the first commiss ion impressed Henry, wh i ch prompted h i m to 
іпсофога їе the use o f i r regular commanders into h is provocat ive po l i c y towards 
Scot land. In Ju ly 1542, the k i ng and counc i l draf ted a special commiss ion fo r Sir 
Robert. Th is granted h i m the extraordinary use o f 600 men ' w i t h their capitaynes 
and pet icapitaines, to be w i t h al l d i l igence conveyed to the same Bordures, and there 
layd and employed f r o m tyme to t yme, t y l the said Erles cummyng , as he the said 
Sir Robert shal th ink best and most benef ic ia l i fo r the surety and defence o f H is 
Majest ies subgiettes in those p a r t i e s ' . S i r Robert was suppl ied w i t h on ly a month's 
wages, as we l l as coat and conduct money,^^ suggest ing that these soldiers were 
commiss ioned fo r a speci f ic purpose. Th is is h igh l igh ted b y Robert's exp l ic i t charge 
to have 'good espial uppon the Scottes, ' and to report his findings w i t h i n five days 
o f a r r i v ing at the Border.^^ That the borderers were encouraged to b r ing i n their 
harvests upon the arr iva l o f Bowes can o n l y point to the king's in tent ion o f invad ing 
Scotland.^^ It is qui te apparent from the w o r d i n g o f the commiss ion that Sir Robert 
had the benef i t o f ca l l ing on the services o f any Border pensioners, as w e l l as the 
services o f the deputy Wardens. H e n r y i n his or ig ina l instruct ions to Bowes had 
urged h i m to 'ayde them [Borderers] w i t h h is counsai l and strenght, i f need soo 
6 2 LP, X V I no. 12フ4. Bowes along wi th Ellerkar had already received special instruction to survey the 
wastelands o f the East and Middle Marches, to determine the mil i tary strength o f Northumberland. 
63 LP, X V I no. 1279. Ellerkar and Bowes, whilst compi l ing their survey, were also responsible for 
directing several raids along the borders. 
LP, X V I , nos. 1205 & 1206. 
65 StP,, V， p. 206; LP, X V I I no. 540, 
''Ibid. 
68 Ibid. It was standard practice to harvest before invasion so that any counter-move by the Scots 
would be denied potential forage from the Northumberland fields. 
210 
requ i re . . . [and cause] John Heron, and al l the pensioners and act ive men inhab i t ing 
uppon the same, to be in suche aredynes.. .as they may be hable to doo that 
s e r v i c e ' . A l t o g e t h e r , the creation o f this commiss ion was as dangerous as i t was 
unor thodox. Wh i l s t i n theory i t gave Bowes some mi l i t a ry leverage, his status 
c lums i l y grafted i tse l f onto the already precarious rankings o f deputy Wardens, 
Keepers and constables. His miss ion , w h i c h began on August 12 ended in the 
disaster o f Haddon R igg , where Bowes and the many border of f icers under h is 
command were captured and ransomed b y the Scott ish leaders, was a disaster fo r 
Henry ' s war strategy. 
The Haddon R i g g fiasco points to a specif ic weakness i n the commiss ion ing 
scheme set up b y Henry : the inab i l i t y to enforce one's author i ty amongst troops w h o 
were inherent ly mis t rust f i i l o f outsiders l i ke Bowes.™ A t the same t ime, Sir Robert 
seemingly lacked the ab i l i t y to j udge his t roops, as w e l l as his enemy. For the ra id , 
Bowes employed the men o f Redesdale, under the command o f Sir Cuthbert 
Ratc l i f f , the Keeper and Deputy Warden o f the M i d d l e March . The force compr ised 
rough ly 3,000 men , a l though this var ied probab ly at any one day. In sending the 
p lunder away, B o w e s ' error came i n fa i l i ng to keep the surnames o f Redesdale 
e f fec t ive ly p inned to their task. It was this first misstep that caused the Redesdale 
l ight caval ry to flee the field as soon as Hun t ley approached.^* Thei r actions suggest 
that they were u n w i l l i n g to r isk capture or death i f they were to be cut out f r o m the 
spoils. The second weakness in the commiss ion was the v i r tua l uni lateral power that 
i t handed to Bowes. There exists no evidence that Hen ry or the Pr i vy Counc i l 
ordered Bowes to ra id , but since the k i n g granted h i m author i ty to do so, Bowes 
most l i ke l y interpreted his commiss ion as a direct order to ra id into Scot land. It was 
' SiP.y ,no. 391 . 
' See Appendices for a description o f Haddon Rigg. 
' Bruce, T h e English Expedi t ion/ p. 195. 
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his decis ion to launch the raid in to Scot land, and it was his decision to spl i t his 
forces, manoeuvres that w o u l d bear i l l for tune fo r the Engl ish. 
G iven that the Marchers, and especial ly the dalesmen, who accompanied 
Bowes, customar i ly served as guerr i l la or i r regular forces, i t is probable that they 
treated his leadership w i t h caut ion. A l t h o u g h L i t t l e John Heron was present, the 
Keeper had already demonstrated that he w o u l d defer to Bowes ' au thor i t y / ^ so that 
the tactics o f the chevauchée replaced the t radi t ional method o f the quick ra id . In 
contrast, Wardens-General were encouraged to keep w i t h i n confines o f t radi t ional 
Border war fare, a po l i cy that was more ent ic ing to the Nor thumber land gentry even 
i f they sometimes treated the Warden-General w i t h disdain. Bo th the k i ng and 
Bowes had over looked the fact that author i ty on parchment d id not necessari ly 
translate to author i ty i n the field, especial ly when using irregular l ight cavalry in 
war fare that was more convent ional . Thus, the commission's ch ie f weakness was 
compounded b y naïveté on the part o f both Bowes and the Tudor government. 
Bowes ' miss ion i n 1542 marked the last t ime in w h i c h such a general 
commiss ion was g iven to an of f icer for the command o f a m i l i t a ry force in the 
borders. H e n r y had to admi t his o w n error i n g i v i n g Bowes such unrestr icted power 
when James confronted the Engl ish k i n g after d iscover ing Sir Robert's wr i t ten 
instruct ions on his person.^^* The force that entered the borders in August 1542 was 
no th ing less than a special ly designed m i l i t a r y un i t that was used to provoke war 
w i t h Scot land; such sinister object ives ruptured the tenuous truces o f the Borders. 
Th is put Henry at an immedia te disadvantage; not on l y were many o f his ch ie f 
7 2 There exists no letter commanding Bowes specifically to bum Teviotdale, although the "secret 
matters" referred to in LP, X V I I no. 577 might have encompassed this mil i tary action. Regardless, the 
king's commission did give Bowes the power to organise raids, a privilege that was not even granted 
to the Wardens. 
7 3 Heron ult imately complied wi th Bowes' demand to raid Liddesdale in 1541, despite his reluctance 
to do so. See LP, X V I no. 1404. 
StP., V， nos. 392-93. 
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border of f icers lost, but so were many o f the horses that were needed for the conduct 
o f border warfare. Worse s t i l l , the Scott ish k i n g knew now o f his intent ions, as w e l l 
as his disposit ion.^^ Wh i l s t scrambl ing to appease the outrage o f James V , Henry 
had to urge his Wardens caut ion and to ' forbear tattempt any fiarther th ing against 
the Scottes,' and not to revenge 'every skegge or thef te, but uppon a notable rode or 
hurte, soo to be doon as i t maye appere to be attempted w i t h the consent o f summe 
o f the rulers on the Bordres o f Scot land ' . ՚՛^  M i l i t a r y act ion i n the Borders returned 
once again to the methodica l , established custom o f ra id, counter-raid and 
appeasement v ia redress, but most o f al l the government now put al l trast in its 
t radi t ional M a r c h of f icers . A l t hough Bowes managed to surv ive his capt iv i ty w i t h 
h is c red ib i l i t y intact, the remainder o f h is career w o u l d not entai l service v ia special 
commiss ion , but as Warden , 77 Counc i l lo r or comptrol ler.^^ Bowes ' future m i l i t a r y 
act iv i ty was accompl ished under the guise o f these of f ices. Bowes was also a sk i l led 
d ip lomat , be ing a trained lawyer, and act ing as a commissioner for days o f truce and 
as an envoy to the Scott ish government. A thorough workhorse, Sir Rober t 'ร 
mu l t i p le sk i l ls were s t i l l i n much demand b y the government. 
Few men were able to experience the f reedom o f o f f i ce to the degree that 
Bowes d id , perhaps w i t h the except ion o f Sir Thomas Whar ton dur ing Dud ley ' ร 
administ rat ion. The commiss ion is a remarkable i n that i t demonstrated how the 
Tudor war e f for t worked on a cont ingent basis. Bowes was sent on a very speci f ic 
ᄀԼ ՏէբԼ v: no: 395; LP, X V I I , nos. 70^ ^ 
77 Bowes became the Warden o f the Middle March after the death o f Sir Ralph Eure in 1544. He also 
received the Wardenship o f the East March after the death o f Lord Wi l l i am Eure in 1548. 
7 LP, X V I I I ( l ) nos. 464 and 623 (23). Released from captivity in 1543， Bowes returned as a 
council lor at York . That year, when Lord Parr was selected as Warden-General o f the Marches, Sir 
Robert was appointed his council lor. Late that year the K ing granted to Bowes stewardship o f 
Barnard Castle in Durham. A l l offices there were his to disperse as he saw fit. 
՜ゆ LP, X V I I I (1) no. 683. Wi th in a few days o f receiving his patent for Barnard Castle, Bowes was 
also appointed comptroller o f the king's wars in France, and was ordered to accompany the 
expedition to Boulogne. 
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miss ion, and the commiss ion that sanctioned his m i l i t a r y operations in Scotland is 
evidence o f Henry ' ร desire to provoke Scotland. Ye t , Henry was clever enough to 
k n o w that any m i l i t a r y act ion on the part o f the Engl ish wou ld have to appear as a 
j us t i f i ed retal iat ion against Scott ish aggression. The strategy was c lumsy i n its 
execut ion. The chain o f command in the Borders could already be tenuous enough 
w i thou t the Pr ivy Counc i l g ra f t ing another m i l i t a ry commander to its unga in ly 
structure. Secret intent ions, such as were la id out for Bowes, and the style o f ra id ing 
that was unor thodox even when compared to the unconvent ional practices o f the 
Borders, on l y weakened the Engl ish chance for w i n n i n g allies in Scot land, despite 
the unbr id led power that such of f icers could w i e l d . 
Wardens 
O n the first t ier o f permanent or t radi t ional Marcher leadership were the 
Wardens. A t t imes, there was also a Warden-General or a Lieutenant o f the No r t h to 
w h o m the Wardens answered, w i t h most o f these superior ranks emerging dur ing 
t imes o f war. D u r i n g the 1540'ร, most wardens were answer ing to men such as the 
D u k e o f Su f fo l k or the Ear l o f Her t fo rd , bo th o f w h o m served as Lieutenants-
General du r ing the campaign ing seasons. W h e n Henry V I I I rev ived the o f f i ce o f 
Warden-General i n 1542 w i t h the appointment o f the Earl o f Rut land, the Wardens 
had an o f f icer that cou ld coordinate m i l i t a ry operations throughout al l three 
Marches. However , i t is the Wardens o f each M a r c h w h o guided the day-to-day 
business throughout the Borders. 
The o f f i ce o f Warden , w h i c h began i n 1297 w i t h the appointment o f Robert 
Fi tz Roger, Br ian F i tz A l a n and R a l f F i tz W i l l i a m as Captains o f the Ma rch , saw 
men o f d i f ferent ranks over the course o f its three-hundred year existence.^^ Th is 
so The original commission sent to these men refers to them as custodes marchiamm. Nicholson, 
Leges, pp. 5-6. 
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his tory o f the appointments suggests that Border magnates were the most suitable 
choice, a l though many o f the appointments appear to have been g iven to Border 
gentry as well.^^ A s w i t h al l of f ices under the Tudors , the m i l i t a r y author i ty o f the 
March Wardens came from their commissions. There are some examples o f 
commiss ions for March Wardens i n N icho lson 's Leges Marchianim, i n the Be l l 
M S S o f the Carl is le Record Of f i ce and in the Papers o f Lo rd Grey de W i l t o n , w h i c h 
l ist the duties o f several m id -Tudor wardens, inc lud ing Lo rd Grey and the 
reprehensible Sir John Forster. D .L .W. Tough has already noted that these 
commissions are almost ident ical to each other, so that there is no real point in 
discussing n igg l i ng differences.^^ 
The specif ic powers o f the Warden as set by their commissions were both 
j ud i c ia l and mi l i ta ry . F i rs t ly , i t was the duty o f the Warden to set the watch against 
any enemy incursions, at the cost o f the local i ty , and to mon i to r the garrisons in h is 
ju r i sd ic t ion . Th is was important to safeguard the loca l i ty f r o m surprise attacks, 
w h i c h occurred at regular intervals i n the Marches, but especial ly dur ing the ra id ing 
season that extended f r om October to March . In 1545, Bowes ' first act as Warden 
was an attempt to re inforce the border garrisons. Bowes suggested to the k i n g that 
more archers and b i l i m e n should be stationed on the Border. Soon after, Bowes 
received special permiss ion to lay a garr ison o f archers and b i l imen i n Ha l twh is t le , 
on the edge o f the M i d d l e March.^^ The upkeep o f fortresses was another essential 
m i l i t a ry fonction. A s Warden, Sir Ralph Sadler spent much o f h is b r i e f tenure 
ensur ing the defensive capabi l i t ies o f the Marches and o f Be rw ick , w h i c h became 
the launching port for most invasions into Scotland. M u c h l ike Bowes d id in 1542, 
SI C.H. Hunter-Błair, "Wardens and Deputy Wardens o f the Marches Towards Scotland, In 
Northumberland," Archaeologia Aeliana, 4 * Series 28 (1950), p. 18. 
I I D . L . พ . Tough, The Last Years ofa Frontier, (Oxford: OUP, 1928), p. 78. 
83 LP, X X ( l ) n o . 466. 
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Sadler t ravel led the length o f the March to personal ly inspect the fortresses i n order 
to satisfy the queries o f the Pr i vy Counc i l regarding the regio๙ร defensive 
capabilities.^"* A l t hough Sadler's career was br ief , he managed to accompl ish the 
ready ing o f Be rw ick fo r the last Engl ish invasion o f Scot land, and he personal ly 
oversaw the beginnings o f the m o d e m for t i f icat ions that sprang up around Berw ick , 
one o f the few cit ies in the Br i t i sh Isles to receive any o f the innovat ive, trace 
italienne-stylc breastworks. Because Be rw ick held strategic importance for al l o f 
Nor thumber land , the upkeep o f its wal ls remained a h igh p r io r i t y throughout the 
sixteenth сепШгу. The Warden o f the East March was usual ly the ch ie f o f f i ce r o f 
Be rw ick , w h i c h a l lowed the Warden to personal ly oversee any construct ion, 
a l though b y El izabeth 's re ign separate commissions began to take over this role. 
Mos t impor tant ly . Wardens held the power to muster al l fencib le men, age 
16 to 60, i n the Marches and the l ibert ies o f Tynedale, Redesdal e and Hexham, and 
to ensure that al l were proper ly furnished w i t h arms and armour. Imp l i c i t i n this 
p r iv i lege was the author i ty to part ic ipate in the p lann ing o f operat ions, and to 
request men f r o m counties that t rad i t ional ly suppl ied men for Border service. In 
1544, Sir Ra lph and Lo rd W i l l i a m Eure were both act ive in d raw ing up p i ans for 
their march through Scotland to Le i th to cover Her t fo rd ' ร amphibious operations. 
Sir Ralph requested 1,000 horsed archers from Yorksh i re and the Bishopr ic , to 
accompany his 2,000 elite horsemen.^^ I n a rare show o f deference fo r his superiors, 
Eure noted that he required 500 men f r o m the B ishopr ic i f he were to b u m Jedburgh, 
tak ing t ime to c l inch his request w i t h a sycophantic appraisal o f Her t fo rd 's 
generalship.^^ Wardens cont inued to p lay an impor tant role in conduct ing troops for 
invasions o f Scotland in the first years o f El izabeth 'ร re ign. Sir Ra lph Sadler took 
Sadler Papers, I， nos. 581 and 584. 
LP X I X ( l ) n o . 335. 
'LP X I X ( l ) n o . 601. 
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direct responsib i l i ty in prepar ing for the Le i th campaign, ca l l ing for the Pr i vy 
Counc i l to stay in sending 4,000 fresh troops northwards un t i l he cou ld find 
adequate grain i n B e r w i c k and Newcastle.**"^ A s i t stood, there were already 2， 190 
men under Sadler's command in December 15 59. 88 In the end, Sadler spent his t ime 
as Warden prepar ing the way for a 4,000-man army that w o u l d later besiege the 
French at Le i th regardless o f his complaints.^*^ Under al l Tudor monarchs, the 
Warden was expected p r imar i l y to ut i l ise his m i l i t a ry sk i l ls in defending the f ront ier , 
and it was this expectat ion that imbued the o f f i ce w i t h its author i ty to wage war w i t h 
Scotland. 
A s w i t h any m i l i t a r y o f f i ce o f the sixteenth century, the warden was 
empowered to create of f icers: two deputy wardens and two wardens-sergeants to 
serve under h i m , and any other necessary of f icers according to custom, al l to be paid 
from the Warden 'ร salary. In essence, this a l lowed the warden to use men we l l 
k n o w n to h i m i n a l l m i l i t a ry matters. Castles and their ordnances were also subject 
to inspect ion b y the Warden , who , as the ch ie f o f f icer , was responsible fo r their 
upkeep. One o f Bowes ' ch ie f responsibi l i t ies was to ensure the defensible array o f 
the p r imary castle o f the M i d d l e March , A l n w i c k . He also received orders to see to 
the defences o f W a r k castle in the East March , w h i c h encroached upon the author i ty 
o f W i l l i a m Lo rd Eure.^^ Wardens also he ld u l t imate power to have the obedience o f 
al l l ieges, i nc lud ing those residing w i t h i n the l ibert ies, and to use their help as he 
SadlerPapers, I， no . 596 . 
CSPF, Elizabeth, V o l . I I ( 1 5 5 8 - 5 9 ) no . 403 
Sadler Papers, I， no . 6 3 8 . Sad ler was h a p p i l y i n f o r m e d o n D e c e m b e r 16 that L o r d G r e y w o u l d 
soon rep lace h i m as W a r d e n . 
՚^լբ, X X ( l ) n o . 535 . 
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saw fit. Th is last art icle remained intent ional ly vague so that i t m igh t prevent any 
attempt to undermine the tak ing o f musters.^' 
Such powers were extensive, and were of ten interpreted b road ly b y the 
Wardens. Eure, much l i ke his father, ran his March much l ike a f i e fdom, at t imes 
v i r tua l l y ignor ing the author i ty o f the Lieutenant that supposedly governed his o w n 
of f ice. In 1543, Lo rd Parr received letters from the Eures stating that since the East 
and M i d d l e borders were unable to defend themselves in the last war, they ought to 
now be fo r t i f ied and garrisoned. I t seems though that Eure already acted on this, as 
Parr compla ined to the Duke o f Suf fo lk that the Warden was not fo r thcoming w i t h 
news o f his exploits.^^ Ra lph Eure also had his f ingers i n his father 'ร pie, as he had 
stationed at Be rw ick a sizeable garr ison and al l o f their of f icers, under his o w n 
command.^^ There is no evidence that any other warden o f the M i d d l e M a r c h had 
contro l o f the Be rw i ck garr ison. However , its governor, the n e w l y ennobled 
W i l l i a m Lo rd Eure, Sir Ralph 's father, was get t ing on i n age and was probably al l 
too w i l l i n g to let his energetic son take the lead. 
However , there were some l im i ts to the Wardens ' author i ty. For instance, 
the Warden o f the East March could not conduct any po l i c ing operations against the 
M i d d l e March w i thou t the express permiss ion o f the Warden there, but the Warden 
could act in con junct ion w i t h other wardens when i t came to m i l i t a ry or po l ice 
act ion. Even then, their actions were of ten l im i ted b y the government. In 1540, 
Henry V I I I expressly forbade the use o f fire dur ing raids into Tynedale and 
Redesdale.^'' Even i n 1557, when Thomas Percy had regained the t i t le o f Ear l o f 
Nor thumber land and w i t h i t the Wardenship o f the East and M i d d l e Ma rch , the 
" CPR Elizabeth, 1558-60, pp . 37 & 4 U . T h ^ p o w e r s are desc r i bed i n the 1559 patent f o r W i l l i a m 
Dac re f o r c o m m a n d o f the W e s t M a r c h , and i n the 1560 patent f o r S i r John Fors ter f o r the M i d d l e 
M a r c h . 
ひ p , X V I I I ( 2 ) no . 146 
')3 T a l b o t M S S A . f f . 69 -72 
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government st i l l regulated his power when they refused his attempts to undermine 
the Forsters. In December 1557, Percy was repr imanded for remov ing a Forster from 
the Captaincy o f W a r k ; เท Febmary 1558， the Pr ivy Counc i l ordered the Earl to stop 
invest igat ing Sir John Forster for the homic ide o f Thomas Carr, the late Marsha l l o f 
Berwick.^^ A t t imes, this proved to be reciprocal , especial ly when i t came to 
m i l i t a ry act ivi t ies. In 1543, the Nor thumbr ian Wardens argued that logist ics w o u l d 
prove an obstacle for any invad ing army, and their op in ions ef fect ive ly quashed the 
invasion that Henry had proposed.*^^ Instead o f invasion, the k i ng was satisf ied to 
a l low the Wardens to cont inue ra id ing into the Scott ish borders.^^ A l t hough the 
Marchers had the benef i t o f Su f fo l k ' ร inf luence upon the k i ng , their author i ty st i l l 
answered to a higher power. Even when the Lieutenants or Warden-Generals were 
unable to contro l the Wardens, i t is clear that the Pr i vy Counc i l and the c rown cou ld 
do so w i t h l i t t le d i f f i cu l t y . 
The jud ic ia l power o f the Warden to ho ld Wardens ' courts was also l im i t ed , 
in that they were a l lowed to t ry cases o f M a r c h treason. M a n y felonies were reserved 
for the judges o f the assize since many o f them were not speci f ica l ly M a r c h treasons, 
wh i ch a l lowed the Warden to focus upon internat ional matters. Despite the l im i t s set 
by the specif ic nature o f March L a w , the Wardens proved to be indispensable in 
their knowledge. Sir Robert Bowes sat in the Pr i vy Counc i l b y 1551 , when he 
released a commissioned report that attempted to regulate the proceedings du r ing 
days o f redress, as w e l l as the establishment o f ju r ies for trials."*^ A s Warden-
General, Whar ton called upon his previous experience as Warden to cod i f y M a r c h 
law. Paired w i t h the j ud i c i a l funct ion was the power to conclude cease-fires, or 
P R O SP 1/157 f. 67 . (Jan. 19, 1540) . 
շ P R O , SP 15/8 /52 & 5 5 ; APC, V I , p p . 159-60 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 6 2 , 2 6 4 - 2 7 8 p a s s i m 
9 6 LP, X V I I I ( 2 ) no . 236 . Eu re , C o l i i n g w o o d , and H o r s l e y w e r e the r a n k i n g N o r t h u m b r i a n s to s i g n 
the let ter to the k i n g b e g g i n g h i m to recons ider an i n v a s i o n f o r that year. 
97 Լ Ր , X V 1 I I ( 2 ) nos. 262 and 3 2 4 . 
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abstinences, w i t h i n the Marches in order to conduct days o f redress. Th is a l lowed 
the Wardens to entreat d i rect ly w i t h the Scott ish Wardens, i f i t d id not contravene 
March L a w or upset acceptable d ip lomacy. First amongst Sadler 'ร duties was the 
overseeing o f the aid that was sent to the Scott ish lords i n their struggles against the 
Queen Regent and the French. In the end, much o f the j ud i c i a l power was a 
logical extension o f the Warden 's power to conduct po l ice operat ions in h is March . 
The c rown and Pr i vy Counc i l appointed al l Wardens. Roya l patents set out 
the guidel ines for the Warden, and the k i n g kept close watch over each Warden to 
ensure his compl iance. A l t hough the temporary powers granted to the Wardens-
General dur ing the Duke o f Nor thumber land 'ร administ rat ion gave the h igher 
of f icers the author i ty to appoint the Wardens under them,'*^^ roya l appointment o f 
Wardens resumed under successive regimes. M a r y ' ร first act i n the Marches was to 
appoint her supporters as Wardens.**^* Royal interest in f i l l i n g the of f ices 
demonstrated the c rown 'ร desire to see through al l pol ic ies related to the defence o f 
the Borders. 
There was no template for the government 's choice o f Wardens, but most 
were from fami l ies that had a h is tory i n o r near the Borders, and a l l had m i l i t a r y 
power and some administrat ive experience. Sir Ralph Eure came from such a f a m i l y 
that had Border connections.'*^^ A s the eldest son o f Sir W i l l i a m Eure, he became 
invo lved in Border matters at a young age. I n 1537, he had seen the w r i t i n g on the 
wa l l i n Tynedale and Redesdale, pet i t ion ing C r o m w e l l that he m igh t be more 
suitable for the post o f the Keeper o f Tynedale as ' good service migh t best be done 
I I Addenda, V I I , no . 6. 
"^^SadlerPapers, I， no . 5 5 6 , 5 6 3 , and 5 7 4 . 
1*め T h i s was espec ia l l y t rue o f S i r T h o m a s W h a r t o n . 
|°1 CPR. Philip and Mary, I , pp . 140, 170 and 177. L o r d Dac re rece i ved h is a p p o i n t m e n t as L o r d 
W a r d e n o f the W e s t a n d M i d d l e M a r c h , a n d as the K e e p e r o f T y n e d a l e and Redesda le i n January 
1554. L o r d Conyerร rep laced R a l p h G r a y as the W a r d e n o f the East M a r c h . 
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amongst ev i l p e r s o n s . ' I t was not un t i l 1543 that Eure was appointed as Keeper, 
al though by that t ime he had already established h imse l f as a hawk ish leader. 
Sir Robert Bowes, Eure'ร replacement in the M i d d l e Marches, was one o f 
the most act ive borderers under the Tudors, and al though his f a m i l y base was i n 
Durham, Bowes satisfied royal cr i ter ia for the Wardenship. A l t hough mediocre 
m i l i t a r y leadership already marked his career, he had a talented capaci ty for 
administ rat ion. Undoubted ly the latter qua l i ty earned h i m his pos i t ion. Thus b y 
1545, Bowes was back in the Borders from his commiss ioned posts i n France and 
London , beg inn ing his stat ion w i t h the industry that marked his career as Warden. 
Bowes, after a l l , was a competent administrator i f s l ight ly un-sold ier ly . H is t ra in ing 
as a lawyer made h i m better for understanding such things as logist ics and strategies, 
qual i t ies that were not so useft i l fo r bat t le f ie ld tactics and command. Pol i t ica l 
surv iva l , rather than m i l i t a ry savoir- faire, was Sir Rober t 'ร advantage. 
Sadler had his Wardenship thrust upon h i m when he served as an emergency 
replacement for the Ear l o f Nor thumber land in 1559, and was also more o f an 
administrator than he was a soldier, yet Sir Ralph was no stranger to m i l i t a ry act ion. 
D u r i n g the campaign o f 1547, he acted as h igh treasurer fo r the army, a rank that 
gave more credit to his administrat ive abi l i t ies than to h is sold ier ly attr ibutes, but 
Sadler earned his banneret*ร spurs on the field at Pink ie. It was there that Sadler 
stayed the Engl ish foot dur ing the Scott ish rout, 'a th ing not easily to be done, b y 
reason they a l l , as then, somewhat bus i ly appl ied their market , the spoi l o f this 
'0շ S i r R a l p h w a s an a m b i t i o u s f e l l o w , a l t h o u g h d u r i n g h i s a n d h is father 'ร tenure as W a r d e n the 
Eures came i n to possess ion o f a s u r p r i s ๒ g a m o u n t o f N o r t h u m b e r l a n d land . Northumberland County 
History has g i v e n a b r i e f h i s t o r y o f the i r acqu is i t i ons . 
103 P R O , SP 1/126 i f . 8 0 - 8 1 . 
X X ( l ) n o . 1085. 
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Scott ish camp.'**^^ Sadler was thus a natural choice for a Border o f f i cer ; his service 
under Henry V I I I as a commissioner, and his po l i t i ca l shrewdness, earned h i m a 
reputat ion as a sage statesman. Sadler reacted to h is appointment w i t h distress, 
despite hav ing been chosen for his uprightness and his good standing w i t h the 
Queen. き Sadler was not g iven a choice in the matter, however. He compla ined 
b i t ter ly to Cec i l , compla in ing o f the great w r o n g that was done to him.^^^ 
H is lack o f m i l i t a ry power also le f t h i m fee l ing exposed. Sadler made a v a l i d 
po in t ; he had neither money, nor men and horses. In the end, he was o n l y able to 
have twenty horsemen, al though he reported that he knew o f no southern gent leman 
who had less than 100 horsemen i n wages. ՚^՛՛ Th is undermined the m i l i t a r y nature o f 
his o f f i ce . Hav ing no lands in the area or tenants that he cou ld cal l upon to serve, 
Sadler was le f t w i t h no choice but to re ly upon the Nor thumber land tenantry du r i ng 
m i l i t a ry emergencies. Worse yet, Nor thumber land st i l l styled h imse l f as Warden , 
w i t h Sadler as his mere deputy, w h i c h meant that the salary o f the o f f i ce w o u l d go to 
the Percy cof fers, leav ing Sadler to soak up al l o f the expenses. It is no зифг ізе that 
Sadler wro te to Cec i l that the Percys were unsuitable for any o f f i ce i n the 
Marches. '^^ 
P lura l ism was a key part o f w iden ing the m i l i t a r y author i ty o f the M a r c h 
Wardens under Henry V I I I , since it was bel ieved that ho ld ing mu l t i p le o f f ices w o u l d 
a l low the Wardens to cast a w ider net. Th is was especial ly true for the M i d d l e 
March . F rom 1543 unt i l the end o f Henry ' s re ign, the Keeperships o f Tyneda le and 
" め W i l l i a m Pat ten, T h e E x p e d i t i o n in to S c o t l a n d , 1547.， I n A . F . P o l l a r d , (ed ) Tudor Tracts 1532֊ 
1588. ( W e s t m i n s t e r : Cons tab le , 1903) , p. 128. H e is l i s ted as h a v i n g rece i ved h is t i t l e later i n the 
'07 CSPF Elizabeth ƒ， I I ( 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , no . 1 6 1 . 
'OS CSPF Elizabeth I, I I { 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , no . 2 1 3 . 
^^'^รadler Papers, I， no. 615 . 
I'o CSPF Elizabeth I, I I ( 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , no . 2 7 4 . 
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Redesdale were he ld b y the Warden o f the M i d d l e March . ' 11 L o r d L is le, the k ing ' s 
Warden-General in early 1543, used Sir Ra lph Eure to replace the incompetent Sir 
Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe , w h o m L is le thought un f i t fo r the momentous j o b o f govern ing 
the M i d d l e March , w h i c h b y 1543 also inc luded the Keepership o f Tynedale and 
Redesdale."^ A l t hough L is le considered sp l i t t ing the pos i t ion o f Keeper and 
Warden between two candidates i n 1543 , " ^ Eure he ld al l of f ices b y roya l 
appointment. Bowes replaced Eure when the latter fe l l at A n c r u m M o o r i n February 
1545， and the practice o f p lu ra l ism cont inued. It was not unt i l the end o f Hen ry ' s 
re ign that the Wardenship o f the M i d d l e M a r c h was separated f r o m the 
Keeperships.^'"* I n the East March , the Capta incy o f B e r w i c k had been c losely 
associated w i t h the Warden o f the East Ma rch . The Warden under Henry VIII， 
W i l l i a m Lo rd Eure, also he ld the captaincy o f Be rw i ck , w h i c h gave h i m author i ty 
over the garr ison as we l l as the castle. 
P lura l ism unquest ionably benef i ted the M a r c h Wardens under Henry V I I I , as 
the practice granted more connections to the Marchers , w h i c h in turn resulted in 
better bands o f l ight cavalry. T o support mu l t i p le of f ices the W a r d e n s ― W i l l i a m 
Eure, Bowes and W h a r t o n ― a l l received extensive land grants, ostensibly to 
augment the income for their responsibi l i t ies and increase their manrede. 115 Bowes 
received the farms o f Hexham and Langley w i t h his o f f i ce a long w i t h wardships and 
messuages throughout Nor thumber land, w h i c h secured prob lem areas and drew the 
''' LP, X V I I I ( l ) , n o 4 3 2 ( 2 ) ; LP, X X ( 1 ) no . 1085. B o t h E u r e and B o w e s h e l d the K e e p e r s h i p s , 
a l t h o u g h they had d e p u t y keepers s e r v i n g unde r t h e m as w e l l . 
" Ч ғ . X V I I I ( l ) n o . 4 3 2 ( 2 ) . 
՚ ՛ 3 L P , X V I I I ( l ) , no . 4 3 2 ( i t e m 2 ) . 
' ՚ 4 H i s t o r i c a l M S S C o m m i s s i o n , The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Rutland, v o l . I 
( L o n d o n : H i s t o r i c a l M a n u s c r i p t s C o m m i s s i o n [ H M S O ] , 1 9 0 5 ) , p. 33 . T h e L a r i o f Ru t l and 'ร 
i ns t ruc t ions i n 1549 m a k e no m e n t i o n o f the K e e p e r s h i p . 
'15 F o r an e x a m p l e o f t h i s , see the patent r o l l s l i s ted i n LP, X X I ( 2 ) n o . 648， w h e r e b y T h o m a s 
W h a r t o n is g ran ted ex tens ive messuages and tenements t h r o u g h o u t Y o r k s h i r e . 
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tenants closer to the m i l i t a ry of f icers.* '^ A f te r the death o f Lo rd Eure i n 1548， 
Bowes was given the double Wardenship o f the East and M i d d l e Marches.* ' ' ' 
Hav ing the double Keepership meant that the M i d d l e M a r c h of f icers en joyed 
a poo l o f el i te Border cavalry in the fo rm o f the surname bands. Ralph Eure spent 
much o f his t ime as Warden col laborat ing w i t h the roguish elements o f the M i d d l e 
Marches. There was jus t i f i ca t ion for th is, as the thieves o f Tynedale and Redesdale 
suppl ied the royal bands w i t h w e l l over 2,000 soldiers at any g iven t ime dur ing the 
1540'ร. H e was therefore reluctant to pursue any o f them fo r cr imes, w h i c h 
presented a prob lem. A l t hough many o f his fo l lowers were charged w i t h robberies 
prev ious ly commi t ted , they had insuf f ic ient goods to make amends w i t h those w h o m 
they had spoi led, so that, i f compel led to make redress, they w o u l d have to resort to 
th iev ing again i n order to l ive. I f any were executed fo r M a r c h treasons, the rest, 
k n o w i n g that they were ident ica l ly culpable, w o u l d have become fugi t ives; though i f 
noth ing were done, those who were in i t i a l l y robbed b y the Tynedalers w o u l d say 
that Eure favoured the th ieves . "^ In the end, Eure preferred to let such in iqui t ies 
sl ide. In 1544, he backed A rch ie Dodd , he idsman o f the Dodds, over charges ar is ing 
from a deadly fray at Hexham.^ '^ Aga in , i n 1544， he conspired w i t h Dodds and the 
Underkeeper o f Tynedale, Gi les Heron o f Chipchase, to k idnap the La i rd o f 
Buccleuch. '^^ U n l i k e many o f h is predecessors, Eure d isplayed some sympathy for 
his sumame fo l lowers and was eager to protect their interests. In early 1544， Eure 
reported that the Scots k i l l ed one o f his guides, a Tynedaler , i n a raid because they 
knew o f his role. In his anger, Eure demanded just ice, i nqu i r i ng whether the 
Lieutenant m igh t conduct a ra id. I f not, Eure made i t a l l too clear that he w o u l d ra id 
՝" LP. X X I ( 2 ) no . 771 ( i t e m 26 ) . 
" SP 10/5 /14. L o r d E u r e h a d been the W a r d e n i n the East s ince 1537. 
'^ Ζ ρ , Χ ν Π Κ ί Χ η ο . 5 8 0 
I l P R O , SP 1/180, f. 2 4 1 ^ л X V I I I { l ) , n o s . 937 and 964. 
շ0 B L , A d d . M S S 3 2 6 5 5 f. 203 . 
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on his o w n . ' ^ ' Th is react ion shows that Eure respected the Marcher pattern o f 
vengeance, the deadly feud, especial ly when his o w n soldiers were af f ronted. For 
th is, his soldiers proved loya l to their commander, w h o explo i ted their desire to lay 
waste to their deadly rivals in Scott ish Teviotdale. 
Sir Robert Bowes also keenly defended the interests o f the men in his charge, 
much l i ke Sir Ra lph Eure, a l though instead o f emphasis ing his connections in the 
dales, Sir Robert preferred to use his other posi t ions as counc i l lo r and legal advisor 
to interpose for his men. W h e n Robert Crouch, a captain o f mounted harquebusiers 
stationed a long the Borders, was ordered to appear before the k ing ' ร just ices, Bowes 
argued that his m i l i t a r y service and w i t was far more impor tant than standing before 
the K i n g ' s Bench on charges o f break ing the k i ng ' s peace.'^^ Crouch never 
answered for h is transgression as he went on to serve as a captain o f the l igh t horse 
in the P ink ie campaign o f 1547, where he was captured b y ' [Ыร ] o w n forwardness, 
and not by the enemy 'ร f o r c e . ' B o w e s also recognised the strategic value o f the 
Heron c lan; he pet i t ioned to have the ch ie f offenders o f the f am i l y removed from 
incarcerat ion i n Newcast le and stationed at A l n w i c k . The k i ng grudg ing ly accepted 
this.'^"* In 1546 John and George Heron went south to pet i t ion their release from 
ward at A l n w i c k , w i t h Bowes ' ร recommendat ions. Bo th men were invaluable i n 
their experience w i t h border matters, and i t was suggested that they should operate 
w i t h Bowes at A l n w i c k Castle, where he was also constable, thereby p lac ing them 
d i rec t ly under a trusted roya l servant.'^^ Despite al l o f h is patronage, Bowes never 
he ld the esteem o f the men o f the Marches as Ralph Eure had done. Perhaps his role 
' ^ ' L P , X l X ( l ) , n o . 1 7 0 . 
• L P , X X I { l ) n o . 827 . 
' Pa t ten , ' b x p e d i t i o n , ' p . 100. 
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as roya l commissioner caused certain misg iv ings amongst the Marchers who were 
already wary o f the K i n g ' s presence advancing into their fo rmer f ie fdoms. Bowes 
was also not a true Borderer; '^^ rather, he was appointed to the borders due to his 
experience and w i t . A l l the same, the K i n g ' s of f icers could not find faul t w i t h h i m 
despite his shortcomings as a m i l i t a r y o f f icer . Bowes also act ively t r ied to govern 
the surnames. Even the t rouble spots o f Tynedale and Redesdale seemed re lat ive ly 
quiet under their new ch ie f and his son, Richard Bowes, Captain o f N o r h a m , though 
the reasons fo r this are probably due to the large numbers o f the surnames be ing i n 
garr ison in Nor thumber land and, after 1547, i n Scotland.'^^ 
However , after the Bowes ' tenure as Warden, the need for a large war budget 
for the Warden disappeared; a long w i t h i t went the mu l t i p le of f ices, and most 
s ign i f icant ly , the two Keeperships. There was a consequential b reakdown thereafter. 
A l t hough the m i l i t a r y cont r ibu t ion o f the surnames had begun to wane after 1550 
due to the government 'ร increasing desire to keep them from enter ing the garrisons, 
and due to their landho ld ing practices, their separation from the Warden meant 
fewer opportuni t ies fo r the m i l i t a r y administ rat ion to enforce m i l i t a r y ob l igat ion. 
A f t e r the o f f i ce o f Warden was depr ived o f the Keeperships, law and order once 
again began to break d o w n i n the dales. I n 1551, Bowes reported that the dales were 
filled again w i t h ' w i l d and misdemeaneď people. '^^ 
The gradual separation o f m i l i t a ry of f ices i n Marches targeted the nepot ism 
that had grasped M a r c h admin is t ra t ion, bu t i t was seen as a means o f imp rov i ng the 
e f f ic iency o f the m i l i t a r y structure. However , i t on l y prov ided an oppor tun i ty fo r 
more incompetence to enter the of f ices. Sadler was keen to cashier some o f the 
՚ 2 7 T h e B o w e s f a m i l y was o r i g i n a l l y f r o m C o u n t y D u r h a m . See Ch r i s t i ne N e w m a n , The Bowes of 
Streatlam. Co. Durham: A Study of the Politics and Religion of a Sixteenth-Century Northern Gentry 
Family, ( L o n d o n : B r i t i s h L i b r a r y , 1991 ) . 
^–Ղբ, X X I ( 2 ) nos . 9 4 2 and 1279. 
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of f icers that had served under the Percys, especial ly the captain o f No rham, a man o f 
such corrupt ion that Sadler cou ld not bear the thought o f w o r k i n g w i t h him.'^*^ In 
the same breath, the Keeper o f Tynedale, Francis Sl ingsby, was also under attack 
from Sadler, as he was unable to operate e f fec t ive ly in l ieu o f the Herons, who 
despised h i m . 
The separation o f of f ices m igh t have undermined corrupt ion and nepot ism, 
but i t also undercut the Wardens ' ab i l i t y to muster a l l men under their command , 
w h i c h Sadler 'ร tenure con f i rmed. Sadler experienced great d i f f i cu l t y i n con t ro l l i ng 
the dalesmen; the thieves o f Tynedale and Redesdale were no better than ' ve ry 
rebels and out laws, ' fo r w h i c h the on ly remedy was the cont inual garr isoning o f the 
dales or the issue o f a general pardon.*^ ' S t i l l , Sir Ralph vowed to retain twenty 
horsemen in order to patro l the outer reaches o f his charge, determin ing to measure 
the defensive capabi l i t ies o f the frontier. '^^ 
A l t hough the m i l i t a r y power o f the Wardens p lummeted after 1550, the 
abeyance o f the Warden-Genera l after Edward V I meant that the Wardens were able 
to recover some o f their power under M a r y and El izabeth. Rather than re ly ing on a 
strong h igh command to direct the Wardens, M a r y ' ร government saw fit to make the 
Wardenships sel f -suf f ic ient b y par t ia l l y resuming the p lu ra l i sm that H e n r y V I I I had 
employed. W h e n L o r d Whar ton was assigned the Wardenship o f the M i d d l e M a r c h 
in M a r c h 1 5 5 5 , ' " he was also g iven both Keeperships, a clear reversal o f the po l i cy 
that he had helped to ins t i l i n the Marches. Whar ton also received the stewardship 
o f Hexhamshi re and the constableship o f A l n w i c k , as w e l l as a l l other vacant royal 
o f f ices, w h i c h gave the Warden a stronger m i l i t a ry եՅՏ6.՛^՛* 
^° CSPF. Elizabeth I, I I ( 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , n o . 132. 
I ՝ CSPF Elizabeth I ， I I ( 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , n o . 213 
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However , the monopo ly that the Warden o f the East March had in the 
Be rw ick captaincy had unravel led just after the death o f Henry V I I I i n 1547. 
Nicholas St i r ley, w h o m Her t ford had appointed captain o f Be rw ick castle, had taken 
the pos i t ion from Eure. ' 3 5 A f t e r Eure 'ร death, the successive Wardens resided at 
Be rw ick , but the o f f i ce was increasingly separated from the captaincy o f the t o w n , 
un t i l the separation was formal ised in 1552.^՝^^ A l t hough Whar ton gained temporary 
possession o f the captaincy i n 1555/^^ Be rw ick had proved far too important for the 
securi ty o f the f ront ier , so its sq)arat ion f o r m the East March Wardenship was a 
matter o f pract ica l i ty , as we l l as strategy. 
As ide from the experiments w i t h p lu ra l ism, there was throughout the fifteen 
fort ies and fifties an earnest attempt to re fo rm the o f f i ce o f Warden. I n the summer 
o f 1543, Whar ton drafted a proposal fo r the governance o f the Borders, ca l l ing for a 
better de f in i t i on o f the Warden 's responsibi l i t ies, and for a cod i f ica t ion o f Border 
law.'38 Whar ton cal led for two deputies in each march , a practice that was not 
un fami l ia r to his contemporaries as there was usual ly a deputy appointed b y each 
W a r d e n / A b o v e a l l , Whar ton desired to have a clear l ine o f author i ty that began 
w i t h the Wardens; Sir Thomas was eager to have the pensioners under stricter 
cont ro l o f the Warden and his deputy. Th is speaks o f the d i f f i cu l t ies that the 
Wardens had i n con t ro l l i ng the pensioners, many o f w h o m were b lamed for the 
decay o f Border service. ՚՛^^ Whar ton in general was keen to see al l Marchers placed 
under the yoke o f the of f icers, inc lud ing those who l i ved i n areas where the King 's 
w r i t d id not run. The ind iv idua l lordships that s t i l l exercised independence from the 
APQ 1 5 4 7 - 5 0 , p. 6 8 1 . 
3 6 Roscher , T o l i t i c s ' , p p . 151-152 . 
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c rown should, i n Wharton's op in ion , be placed in the hands o f the k i n g through an 
exchange w i t h the current lords. A l l tenants i n such areas w o u l d be placed at the 
Warden's beckoning. Whar ton suggested that i f the k i n g were to pay higher salaries 
to his wardens, then a cont inual presence migh t be fel t i n t roubled areas l i ke 
Tynedale and Redesdale. Whar ton obv ious ly felt that s imp ly a l l ow ing the Warden 
to act as a cont inual hammer upon the Scots could solve the problems o f the 
Marches, i f on l y the scheme o f Marcher author i ty w o u l d a l low them to do so. Th is 
was not the last o f Wharton 's opin ions regarding the order ing o f the Marches. A g a i n 
i n 1553, he comp i led the minut iae o f the search and watch o f the East and M i d d l e 
Marches, dedicat ing near ly ten pages i n ca l l ing for the re inv igorat ion o f Border 
service and the augmentat ion o f o f f i c ia l authority.'"^' I t was also proposed that 
Hexham serve as a base fo r the Warden-General , who cou ld have access to al l 
Marches w i thou t much trouble. For al l o f his unpopular i ty w i t h his fe l l ow 
Marchers, especial ly the Musgraves and Dacres, i t appears that the government 
heeded many o f Whar ton 's suggestions but on l y i n the last quarter o f the century. It 
was on ly then that the c rown was able to place its o w n of f icers on the lands and 
lordships o f the Dacres, w h i c h had for fe i ted to the c rown after their par t ic ipat ion i n 
the rebel l ion o f 1569.'^^ 
There remains the quest ion o f how the constant tweak ing o f the Warden 'ร 
power affected his ab i l i ty to lead soldiers into actual combat. M i l i t a r y author i ty d id 
not come easi ly to al l Ma rch Wardens, a l though there were some who par t icu lar ly 
thr ived i n leading Nor thumbr ian Borderers into combat. Sir Ra lph Eure, whose 
fam i l y had l ong served in the N o r t h as soldiers and leaders, was one o f the most 
active soldiers to serve as Warden.'"*^ Eure earned a reputat ion for hav ing too much 
N i c h o l s o n , Leges, p p . 3 3 9 - 3 4 9 . 
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forwardness in combat, personal ly leading his troops in charges. It is clear from the 
death to l l at A n c r a m M o o r that Eure had a po l i cy o f leading from the front, ' 4 4 w h i c h 
in the end was as benef ic ia l as i t was harmftxL A l t hough casualty f igures were 
comparat ively l igh t for such a rout , Douglas noted that the dead included a h igh 
number o f captains, i nc lud ing L o r d Ogle, al l o f w h o m had formed the front l ine o f 
the Engl ish charge. That his deputy of f icers f o l l owed suit was on ly natural , g iven 
the af fect ion that E u r e ' ร men had for h i m . Even his enemies acknowledged his and 
his of f icers ' eager savagery on the f ie ld , as the Ear l o f A r ran declared, ' H e was a 
fe l l , cruel man, and over-cruel , w h i c h many a man and fatherless ba i rn m igh t rue. ' 145 
Wi thou t his personal leadership, the Engl ish cause suffered a b l ow , but the M i d d l e 
Marchers felt i t most , regret t ing that ' w e m igh t as w e l l have been slain ourselves for 
our great friends [be] gone.''"^^ The war l i ke tendencies o f the Marchers had fed o f f 
his o w n personal aggressiveness, enabl ing the utter destruct ion o f Teviotdale over 
the course o f eighteen months. 
Other leaders were not as adept. Sir Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe showed no ab i l i t y at 
al l to contro l his Redesdalers at Haddon R igg , a l though this was the first notable 
batt le i n wh i ch he had led such a large contingent o f Marcher cavalry.'"*^ Sir Robert 
Bowes was also not as adept at con t ro l l ing the Marchers under his command. 
Bowes exhib i ted a greater sense o f sel f -control on the bat t le f ie ld than his 
predecessor, but he also displayed a certain naivete at d i f ferent points i n his m i l i t a r y 
career. The disaster at Haddon R igg was not the on ly t ime that Bowes was 
captured. In 1548, Bowes led a band o f Border horsemen to the re l ie f o f the Eng l ish 
garr ison at Hadd ington i n Scot land, wh i ch was under siege b y a t roop o f w e l l -
trained French soldiers led by the co lour fu l Sieur D'Esse. B o t h Bowes and Sir 
[ LP, X X ( l ) n o s . 95 and 3 0 1 . 
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Thomas Palmer were conf ident o f break ing the siege. Sir Pedro de Gamboa, a 
Spanish mercenary in service o f Edward V I , advised against m a k i n g a sortie against 
the besieging French forces, but Bowes and Palmer rejected his advice. B o t h men 
had been pressured b y their men to press home a charge. The Eng l ish horse bol ted 
past the Spanish gunners, and ran headlong in to a d isc ip l ined force o f German 
Landsknechts and harquebusiers. Gamboa wro te that ' thies northern horsemen 
began to flye' when it became apparent that they had been ambushed. ՚՛՛^ In the rout , 
Bowes was captured, as was Palmer. 149 Despite his experience i n France and in the 
Borders, Bowes had t rouble in cont ro l l ing his men i n this instant. Bowes ' charge at 
Hadd ing ton demonstrates his overest imat ion o f his t roopers' abi l i t ies to face a 
convent ional army; the force at his disposal was Border horse and was unsuitable for 
charging established in fant ry posit ions. Bowes, in general, was keener on 
convent ional tactics, and as such, he found guerr i l la warfare distasteful , i f not 
point less. '^" S t i l l , Bowes was experienced i n combat leadership, even i f he d i d from 
t ime to t ime display remarkable lapses in judgement . H i s actions put Liddesdale on 
the defensive in 1541, a move that essential ly created enmi ty between the 
Arms t rong-E l l i o t fact ion and the Robsons, w h i c h suggests that Bowes lacked an 
understanding o f the deadly feud i n spite o f his supposed acquaintance w i t h such 
af fa i rs . '^ ' However , Lo rd L is le commended Sir Robe r t 'ร actions dur ing the siege o f 
Boulogne, where he and his l ight horsemen per formed w e l l act ing as scouts and 
scourers fo r the rest o f the Engl ish army. '^^ 
^Ζ ,ΛΧν ί ΐ no . 6 f ô 
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Th is personal method o f combat leadership had its drawbacks, none as 
apparent as the disasters at Haddon R igg and A n c r u m Moor , Henry V I I I of ten 
cautioned his M a r c h of f icers to avo id combat, ma in l y to avo id their capture b y the 
enemy, a l though this po l i cy was ma in l y directed towards the higher command. 
Bowes ' defeats came from i l l -advised snap decisions rather than from 
impulsiveness. Eure, on the other hand, was cr i t ic ised because he overstepped his 
obl igat ions as a leader b y act ing recklessly. The Earl o f Shrewsbury had instructed 
them to raid caut iously, and await re inforcements from Durham.'^"* Eure and Lay ton 
chose to ignore this order. I n do ing so, Eure put the entire M i d d l e M a r c h in 
jeopardy. A t the same t ime, his hotheadedness on the field encouraged the war l i ke 
proc l iv i t ies o f the Marchers, a l though this produced disordered ranks, w h i c h were 
useless against a wel l -organised body o f soldiers. Eure was a much better leader i n 
guerr i l la tactics o f the Marches. H is raids on Tev io tda le put the Scott ish on the 
defensive, his success coming from his wi l l ingness to employ the tactics that his 
soldiers preferred. Th is points to a p rob lem o f Marcher l e a d e r s h i p t h e r e was 
inadequate de f in i t ion o f the Warden 'ร m i l i t a r y protoco l . Ye t , Eure must have fel t 
prodded b y the warmonger ing spir i ts o f the Earl o f Her t fo rd , and most o f a l l , Henry 
V I I I . I n an era where personal lordship translated to personal m i l i t a ry leadership, 
one st i l l has to question whether Eure acknowledged or overstepped his author i ty in 
act ing so rashly. Regardless o f such judgements, the Wardens ' commissions 
imp l ied that they were to lead raids into Scot land, and w i t h that task came the risks 
to w h i c h Nor thumbr ian soldiers were l iable. 
Ye t none o f the Wardens was inv i ted to part ic ipate in the campaign o f 1547. 
Bowes was absent on the field at P ink ie , despite the large cont ingent o f 
L P , X V I I I ( l ) no . 4 6 8 ; Ibid., X V 1 I I ( 2 ) , no . 196. 
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Northumbrian light cavalry.'^^ Ironically, his only role was the entertainment of 
Hertford's retinue at Alnwick.'^^ Most likely, the Wardens were kept at home in 
order to guard the Borders in case the invasion failed. The fact that they led troops 
into Scotland after Pinkie was no indication of them recovering their former role as 
battlefield commanders, as their actions were only meant to support the garrisons in 
Scotland. 
Wardens increasingly became Border guards after 1550, a role that was 
already inherent in their duty, though this was now emphasized at the expense of 
their power to take offensive action. Wardens were too important to expend in 
military operations, and their increasing importance in stabilising the Borders meant 
that they were encouraged to focus on domestic tranquillity, rather than warfare. 
Although the collapse of the English garrison effort in 1550, and the ensuing treaty 
of Norham, meant that mid-Tudor Wardens such as Lord Conyerร did not take an 
active role in leading Marcher soldiers into combat during their tenure, the 
resumption of warfare in 1557 allowed the Marian Wardens a chance to flaunt their 
combat leadership skills. It is unfortunate that the records remain rather silent, as the 
flow of after-action reports from the high command is sparse. Still, there is enough 
to suggest that the Wardens still led troops into combat. In August 1557, Sir Henry 
Percy, the deputy Warden in the East March, personally conducted a retaliatory raid 
into the Merse, in which his forces burnt 16 towns and captured over a dozen 
Scottish prisoners.'^^ Percy was active again on Halloween in 1557, once more 
personally leading cavalry into the Merse and netting 40 prisoners.'^^ Percy'ร 
military fortunes continued the next year, when he led a raid against Langholm. In 
Patten, 'Expedit ion, ' p. 78. 
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the ensuing battle against the Scots the English shot failed in the foul weather, but 
the light horse recovered to take the field under the personal leadership of Percy.'^^ 
However, these raids were desultory compared to the great raids of the 'rough 
wooing', so that any comparison suggests either military decay or a change of 
policy. In reality, neither of these suggestions accurately reflects the situation in the 
Marches. Wardens still led their troops, although their reports on their military 
exploits have largely been lost or glossed over by those who answered to the Privy 
Council. Again, Wardens would not accompany the army northwards in the Leith 
campaign, a reiteration of the situation in 1547, confirmation that while the Warden 
was still important for frontier defence, he was no longer considered part of the 
regular English army. 
When Anglo-Scottish warfare came to an official dose in the 1560'ร, the 
Warden ceased to be a predominantly military leader. Already his superiors had 
begun to commute the military duties of the Warden. Sir Ralph Sadler is a perfect 
example of the Warden that characterised the leadership of Elizabethan 
Northumberland, somewhere between administrator and chief of police. Although 
there were exceptional excursions led by the Wardens, the peak of their military 
authority came during times of open conflict with Scotland. This in part explains 
their temporary subjugation under the Warden-Generals Dudley and Wharton during 
the lull in Anglo-Scottish warfare. As such, the Wardens' power came ftill circle 
with the resumption of conflict under Mary Tudor, and continued into the first years 
of Elizabeth. Always implicit in this was the power of the Privy Council to control 
the chief March officers, except when the crown desired to give the Warden more 
advantage. 
'PRO, SP 15/8/88. 
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The Keeperships of Tvnedale and Redesdale 
Just below the position of the Warden were the Keeperships of Tynedale and 
Redesdale. The Keeperships began simply as administrative stewardships of the old 
Liberties, but when raiding became a problem in the late fifteenth century, the office 
then involved internal policing. The office traditionally was filled by a local family, 
and thus the history of the Keepership of North Tynedale is closely bound up with 
the family history of the Herons from 1540 onwards.'^^ In contrast, the Redesdale 
Keepership only came into the possession of the Herons for a brief time just after 
1540, when it was paired with that of Tynedale. After 1543, Redesdale saw a variety 
of Keepers, although the increasing power of the Halls of Otterbum guaranteed that 
they always played at least a minor part in governing this problematic dale. 
The Keeperships wholly involved policing the troublesome surnames of the 
Northumberland uplands. As such, the Keeperships required much of their 
incumbent officers, the most challenging of which was practising with thieves whilst 
keeping an honest countenance and satisfying the military needs of the Tudor 
government. For a brief period, the Keeper served as a military commander of the 
dalesmen, although this role rose and fell along with the participation of the 
surnames in Tudor warfare. The office was far from stable in terms of power; thus, 
the Tudors witnessed both brilliant success and dismal failure from their Keepers. 
Like other offices, the Keepership of the dales was a royally appointed post, 
at least under Henry VI I I . Unlike the position of Warden, there were specific 
The Heron fami ly had a turbulent history, feuding wi th John de Coupland and the Li lbums in the 
fourteenth century. A t one point, the latter clan ransacked the Heron stronghold o f Ford castle, which 
required Parliamentary attention before the feud was quelled. In 1428, Wi l l i am Heron o f Ford was 
slain in an open feud wi th John Manners, the Lord o f Etal Castle, and the quarrel was not settled unti l 
the case was heard in front o f the priors o f Durham and Tynemouth. Even then, the feud vSimmered 
for decades thereafter. In 1506, John Heron o f Crawley, or "the Bastard o f Heron", infamously slew 
the Warden o f the Scottish Midd le March, Sir Robert Kerr, ignit ing a feud that threatened the already 
tenuous peace between the Scottish and English crowns. See James Raine, The Histoij and 
Antiquities of North Durham (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1852)， pp. 210-211. 
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requirements that the crown looked for in its Keepers. The first quality was summed 
up by Lord Howard in 1619: 'neither wil l any man which hath not been bred in 
those highland countries come from a more civil place to interpose himself on such a 
business for any reasonable means that can be given.՚՛^՛ Thus, the successful Keeper 
had to be a Northumbrian, and reside close to the dales. As late as 1558, the Privy 
Council acknowledged this when they reminded Sadler and the earl of 
Northumberland that both Tarset Hall, which was in ruins, and Widdrington's tower 
at Haughton, which had been destroyed by Liddesdale in 1541, might be suitable for 
a Keeper with a garrison.'^^ 
The Herons were natural for the Keepership of Tynedale as their towers of 
Chipchase and Simonbum guarded the mouth of the North Tyne. Even the Council 
of the North were agreed that there was no substitute for a stronghold in the dale.'^^ 
Sir John Forster, Sadler's appointed Warden of the Middle March in 1559, wasted no 
time in appointing George Heron as the new Keeper Of that evil country. ՚՛^՛՛ Sadler 
remarked that Heron was "meet" for the job, and that his house was most convenient 
for a Keeper.'^^ The Fenwicks, too, had a strong presence near North Tynedale and 
Redesdale, with holdings at Hartington Hall, Gunnerton and Sweethope.'^^ Their 
C e^epership in 
the early sixteenth century until Hodge'ร murder in 1537.'^^ 
Any lack of residence near the dales created complications. The Tynedale 
Keeper from 1537-40, Sir Reynold Camaby, had no power base in North Tynedale, 
having no relations to any of the surnames. Camaby was the steward of the king'ร 
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lands in Hexham, where he chose to reside, while his father owned Halton near 
Corbridge, but this proved inadequate to support him as Keeper. The fact that the 
Robsons and Charltons kidnapped Camaby in 1539 was partially due to his military 
weakness. 
Hexham proved to be a problematic place of residence for the Keeper yet 
again under Elizabeth. When in 1558 the Percy Earl of Northumberland appointed 
Francis Slingsby as his Keeper in Tynedale, there was no convenient place in 
Tynedale to lodge him. The earl reluctantly admitted that proximity to the Keeper 
was the only means through which the Tyndalers could be stayed.'^* The only house 
that was suitable was the Hexham residence of Lady Camaby, widow of the 
deceased Sir Reynold, according to Percy. Slingsby was keen to have it as well, as 
it would provide him a safe haven from the men whom he policed. Within a few 
months' time, Sir Ralph Sadler delivered to Lady Camaby the queen's request that 
she give up the house,'^^ but it is evident that neither the Queen nor Sir Ralph Sadler 
thought Hexham a convenient place for the Keeper since it was relatively far from 
the dales for immediate action.'™Both Northumberland and his servant accused 
Sadler of ignorance.'^' Sadler replied, 'whoever says that Hexham is a convenient 
place for the Keeper of Tynedale understands not what appertains to that service.''^^ 
In the end, Sadler won the battle and Lady Camaby was allowed to keep her house. 
Slingsby, whose fortune was tied to the commission and generosity of his master, 
was unable to fulfil his office properly by taming the countryside. Even the Earl 
described Tynedale as 'wild country' when he wrote to Sadler informing him that 
՚ 6 7 S.C. Dietrich, 'Liberties and Lawlessness ： Reiver Society in Tudor Tynedale and Redesdale.' 
(Cornell University Ph.D., 1973), p. 150. 
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Slingsby would no longer be able to ftinction as Keeper.'^^ Hexham was not a 
suitable residence; it was too far for immediate action. The system of watch and 
ward in the dales required a resident Keeper as it had in 1552 when Keeper George 
Heron was appointed searcher and setter of the watch along the Tyne.'^"* Most of all, 
the suraames needed a continual reminder of the crown'ร authority, although they 
would only follow one of their own. It was for this reason that the Herons flourished 
in Tynedale after the wars had ended. 
In Redesdale, the Warden of the Middle March often served as Keeper since 
the Warden often resided at Harbottle, which was the closest fortress to Redesdale. 
For many years, the Herons controlled this Keepership as well. Little John had 
served as the sixth Earl of Northumberland ' ร deputy in Redesdale just shortly before 
the rebellion broke out, although Heron'ร arrest in 1537 saw the office go to a 
rival.'^^ George Fenwick was briefly Keeper of Redesdale in 1537 before Sir John 
Widdnngton entered the office as deputy Warden/Widdnngton was a 
Northumbrian knight but his incompetence in controlling the Redesdalers 
demonstrated that having ties in the region did not automatically equate to sound 
leadership in the dales. When Redesdalers sided with the Hesleyside company in 
the chaotic aftermath of the Pilgrimage, Widdrington lamented the violence they 
inflicted upon the Milbumร, although little action followed his recriminations.'^^ 
It was highly desirable throughout the mid-Tudor years to have a resident 
Keeper since proximity equated to control over the clans, and since Heron had 
connections in Redesdale who were ready to obey him,'^^ the crown prudently 
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allowed him to govern Redesdale. Redesdale Keepership escheated to the Warden 
again when Heron was captured at Haddon Rigg in 1542， and for the next eight 
years it remained in the possession of the chief office of the Middle March, as Sir 
Ralph Eure, Sir Robert Bowes, and the Earl of Rutland successively held both dales 
with their Wardenship. In 1552, the dual Keepership of the dales fell back into the 
hands of the Herons, as their connections to the highlanders proved yet again to 
work in their favour /La ter in the decade, the crown divorced Redesdale from 
Tynedale, first with Robert Collingwood,*^*^ and then with John Hall of Otterbum, 
who as a Redesdale heidsman led a sizeable band of light cavalry, but only in a 
policing capacity.'^* 
Association with the English highland surnames was another desirable 
quality as it provided the government with a large pool of light cavalry that was 
adept at the guerrilla warfare needed for the defence of the frontier. The Herons 
were actively involved with the notorious bands of the Charltons of North Tynedale. 
In 1537, Edward Charlton of the Hesleyside Band was implicated in the murder of 
his governor, Roger "Hodge" à Fenwick, the Keeper of Tynedale, and it is likely that 
John Heron of the Hallbameร, Little John's illegitimate son, was also involved. 
Charlton was still free in December 1538, when he helped orchestrate the escape of 
an outlawed priest from Hexham jail. Before the break, he sent a letter to the 
Herons, warning them to keep in their cattle, 'for the thieves and the outlaws would 
come in.' The next day, the jail was breached, and their fellow outlaws liberated all 
'78 Heron requested to have the Redesdale Keepership in 1540, just after he had become Keeper o f 
Tynedale. His reasoning that he used men from one dale to police the next sat wel l wi th the crown, 
as it dovetailed wi th their plan to have one governor for all o f the English dales. See LP, XV， no. 487. 
՚ 7 9 Nicholson, Leges, pp. 256-57. Al though no patent exists, the Leges Marc hia rum lists Heron as the 
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prisoners inside.'^^ This friendly warning from the Charltons alone suggests the 
Herons' collusion with the surnames of Tynedale. The illegitimate activities of the 
Charltons were thus at least partially screened from the king's justices since the man 
who was supposed to dispense justice was directly involved with the men whom he 
ought to have persecuted. It probably helped the Charltons that Edward of 
Hesleyside had married into the Heron family. Yet without the Charltons, the 
Herons would have had a much harder time, not only in defending their main 
holdings which sat at the bottom of the North Tyne valley, but in the effective 
execution of their office, which required the power of the local warlords. Thus in 
1540 Heron was fished from his cell in the Tower and given a garrison of 170 men 
altogether, for the express purpose of policing the dales, and later, using the 
surnames to harass the Scottish dales. ՚^ ՛* 
The Herons wasted no time in re-establishing their power and turned on the 
Robson gangs with whom they had once shared a working relationship.'*^ This put 
Little John back into favour with the crown. As for the surnames, Heron sought a 
pardon for Henry and John Robson of Falstone, as well as all of the abductors of 
Camaby in October 1540, all of this with sponsorship from the Duke of Norfolk, 
putting himself in better graces with the heidsmen whom he had just hounded.'^^ 
The bands of North Tynedale provided powerful military leverage against the 
Herons' rivals, and they filled out the musters when they were loyal, which 
encouraged both the crown and the Keeper to treat them with clemency. When 
George Heron became Keeper under Elizabeth, he imitated the behaviour of his 
deceased father, Little John, as he was at least complicit in harbouring Kerr of 
LP, X I I I (2 ) nos. 1101, 1103, 1146, 1156, and 1159. 
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Femihurst, who was on the lam from Scottish Wardens.'^^ Even Sadler, who had 
once commended Heron, was sure that he had received bribes from the thieves of his 
patrimony.'^** Yet, like his father, George Heron obviously could not function 
effectively as Keeper by persecuting the surnames of Tynedale; rather, he would 
draw them closer to royal service through patronage and support. 
Keepers who were not as lenient were generally not as successful. Hodge à 
Fenwick lacked any sort of familial connection to the clans, and as such, he tended 
to take a dim view of their activities. Sir Reynold Camaby, too, lacked this 
connection and although well-landed with the Hexham stewardship, he wanted for 
power to enforce his many demands. There were few successes for men who had no 
connection to the area. Despite his shortcomings, Francis Slingsby was able to 
gather pledges from the Tynedale thieves in 1558， and to remand Gerry Charłeton of 
the Haw Hill into ward at Newcastle, who was then released upon bond.'^^ His 
tenuous connection to the clans through the Percy lordship of the manor of Charlton 
in North Tynedale most likely worked in his favour this time, although the surnames 
in general ignored this ineffectual Keeper as, in the opinion of Sir John Forster, he 
had nothing to offer the surnames except his reproach.'^^ That a successful Keeper 
required the cooperation of the surnames highlights the fact that the Tudor war effort 
was still largely dependent upon the goodwill of the Northumbrians for the defence 
of the frontier. Moreover, in order to govern the surnames successfully, the Keeper 
required inducement in the form of money or employment, for which only the king'ร 
wars provided an opportunity. 
' C Scot Л V no, 238. 
՝ Sadler Papers, 1， p. 64. 
' CSPF, I I (1559-60) nos. 303 and 347. 
' Sadler Papers, Լ pp. 611-16 and 636-37. 
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The Tudor government initially sought to consolidate both Keeperships as 
well as numerous supporting lands in order to finance the raising of irregular bands 
amongst the dalesmen. Although Northumbrians in general owed Border service, it 
was widely recognised that withholding wages for extended service would net few 
men for the Keeper'ร bands.Since the Keeper'ร wages fluctuated wildly between 
40 and 100 markร,'*^^ subvention from the farm of lands was needed in order to 
attract more men to the Keeper's posse. Sir Reynold Camaby used his stewardship 
of Hexham to finance his stint as Keeper, and he had recourse to the Barony of 
Langley, into which he installed his own family members.'^^ Heron personally 
requested to have not only Langley but Hexham as well, even though Sir Reynold 
was still alive. ՚^ ՛* It is unclear how the king persuaded Camaby to give up the farm 
of Hexhamshire, but it was in н eron's possession within a few months of his 
request.'^^ Heron'ร alleged misdeeds as Keeper prompted Henry to split the lands 
again in order to reduce the power of the Keeper, but he reinstated the lands to the 
office in 1545 when Bowes became Keeper and Warden.'^^ By the end of Henry'ร 
reign, the office controlled the zones that abutted the foot of both dales. This 
remuneration continued into the reign of Edward VI , although with the end of the 
rough wooing and the collapse of the garrison effort in Scotland, the Keepers began 
to diminish in their military importance. Most lands that supported the Keeper'ร 
military abilities began to disappear in 1552, when Sir Thomas Percy was granted 
the manor of L a n g l e y . A l l trace of the lands that formerly supported the Keeper'ร 
PRO, SP 1/124 ff. 67-72. 
9 3 J.M.W. Bean, The Estatesofthe Percy Family 1416-1537, (London 1958); BL， Calig. в III f. 231. 
94 LP, X V no. 487 
^ B Ľ , A d d . MSS 32651 f. 269; PRO SP 1/199 f. 161. 
9? CPR, Edward VI, IV , pp. 195-96.; M.E. James, (ed.) 'The Estate Accounts o f the Earls o f 
Northumberland, \562-1637\ Surtees Society^ 163 (1948), pp. 12-13. 
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retinue of heidsmen disappeared by 1559, when George Heron reluctantly took up 
the post again after the dismissal of the Slingsbys. Heron complained that there was 
no money left in the office. ՚՛՛^ This was a direct effect of the Tudors no longer 
retaining heidsmen and their bands for the wars, although Borderers still managed to 
join the garrisons, albeit under the command of appointed captains. 
Much like that of the Wardens, the Keeper'ร military function was largely 
dependent upon the state of international relations. In the early years of the 'rough 
wooing', the government was desperately trying to provoke Scotland into an act of 
aggression; the Keepers in part complemented the unconventional warfare that 
essentially targeted all Scottish Border society. Consequently, in January 1540 
Heron was free to act upon his office with virtual impunity, setting a course of 
violent action that ultimately resulted in an all-out war between England and 
Scotland. Heron's Tynedalers and Redesdalers were actively raiding by 1541， a 
deed that King James had considered an act of war.^ ^^ 
The military power available to the Keeper was considerable, despite the 
political and social factors that greatly affected the numbers of available men. The 
cavalry mustered in both dales numbered almost 400 for Tynedale and 200 for 
Redesdale in 1539.^ *^ *^  The next year witnessed a fall in numbers, with only 180 for 
Tynedale and 140 for Redesdale.^^' This reduction was most likely a result of the 
kidnapping of Camaby, which was рефеЇгаіе0 by the men who had acted as 
captains for Tynedale and Redesdale,^ ^^ and the resulting raid into Falstone by Little 
John in a bid to capture John Robson. However, as soon as pardons were sent to the 
' ^ ' C W ^ I I (1558-59) no. 349. 
PRO, SP 49/5/29. 
PRO E 36/40 f. 29 
շօւ BL , Calig. В V I I f. 440. 
շ օ շ John Robson and Gerry T o p p m g ՝ Charlton o f Wark were listed in the muster o f 1539 as the heads 
o f their surnames. A consequence of their outlawry was that their graynes were less l ikely to respond 
to the Keeper for service, i f they had not already fo l lowed them in exile to Liddesdale. 
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principal offenders in October 1540,^ **^  the pool of available Borderers increased for 
the next four years. In 1542， George Heron employed 200 Tynedalers to pound 
Teviotdale in the aftermath of Haddon Rigg.^^^ By 1545, Bowes as Warden and 
Keeper was able to muster 1500 men from the Middle March, the majority of them 
from the surname bands."^^ 
After 1550， the dalesmen were exhausted, as the number of able men in 
Tynedale numbered less than 400, with less than 200 suitably horsed men.^ *^ ^ This 
dovetailed with the Keeper's reduced military role in the Marches, as temporary 
peace with Scotland saw dwindling musters. Keepers' musters become sporadic 
after the peace with Scotland, and even during the wars of 1557-60. The heidsman'ร 
band no longer held any military value, which in turn cut the military significance of 
the Keeper. George Heron's appointment as Keeper of Tynedale gives a glimpse of 
how the office had begun to change its role. Since the 1540'ร when the heidsmen 
and their clans were inducted into the English armies, either through direct 
involvement as garrison troops or as irregulars, there seemed to be a new desire to 
look after this segment of former outlaws turned semi-respectable servants. By 
Elizabeth's reign, the Keeper showed signs of restraint, and a general hesitation to 
perform any military action against the surnames. In December 1559, a group of 
Scottish thieves, with the help of some elements of Tynedale and Redesdale, raided 
Cumberland but were forced to bivouac in Redesdale, when another band of 
Tynedale reivers, returning from similar activities in Scotland, happened upon the 
sleeping Scots and helped themselves to their cattle. Borrowing a hound from their 
շ1 LP, X V I no. 172. 
–՚^ B L Add. MSS 32648 f. 179. 
Ţ u\ XX(2 ) no. 400. 
B L , Calig. V I I В f. 106. Service over the previous ten years most l ikely took its toll on the 
dalesmen, especially after the disasters that befell the garrisons. Many returned home without horse 
and armour, while others simply grew weary o f constant conflict. See Phill ips, pp. 200-260, for an 
account o f the dismal conditions endured by the garrisons. 
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allies in Redesdale, the Scots went on the trod to retrieve their lost booty.^^'' Heron 
pleaded to the Warden to see the malefactors punished, since collaboration with 
Scotsmen was a matter for the Warden courts. This incident points to the 
government's efforts to keep Tynedale and Redesdale loyal and to avoid the feud by 
use of courts, whereas twenty years earlier there would have ensued a punitive raid 
followed by executions and the exactions of pledges from all heidsmen, whether 
guilty or innocent. Heron's actions regarding the retrieval of the Tynedalers' cattle 
from the Uttenshop raid were not about embroilment with feuding clans; instead, his 
concern was for protecting the men who had made good on their pledges to serve the 
crown faithfully. On the other hand, outlaws, including English Tynedalers who had 
committed unlawful robberies in Scotland, were sometimes handed over to the 
Scottish Wardens via Heron's network, as was John Robson of Stonehouse, as days 
of redress began to replace punitive raids into Scotland.^^^ 
The shifting of Tudor military enterprises only partially explains why the 
Keepers evolved into a lesser military role. In general, the crown was less willing in 
the 1550'ร to employ the chevauchée tactics that had marked the rough wooing, but 
more importantly there was increasing wanness over the use of covert raids and 
subterfuge, which defined the incursions at Thorlieshope and Haddon Rigg. 
Initially, the role of the Keepers during the outbreak of war was devious. The 
Keepers, but especially the Herons, were able to embark on raids without any real 
consent from the Wardens, as Heron wielded more power than any other Keeper did 
in the previous decade. Little John virtually assumed the power that traditionally 
went to the Warden of the Middle March.^^^Aside from orchestrating the release of 
CSPF, I I (1559-60) no. 1426. 
V， no. 226. 
շ 0 9 Sir Cuthbert Ratcl i f fe was appointed the Warden o f the Middle March in October 1540, although 
his commission gave him no specific authority in Tynedale or Redesdale, which undermined his 
ability to muster men there. See LP, XVl, passim. 
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Heron of the Hallbameร, a matter in which Ratcliffe had little input, 2 ' ° the Keeper 
also personally arranged pardons for any dalesmen who would serve him.^' ' In late 
summer and fall of 1541, Heron raided into Scotland with a free hand, causing over 
£1000 in damage.^ 
However, Henry VII I is probably the guilty culprit here as his policy of using 
a thief to police other thieves courted danger. Heron had already proved how volatile 
he could be. Little John was never one to like his neighbours, the Camabyร and the 
Widdringtons. Heron plotted to use not only Tynedale and Redesdale, but the Scots 
of Liddesdale as well, in order to send his rivals scurrying for other parts, as he had 
during the Pilgrimage. When he came back north in 1540, he was armed with a 
patent that allowed him the power to tryst with the surnames, and although it was a 
military necessity to employ him at the time, Heron demonstrated his eagerness to 
cater to both the king and the outlaws of the dales. His military exploits were well-
received, but all disorders that occurred after his return suggest his duplicity, even i f 
the evidence is circumstantial. The Keeper most likely had prior knowledge of a raid 
on the Widdrington home of Haughton by elements of Liddesdale,^'^ and another 
raid at the Camaby house of 1131էօո.^ ՛՛* A grievous assault on Sir William Camaby 
by Tynedalers under the recently pardoned John Heron of Hallbames also blemished 
Heron'ร record as most of the aggressors were members of his posse.^'^ Evidence in 
the form of Gerry 'Topping' Charlton of Wark served to damn Heron even more: the 
Halton affair had been arranged by Heron to create war between the two kingdoms 
so that he might have the chance to plunder Teviotdale.^'^ Heron tried at every 
' PRO, SP 1/152 ff. 215-17; SP 1/153 f. 86. 
ι BL , Add. MSS. 32646 f. 237. 
՚ LP, X V I no. 843. 
* LF, X V I no. 1404. 
[ LP. X V I no. 982. 
6 StP., ν, no. 390. 
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chance to escape launching raids into Liddesdale, as Sir Robert Bowes had 
commanded him to do in retaliation for the Halton m i d } ^ ^ 
In the end, Heron was forced to acquiesce. In addition. Sir Robert compelled 
Heron to reconcile with Camaby in a public display of comradeship. That he only 
reluctantly complied with Bowes' demands demonstrates that he was unwilling to 
submit to the authority of other March officials. He had already managed to evade 
William Eure'ร plan of assassinating the prominent leaders of Liddesdale with the 
help of the Charltons, for fear of sparking the deadly feud with the men whom he 
had secretly entreated.^When the lid was off Heron's plans, he was already a 
prisoner of the Scots, being captured in the bungled Haddon Raid in 1542, which his 
tormentor, Sir Robert Bowes, had personally led. Though it would have been easy to 
condemn him for his questionable connections in Liddesdale, Heron could not have 
performed adequately had he not practised with the Scottish Borderers; even Sir 
Thomas Wharton was encouraged by the king to plot with the irascible Armstrongs 
of the Scottish West March.^'^ The king needed March officers who had such 
connections, as cross-border intelligence would have been nearly non-existent 
without them."^ *^* Moreover, i f Heron was trying to create a war, it only 
complemented Henry'ร own policy, so it seems unlikely that his arrest in 1542 was a 
direct result of his military activities; instead, his complicity in the Halton affair, 
which is barely discernible, was the prime cause of his incarceration. Even i f his 
intentions complemented those of the king, the means by which he tried to achieve 
them were intolerable. 
՜\1ւՐ, X V I no. 1264 
l[lLF,XVl no. 1264. 
" ' ' ΐ Λ Χ ν ΐ Ι Ι ( 2 ) η ο . 137. 
շ շ 0 The spy networks developed by the Wardens required the employment o f Scots Borderers. The 
Letters and Papers catalogue a vast network o f spies, but Wharton and Lord Eure seem to have had 
the best results. Also see Merriman, "Assured Scots", passim, for a decent account o f how cross-
border ties served the English March officials. 
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Heron's son, George, was no better when he took up his father's post, with 
Rutland complaining in September 1542 that Northumberland was in complete 
disorder from spoil and robbery,^^' Later that year, Lord Lisle decried the men of 
Tynedale and Redesdale, accusing their gentlemen keepers of practising with 
them.^^^ It was convenient, though, that George Heron was as skilled as his father 
was in leading the Tynedalers and Redesdalers on raids, as he proved when he 
sacked Jedworth that October 1542.^ ՝^^  Even the critical Lord Lisle had to gณdgingly 
admit in the end that the younger Heron was doing well in catching thieves.^ "^^  This 
was short lived, when George ran afoul with Lisle after a botched, unsanctioned 
raid.^^^ He was arrested by order of the Privy Council and committed to ward in 
Newcastle for his crimeร.^^^ Thereafter, the Keepership went to the Wardens in order 
to avoid such conflicts of interest. շ շ 7 upon Little John's release by the Scots, Lisle 
suggested that both John and George Heron should remain committed to ward for 
their indiscretions.^^^ It was only after the intervention of Sir Robert Bowes that the 
two men gained their freedom, and even then it was under the watchful eye of their 
unlikely benefactor. George Heron made an impressive comeback with Sir Robert 
Bowes'ร patronage^ and he eventually gained a knighthood under Mary and served 
as Keeper under Sir Ralph Sadler. This allowed the Herons to maintain their 
influence in the region, albeit to the frustration of the senior officers in the Marches. 
In this respect, Heron had much in common with Sir Ralph Eure, who also began a 
private war when he invaded Teviotdale in 1545 in order to carve new lands for 
^^Լլբ, X V I I no. 808. 
さ 尸 : X V I I no. 1194. 
223 LP. X V I I nos. 1083 and 1086. 
2 2 4 / Д X V I I по. 1180. 
՜^ ^ ΙΛΧν ΐ Ι Ι ( 1 )ηο . 161. 
^"^ LF, Χν ΐ Ι Ι (1)ηο. 432. 
2 2 7 B L , Add. MSS 32655 f. 203 After the fal l o f the Herons in 1543, Sir Ralph Eure acted as the 
temporary Keeper o f Tynedale. Eure was the first to hold this honour simultaneously wi th the 
Wardenship o f the Middle March, although Eure admitted to the efficacy o f the Herons when he used 
Giles Heron as his assistant, after George had been sent down wi th Litt le John. 
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h imse l f at the expense o f the Douglas clan. Nevertheless, Eure and his successors 
who also held the Keeperships proved to be much sterner in their services rendered 
to the c rown. The Keeper 'ร role as a coordinator o f clandestine operations proved 
too much even for Henry in the end. 
The o f f i ce o f the Keeper changed great ly f r o m its role in 1542 when b y 1558 
i t had reverted to the role o f what amounted to a local constable. The b r i e f ro le that 
the Keeper p layed i n the Anglo-Scots wars not on ly underscored the relat ive 
importance to the m i l i t a ry role that the Eng l ish surnames were able to prov ide, i t 
demonstrated that the Keeper cou ld w i e l d a considerable amount o f power. W h e n 
decay o f border service began w i t h the w a n i n g o f the Scott ish conf l ic t , the Keepers 
lost m u c h o f their m i l i t a r y importance through the s imple loss o f their furnished 
subjects. 
Constableships and Captaincies 
Constables and captains fo rmed the basis o f al l Marcher leadership, m u c h 
l ike j u n i o r of f icers o f m o d e m armies. The duties o f each captain were s imp l i f ied b y 
u l t imate power o f the Wardens and Lieutenants, a l though i n the chain o f 
c o m m a n d ― i f w e can even cal l i t s u c h ― t h e constables rare ly answered to the 
Keepers. A s i t was the lowest rung o f command, captains were always exposed to 
combat dur ing campaigns and raids. These were constant dur ing the Ang lo-Scot t i sh 
wars, as the important castles o f No rham, W a r k , and Harbot t le stood either near the 
f ront ier or near the dales. As such, the post was not a sinecure but ch ie f l y invo lved 
active so ld ier ing and serving the Wardens dur ing expedit ions. The relat ionship o f 
any captaincy to the c rown depended upon the part icular captain's status, but many 
were pensioners who could d i rect ly appeal to the k i n g for advice or a id. In tu rn , the 
LP, X V I I I ( l ) , no . 1 6 1 . 
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k i n g communicated d i rect ly w i t h them when a captain needed correct ion or when 
g i v i ng specif ic orders. For the most part, the da i l y business o f the Marches required 
the captains to co-operate w i t h either the Warden or Lieutenant, or the Counc i l o f 
the No r th . M a n y gave consistent service. W i t h o u t their presence, the Wardens 
w o u l d have had l i t t le immediate m i l i t a ry power to cal l upon, except through i l l i c i t 
dealings w i t h the surnames. 
W i t h few exceptions, the captains o f castles were a l l f r o m gentry fami l ies . 
Such was the case for the captain o f Wark . B y the mid-16" ՝ century, the importance 
o f W a r k Castle was great enough for the k i n g to have it i n his o w n inheritance.^^^ 
Keeper o f the Castle in 1537 was Robert Col l ingwood,^^° but Co l l i ngwood resigned 
in December 1538, and John Carr o f Het ton took over h is pos i t ion. Carr resided 
there as captain un t i l 1551, despite a few temporary dispossessions, becoming 
k n o w n thereafter as "Car r o f W a r k . " H e was reputed as a " t rue sharp borderer, 
and his career seems to j us t i f y this descr ipt ion. W a r k remained one o f the most 
active garrisons i n the Marches, undoubtedly a result o f Carr 'ร even-handed 
captaincy. A s a result, Wark was one o f the more stable neighbourhoods i n the 
Marches tooughout Carr 'ร tenure, despite its pos i t ion over look ing the Tweed . A f t e r 
John's death, his son, Thomas Carr, husband to the Heron heiress o f Ford Castle, 
received the captaincy in 1551, but was forced to resign i n 1554 when the rightful 
owner, Ra lph Gray, came o f age?^^' 
Norham castle, wh i ch guarded the T w e e d jus t a f ew mi les from the mou th o f 
the T i l l va l ley, was also dominated b y gentry. Sir Br ian Lay ton , who was to share 
Sir Ralph Eure 's fate at A n c r u m Moor , is first ment ioned as Captain o f N o r h a m i n 
1542, as he was the first to report the defeat at Haddon R i g g to the Earl o f 
' P R O , SP 1/168, ff. 19 -54 ; N R O M S S 1147/f . 9 (Book ofTenures. с. 1540). 
՝ L P , I V ( 3 ) n o . 2830 . 
B L C à l i g . В V I f. 503 . 
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R u t l a n d ? " Sir George Bowes, Lay ton 'ร subordinate at No rham, took over the 
captaincy after A n c r u m Moo r , and the o f f i ce stayed i n the Bowes f a m i l y fo r some 
йтеР"* In 1553, Richard Bowes appeared i n the watch and wa rd system as captain 
o f Norham. '^^ B y 1557, the o f f i ce had fa l len into the hands o f R ichard Nor ton , w h o 
had command o f the castle through the first years o f Elizabeth.^^^ Mos t captains thus 
came f r om leading Marcher fami l ies, or from fami l ies that had t radi t ional ly served 
in the Borders dur ing the wars. A l l captains were members o f the m i l i t a ry 
communi ty , and a l l had rendered services du r ing the wars, as the gentry were 
expected to do. 
Captaincies usual ly contro l led the area surrounding the castle. Wark , fo r 
instance, was able to cal l upon the entire Barony o f Wark , w h i c h in 1537 suppl ied 
Robert Co l l i ngwood w i t h an addit ional 42 l ight cavalry.^^^ Mos t o f their author i ty 
centred on the garr ison. The mi l i t a ry author i ty o f the Captains usual ly had the 
command o f at least a fiali company. The garr ison numbers o f W a r k i n 1545 
consisted o f 25 horsemen and a smal l handfu l o f a r t i l le rymen, w h i c h was a vast 
reduct ion o f the 100 men who had served there prev ious ly , a l though many former 
garr ison soldiers were most l i ke l y amongst the 200 pioneers w h o were st i l l 
labour ing there from the previous summer.^^* In 1547, W a r k cont inued w i t h a 
garr ison o f horsemen, w h i c h at t imes swel led to 200 act ive soldiers, a l though i t was 
decreased to 100 b y 1549 . շ 39 Other castles also had fluctuating numbers. No rham 
castle garr ison numbers tended to j u m p whenever there was escalating conf l ic t . A s 
-^APC,V, p. 2 0 1 . 
LP, X V I I no . 663 . G e o r g e B o w e s s igned the let ter a l ong w i t h L a y t o n . 
2 3 4 T a l b o t M S S , A f. 3 2 5 - 2 9 . 
" 5 John H o d g s o n , A History of Northumberland in Three Parts, v o l . I ( N e w c a s t l e - u p o n - T y n e , 1820-
! 8 2 5 ) , p. 359 . 
2 3 6 T a l b o t M S S , D f. 56. 
2 " P R O , E 36 /173 f f . 114 -115 . 
2 3 8 LP, X X ( 1 ) pp .157 and 516 . T h e 2 0 0 p ioneers we re to be used as so ld ie rs i n case o f emergency , 
i nd i ca t i ng the i r m a r t i a l sk i l l s . 
" 9 CSPD, 1601 -1603 , p. 3 2 9 . 
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a Franco-Scott ish invas ion loomed in October 1557, the Captain had a personal 
garrison of 100 light cavalry, with another 200 troopers sent in as ք6ւոքօք06տ6ոէտ.^՛*՛^ 
O f al l the M a r c h of f icers, captains were probably the on l y true professional 
soldiers. Th is is ref lected not on ly in their power to lead Marchers in to combat, but 
also in the structure o f the bands that they led, and b y their combat experience. 
A lmos t al l captains had combat experience dur ing their tenures, as they were 
expected to act as captains o f bands under the Wardens. John с arr was a constant 
soldier, despite the setbacks he suffered; he was capณred i n the bungled ra id near 
Haddon R igg i n 1542, and surpr is ingly released b y his captors on l y a few days after 
the batt le. In Ju ly 1543, с arr repulsed a ra id , and i n the ensuing t rod his men netted 
80 head, 20 nags and two dozen prisoners?'*' In 1544, he reported a successful ra id 
to Eure?"*^ Mos t l i ke ly , he was part o f the vanguard that crashed on the Scott ish 
spears at A n c r u m , a l though he was spared the fate o f h is f e l l ow captains, с arr soon 
returned, but later that year left fo r London so that he cou ld recuperate his many 
wounds. Sir Robert Bowes commend h i m for 'so mauny a grete advenณres in the 
k ings honour.՚^՛*^ B y 1546, Carr 'ร record was impressive: he was tw ice wounded, 
be ing lef t fo r dead once on A n c r u m Moo r , and once captured. Cer ta in ly , he led his 
men from the front, much as Sir Ra lph Eure d id . Carr 'ร m i l i t a r y escapades seem to 
have halted w i t h the establishment o f Engl ish garrisons i n Scot land, and the 
subsequent sh i f t ing o f the front away from the Marches o f England. 
Sir Br ian Lay ton was jus t as act ive in his captaincy. In January 1543, he 
raised 2,000 men w i t h Ralph Eure for the defence o f the Աճէշհշտ^՛*^ H i g h summer 
；^" T a l b o t M S S D ff. 2 2 8 - 2 9 . 
2 4 ' L P X V I I I ( l ) n o . 4 9 3 . 
" 2 L P , X I X { ! ) nos. 7 3 6 and 7 4 1 . 
- ' " L P , X X I ( l ) n o . 804 . 
^ • " L P , X V I I I ( l ) n o 19. 
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o f that year saw Lay ton b u m Kelso w i t h 600 men from the East March.^"*^ A s a 
reward for his services at N o r h a m , and for h is act ive leadership, Lay ton received his 
kn ighthood in M a y \ 544?^^ L i ke Can*, he was present at A n c r a m M o o r , but be ing 
the friend o f Sir Ralph Eure i t is l i ke l y that he fought alongside the Warden un t i l he 
fell?"^^ Un l i ke Wardens, some captains accompanied Her t fo rd on the P ink ie 
campaign, w h i c h suggests that the Protector valued their combat leadership. Sir John 
Horsley, the Captain o f Bamburgh , earned his spurs after campaign, as d id Sir John 
Forster.^^^ 
As the wars waned in the early 1550 'ร , captains took a less act ive role i n the 
county m i l i t a r y leadership, so that al l captains, except those from N o r h a m and 
Be rw ick , were absent from a l ist o f signatories in 1552.^՛*^ W h e n Franco-Scott ish 
forces grouped their ef for ts towards Glendale and the neighbourhoods surrounding 
Be rw ick and No rham i n 1557-59, the importance o f the castles in the M i d d l e 
Marches began to wane. No rham and W a r k became o f paramount impor tance, to the 
exclusion o f other castles, so that the captains there were on constant al ert. 
Captaincies required a certain amount o f risk; most captains saw more act ion than 
the Wardens d id , since they of ten repel led raids that spi l led into thei r 
neighbourhoods. In do ing so, they remained more act ive i n a m i l i t a r y sense than 
any other M a r c h of f icer . 
A t t imes, the c r o w n d i rec t ly i nvo lved i tse l f i n the af fa i rs o f a castle and its 
captain. In 1542， after John Carr 'ร return to W a r k after hav ing been a pr isoner i n 
Scot land, the k i n g thought i t best to depr ive h i m o f o f f i ce since he was a pr isoner on 
LP, X V I Ï I ( 2 ) no . 298 . 
LP, X I X ( l ) n o 5 3 1 . ՜շ Lp] X X ( 1 ) nos. 281， 
Pat ten, ^ E x p e d i t i o n ' p. 150. 
249 N i c h o l s o n , Leges, p. 212 . 
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parole. A l t hough he was a l lowed to keep the su rv iv ing 50 men o f his ret inue, the 
k ing instructed Rut land to move Carr to another locat ion o f h is discret ion.^^' In his 
place, the K i n g sent northwards one Robert Raymond from London , a man w i t h few 
connections i n the Marches, a move carr ied b y the fear that Carr was i n co l lus ion 
w i t h the Scots.^^^ Henry and the Counc i l were also angered b y the fact that several 
carts and their loads, quarr ied stones intended fo r the repair o f the castle, were 
seized b y a group o f Scott ish raiders, wh i l e Carr looked on and refused any 
succour.^^^ Carr appears to have stayed at W a r k i n some capacity p robab ly because 
Rut land recognised the value o f hav ing a veteran borderer w i t h i n the castle; the 
frequent turnover o f the K i n g ' ร Lieutenants h indered also any admin is t rat ive ef for ts , 
w o r k i n g therefore i n с arr 's favour. B y September 1543, Carr seems to have 
temporar i ly lost the captaincy to a C l i f f o r d , but was in command once again b y 
A p r i l 1544.254 B y 1549 the Counc i l re formed their opin ions o f Carr, personal ly 
thank ing h i m for his services."^^^ A l t h o u g h Carr was displaced as Captain once again 
in 1545, probably as a result o f wounds suffered at A n c r u m M o o r , he s t i l l acted as 
Constable o f the garr ison horse.^^^ H is replacement, George Lawson , was on ly 
present for less than a year, be ing accused o f incompetence w h e n his ret inue 
slaughtered over t w o dozen Scott ish prisoners w h o were on thei r w a y home, under 
the safe passage o f their parole. Hen ry was not pleased w i t h this breach o f 
convent ion, and ordered several men to be hung in chains so that the Scots w o u l d 
see their malefactors punished.^^^ 
Hamilton Papers, I, pp . 166-65. 
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M a r y was also took an act ive role in gu id ing her Nor thumbr ian captains. 
Richard Nor ton , the captain o f N o r h a m , c la imed that his captaincy there had 
impover ished h i m and thus sold his estates i n N o r h a m to the Percys for £300, 
reasoning that they could prov ide better f inanc ing o f the castle than any other 
person. The bishop o f Durham was h igh l y dubious o f Nor ton ' s author i ty to take 
such steps, but the captain threw h imse l f at the queen's mercy regardless. The rep ly 
was icy , remind ing Nor ton o f his o f f i ce , w h i c h he had made a 'matter o f 
Merchandise, not regarding its surety.'^^^ Regardless o f u l ter ior mot ives, N o r t o n was 
f i r m l y commanded to stay and captain the castle. Sir John Foster, captain o f 
Bamborough dur ing the re ign o f M a r y , received a rebuke fo r re fus ing to reside at his 
o f f ice , and for the general d i lap idat ion o f the castle itself. Regardless o f the castle'ร 
defensive propert ies, the c rown st i l l urged Foster to reside i n h is o f f i ce i n order to 
keep a royal presence i n the area.^^^ 
Despite the watchf t i l eye o f the c rown and P r i vy Counc i l , captains and 
constables were prone to take a central ro le in the feud ing that characterised m u c h o f 
March society as the Border gentry struggled to assert itself. Mos t feuds d id not 
surface unt i l the m id -Tudor per iod, so at least the government o f Hen ry V I I I d i d not 
have to interpose amongst feud ing fami l ies in order to ensure that the garrisons 
remained ef fect ive. The on ly real except ion was the murder o f W i l l i a m Reveley b y 
W i l l i a m Selby, who was brother to John Selby, one o f the k i ng ' ร No r thumbr ian 
p e n s i o n e r s . S e l b y was the dominant tenant at Ford v i l lage in the 1530'ร , and the 
leader o f the garr ison stationed there .26' H is m i l i t a ry importance as the captain o f 
horse in Ford, his connect ion to the k i n g v ia his brother, and the relat ive 
Addenda, V I I I , nos. 71 and 75 . 
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unimportance o f the Reveleys most l i ke l y prompted the P r i vy Counc i l to pardon h i m 
i n 1544. Feuds tended to emerge dur ing lu l ls i n the ongo ing wars, as there was l i t t le 
to distract the gentry from their squabbles, but o f ten they cont inued even after the 
wars escalated. The Ford dispute between the Herons and the Carrร, w h i c h began in 
155 เ , i nvo lved most o f the garr ison o f Be rw ick , so that the sher i f f o f 
Nor thumber land compla ined that 'wee have, god knoweth , l y t le need o f any c y v i l l 
or damestyque d iv is ion or defect ion amongst ourselves, ' as the garr ison of f icers 
were pul led into the conflict.^^^ N o t al l feuds invo lved bloodshed. In December 
1557, Percy removed Roland Forster from the Captaincy o f W a r k castle; i t came to 
l ight that many o f the garrisons w o u l d not w o r k w i t h Forster, w h o had also made an 
unauthorised ra id into Scotland earl ier that summer, h imse l f be ing captured thus 
undermin ing the author i ty o f his o f f i c e . I n real i ty , Percy was fur ther ing his feud 
w i t h the Forsters, replacing them w i t h his bro ther - in - law, Francis Slingsby.^^'^ A s 
captain o f No rham, Richard No r ton was invo l ved i n a fray against the C l i f f o rds , 
a l though the scope o f v io lence appears to have been quite l im i ted . The reason for 
quarrel is unclear, but i t most l i ke l y or ig inated from a property dispute.^^^ In Ju ly 
1559, El izabeth d i rect ly ordered N o r t o n to ref ra in from v io lent behaviour against the 
Ear l o f Cumberland.^^^ A l t hough the instances where captains actual ly used their 
men to perpetuate a b loodfeud were re la t ive ly rare, the fact that they came from 
Nor thumbr ian fami l ies who tended to feud o f ten drew them in to conf l i c t w i t h their 
rivals. 
2 6 2 T a l b o t M S S D. f. 8 ; M . M e i k l e , T a i r d s and G e n t l e m e n : A S tudy o f the L a n d e d F a m i l i e s o f the 
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A l t hough the captaincies and constableships o f the garrisons in the East and 
M i d d l e Marches presented d i f ferent prob lems, i t is possible to see some simi lar i t ies. 
The garrisons were strategical ly impor tant fo r the defence o f the Marches. A l m o s t 
all were subjected to the v io lence that was characterist ic o f the Marches. Ye t Wark , 
wh ich sat on the Ang lo-Scot t i sh border l ine, enjoyed a re lat ive ly established captain. 
John Carr represents one o f the few men w h o actual ly weathered the devastat ion o f 
the Ang lo -Scot t i sh Wars , p rov id ing W a r k w i t h a stable captain; but the pr ice he pa id 
for do ing so was h igh . M o s t Marchers w o u l d rather qui t . I t is clear that the 
captaincies and constableships suffered from the str i fe o f the internal squabbl ing that 
characterised border society, w h i c h cou ld e f fec t ive ly remove a garr ison from roya l 
service i n order to pursue a deadly feud. B e r w i c k suffered th is fate when its Captain 
became invo lved i n the Ford dispute.^^^ The author i ty to command the soldiers i n 
the garr ison, coupled w i t h the iso lat ion i r o m London , meant that the Captains w o u l d 
sometimes take certain l ibert ies w i t h their author i ty. Norham'ร captain, w i thou t 
regard to the royal commiss ion that had established his captaincy, treated his 
commiss ion as mere chattel . The problems that af fected the captaincies were much 
more var ied than those o f the Wardens or Keepers were. Acco rd ing l y the so lu t ion to 
the problems required micromanagement , w h i c h the Pr i vy Counc i l cou ld not a f fo rd 
to g ive. S t i l l , the attent ion that each case received amp ly demonstrates the 
importance o f the lowl ies t captain i n the Marches, and the dire consequences that 
could result from even the slightest breach o f etiquette. 
The leadership o f the No r thumbr ian m i l i t a ry commun i t y was haphazard. 
There was l i t t le i n the w a y o f regulat ion when i t came to m i l i t a r y leadership. 
Personal lordship, as w e l l as a f f i n i t y and fam i l i a l connect ions, affected the execut ion 
T h i s is c o v e r e d i n Chap te r 7. 
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o f a commiss ion , w h i c h i tse l f was usual ly lef t vague, especial ly for the higher 
echelons. The gentry w h o served as Wardens and Keepers w ie lded m i l i t a r y 
author i ty as def ined b y their patents, a l though many had their author i ty augmented 
by a direct re lat ionship w i t h the k ing . A s there was no means o f b r ing ing up a 
Warden on charges o f insubord inat ion, many o f the Wardens operated w i t h l i t t le 
consul tat ion w i t h their al leged superiors. Tha t a Warden could fob o f f successfii l 
generals such as Su f fo l k , demonstrates the d i f f i cu l t y the higher echelon had i n 
enforc ing thei r o w n author i ty . G iven the broad de f in i t i on o f acceptable m i l i t a r y 
act ion under M a r c h Law , and the fact that Wardens shared a direct relat ionship w i t h 
the k ing , i t is not s u φ r i s i n g that there was d i f f i c u l t y i n establ ishing a system o f 
ef fect ive command . Th is le f t the Marcher leaders to their o w n devices much o f the 
t ime, but this p rob lem disappeared when the M a r c h of f icers reverted to peacetime 
Border guards. Occasional ly , the Marcher soldiers saw the regimented, cont inental" 
style author i ty that was st i l l i n its in fancy, a l though this experience, i n general, was 
on ly when they accompanied the troops o f the Lieutenants-General in the Scott ish 
campaigns. A t Bou logne , there were many compl iments made b y Charles V 
regarding the str ict order ing o f the Nor thern Horsemen. A t home, though, i t seems 
that the Marcher leaders were content to leave such practices for the 'wh i tecoat ' 
garrisons o f Scot land and France. Procedure w o u l d have to remain both spontaneous 
and flexible i n order to accommodate the complex i t ies o f Marcher m i l i t a ry 
author i ty. Increasingly the Marcher of f icers began to per fo rm more po l ice 
funct ions, especial ly after the wars began to quieten. A s a result, their m i l i t a r y 
signi f icance was reduced since they no longer p layed crucial roles i n the Scott ish 
pol ic ies o f the c rown . 
Leadership also took a to l l on the Nor thumbr ian gentry. M a n y were either 
captured, wounded or k i l l ed in the l ine o f duty . Other fami l ies, such as the 
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Camabyร, s imp l y disappeared from active roles in the m i l i t a r y commun i t y due to the 
incompetence o f a part icular f a m i l y member. Surv ivors such as the Herons and the 
Eures went o n to serve as El izabethan of f icers , but for the most part the wars had 
fa i led to inst i l a sense o f overal l un i t y amongst the gentry. W i t h its feuds and 
m i l i t a r i sm, No r thumbr ian society proved to be a tough nut for the Tudor state, as w e 
shall see i n the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Ident i ty , M i l i t a r i sm , and the M i l i t a r y C o m m u n i t y o f the 
Nor thumbr ian Borders 
A s noted i n the previous chapters, the f ront ier that separated England from 
Scotland was in a cont inual state o f tu rmo i l du r ing the per iod jus t after the risings o f 
1536-37, and dur ing Ang lo-Scot t i sh wars o f 1542-60. W h e n both k ingdoms were 
not engaged in open warfare w i t h one another, guerr i l la warfare and in t r igu ing plots 
o f k idnap, murder and extor t ion r ipp led throughout the borders. V io lence was 
constant, and grew to epidemic proport ions once the Engl ish government employed 
harsher tactics. The result was that the borders o f England and Scot land embraced 
even closer their part icular l i festy le, one that is best described as m i l i t a r i sm. Th is 
war r ing nature was closely bound up w i t h fami l i a l ident i ty , w h i c h was strong 
amongst the clannish fami l ies , o f ten over r id ing loyal t ies to the c rown . Border 
soldiers o f ten conf ined thei r absolute loyalt ies to their o w n surnames, and 
emphasised conquest and booty upon the bat t le f ie ld , despite the strategies o f the 
government. Strong local loyal t ies fostered a part icular resentment o f southern 
Engl ish of f icers. Ye t when led b y their heidsmen, Border soldiers per formed w e l l , 
as witnessed through the successful charge o f the l igh t horse o f Lo rd Dacre and John 
Heron at Flodden i n 1513. There is a strong ind icat ion that xenophobia reached 
extreme port ions amongst border soldiers, wh i l s t fami l i a r i t y and local ident i ty cou ld 
spur them to per form very w e l l on the bat t le f ie ld. 
Front ier m i l i t a r i sm was not conf ined to the Br i t i sh Marches. Free peasants 
k n o w n as grenzers settled in the Aust ro-Croat ian borders to become the first l ine o f 
defence against the Turks , wh i l e Cossacks in the south-east Pol ish borders became 
one o f the most mi l i tar ised societies that Europe had seen. 1 Dav id Potter has noted 
' M . S . A n d e r s o n , War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789 ( N e w Y o r k : St. M a r t i n ' s 
Press, 1988) p. 18. 
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that Picards developed a m i l i t a ry ident i ty that developed from prov inc ia l 
consciousness as w e l l as royal inducements and impos i t ions? A s imi lar ident i ty 
reached deeply into Nor thumber land society. The surnames that comprised the most 
notor ious reiver bands are certa in ly more extreme examples. Evidence indicates that 
the pensioners and even the local o f f icers , too, exhib i ted this tendency to iden t i f y 
c losely w i t h their fami l ies , at the cost o f the Tudor m i l i t a r y apparatus. The result 
was that the m i l i t a ry commun i t y o f Nor thumber land was h igh l y f ractured, a l though 
there were dist inct elements that were inherent ly t ied to the Ang lo-Scot t i sh wars and 
the percept ion o f a c o m m o n enemy. 
The effects o f war on ident i ty are d i f f i cu l t to detect i n the early m o d e m w o r l d , 
more so i n pol i t ica l backwaters l i ke the Ang lo-Scot t i sh Marches. A t the same t ime, 
warfare has always g iven shape to ident i ty , as T i m Thorn ton has suggested.^ 
However , the nature o f these identi t ies remains obscured save for the scattered bi ts 
o f evidence. The result is that recent scholarship has wrest led w i t h this intangib le 
concept. The ma in debate centres on the tensions between local and ind iv idua l 
identi t ies on the one hand, and g r o w i n g nat ional ism on the other. John L y n n 
conv inc ing ly argues that the hierarchical m i l i t a r y commun i t y that characterises 
m o d e m armies was extant b y the end o f the seventeenth century, and w i t h i t g rew 
the idea that the soldier belonged to the regiment and the state."* Western armies lost 
dependence upon personal connections o f the nob i l i t y , and became an extension o f 
the m o d e m nation-state. Th is process was d rawn out over centuries, and began as 
early as the late M i d d l e Ages. The personal nature o f medieva l combat as set out b y 
- D a v i d Pot ter , War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-J560 ( C a m b r i d g e : 
C U P , 1993) pp. 18-19. 
3 T i m T h o r n t o n , ' T h e E n e m y o r St ranger , T h a t Sha l l I nvade T h e i r C o u n t r e y , ' I n War: Identities in 
Conflict, 1300-2000. B e r t r a n d T h a i t e and T i m T h o r n t o n (eds. ) , ( S t r o u d : Su t ton P u b l i s h i n g , 1998) , p. 
60 . 
4 J o h n L y n n , " T h e Wes te rn A r m y i n Seven teen th -Cen tu ry F r a n c e , " M . K n o x and พ . M u r r a y , (eds.) 
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, ( C a m b r i d g e : C U P , 2 0 0 1 ) , pp . 5 0 - 5 1 . 
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Michae l Howard has been thorough ly questioned by medieval ists, suggesting that 
the personal ties o f k i th and k i n , w h i c h had played an impor tant role in medieva l 
armies, began to unravel b y the fourteenth century.^ I n t rack ing this evo lu t ion , i t 
stands to reason that the Tudor armies were even closer to resembl ing m o d e m 
armi es than earlier Engl ish armies. Even so, seignior ia l connections remained an 
important aspect o f Western armies in the sixteenth сепШгу, especial ly i n Br i ta in . 
M i l i t a r i sm on a nat ional scale was p la in l y extant dur ing the sixteenth century. 
J.R. Hale has noted the emergence o f m i l i t a r y science and the rise o f the debate 
regarding the role o f the m i l i t a r y i n regards to the state.^ However , m i l i t a r i sm and 
m i l i t a r y ident i ty certainly must have existed on a local leve l , especial ly i n the 
Marches where warfare def ined everyday l ives. As T i m Thorn ton has stated, Чһе 
County , the region, the sub-k ingdom, the autonomous t e r r i t o r y ֊ al l o f these 
remained ext remely s igni f icant foc i for m i l i t a r y ident i f icat ion. '^ Th is chapter w i l l 
quarry the tangible parts o f this aspect o f Marcher ident i ty and t r y to reconstruct 
them in order to shed l igh t upon its basic elements. 
March Law as cod i f ied by L o r d Whar ton i n 1552 and preserved in SP 15 
co l lec t ion, gives a g l impse o f how m i l i t a r i sm affected ident i ty . Th is extraordinary 
code not o n l y re inforced the m i l i t a r y duties o f each landholder, bu t also served to set 
border society apart from the rest o f the country. D .L .W. T o u g h has capably 
described March L a w , yet h is account lacks analysis as to how this code treated 
m i l i t a r i sm, or the mi l i ta ry commun i t y o f the Borders that i t was supposed to 
5 M i c h a e l H o w a r d , fVar in European Histoty ( O x f o r d : O U P , 1976) , p. 56 ; C l i f f o r d Rogers , T h e 
M i l i t a r y R e v o l u t i o n s o f the H u n d r e d Years War,* The Journal of Military History, 57 ( 1 9 9 3 ) , pp . 
2 5 8 - 7 5 . 
6 See J.R, H a l e , War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450֊ 1620, ( L o n d o n : Fon tana , 1985) and 
Renaissance War Studies ( L o n d o n : H a m b l e d o n Press, 1983) . 
7 T h o r n t o n , ' E n e m y o r St ranger , ' p. 6 1 . 
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govern.^ The рифозе o f the code was essential ly to prevent any co-operat ion 
between Engl ish and Scott ish surnames, thus ind icat ing the severity o f the prob lem. 
There is a tendency to hesitate in emp loy ing Border bal lads as a means o f 
understanding m i l i t a r y ident i ty ; i n part, this is due to the dis juncture between the 
discourses o f v io lence on the one hand, and the realit ies o f war on the other.^ 
Border society was s imp ly not sophisticated enough to produce l i terature, art and 
architecture that act ive ly ref lected pol i t ica l or social ident i ty : so ld ier ing and l i teracy 
rarely went together i n the sixteenth-century Marchers. Instead o f bookishness, 
m i l i t a r i sm became the means through w h i c h the young men o f Nor thumber land 
were educated and indoctr inated into the mart ia l society o f the borders, as the men 
o f the borders cou ld not escape warfare. Every pele tower and bastle house that 
dotted the dales echoed the necessity o f arms, wh i l e every hearth theoret ical ly 
supported at least one moss-trooper. As w i t h any group o f soldiers, m i l i t a ry ident i ty 
lay i n c o m m o n experience, but i n the Borders, th is was the p r imary basis through 
wh i ch the men o f the m i l i t a r y commun i t y connected to each other. I ron ica l ly , i t 
could also be the means b y w h i c h i t f ractured. 
Marcher Gent ry and M i l i t a r y C o m m u n i t y 
The fact that Marcher gent lemen were expected to serve as fu l l - t ime soldiers 
sq)arated the average gent leman Borderer from his southern count rymen. A t the 
same t ime, the Marcher gentry were expected to lead their tenants as part o f thei r 
Border service. Th is system o f leadership fo rmed a commun i t y compr ised o f 
8 D . L . พ . T o u g h , The Last Years ofa Frontier, ( O x f o r d : OUP， 1928) , pp . 147 -165 ; W i l l i a m 
N i c h o l s o n , Leges Marchiarum or Border Laws ( L o n d o n , 1747) , pp . 2 1 2 - 2 0 . 
9 I n re te l l i ng the case o f W i l l A r m s t r o n g o f K y n m o n t h , T o u g h en t i r e l y ignores The Ballad of Kinmont 
Willie i n f a v o u r o f c o n t e m p o r a r y d o c u m e n t s from the m e n i n v o l v e d i n K y n m o n t h ' s arrest a n d 
subsequent rescue from Ca r l i s l e Cast le. A s a resul t , the au tho r is able to de l i ve r a d i scuss ion o f the 
event w i t h o u t w a n d e r i n g o n the th in ice o f l i t e ra r y h y p e r b o l e . T h e r e is some h i s to r i ca l va lue i n the 
ba l lads , bu t a d i scuss ion o f th is mus t be reserved f o r a separate w o r k . 
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gent leman soldiers. The most prominent id iosyncrasy o f the Marcher m i l i t a r y 
commun i t y was the development o f a cadre o f of f icers. Yet , the Marchers were 
d iv is ive so that a chain o f command was near ly impossib le to establ ish, so that the 
regimental camaraderie w h i c h marked later armies was st i l l absent. There was also 
the lack o f a dist inct ant i-Scott ish sentiment b y w h i c h the Marchers def ined 
themselves through opposi t ion. W i thou t a c o m m o n cause to uni te against, m i l i t a r y 
ident i ty ceases to funct ion w i t h i n a part icular body and fractures into i nd i v idua l i sm, 
the bane o f a l l armies, bo th ancient and m o d e m . W h i l e i t is most certain that some 
elements o f self- interest, whether directed towards one's immediate f a m i l y or one's 
o w n ga in , was a dominant mo t i ve for some Marchers, i t is clear f r o m the evidence 
that there were common casus belli that uni ted the gent lemen marchers in to one 
cohesive element. Regardless o f their po l i t i ca l and fami l i a l loyal t ies, i t is apparent 
that at t imes gent lemen borderers forged their o w n ident i ty , one w i t h its o w n set o f 
customs and behaviour. However , this was remarkab ly f ragi le , and was shattered b y 
feuding and ambi t ion . 
In an era when the c rown predominant ly raised troops v ia letters signet to its 
ch ie f nobles and certain members o f the aristocracy,'*^ i t is d i f f i cu l t to argue that 
Tudor Nor thumber land possessed an early m o d e m m i l i t a r y system o f h ierarch ica l ly 
arranged of f icers , especial ly when commissions over lapped the m i l i t a r y author i ty o f 
its ch ie f Border of f ices. ' I W h i l e the Border gentry d i d not band together in 
regiments, there is evidence that the Marches fostered elements o f a m i l i t a r y 
commun i t y , consist ing o f bo th notable gent lemen and roya l pensioners. A document 
created i n the late 1530 'ร p la in ly l ists the muster ing abi l i t ies and 'o ther qual i t ies ' o f 
' 0 J o h n G o r i n g , ' T h e M i l i t a r y O b l i g a t i o n s o f the E n g l i s h Peop le , 1 5 1 1 - 5 8 / ( L o n d o n U n i v e r s i t y 
P h . D . , 1955)， passim. 
' 1 See chapter 6. 
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the leading Northumbrian military leaders.'^ The administrative риф08е of the 
document is evident in that it lists the numbers of men available to each household. 
It is most likely that these gentlemen were part of the pool of Northumbrian 
gentlemen who raised their tenants by letters signet. The implication of a military 
community remains uncertain, but what is implied is that these gentlemen were 
рифозеіу utilised against the Scots during the wars. Moreover, their personal 
qualities are identical. The upper echelons of Marcher leadership֊the Wardens and 
their sergeants——were all described as 'true gentleman' or 'true plain men'. Sir 
William Eure, the Warden of the East March, 'is a true gentleman and a good 
justice', while Sir Richard Ellerkar 4s a trae plain man'. Sir John Widdrington, the 
disastrous Deputy Warden of the Middle March, faired well in his assessment, being 
characterized as 'a good housekeeper and a true man,' although his fortified house 
would later suffer from the depredations of the Liddesdale men in 1541.՛՛^ Sir 
Cuthbert Ratcliffe, who eventually superseded Widdrington as Warden, also kept a 
good house and was a 'true gentleman,' a description that is also given to Sir John 
Delavale. While these qualities cannot be claimed as 'Northumbrian' traits, that the 
gentlemen were identically described gives weight to a notion of a specific 
community of gentry-soldiers, who, like many other English gentlemen, were 
responsible for leading the county to war. 
Several references are made to the lesser gentry'ร specific fiinction as Border 
guards. John Selby and John с arr, both of whom served the king in the East 
՚ 2 PRO E 36/173, ff. 114-115. This document was drawn up to measure the mustering capabilities o f 
the Northumberland officers. It is l ikely that this muster was drawn up in 1537-38, when the crown 
was reeling f rom the bad behaviour o f several o f its chief border officers. Personal merit was at a 
premium in much o f Northumberland durmg this period, so this missive was probably used to show 
the k ing that he sti l l could depend upon at least some o f his men in the Marches. '^ Λ^ΚΥ, no. 377. 
'4 Hamilton Papers, I， no. 69. 
265 
Marches,'^ are each listed as a 'sharpe borderer', the Ogles 'sharp' and 'forward', 
while John Horsely was listed as a 'true wise borderer.' Such depictions localise the 
military function of Northumbrian gentlemen, to act as Border guards against the 
Scots. The contrast between the shire knights, who are described more as typical 
gentlemen, and the rest of the gentry, many of whom are depicted as 'Borderers', is 
also striking in that the reader is presented with the perception that the indigenous 
border soldier was much more experienced in localised warfare, but much plainer. 
The higher-ranking knights such as Eure and Ellerkar came from Durham and 
Yorkshire and were not true Borderers, yet they share the same gentlemanly 
qualities as Sir John Delavale and Sir Roger Gray, both of whom were native to 
Northumberland and experienced military leaders. Nevertheless, as primary 
gentlemen of the Marches, their inclusion with a higher class of gentry officers is 
appropriate given their roles as primary military leaders. The lesser gentry, such as 
the constables, marshals, sergeants and captains that commanded the individual 
garrisons of Northumberland, were expected to behave differently than their 
superiors. The Selbys, с arr ร and Ogles came from families that served as constables 
and deputies, the third tier of local leadership under the Wardens and Wardens-
General, and their qualities were most likely indicative of their having spent time in 
the front lines.Families such as these provided the king with his largest pool of 
allies and paradoxically his greatest source of trouble when they feuded. Their 
militarised lifestyle made them perfect soldiers in the frontier, a quality that became 
a liability to the king whenever a truce existed in the Borders. 
15 PRO SP 1/168 ff. 19-54. This is most l ikely John Carr o f W a r k , the infamous constable who made 
a name for himself in the borders. Selby, on the other hand, leased the tower at Gr imdon Rigg from 
the Herons, which is listed in Bowes survey o f 1541, and is most l ikely the father or grandfather o f 
John Selby o f Twizzel , who later became the Deputy Warden o f the East March under Elizabeth. 
' 6 The one exception to the Ogle fami ly was, o f course, Lord Ogle, who was Eure'ร deputy at the time 
o f Ancrum Moor. According to the muster. Ogle was able to put 100 men into the field, which is 
comparable to the retinues o f Radclif fe, Eure and Widdr ington. 
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For the lesser gentry of the Marches, cunning and bluntness counted more 
than refined qualities. For Wardens, this quality could be a liability. After Sir Ralph 
Eure'ร defeat at Ancrum Moor in 1544, Shrewsbury noted that 'because we knew the 
fowardenes and courage of the man, we specyally did admonisshe him wysely to 
forsee things, and that in no wise he shuld give up to rasshe adventure, ne hazarde 
further then wysedom wold requyre.''^ Thus the Marcher gentry'ร brazenness was 
unfit for a Warden, according to the judgements of the 'civil society' of the 
lowlands. Instead, the position required the tempering of the Border soldieťs 
hawkish appetites. Yet wisdom and council would be at a premium for the Duke of 
Norfolk in 1542， as he desperately tried to patch together an invasion of Scotland. 
'Cownsaille ne knowledge [we] can geit non, nor yet demonstration of good will to 
do any good service of any man there, salve only Robert Colingwode, John Horseley 
and Gilbert Swynowe, and sometyme of John Car,' complained Norfolk to the Privy 
Council.'^ Perhaps Norfolk preferred the coarseness that came to characterise the 
more common Borderer, as opposed to the temperance preferred by Shrewsbury and 
Bishop Tunstall. Their experience as soldiers, which brought them into close contact 
with the common Borderer, certainly gave them a rougher edge than the polished 
demeanour of the higher ranks. This differentiation appeared yet again when the 
earl of Hertford held his first meeting with the officers of the East and Middle 
Marches. After the ceremony that saw the creation of Lord Wardens, there followed 
a discussion of the impending invasion of Scotland. At some point, an argument 
broke out regarding the keeping of the borders during the invasion, with the leading 
March lords on the one side, and Brian Layton, Robert CoUingwood and John 
Horsley, the captains of Northumberland's largest garrisons, arguing against them. 
：二 Hamilton Papers, I I , no. 414. 
՚ 8 Hamilton Papers, I, no. 168. 
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The three dissenters, 'men of wit and experience', coarsely argued their point 
regarding the surety of the castles they kept, and were only placated when Hertford 
heard their opinions at length. For Hertford, it was a rough introduction to the 
plain, soldierly qualities of the lesser Northumbrian gentry. Both Norfolk and 
Hertford viewed gentry captains such as Collingwood and Horsley as belonging to a 
loosely confederated group of Northumbrian gentry who had shown at least some 
cohesion in terms of military organisation. Although lacking the regimental chain of 
command, the cadre of gentry officers exhibited a willingness to form loosely 
confederated war councils when warfare provided enough distraction from their 
individนal squabbles. 
The immediacy of the Scottish threat was indeed a powerful force in the 
creation of an identity, although there is a disjuncture between the identity of the 
Northumberland Borderer as a guardian of the Anglo-Scottish frontier, and the 
xenophobia towards the Scots that was felt in other parts of the country?^ Such 
elements not only separated Marcher society from that of the southern English, they 
reinforced a notion of independence that had attached itself to the existence of the 
former liberties that once had governed most of the Borders. Yet the contradiction 
of national and local or familial identity was clearly extant as Borderers saw 
themselves as interposed between conflicting states. Cooperation between English 
and Scottish Borderers was often times a necessity, despite inherent political 
tensions. When the gentlemen pensioners and March officers pondered the notion of 
conflict, it was only with caution that they set their designs northwards across the 
borders. 
LP X l X ( l ) n o . 223. 
շ0 Thornton, 'Enemy or Stranger,'p. 6 1 . Thornton has argued that the immediacy o f the Scots, and 
the damage done by them in previous raids, crystaUized the mi l i tary identity o f Cheshire and 
Lancashire. 
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The Northumberland gentry did not always treat the Scot as an enemy. J.R. 
Hale notes that frontiers were ill-defined in Europe; that there was no indication that 
there was a perception of a firm border.2i The opportunities for Scots and English to 
mingle were plentiful in the Marches. In 1541, when ordered to expel all Scots from 
the East and Middle Marches, Sir William Eure wrote that 'we have perceyvde and 
founde a varey greate nombre of Scottes that were householders within the same 
countie, whereof the most parte were hirdmen, laborers or artificers,' the likes of 
whom were expelled from the country according to the royal decrees.^ ^ Eure pledged 
to find 'Englishemen bom๙ to occupy all of the vacated tenancies. Despite the legal 
protection that allowed men to keep Scottish labourers by license, Eure forced the 
gentlemen and the heidsmen of the county to refrain from retaining or keeping more 
Scots in their households. However, Eure found that two Scots, 'Troyiirร Tailoure' 
and 'Gilberte Cokelands', had performed services to the king as armourer and local 
scout, respectively. It was suggested that 'it wolde please youre maj estie to make 
those twoo Scottyshemen dennysyns'.This was not the only time that Scots were 
offered citizenship, or befriended by the Northumberland gentry. 
Many Scots who had assured with the English were given the chance to 
become English denizens, and many more became familiar with the English 
Borderers. Sandy à Pringle, of the notorious Pringles of the Teviot, became a spy 
for the English, and was offered citizenship in return for his good services to the 
English crown, 'in hope that he will now be an honest trew man to his majeste.'^ "* 
His reception amongst the Marcher leaders was most warm, although he belonged to 
a grayne of the Pringles whose laird, Jok à Pringle, habitually raided the English 
J. R. Hale, Renaissance Europe: The Individual and Society. 1480-1520 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), p. 56. 
스? Hamilton Papers, I， no. 101. 
23 Hamilton Papers, I: no. 101. 
24 Hamilton Papers, I, no. 462. 
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Borderers on the east side of the Cheviots. Pringle'ร influence with the king belied 
his recent appointment, when he unsuccessfully sued for clemency for Jok, whom 
Robert Collingwood had captured while the laird was reiving into 
Northumberland.^^ Suffolk, ever mistrusting of the Borderers, wanted nothing more 
than to execute Pringle and his accomplices, despite Parr's suggestion that to spare 
them would draw the entire Pringle clan closer to the English cause.^ ^ Despite Jok'ร 
arrest, Sir Thomas Wharton, with the blessing of Suffolk, managed to indent with a 
group of the Pringles and settle them at Coldstream, where they tended cattle and 
horses for the captain of Norham.^^ 
In the end, the gentlemen of the East and Middle Marches were not as adept 
at assuring Scots border clans as Wharton was in the West March. There were many 
reasons for this, the least of which was the unpopularity of the Wardens of the 
Scottish West March."^^ Wharton was also willing to embroil himself in the deadly 
feuds of the Armstrongs, Elliots and Grahams, powerful clans who took every 
advantage of the weakened Scottish c r o w n . A t the same time, the Scottish clans of 
the East and Middle Marches were not as powerful, and tended to ally themselves 
with the Kerrร, who often were at loggerheads with the English. The delicate 
political landscape of the Marches determined the alliances, and even when the 
25 Ibid. Jok à Pringle was the erstwhile captor o f Parson Ogle, who was seized after the rout at 
Haddon Rigg. Ogle also sued for Pringle's l i fe, recalling the splendid treatment he received at the 
hands o f his keeper. The suits were all i n vain as the evidence against Pringle was more than enough 
to just i fy death under March Law. Al though no record survives, Pringle was most l ikely executed 
according to Marcher custom. News o f the capture is also listed in LP, X V I I I ( l ) no. 959. 
-Լ LP. X V I I I ( l ) n o . 978. 
LP, X V I I I ( 2 ) , no. 518. 
2 8 PRO SP 1/178 f 85; SP 1/178 f. 53; StP., V， no. 433.Тһе Earl o fBo thwe l l , the Scottish Warden in 
1543, was unpopular w i th the Armstrongs, Ell iots and Croziers, who sued Wharton and Ralph Eure 
for protection. 
29 Wharton was continual in his abilities to draw Scots into English service. In 1543, he was 
instrumental in inducing the Armstrongs to spoil the Scotts, whi le in 1544 he indented the Pringles, 
Taits, Youngs, and Rutherfords. His plans for assuring the Maxwel ls backfired in February 1548, 
when the Maxwel ls turned on h im dui ing an ambush at Drumlanr ig. Al though Wharton escaped, his 
sway in the Western Marches was permanently damaged. See Gervase Phillips, The Anglo-Scots 
Wars, 15I3֊1550, (Woodbridge: Boydel l , 1999), pp. 160-61, 214-17. 
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threat of the Scottish invasion loomed, the border gentry hesitated to label all Scots 
as enemies. In 1543, when the king had proposed to invade the Scottish borders, the 
gentlemen of the Marches hesitiated to 'taik all Scotishmen to be as ennemyeร to the 
Kinge His Highnes.'^*' For lack of com, the English army would have had to plunder 
the Scottish Borders for its victual, thereby driving the Scottish allies into the hands 
of the enemy. Lest they should 'maik ennemyeร of friends,' the Marchers 
unanimously opposed any such invasion until the English could be assured of 
minimal collateral damage to their Scottish brethren.^ ^  Often times, it was necessary 
to declare Scotsmen outlawed when warfare had escalated. In 1558， the earl of 
Westmoreland proclaimed that 'noo Inglisheman have any talke or conference with 
any Scotte.. .privie or openlie aftere this proclamación under payne of death๙， 
indicating that the amount of intermingling that had occurred between both English 
and Scottish Borderers proved disturbing to the Lieutenant General.This indicates 
that there was at least some familiarity with the Scots, or at least with the Scottish 
border clans whose lifestyle was virtually identical to that of the English dalesmen. 
Thus when searching for indications of military identity, it is best to avoid the cliché 
that all English borderers identified themselves as an unflinching, opposing force. 
However, the gentry soldiers of Northumberland and Cumberland saw their 
primary purpose as defenders of the frontier against Scotland. When asked to serve 
in France during the 1540*ร, few border officers relished the chance to do so, despite 
the orders given to them by the king's counci l .S i r Thomas Wharton and Sir Ralph 
Eure complained that when bands of Northern cavalry served overseas there were 
not enough men left to police the Borders, a clear indication that the Marchers 
^**5՛/^., ν , η ο . 466. 
' [ I b i d . 
է BL, Càl ig, в IV f. 259. 
3 3 The only border officers to travel to France were Sir Robert Bowes and Sir Rafe Ellerkar, whilst 
the native Northumberland and Cumberland gentry refused to go. See chapter six. 
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associated their military skill with the Borders exclนsively."^ "^  Lists drawn up in 1541 
recounted the Englishmen of Cumberland and Northumberland who were 'cruelly 
sleyne and murdured' within the realm.^^ Such catalogues were grim reminders of 
the danger imposed by Scottish borderers, who faced the English across the easily 
travelled borders. Moreover, it prompted the English officials to pursue their office 
with rigour, and it underscored their purpose as leaders in a frontier world, where 
violence was the norm. The stark realities of border warfarethe ridings, the 
assassinations and the lootings―kept the English borderers from over-identifying 
with their Scottish brethren, who seemed content to treat their English cousins as 
targets of opportunity. 
The welfare of the English Borderers was at very least closely guarded by the 
officers of the March. Sir Cuthbert Radcliff sought good justice for his subjects 
from such depredations, although he noted in 1541 that many Scottish criminals, 
nearly all of whom the afflicted English had named as criminals, were not brought to 
days of redress, as they ought to have been by their keepers.՝^ ^ Radcliff bitterly 
complained to the king about this, and sought to further the interests of the English 
borderers by asking for new procedures during redresses. Captains also regarded the 
welfare of their men as part of their responsibilities, belying the stereotype of the 
greedy muster captain who viewed his men as targets of opportunity. 
At the same time, comradeship was strong amongst the garrisons and bands 
of Northumberland, and a fierce local identity caused some suspicion and 
resentment of outsiders. As late as 1597, the Keeper of Redesdale received warning 
that i f he staffed his garrison with foreign troops, the Redesdalers would resent it to 
34 LP, X I X ( l ) , nos. 562， 596 and 621. 
Յ5 Hamilton Papers, I， nos. 106 and 110. 
36 Hamilton Papers, I , no 108. 
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37 the point where they would betray the garrison to their riding clans.^^ When Norham 
Castle was rumoured to have been betrayed by a spy, the captain, Sir Brian Layton, 
held a Scottish turncoat ฯท most suspexcyon of all oder.，38 The chief suspect was a 
native of the Merse, and was known to have connections to a Scottish courtier, 
which caused most worry. That he was a Scots Marcher was no cause for alarm; that 
he was allied with a Scottish courtier, thereby becoming a political outsider, was 
almost unforgivable. In the end, the unfortunate accused was found guilty and was 
most likely put to death under March Law, although there are no surviving records 
of his whereabouts after he had been clapped in Norham'ร dungeon. The perception 
of a common, Scottish enemy was more palpable in London, whereas the Borderers 
perceived the enemy in nearly nation-less terais. The ease with which the royal 
border officials practised with the Scots was as unnerving as it was treasonous. Like 
Lord Dacre was in the 1520's，39 Little John Heron was active with both English and 
Scottish Border СІ ans when he was the Keeper of Tynedale and Redesdale."**^  
Nonetheless, the border officials often saw no other route for the preservation of 
peace, as the typical Border officer strove to keep the wild elements within his rule 
from tearing apart the individual Marches, even i f it resulted in cooperation with 
Scottish Borderers. 
Part of the Marcher identity, or at least what separated the Marchers from the 
rest of English society, was that their domestic lives and their military careers were 
СВР, \Լ no. 650. 
38 Hamikon Papers, I, no. 225. Layton'ร judgment seems to have been borne by Coke's testimony, 
which was far too detailed in its description o f the castle walls for a mere soldier to know. The other 
testimonies o f the garrison soldiers show the deponents' ignorance o f the castle's weaknesses. The last 
names o f the deponents also show that the garrison was comprised o f Northumbrians, and many from 
the Selby family. Al though the Selbys were a r id ing fami ly, their loyalty to the crown o f England 
was never brought into question. In the end, Coke was either gui l ty o f treason or spying (and was 
extremely reckless given that he was the only Scot in the garrison), or he was more observant o f the 
castle's deficiencies than his fe l low soldiers, and was just unfortunate. 
39 See ร.G. El l is, ' A Border Baron and the Tudor State: The Rise and Fall o f Lord Dacre o f the 
N o r t h / The Historica! Journal vo l . 35 (1992). 
•*。 StP., V , no. 390. 
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often indistinguishable, the obvious outcome of which was to produce a highly 
militarised society. Although actual warfare with the Scots was not necessarily a 
regular activity, the constant threat of a devastating raid from both English and 
Scottish surnames put the Marches of England in a continual state of military 
preparedness. Military obligation reflected this perceived threat. In spite of their 
martial disposition, the gentlemen soldiers of the Marches did not fully appreciate 
the conventional warfare proposed by the crown in 1543. Rather than invading 
Scotland with a proper army, the Marchers proposed 'exploytes by small nombres of 
light horsmen' to destroy the settlements of the Scots who had not assured 
themselves to the English cause."*' Guerrilla warfare seems to have been more 
appropriate for Marcher soldiers, as it was the main military activity that most 
identified with in terms of practicality and ability; the Northumbrians could not 
afford to wage pitched battles. Even outsiders identified the Marchers as most 
suitable for skirmishers; southern men, according to one observer, were 'not used to 
the skirmish' and were generally inexperienced in guerrilla tactics."*^ The 
unwillingness of the March cavalry to linger during the Scottish advance at Haddon 
Rigg underscores the Marchers' trepidation regarding set engagements. By allowing 
the borderers to pursue this form of unofficial warfare, Henry allowed the marcher 
gentry a continuity of their lifestyle, which they saw as a deterrent to Scottish 
aggression. Even when French and Scottish troops threatened the frontier in 1558 
and reportedly raided as far south as МофеЛ/^ the Warden only suggested 
reinforcements 'so as our force to countervail էհ'օէհ6ք.՛՛*՛* Ironically, official war 
between Scotland and England contradicted the military practices of the English 
^[ St.p., V， nos. 466-68. 
PRO, SP 15/4/32. 
4 3 PRO, SP 59/1/12. 
4 4 PRO SP 59/1/83. 
274 
Marchers, as the national armies of the Tudors sought to engage the Scots, whereas 
the Marcher officers realised that this only incurred retaliation. Although the raids 
by the English Marchers during the rough wooing demonstrated their willingness to 
engage in open warfare, the consensus was that Marchers identified themselves 
increasingly as Border guards. 
Quite often, one catches glimpses of how militarism influenced 
Northumberland society in other practical aspects, as each element sought to 
preserve its own interests from the depredations of its neighbours. There were other 
expressions of the martial tendencies of the Marcher lifestyle. Most Marchers tended 
to live either in basties or in some form of fortified housing. A.c. King has argued 
that members of the Northumberland aristocracy used their castles to convey a sense 
of authority during the fourteenth century, status symbols without much military 
practicality."^^ However, the survey of 1541 demonstrates that the role of such 
structures changed dramatically by the sixteenth century: the basties and peles that 
existed in Northumberland (especially in the outer dales) were in fact used for 
military риф08Є8 and for the defence of the countryside. The sheer number of 
towers, barmkinร and castles that dotted the landscape of Northumberland suggests 
its violent history. The need for defensive structures to protect the welfare of the 
border inhabitants permeated the mentality of the March officers. Bowes saw the 
role of the gentry as providing suitable defences for the countryside, and those who 
owned land in the frontiers should be held accountable for their military protection. 
It was thus suggested that all towers should have barmkinร made for the safe 
keeping of livestock, and that townships should be assigned to the fortresses 
adjoining them. Each tower was recommended to keep a garrison of 40 men, paid 
46 
4 5 A .C. K ing , Tortresses or Fashion Statements,' paper delivered at the University o f Durham, 
December 2003. 
4 6 PRO SP 1/168 ff. 19-54. 
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for by the neighbourhood; above all, Bowes suggested that the king should give 
rewards to the gentlemen who made repairs on their own towers. It is apparent from 
the survey that many of the gentry saw themselves as the first line of defence against 
the Scots, although the key castles of Harbottle and Etal stood in ruins. Collectively 
speaking, the frontier gentry managed to keep up many of their duties, which aided 
in reinforcing their authority. As symbols of power, the towers and fortresses of 
Northumberland undoubtedly served as reminders to the countryside that the 
neighbourhood was not entirely without a military community. Their actual 
effectiveness is another question, though one only has to see the ease with which 
Widdringto๙ร tower at Hatton was destroyed by a comparatively small group of 
raiders. Tarset Castle, too, suffered the same fate in the 1520'ร. Yet, since there is 
no report of any other significant destruction of the towers and peles, one can 
assume that they were indeed effective as both shelters, and as symbols of the 
authority and power of the Marcher gentry. At the same time, one must use caution 
in assuming the building of fortifications in the frontiers was the result of 
identification with any anti-Scottish sentiment. Many towers, such as Roger 
Hangingshawe*ร tower at Harclay, were built in defence against the English 
Borderers as much as the Scots."^ ^ Such outward displays of militarism occurred on 
both sides of the border, demonstrating that although a political line ran through the 
Marches, the average Marcher mistrusted his neighbours as much as the national 
enemy. This, of course, ftirther complicates any explanation of a collective border 
identity amongst Northumberland society. 
The gentry of Northumberland were no strangers to feuding; in fact, they had 
nearly perfected the feud so that their political identities became a mixed jumble. 
This feuding character had its roots as far back as the early fourteenth сепШгу, when 
Ibid.\ พ . Percy Hedley, Northumberland Families Vo l . 11， (Newcastle, 1968), p. 
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most of the surnames saw their genesis under the leading feudal lords of the dales.^ ^^  
Yet for all of their individualism, the Northumberland gentry showed an unwavering 
loyalty to the Lancastrian cause during the Wars of the Roses, usually in the service 
of the Tailboyร and the Perdes/^ Some, like the Ogles and the Camabyร, became 
fiercely loyal to the crown in the sixteenth century, despite the former family'ร 
support of the Yorkist cause during the Wars of the Roses. The Yorkist sympathies 
of Lord Ogle of Bothal ensured that this rising family annexed the Heron 
possessions in Ford and Tynedale, after Heron of Ford fell at Towton. Also 
garnered were the Tailboyร' castle at Harbottle and their holdings in Redesdale. 
Others were loyal to the local magnates, the Percys, and were constantly striving to 
augment the power of that household, and always looking to make a name for 
themselves in doing so. The Herons were reinstated with their inheritance within 
fifteen years of losing it to the Ogles, and although still allied to the Percy cause, 
they became less dependent upon that house as time wore on; it was only a matter of 
time before the Herons began to operate as royal officers in their own right, without 
Percy patronage.^*' Likewise, the Ogles, Shaftoes, Erringtons and other gentry 
families found new power in direct service to the king, a sign of the retreating power 
of the Percys. Yet the Percy ascendancy kept the more powerful surnames in check 
and without the barrier of such patronage, the result was a power grab in 
Northumberland, which in turn sparked much of the gentry'ร internecine squabbling. 
4 8 R. Robson, The Rise and Fall of the English Highland Clans: Tudor Responses to a Mediaeval 
Problem, (Edinburgh: East L inton Press, 1989), pp. 31-47. 
Robson, English Highland Clans, pp. 58-59. 
5 ° B y 1500, Heron's power was unquestioned and he was referred to as "Captain o f all Redesdale" by 
Bishop Fox. In this fashion. Heron served both the K ing and local magnates 'Bishop Foxes 
Register,' Publication of the Surtees Society vol . 147 (London and Durham, 1932), p. 129. 
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The case of Ford is indicative how prone the gentry were to the inter-familial 
violence that characterised Marcher relationships.^' Ford Castle was built by 
permission of Edward III , the construction beginning in 1338, with William Heron 
as its heir.^^ Ten years later, William arranged for the marriage of one of his sons to 
the heiress of the Usles of Chipchase, thus securing their legacy in the jurisdiction 
of Hexham.^^ By 1533, the chief executor of the Herons, Sir William Heron, owned 
several important strongholds, including Simonbum, one of the keys to the wild 
North Tynedale area. 
However, by 1534, there arose a dispute between the Herons of Chipchase 
and the Herons of Simonbum and Ford. Sir William had apparently settled his lands 
in tail male with his two brothers, Henry and Odinei, and also with Sir John Heron 
of Chipchase, his cousin, in 1500.^ "^  Although it is unclear exactly when the two 
brothers died, it is probable that they had done so by 1534, when John of Chipchase 
put in a claim for the entire Heron inheritance. As it turns out. Sir William had 
already granted the castles of Ford and Simonburn to his granddaughter, Elizabeth, 
who, being a minor at the time of her inheritance, became the ward of Sir Thomas 
Audley.55 Little John of Chipchase tried to pursue his right of tail male, but his 
involvement in the Pilgrimage of Grace undercut his case, and Elizabeth was 
allowed to keep her inheritance, albeit with one of her cousins as captain.This set 
S ' M , Meik le , ' Lairds and Gentlemen: A Study o f the Landed Families o f the Anglo-Scottish Borders, 
1540-1603/ (Edinburgh บniversity Ph.D., 19ร6),passim and M. Meik le, 'Northumberland Div ided: 
Anatomy o f a รixteenth-Century Bloodfeud, ' Archaeologia Aeliana 5th series, vo l . 20 (1992), pp. 
79-89; P.G. Boscher, 'Polit ics, Administrat ion and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Scots Border, 1550-60/ 
(Durham University Ph.D., 1985), pp. 283-86. Meikle 's take on the feudis deeper than Boscher'ร 
analysis, although Meikle is not as quick to appreciate the mil i tary ramifications o f the feud. 
52 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
\ Meik le, 'Northumberland Div ided, ' pp. 79-89. 
' LP, IX : no: 216; ibid., X I I ( l ) no. 513. 
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the stage for the ensuing feud. Thomas Carr, son of John Carr of Wark and Hetton, 
had married the heiress of Ford, and in doing so had become the new owner of Ford 
Castle, and acted as its Captain. John Heron of Chipchase immediately revived his 
claim on the Ford estates, as did several other members of the Heron family who 
claimed possession through tail male, a move that set the wheels in motion for yet 
another feud.57 The matter was further complicated by the fact that Elizabeth'ร 
mother was now the wife of John of Chipchase. 
By March 1557, the feud had come to a head when the Herons forcibly 
ejected Carr and his servants from the castle. The following day, a group of border 
soldiers, including Sir Ralph Grey, Giles Heron and the mayor of Berwick were en 
route to Ford when they were ambushed by a group of men lead by Robert Carr, 
brother of Thomas. The mayor was slain immediately, and Giles Heron was mortally 
wounded.Lord Wharton, the deputy Warden-General of the Marches, straight 
away held the Carrร and their allies, the Collingwoods, responsible for the 
bloodshed.^^ The Collingwoods were the only family to support the Carrร, as the 
Herons were now related by blood or marriage to virtually every other household in 
Northumberland. The Herons' support from Wharton, and their allegiance with the 
Northumberland gentry soon had a polarising effect in the Marches, and the Privy 
Council was eager to settle the matter.60 After all, the crown could not have its 
border officers slaughtering one another to the detriment of their charges. Despite 
the intervention of the central government and the exaction of sureties from both 
parties, Thomas Carr was murdered in January 1558.^ * Although the immediate 
suspects were of course the Herons of Chipchase, the murderers remained at large. 
" James Raine, The History and Antiquities of North Durham, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1852), p. 208 
[I Talbot MSS D f. 8. 
Talbot MSS D ff. 15֊ 18. 
^^ АРС, V I , pp. 72-73. 
" APc[ V I , pp. 86-87. 
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The feud continued between the Herons and the с arrs, resulting in the 
neglect of Ford castle and subsequent decline of its garrison. In April 1557, just after 
the initial fray, it was reported that all Northumberland Marchers rode 'suedye upon 
[their] garde as i f [they] rode against the enemye of Scot land',a situation that 
undermined the defence of the Borders. Since the military community of the 
Borders was inextricably tied to the gentry, feuds that involved large sections of 
Northumberland society often turned violent, exposing one of the primary 
weaknesses of a militarised Border culture. 
Much of the bickering centred on former Percy lands and those who would 
attempt to make away with the largest parcel of the former earldom. There is no 
better example than the feud between the Camabyร and the Herons, which amply 
demonstrates how a prominent Border family coveted the scraps of the Percy legacy. 
The Herons, who had been long-time servants of the Percy family, did not overtly 
feud with their Halton neighbours until 1536. In that year, Sir Reynold Camaby 
began to use his authority as Bailiff of Hexham to increase his own lands with those 
that were formerly in the hands of the Earl of Northumberland, who had disinherited 
his heirs. As bailiff, Camaby was about to see tføough the dissolution of Hexham 
Abbey, and to receive for his own profit some of the Abbey farms; this made him a 
natural target. At the same time, Little John had been unsuccessful in his lawsuit 
after the death of his father, Sir John of Chipchase, to become the heir of the Herons 
of Ford, his cousins who held Tynedale land in the manors of Chirdon and 
Simonbum. Jei 
Percy brothers towards the rising Camaby. Sir Thomas Percy, who would later be 
executed for his role in the rebellion, wrote that Camaby was 'the destruction of all 
6 2 Talbot MSS D. f. 9. 
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our b lood, for by his means the k i n g shall be m y Lord's heir.'^^ It was in th is manner 
that the Heron-Camaby feud became t ied to the misfor tunes o f the Percys. 
The Herons, especial ly the Chipchase gra in , were never content unless they 
were at the front o f the enterprise. As such, L i t t l e John Heron was most l i ke l y one o f 
the pr ime agitators o f the Pi lgr image o f Grace.^"^ Seeing the chance to despoi l 
Camaby and to increase his weal th in do ing so, Heron j o ined w i t h the rebel Percy 
brothers to rebel against the k ing . Upon meet ing the Hexham canons, i t was most 
l i ke l y that they agreed to resist the k ing ' ร commissioners, w h i l e seiz ing the chance 
to do away w i t h the parvenu Camaby, who stood to gain the most from the 
dissolut ion. Heron then conspired to have their support i n ra is ing the surnames o f 
Tynedale, w h i c h they apparent ly had agreed to g ive b y h i r i ng them as soldiers. 
W h e n the day came that the armed canons o f Hexham confronted the roya l 
commissioners, the road to rebel l ion had already been paved. Hear ing o f the 
resistance o f the canons o f Hexham, Heron rode over to Ha l ton to warn W i l l i a m 
Camaby, father o f Sir Reyno ld , that he should seek terms w i t h the rebels, since the 
Camabyร were not power fu l in men and retainers. Heron o f fered to act as mediator 
for Camaby, who was too happy to have Heron intercede on his behalf, d isp lay ing a 
too-trust ing tendency that Heron was w i l l i n g to explo i t . 
W h e n he returned to Ha l ton , Heron 's j o v i a l att i tude suggested to Camaby 
that Ha l ton was safe f r o m the rebels. No th i ng cou ld have been farther from the 
t ruth. W h i l e d in ing that af ternoon, news came that the Tynedale men had risen in 
support o f the canons o f Hexham, and that the dalesmen had already mob i l i sed for 
war. Heron then confessed to his naïve host that his d ip lomacy w i t h the canons had 
come to no th ing , and that the rebels were intent on p i l l ag ing al l o f Hexhamshi re , 
PRO SP 1/119 ff. 94-104. 
^ PRO SP 1/119 ff. 94-104. The fo l lowing paragraphs are based upon this deposition given during 
the trials o f the Tynedale rebels. 
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especial ly Caraaby 'ร ho ld ings. Camaby was understandably shocked; w h y had 
Heron fai led to warn h im? Incredib ly , Heron then persuaded Camaby to vacate his 
house, stating that ' a l l the goodes in the w o r l d w o l d not sayf his l y f , ' o f f e r i ng to take 
Camaby to his o w n house o f Chipchase. A s they rode away, a servant o f C a m a b y ร 
son, who by chance had met the very Tynedale men w h o m Heron and the canons 
had previously raised, approached them on horseback. H e managed to disclose 
quiet ly the intent ions o f L i t t le John to Camaby, who was able to make good his 
escape, al though he spent the rest o f the rebel l ion h id i ng from the rebels. Heron 
returned to Ha l ton , but his attempts to spoi l the house were filistrated when Nicho las 
Err ington, whose k i n were bound closely to the royal is t , Camaby-a l l ied Ogles, 
spir i ted away Camaby'ร money chest for safe keeping.^^ The Herons o f Chipchase 
were but one gentry c lan on the royal payro l l that p la in l y exhib i ted their loyal t ies to 
their fami ly , go ing as far as open rebel l ion i n 1536. Other fami l ies , i nc lud ing the 
Swinbums, Fenwicks and Rid leys managed to avo id tak ing a leading ro le i n the 
rebel l ion, a l though their fami l ies w o u l d engage in in ter - fami l ia l v io lence t føoughout 
the sixteenth century. 
No t on l y does this case demonstrate the gui le that was needed to conduct a 
Border feud, i t demonstrates the f lex ib le loyalt ies o f the Marcher gent lemen w h o i n 
1536 were i n the t rough fo rmed b y the eclipse o f the Percys and the eventual 
dominat ion o f the Eng l ish state. Heron was an oppor tunis t ; his judgement fo rmed 
throughout many years' experience o f exhaust ing border conf l i c t , w h i c h requi red 
exp lo i t ing every advantage. It is doubt fu l , though, that a person as m y o p i c as Heron 
could have foreseen the rebe l l ion that wou ld have resulted from his actions i n 
Tynedale. One cannot assume then that the Herons were ant i - royal ist , especial ly i n 
6 5 PRO SP 1/119 ff. 94-104. 
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l igh t o f their service to the c rown both before and after the P i lg r image o f Grace. 
Nevertheless, L i t t le John at t imes exhibi ted a shock ing lack o f respect for the K i n g ' ร 
author i ty. His f am i l y ' ร feud ing in general seemed to ho ld utter d isdain for the K i n g ' s 
peace, at t imes pervert ing roya l jus t ice unt i l cal led upon b y the Tudor monarchs to 
answer for their transgressions. Instead, i t is more probable that the Borderers 
caut iously v iewed royal author i ty as a too l w i t h w h i c h one cou ld bu i l d a career. 
M o r e impor tant ly the gent ry were w h o l l y aware o f the m i l i t a r y power that they 
w ie lded, and that wh i ch the c rown had empowered them to exercise, and they o f ten 
used this to reinforce their f a m i l y ' ร standing. 
The gentry o f the Tudor Marches str ived to achieve dominance i n the power 
vacuum that the fa l l o f the Percys had created. W i t h gentry serv ing as Wardens, and 
as lesser of f icers, social standing began to lose i ts prestige, especial ly where m i l i t a r y 
leadership was concerned. In essence, the m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i t y was ruptured by the 
absence o f leading lords. The establishment o f a h ierarchy was therefore impossib le 
g iven that the social structure o f the Marches had inverted w i t h the decl ine o f the 
Percyร. Gent lemen such as the Eures, who had once served as deputies, now 
contro l led Marches wh i l e men o f equal standing, such as the Co l l i ngwoods and the 
Can*ร, served lesser of f ices under the contro l o f the Warden. A l t h o u g h the c rown 
repeatedly exhorted the gent lemen o f the Marchers to remain at the beckon ing o f the 
Warden , this of ten went ignored. A t the same t ime , o f f icers exh ib i ted the occasional 
conc i l ia tory ef for t , suggesting that a commona l i t y ип0еф іппе( і the c o m m u n i t y o f 
gent lemen soldiers. However , the m i l i t a r y commun i t y that the gentry created in the 
face o f fore ign aggression fracณred due to feuds and the consol idat ion o f power 
w i t h i n a network o f k i t h and k i n . 
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Reivers, Surnames and Clash ing Ident i ty 
The closed societies that inhabi ted the outer dales o f Nor thumber land 
fo rmed a m i l i t a ry commun i t y i n contrast to that o f the Nor thumbr ian gentry. The 
heidsman o f the surnames exh ib i ted at least some characteristics o f Er ic 
Hobsbawm'ร peasant hero, w h o as an ou t law became the champion o f his o w n 
c o m m u n i t y . Y e t the surnames were more than jus t bandi ts; their contr ibut ions to 
bo th Engl ish and Scott ish crowns dur ing the wars were considerable. The sk i rmish 
that occurred at Fawside Brae the day before the batt le o f P ink ie was symbo l ic o f 
the surnames' re format ion on bo th sides o f the Ang lo -Scot t i sh frontier.^^ 
The riding fami l ies o f Nor thumber land occupy a special niche in Eng l ish 
h is tory , and i n the h is tor iography o f the T u d o r Marches. The s tudy o f Border reivers 
has proved popular in the past, w i t h the local h is tory societies o f Nor thumber land 
and the Scott ish borders p roduc ing a weal th o f pamphlets, gu ided tours and 
museums. George MacDona ld Fraser'ร book , The Steel Bonnets, is descr ipt ive o f 
the m i l i t a r y activi t ies o f the riding fami l ies, even i f i t ma in l y focuses upon the late 
sixteenth-century Scott ish sumames. 68 The w o r k o f Ra lph Robson attempts a 
thematic study o f the Tynedale surnames, a l though i n the end the narrat ive 
swal lows the development o f themes such as m i l i t a r y culture. 69 However , bo th 
works avoid the quagmire o f po l i t i ca l and m i l i t a r y ident i ty , w i t h on ly a few 
acknowledgements o f the re ivers ' independence from the Eng l ish c rown . Instead, 
Robson has opted to portray the heidsmen as ind iv idual is ts , or as mere opportunists 
66 Eric Hobsbawm, "Social Banditry," in H. Landsberger, ed., Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and 
Social Change (London: Routledge, 1974). 
67 Whi le the clash itself was unspectacular, the fact that most o f the participants were from surname 
groups who were under the command o f appointed captains demonstrated that erstwhile bandits had, 
albeit slowly, become a regular part o f the Anglo-Scottish mi l i tary establishment. 
애 George MacDonald Fraser, The Steel Bonnets, (London: Ban ie and іепюпร , !971). 
69 Robson, English Highland Clans, Chapters 15-19. 
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w i t h no real separate ident i ty from established ' 'Engl ishness". Th is approach is 
certa in ly jus t i f iab le g iven the nature o f the evidence. 
Another more obv ious aspect o f the recalci trance o f Border society was the 
cont inued and conservative observance o f Catho l ic ism. Despite the break from 
Rome i n 1533, most Nor thumbr ians c lung stubbornly to the o ld re l ig ion. Th is 
confessional break w i t h the Engl ish church permeated al l levels o f Border society, 
from the aristocracy who part ic ipated in the t w o ma in northern rebel l ions o f the 
sixteenth century, to the lowest moss trooper who embraced the antiquated practices 
o f medieval re l ig ion . Borderers c losely ident i f ied w i t h northern rel ig ious cults, and 
the closure o f the chantries and the subsequent banish ing o f the cult o f saints from 
the Eng l ish Church never w h o l l y ruptured th is t ie. A Nor thumbr ian soldier 
admit ted that the mere ment ion o f St. Cuthbert on the bat t le f ie ld was enough to st ir 
act ion amongst Nor thern soldiers.™ The banner o f the Durham saint had already 
accompanied most ma jo r expedi t ions into Scot land, as i t had done since the M i d d l e 
Ages, where i t made its mar t ia l debut at the Bat t le o f the Standard in the twe l f t h 
century. He ld b y the household retainers o f the B ishop o f Du rham, this banner 
prov ided a ra l l y ing po in t fo r al l northerners, as its presence was rumoured to w o r k 
miracles on the b a t t l e f i e l d / ' 
The re l ig ion in the Borders is a perp lex ing issue, especial ly when one 
considers the decidedly unchr is t ian act iv i t ies o f many riding clans, who seem to 
have pursued their re l ig ious bel iefs w i t h the same war l i ke obsession that 
characterised their day-to-day behaviour. The i r ro le i n the Pi lgr image o f Grace is 
™ David Lang, ed. "The Trewe Encountre or Batayle Lately Don Betwene Englande and Scotlande; 
In Which Batayle the Scotsshe Kynge was Slayne , Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of 
Scotland, vo l . 7 (1866-68), p. 150 ： 
Michael Bush gives a detailed description o f the banner in M . Bush, Durham and the Pilgrimage of 
Grace, (Durham: Durham County Local History Society, 2000) pp. 13-15. 
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w e l l documented,^^ a l though their mot ives were suspect as they mere ly used to the 
oppor tun i ty to lay waste to the settled areas o f Northumberland.^^ S t i l l , their 
ou tward re l ig ios i ty was in ter tw ined w i t h their m i l i t a r i sm as i t was rumoured that the 
clansmen never said their beads so fervent ly as when they embarked upon a raid/"^ 
Even the hardboi led cases could not escape the desire to b r i ng at least some element 
o f re l ig ion into their lawlessness, presumably to j us t i f y their depredations. The i r 
observance o f re l ig ion cou ld be used to cont ro l them as in 1498, when B ishop Fox 
o f Durham determined that the on l y w a y to contro l the surnames was to threaten 
them w i t h excommunica t ion . These measures appeared to have some effect, as Fox 
was able to receive sureties from the ch ie f of fenders. Sandy Char l ton and three 
M i l b u m ร ― ' A t k i n , Crys ty and H o w y ' ― a l o n g w i t h near ly a dozen others, were 
absolved from the threatened excommunica t ion , prov ided that they cease thei r 
war l i ke l i festy les, and ref ra in from attending the mass wh i l s t heav i ly armed. 
The author i ty o f the B ishop was of ten not enough to stop the fami l ies from 
tak ing matters into their o w n hands. A s B ishop o f Du rham, Wo lsey had la id the 
churches o f Tynedale under interdict , when i t was reported that a member o f the 
Char l ton band ' took the sacrament fo r th o f the sepulchre in Be l l i ngham church and 
one firkin o f w ine and 800 breads and carr ied them to a place cal led Tarset H a l l but 
next day brought them back to Be l l i ngham where they got a Scotch f r iar to g ive the 
Sacrament to a number o f ev i l disposed persons.'^^ The Charl tons were also 
responsible for break ing the j a i l at Hexham in 1538， i n w h i c h they rescued a priest, 
7 2 M . H . and R. Dodds, Pilgrimage ofGrace y 536-7, 2 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 1915). This contains 
the best account o f the rising in Northumberland, and the participation o f the surnames. 
7 3 The Percy brothers Thomas and Ingram, who used the dalesmen to despoil their rivals in the 
Marches, most l ikely prompted this. 
74 Tough, Frontier, pp. 61-75. 
7 5 'Bishop Fox 's Register/ Surtees Society vo l . C X L V I I pp. 80， n o & 126. 
LP, I V no. 1429. 
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Father Robert M o r e , from the clutches o f Sir Reyno ld Carnaby.^^ R. Robson has 
noted that the underground smugg l ing operations were used for more than jus t 
smugg l ing persecuted c le rgymen and w o m e n ; letters to and f r o m the Pope and the 
renegade Cardinal Pole o f ten found their w a y through the sumames^^ In this 
fashion, the o ld re l ig ion persevered in the N o r t h Count ry , so that in 1595 Sir 
W i l l i a m Bowes reported to the Pr ivy Counc i l that * False and d is loyal l re l ig ion hath 
taken deipe roo t ' , a te l l i ng def ic iency o f the Eng l ish Reformat ion in the Borders7^ 
There is suf f ic ient data to indicate that there was something al ien about the 
reivers, both i n the way that they regarded themselves, and in the way that the rest 
o f Eng l ish society port rayed them. Despi te the service that many heidsmen and their 
graynes rendered, our understanding o f Border reivers is st i l l hampered b y a dearth 
o f p r imary evidence. W h i l e bal lads, poems and fo lk lo re abound, many o f these are 
no older than late-seventeenth century, and are more te l l ing o f the atmosphere i n 
w h i c h they were authored. The sixteenth-century documents that exist i n the State 
Papers archives are p r ima r i l y government correspondences֊observat ions made b y 
the organisat ion that ac t ive ly sought to іпсофога їе Border society into the 
c o m m u n i t y o f the realm. Op in ions o f the borderers are predominant ly negat ive, 
g iven the fact that the c r o w n was i n a near constant state o f conf l ic t w i t h var ious 
power f i i l border clans at any g iven t ime un t i l 1541， when their m i l i t a ry ski l ls 
proved useful enough fo r the government to pardon their earl ier offences. Even the 
dales horsemen w h o turned out for royal musters were label led as thieves by the 
muster master; bo th Tynedale and Redesdale suf fered such categorisations, 
a l though many o f the new roya l recruits d id come from the more notor ious 
Robson, ^ ^g /b / ř Highland Clans, p. 9 1 ; LP , X I V ( l ) nos. 455 & 481 . 
СВР, 11， no. 171. 
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families.^*^ Part o f the p rob lem, according to southern prejudices, was that the 
Border clans were not under the thumb o f a local land lord , and thus answerable on l y 
to their c lan. Bo th dales were former l ibert ies, and a l though the Tudors had 
endeavoured to b r i n g roya l just ices into these areas, they remained steadfast i n 
c la im ing the o ld l ibert ies, and refused to recognise royal warrants.**' G iven the fact 
that most gentry fami l ies , inc lud ing the Camabyร and the Widdr ing tons , cou ld 
exercise l i t t le contro l over the surname bands, b y the 1530'ร i t seemed that the 
surnames were a l aw unto themselves. The presence o f the M a r c h Wardens and 
especial ly the Lieutenants and Wardens-general , had at least some posi t ive effect i n 
con t ro l l i ng the surnames. Even then, many roya l o f f i c ia ls sent from the south of ten 
had l i t t le or no connect ion to the men o f Nor thumber land , so that borderers 
regarded them w i t h mistrust , despite the power o f their patents and warrants. Roya l 
o f f i c ia ls responded invar iab ly w i t h heavy-handed techniques, inc lud ing a f o rm o f 
m i l i t a r y government that harshly punished offenders. The u l t imate goal o f the 
government was to take away the re ivers ' l ivelihood一their m i l i t a ry power. 
A l t h o u g h the dalesmen expressed a unique m i l i t a ry ident i ty , one that was bound up 
i n unconvent ional war fare, i t was seen as a threat to the stabi l i ty o f the c rown and 
was eagerly hemmed i n by men such as Her t fo rd and Dudley. 
The survey o f Tynedale and Redesdale made b y Sir Robert Bowes and Sir 
Rafe El lerkar i n 1541 provides s igni f icant ins ight in to the clannish society o f riding 
fami l ies o f Nor thumber land , as does Bowes ' second survey o f 1551, but the surveys 
NRO Z A N M.13/D. 15. For North Tynedale, most o f the men mustered were f rom the Robson and 
the Dodd families, both o f whom were engaged in ล feud wi th the Hesleyside gang. Some Charltons 
also appeared, mainly Gerry T o p p i n g ' o f the riaw-Hill-in-Wark as wel l as Gyb o f the Boughthi l l . 
The men o f Redesdale included mostly Halls, w i th many Redes and Potts. 
8' Redesdale, Coquetdale and Nor th Tynedale had always presented a problem for the English k i n g ' ร 
authority as it was a l iberty where his wr i t d id not ա ո . B y 1536, the sheriff o f Northumberland had 
the power to serve royal warrants in the dales. However, the lack o f any sizeable sher i f fs retinue, 
and the mi l i tary power o f the surnames, was sufficient deterrent from doing so. 
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also demonstrate the local gentry's morb id fascinat ion w i t h their sul len neighbours. 
A s outsiders, bo th Bowes and EUerkar d id not venture into the dales themselves i n 
order to survey the peles and basties. Instead, they rel ied most l i ke ly upon the 
test imony o f the Nor thumbr ian gentry, most o f w h o m held negative v iews o f the 
riding fami l ies . The terms ' w i l d peoples' , Od ious of fenses' and ' f r o m ev i l to worse ' 
co loured Bowes survey o f 154!,^^ wh i l e the latter survey reported that Tynedale and 
Redesdale were ' n o w plenished w i t h w i l d and misdemeaned p e o p l e ' . S . G . E l l is 
notes that these observations ref lected the attitudes o f ' c i v i l society ' , wh i ch b lamed 
Borderers fo r the problems that plagued Northumberland.^"^ Instead o f seeing the 
lack o f e f fect ive po l i c i ng , Bowes saw on l y mora l decl ine. Th is att i tude was 
con f i rmed again. M o s t were probably i l l i terate, as B e m a r d G i l p i n had discovered i n 
the latter sixteenth century, when their adherence to the Cathol ic Church 
underscored their reputat ion as be ing backward and ignorant.^^ I ron ica l ly , many o f 
the of f icers w h o o f fe red such opin ions were themselves from fami l ies that had once 
also engaged in re i v ing and c r im ina l i t y i n earlier generations, either as Percy 
servants or as mi l i ta r ised tenants.^^ 
Some observers tended to have a more ins igh t f i i l v i ew o f their neighbours 
and cousins; roya l o f f icers who had been b o m and raised a long the border counties 
cou ld thus act as a m e d i u m through w h i c h the c r o w n communicated w i t h this al ien 
society. There was some reluctance amongst the Nor thumber land of f icers to do 
away w i t h reivers and their m i l i t a ry power , w h i c h was responsible for p rov id ing the 
I I PRO, SP 1/168, ff. 50-54. 
2 BL， Calig. В V I I I ff. 106-7. 
= S. G. El l is, Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) p. 59. 
85 G. Carleton, The Life of Bernard Gilpin, 1629. When Gi lp in arrived on the Borders, he found 
Чһеге was neither minister nor bell nor Book, there was red hand put on a spear point in defiance o f a 
deadly feud.' 
86 It was only in 1510 that the Ratcliffes became royal servants, when Sir Edward became the king's 
Lieutenant o f the Middle Marches, w i th a royal salary to boot. LP, 1(1), no. 380. 
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gentry w i t h their best soldiers since border t radi t ion kept the clansmen m i l i t a r i l y 
prepared. Sir Ra lph Eure showed more sympathy towards border surnames. H is 
correspondences w i t h Warden-General Lo rd Parr revealed a part icular predicament 
o f the recent ly paci f ied Tynedalers in 1543. Because they had been charged w i t h 
robberies before their pac i f ica t ion, yet not hav ing suf f ic ient moveable goods and 
cash for redress, they w o u l d have to resort once again to robbery and extor t ion i f 
they were compel led to make redress for their cr imes. Eure was i n the midst o f 
conduct ing m i l i t a r y operations against the Scott ish Borders, and he ran the risk o f 
a l ienat ing the largest poo l o f soldiers at his disposal. Ye t , i f Eure were to do 
no th ing , those Borderers w h o m the Tynedalers spoi led w o u l d say that the wardens 
favour thieves. 
The mi l i ta r ised and clannish fami l ies that inhabi ted the dales enjoyed a 
m o d i c u m o f independence from the c rown , w h i c h they mainta ined through their 
o w n m i l i t a r y power. The c la im that the Borderers never thought o f themselves as 
'any th ing but Eng l i shmen ' seems to lack weight.^^ A s late as 1583, i t was noted that 
the surnames were 'Scott ishe when they w i l l , and Engl ishe at theire p l e a s u r e ' . I n 
the same letter, i t was noted that the Robsons o f Tynedale and the Fenwicks o f 
Nor thumber land were at deadly feud w i t h their Liddesdale neighbours, the 
A rms t rong and E l l io ts , suggesting that at least the Nor thumber land surnames had 
l im i ted their allegiances to their Engl ish k i t h and k i n . Ye t , the dalesmen were al l too 
aware o f the power that they held. In opposi t ion to the ef for ts o f the government to 
b r i ng them into royal bondage, the border fami l ies o f Tynedale and Redesdale 
resisted pressure b y re l y ing instead upon the strongest grayne to guide the bands o f 
that sumame. I n the early sixteenth century, i t was c o m m o n fo r the most power fu l 
LP, X V I I I ( l ) , no. 580. 
' Robson, English Highland Clans, pp. 73-74. 
'СВР, I, no. 197. 
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fam i l y to rise to the top and dominate al l po l i t i ca l affairs i n the dales. The most 
power fu l i n the regions o f Tynedale and Redesdale were the Charl tons and the 
Hal ls , respectively. The Charl tons o f Hesleyside were the undisputed rulers o f the 
No r t h Tyne va l ley b y 1536, as far south as Chipchase where the Herons of ten 
courted them. It was we l l acknowledged that Edward Char l ton, the La i rd o f 
Hesleyside, was ch ie f o f the Tynedalers; his power in the area also gave h i m a large 
body o f armed fo l lowers, k n o w n to the Marchers as the Be l l i ngham, Shi t l ington and 
the B o w e r graynes o f the Char l ton sumame.'''^ John Ha l l o f O t te rbum, who h imse l f 
eventual ly became a royal servant, was the undisputed heidsmen along the R iver 
Rede; dur ing the Doncaster meetings o f 1536, he alone represented the surnames o f 
Redesdale.^' B y 1558, either he or his son acted as the Percys' deputy Keeper i n 
their nat ive dale, w h i c h suggests that his m i l i t a r y power stabi l ised his posi t ion as 
leading heidsman.^^ C lan leadership revo lved around the heidsman'ร ab i l i ty to 
promulgate border-sty le warfare, and to safeguard the practices thereof. A l t h o u g h 
many o f the dalesmen entered roya l service when they subscribed to the musters o f 
the late 1530'տ,^՝՛ this was a par t - t ime occupat ion, since the k i n g had l im i ted the 
numbers o f surnames i n the fu l l - t ime garrisons. For much o f the t ime, the surnames 
looked to the heads o f their f a m i l y to lead them against their enemies. 
Border clans acted i n defence o f their commun i t y rather than in the name o f 
a part icular chief, a l though the chiefs considered defence part o f their responsibi l i ty . 
Eure and Bowes bo th observed that the entire area w o u l d defend against true men 
seeking to retr ieve their stolen goods 'as i f i t were their c o m m o n matter.'*''* The 
9 ° B L , Calig V I I I в f. 106; ib id, Add . MSS 24965 f. 119; PRO SP 1/7 f. 281 ; ib id, 1/30 ff. 334-35; 
ib id, 1/31 f ľ l 2 3 . 
= PRO 1/111 ff. 235-240. 
I l CScotP, V I I I , no. 653. 
՚՛^ NRO, Z A N M. Ī3 /D . 15. 
リ4 PRO 1/168, ff. 19-54, Bowes'รนrvey of 154]. 
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m i l i t a r y софога ї іоп o f the surnames was a p rob lem on both sides o f the Borders, 
where any incurs ion was an issue 'nocht o f ane in ane, or few in few bot o f thame 
i l k ane and al , quha ar o f that fami l i e stock or t r ibe. ，95 Heidsmen coordinated 
defences for thei r k indred and tenants as they l i ved i n strongholds֊basties and 
towers, most ly ― t h a t were usual ly set in inaccessible locations.^^ These houses 
served as for t i f i ca t ion against seizure and prov ided k i t h , k i n and l ivestock w i t h 
securi ty from re iv ing enemies or roya l o f f ic ia ls . Since heavy ar t i l lery proved too 
cumbersome for the blanket bogs and thickets that b locked passages in to the T y n e 
and Rede dales, the ch ie f stronghouses remained unassailable b y siege weaponry 
thus increasing the prestige o f the clan. Hesleyside was a p r ime example o f the 
d i f f i cu l t y the border o f f i c ia ls had w i t h such strongholds. Th is made the recovery o f 
stolen goods w e l l n igh impossib le, and the on ly course o f act ion for honest men was 
to attend a day o f redress. The redress i tse l f became useless i f the part icular th ie f 
had not pa id any previous sureties, nor gave any m i n d to attend such redresses. 
Tynedalers and Redesdalers thus v iewed thef t as a legi t imate means o f acquis i t ion. 
A n y attempt for men to retr ieve stolen goods through force on l y incensed the fu ry 
o f the surnames. 
Because proper lordship had no place in the marches, hierarchical 
relat ionships between c lan or fam i l i a l leaders and their customary tenants filled the 
vo id . The m i l i t a r y organisat ion o f the surnames is unclear, but i t has been 
suggested that members o f a sumame owed services and dues to the heidsmen.^^ 
G iven the customary al legiance o f k insh ip that t yp i f i ed the dales, this is most 
9 5 John Hodgson, A History of Northumberland in Three Parts, 111(2) (Newcastle, 1820-25), pp. 233-
34. 
96 Ibid. This survey is printed in ful l in Hodgson's Northumberland. 
9 7 s.c. Dietr ich, 'Liberties and Lawlessness: Reiver society in Tynedale and Redesdale,* (Cornell 
University Ph.D., 1973) p. 36; H.c. Ramm, R.W. McDowal l , Eric Mercer, Shielings and Basties, 
(London: HMSO, 1970), pp. 70-71. 
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plausible, since this is how the heidsmen w o u l d have af forded to bu i l d their towers 
and basties. Th is ne twork w o u l d have fo rmed the basis o f the surnames' m i l i t a r y 
commun i t y , as the heidsmen w o u l d then act as Captain to al l w h o owed them 
services. Th is quasi-feudal approach bound men through both landho ld ing and 
b lood relat ionships; thus, the bands that fo lded into the musters o f Nor thumber land 
w o u l d have been incompat ib le w i t h the other bands, w h i c h were bound sole ly b y 
tenant- landlord relat ionships. It is un l i ke l y that the surname bands spl i t up and 
fo lded into the regular bands, unless they served either in garr ison or i n France.^^ It 
was general ly d i f f i cu l t to іпсофога Їе the dalesmen into the regular Eng l ish armies 
as they proved to be heav i l y specialised as l ight cavalry, and d i f f i cu l t to command 
when not under the thumb o f their heidsman. It was for this reason that they on l y 
went on expedi t ion w i t h men w h o were fami l ia r w i t h their modus operandi, usual ly 
their Keepers, or another experienced o f f i cer l i ke Bowes or El lerkar. 
The m i l i t a ry importance o f the heidsmen is w e l l demonstrated b y the 
lengths that the dalesmen w o u l d go to i n order to protect their leaders. W h e n Sir 
Reginald Camaby arrested several o f the heidsmen, namely Edward , John, and 
Renny Char l ton, fo r re fus ing to lay in their sureties, the entire horse and foot o f 
Tynedale assembled and demanded Camaby 'ร reasons for attaching the men.^'^ For 
the most part, this was a react ion against the perceived abduct ion o f one o f their 
most power fo l all ies and k insmen. Th is is very te l l ing o f the re ivers ' ab i l i t y to un i te 
around their leaders. The Tynedale men even of fered hostages for the release o f the 
Charl tons, but Camaby refused, stating that he w o u l d not consort w i t h men w h o had 
so t ra i torously risen against the k ing . Aga in , the importance o f the Char l ton 
9 8 B L , Add. MSS 32654 f. 98. Sir Ralph Eure was able to form two groups for the k ing's wars in 
France in 1544, where they were split into the rear guard and the main body o f the English army. 
During the operations at Boulogne, the Northern hcņ-se predominantly served under Sir Rafę Ellerkar, 
the Captain-General o f the king's Band o f Northern Horse unti l his death in action in Apr i l 1546. 
9 9 ¿p， X I I I (2 ) , no. 355. 
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heidsmen to their sumame becomes very dist inct ; the tenant reivers o f No r t h 
Tynedale were prepared to make sacrifices on beha l f o f their leaders. 
M embers o f a sumame d i d not always render their services b l i nd l y to their 
ch ie f heidsman. W h i l e fami l ia l ident i ty amongst the border clan was strong, there 
was the tendency to side w i t h immediate f a m i l y or one'ร grayne rather than w i t h the 
sumame, w h i c h spl i t the m i l i t a ry resources o f the dales and of ten t imes turned 
surnames against their o w n . A t t imes m ino r heidsmen w o u l d raise their k insmen i n 
order to pursue a feud w i t h other graynes o f the sumame. Such situations cou ld 
escalate into a m ino r c i v i l war since m inor chiefs sometimes pet i t ioned the c rown 
for support. Th is was a reciprocal relat ionship, as the c rown w o u l d of ten use 
surnames to pol ice the dales. Moreover , those border surnames that entered roya l 
service brought w i t h them a dist inct knowledge о f border warfare, wh i ch was a 
useful too l i n the wars against Scotland and against the untouchable clan heidsmen. 
This was the case i n 1537, when some Charl tons, inc lud ing T o m o f Carr i teth, 
Gerard o f Wark , and G y b o f the Bough th i l l , turned on their relatives when they 
opted to lay i n pledges w i t h the government and cooperate against the Pi lgr image 
rebels. In seeking the favour o f the government, the m ino r Char l ton chiefs agreed 
to help subdue the Hesleyside gang, as we l l as L i t t l e John Heron 's rebel comrades 
in the Tyne and Rede val leys. '0° It was a nice dist ract ion from their gu i l t fo r hav ing 
rebel led in 1536. Th is manoeuvre put them at odds w i t h the Hesleyside gang, w h o 
w i t h their Scott ish all ies from Liddesdale, wasted no t ime in spo i l ing T o m o f 
Carriteth'ร herds, as w e l l as those o f other Charl tons who had sided w i t h the Engl ish 
c r o w n . " " The Hal ls o f O t te rbum also contr ibuted a smal l band to the royal forces in 
1537, though they were powerless to stop their o w n sumame from ra id ing thei r 
B L , Calig. В I I I f. 239. 
PRO, SP 1/134 ff. 142-153; SP 1/118 ff. 235-6. 
294 
neighbours. ' "^ Du r i ng the same per iod, the M i l b u m ร o f Tynedale suffered s imi la r 
thefts by the hand o f Redesdale, w h i c h is s igni f icant since Tynedale and Redesdale 
usual ly let each other alone. 
At tempts from roya l of f icers in both dales to subdue the Hesleyside gang 
reaped retr ibut ion from Edward 'ร band as we l l as his Liddesdale and A rms t rong 
al l ies, p rompt ing his sub-chiefs to reconci le w i t h h i m . A l t hough a smal l force o f 
whitecoats f ina l l y chased Edward from his Hesleyside tower, Caraaby fa i led to 
secure Char l ton 'ร permanent ex i le . A f te r e ject ing h i m from Hesleyside, the b a i l i f f 
o f Hexham found no other w i l l i n g tenants amongst the Charl tons to reside i n N o r t h 
Tynedale, for fear o f p rovok ing a deadly feud w i t h their k i n d r e d . T h u s , Edward 
Char l ton was back i n N o r t h Tynedale w i t h i n a short amount o f t ime, hav ing 
retained his power so that he became the right hand man o f Heron when he became 
the Keeper in 1540.105 A l t hough Edward st i l l resented the Charl tons who had sided 
against h i m , his death i n 1541 smoothed over the enmit ies that had d iv ided the 
f a m i l y for over four years. 
Fu l l - t ime employment as a roya l o f f i c ia l was more popular i n the dales after 
1550, when it became clear that the royal assault on the o ld Libert ies was w e l l 
underway. Certain Charl tons remained loya l to the throne, and some were l isted as 
of f icers o f the watch in 1553, wh i l e others became commissioners o f enclosures i n 
the same year. '°* The Hal ls o f Ot te rbum in Redesdale were some o f the highest-
rank ing surnames on the royal pay ro l l , especial ly under El izabeth. Fractures began 
PRO E 36/173 f. 115. 
'03 PRO SP 1/118 ff. 54-8. ՝շ PRO SP 1/125 f. 13. 
'05 Robson, English Highland Clans, pp. 141-42. Robson has some trouble wi th his dates here. His 
evidence suggests that Charlton reoccupied the tower at Hesleyside in March 1537, some nine 
months before he was evicted. It is l ikely that Robson forgot to adjust for the Julian calendar dates, 
which would have listed the March o f 1538 as part o f the previous year. Regardless, it is not clear 
from Robson'ร evidence exactly when Charlton regained Hesleyside, but it is clear that he did so by 
the time o f Litt le John's return in December 1540. 
Nicholson, Leges, pp. 260-62 and 335. 
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to appear in some o f the clans, w i t h many leav ing the t radi t ional re iv ing l i festy le to 
serve as garr ison soldiers, "^^ and i n some cases, as of f icers. Such cracks i n the 
loyalt ies o f the dale fami l ies undermined any consol idat ion o f m i l i t a r y power , 
a l though the wo rk i ng relat ionship between Tynedale and Redesdale on the one 
hand, and Scott ish Liddesdale on the other, could always rev ive, as i t d id dur ing 
1541. The royal coffers cou ld not permanent ly replace the temptat ion to consol idate 
power, nor could i t overcome the tradit ions o f feud ing and clan warfare. It is key 
that the reiver considered his sold ier ly ident i ty as most important . Whatever the 
state o f affairs, the reiver cont inued to pursue his ro le as raider, guerr i l la and 
sometimes conniver. 
A t t imes, their presence on the field cou ld ensure v ic to ry ; the l igh t horse o f 
Cumber land was p r imar i l y responsible for the defeat o f the Scott ish a rmy at So lway 
Moss i n 1542. Yet , they cou ld also be a l iab i l i t y ; i n 1545, Sir Ra lph Eure and Sir 
Br ian Lay ton mistakenly led a force o f Border horse into an ambush at A n c r a m 
Moor . ' ° ^ The surnames i n the bands turned and fled in t ime to save themselves, 
leav ing the two knights and their immediate retainers to be slaughtered b y an 
ove rwhe lm ing Scott ish force. It is s igni f icant that at Hadd ing ton jus t three years 
after the defeat at A n c r u m the sumame bands d id the same to Sir Robert Bowes. 109 
This points to the d is junct ion between reiver practice and m i l i t a r y or thodoxy: 
Border raids organised b y roya l o f f i c ia ls such as Whar ton and Eure were meant to 
shed b lood . Raids made by the surnames were, for the most part, intent on amassing 
booty. In 1548, Whar ton requested that no more Borderers serve in Scot land, as 
they ' on l y look for p i l l age ' . ' 10 I n part, reivers were u n w i l l i n g to commi t to batt le i f 
'07 The numbers o f Tynedale and Redesdale men in garrison during the 1540'ร was o f concern to the 
crown, but after 1547, many served in the garrisons o f Scotland. See chapter f ive. 
：， For a fuller description o f this battle, see appendices. 
'w Hamilton Papers, 11， no. 452. 
CSP Scotland, I， no. 287. 
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they d i d not possess ove rwhe lm ing odds. I n general, their goal was not roya l 
v ic tory , but self-preservation, and i f they could manage i t , p tunder֊even i f i t meant 
stealing the Engl ish a rmy 'ร baggage trains, as they d id at F l o d d e n / ' ' Even when 
they received pay as regular soldiers, they of ten behaved as i f they were engaging i n 
clan warfare. 
It is indisputable that the surnames brought their o w n agenda to the bat t lef ie lds 
w i t h them, in spite o f their place in the roya l armies. Th is earned them some disdain 
from regular soldiers, one o f w h o m dur ing Protector Somerset 's admin is t rat ion 
described them as ' the refose o f men' . **^ The i r strict adherence to their conservat ive 
m i l i t a r y ideology and ident i ty was most l i ke l y responsible for their d imin ished ro le 
in the Engl ish m i l i t a r y e f for t i n Scot land. The i r behaviour on the bat t le f ie ld and 
their association w i t h the Scots Border clans ref lected their unwi l l ingness to 
abandon their o w n pragmatic needs, wh ich underscored the value o f k i t h and k i n 
amongst Border clans. Th is lef t l i t t le hope o f incorporat ing the surnames into the 
Engl ish m i l i t a ry organisations in any permanent manner. Instead, l i ke the gentry 
that had used them dur ing the rough woo ing , the surnames ident i f ied more w i t h the 
Nor thumber land m i l i t a ry commun i t y o f Ma r i an and El izabethan England, where 
leading heidsmen pol iced the dales as searchers and setters, or as deputy Keepers. 
However , their interests remained st r ic t ly focused on their o w n niche. M u c h l i ke the 
gentry, the external pressures o f cross-border v io lence combined w i t h an emphasis 
on fami l i a l ties to create a m i l i t a r y ident i ty b y w h i c h the surnames v iewed 
themselves as an іп Іеф05 Іп§ force between two power fu l m i l i t a r y states. 
' ' ' PRO SP 1/5 ff. 229 & 730. Bishop Ruthall o f Durham denounced the dalesmen as thieves despite 
the role they had տ securing English victory, and in saving Lord Edmund Howard from being 
annihilated. 
ււ շ Hamilion Papers, II， no. 459; BL， Add. MSS. 32657 f. 52. 
297 
Border L a w and M i l i t a r i s m 
The reformat ion and cod i f ica t ion o f March L a w was an attempt to strengthen 
the m i l i t a ry organisat ion o f the Marches. Because the Nor thumber land m i l i t a r y 
commun i t y had d iv ided into dist inct groups, there was a renewed ef for t under the 
m id -Tudor administrat ions to enforce Border service and l i m i t armed conf l i c t 
amongst the Nor thumbr ian Marchers. The Marcher government o f Edward V I 
began a thorough rev iew o f legal procedure and powers o f the Warden , w h i c h 
ref lected the ongo ing attempt to b r ing just ice in to the l ibert ies; this was the first 
attempt to re form M a r c h law in twenty years, and strict ordinances began to re l ieve 
the confusion that had hampered pr ior Marcher administrat ions. Border garrisons 
also came under harsher codes that re inforced d isc ip l ine, and a l though these s t r ic t ly 
speaking were not a part o f M a r c h law, they, too, echoed a concern fo r regulat ion. 
Truce breaking, fa i lure to f o l l o w the fray, and pract is ing w i t h Scots i n th iev ing and 
ra id ing, w h i c h were already M a r c h treasons, fo rmed the basis o f the new code and 
gave def in i t ion to infract ions that fe l l in to the morass between M a r c h law and 
c o m m o n law. Mos t o f these laws dealt w i t h border securi ty and keeping o f the 
wa tch a long the border, p roc la im ing harsh penalt ies for transgressions. Spec i f ica l ly 
targeted were Engl ish rebels and traitors who act ive ly wo rked or conspired w i t h 
others against Engl ish interests in Scotland and a long the frontier separating the t w o 
k ingdoms. W i t h i n this code, a l ist o f felonies label led 'border treasons' forbade any 
attempt to undermine royal author i ty w i t h i n the ju r isd ic t ions o f the M a r c h Wardens. 
C r im ina l i t y consequently received a renewed special treatment i n the Marches, w i t h 
harsher penal codes and a style o f m i l i t a ry government that sought to undermine al l 
quas i -mi l i tary act iv i ty that M a r c h law d id not sanction. B y enforc ing Border service 
and the cal l to the fray, M a r c h law on ly condoned bloodshed against c r imina ls , and 
i t set a level o f tolerable deadly v io lence. Unfor tunate ly for the M a r c h o f f i c ia ls , this 
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on l y encouraged the cul ture o f v io lence that ип0еф іппес1 the Nor thumbr ian m i l i t a r y 
commun i ty . Moreover , the Nor thumbr ians i n general had a meshed m i l i t a r y ident i ty 
fo rmed b y the internal factors o f k i t h and k insh ip , and the external factor o f the 
Franco-Scott ish threat; the two were т и Ш а І І у support ive. Feuding and internecine 
v io lence were inseparable from the m i l i t a r y capabi l i t ies o f the Marchers, and this 
great ly compl icated the enforcement o f M a r c h law. 
A l t hough March treasons speci f ica l ly attacked any direct attempt to 
confederate amongst the surnames, they also targeted the bonds that made such 
actions possible. Wardens had the power to enquire ' i f any Engl ishman have 
contrarie his dut ie o f allégeance entred into any un lawef i i l l assurance, rebel l ious 
promisse, cond i t ion , or bond w i t h any Scot tsman. ' ' '3 M o s t o f these associations 
resulted i n the breaking o f the peace, a p rob lem that had overwhe lmed the 
inef fectual Engl ish wardens o f the early 1540'ร. Th is led to the declarat ion o f such 
act ion as M a r c h treason, a l though it is l i ke l y that this was not done un t i l the re ign o f 
M a r y Queen o f Scots. ' ՚ 4 W i t h the creat ion o f this treason, any associat ion w i t h 
Scots, and the very act o f enter ing Scot land w i t h the in tent ion to conspire w i t h 
others, gave the k ing ' ร of f icers ample cause to arrest, detain and even execute any 
person who had upset the delicate truces that po l i t i ca l settlements t r ied to impose. 
Where March L a w fa i led to b r ing jus t ice against cross-border confederacies, 
c o m m o n law usual ly ob l iged since M a r c h law was too speci f ic i n its scope to award 
the Wardens sole legal author i ty , even in the Libert ies. W h e n John Heron was 
acquitted o f M a r c h treason after his arrest i n 1543, he was st i l l j a i l ed for rece iv ing 
stolen property and conspi r ing w i t h the thieves o f Tynedale to reset Eng l ish 
' ' 1 ^ e / / M S 5 , f f . 168-69. 
' ՚ 4 Bell MSS, f. 167.The clause specifically mentions the Queen o f Scots. Before this law, it was 
essentially up to the Scottish Wardens to see that bil ls were filed against all English truce-breakers, 
without which there would have been no grounds for arrest. 
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fug i t i ves . " ^ The lack o f any regular, i t inerant courts i n Nor thumber land meant that 
the administrat ion o f the king's just ice was spotty, so that when the men o f 
Nor thumber land found themselves despoi led b y thei r Tynedale and Redesdale 
compatr iots dur ing the embroi lments o f 1537-41, there was l i t t le that the Warden 
cou ld do since i t was technical ly a matter fo r the c o m m o n law courts. 
Even the enforcement o f both M a r c h law and common law was an 
inef fect ive means o f ca lm ing the Marcher h igh land clans, or deterr ing feuds 
amongst the rest o f Nor thumbr ian society. A c c o r d i n g to Su f fo l k , M a r c h law and 
c o m m o n law were mutua l l y exclusive so that the Warden was not a l lowed to t r y any 
common cr imes, inc lud ing manslaughter, unless the accused invo lved a Scots 
Border c lan i n the commiss ion o f their c r ime. ' '6 S t i l l , the Warden of ten found 
h imse l f inc luded in the Commiss ion o f Peace, or oyer et terminer.՝՝^ A f t e r the 
Hexham ja i lbreak, Bowes and EUerkar were part o f the oyer et terminer that was 
supposed to investigate the assault ."^ It was th rough this inc lus ion i n the c o m m o n 
law courts that Border of f icers t r ied Cuthbert Char l ton for a murder i n his nat ive 
d a l e . " ^ I t was also the eyre courts that sent L i t t l e John Heron o f Chipchase south to 
London i n 1537. ՛^ ՛ ՛ Robson holds these up as examples o f the e f f i cacy o f roya l 
law, ' ^ ' but in fact these tr ials were far fewer than the offences that had been 
commi t ted . Even when there was an arrest under either set o f laws, the burden o f 
p roo f was upon the accuser, who of ten fa i led to g ive witness for fear o f 
retr ibut ion. '^^ Offenders caught in the commiss ion o f the c r ime were o f ten executed 
BL , Add. MSS. 32651 f. 247. 
LP, X V I l I ( l ) , no. 964 (March 7, 1543). 
՛Լ LP, X V I I I ( l ) , no. 964 (March 7, 1543). 
՝l LP. X I I I (2 ) , no. 1101. (December 1538). 
PRO, SP 1/125 ff. 21-2 (Sept. 23, 1537). 
2: PRO SP 1/124 ff. 113-114 (August 27, 1537). 
-՝ Robson, Eng/ish Highland Clans, p. 159. 
2 2 See below concerning the Wardens' courts and the empanelling o f the juries. 
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summar i ly , w h i c h at t imes cou ld generate the deadly feud w i t h the f am i l y o f the 
just ice. ՚^ ՛^  The j u r y system was jus t as vulnerable. As ide f r o m unwi l l ingness 
amongst the surnames to test i fy against their fo rmer Keeper i n 1543, there was also 
the p rob lem that the j u r y assembled b y Su f f o l k was p la in l y i n favour o f acqui t t ing 
Heron s imp ly because o f his broad connections.'^"^ M a n y o f the j u r y s imp ly feared 
the m i l i t a r y power that w o u l d v is i t their propert ies upon conv ic t ion . 
Wardens ' courts were far f r om perfect, and thei r increased usage in the 
sixteenth century d i d l i t t le to stem the b lood feuds and the contempt fo r legal 
structure. First, the use o f ju r ies amongst those w h o pursued the deadly feud as an 
alternative to royal jus t ice was problemat ic . The fact that Tynedalers and 
Redesdalers were not dispossessed when the head o f the household was conv ic ted o f 
any c r ime w i t h i n or w i thou t the L iber ty meant that the deadly feud could be easi ly 
pursued against the members o f the j u r y . Th is was a p r ime concern i n 1543 when 
Suf fo lk was t r y i ng to administer jus t ice amongst the dales. P la int i f fs were 
u n w i l l i n g to show their faces i n court. A n y at tempt at a l l b y roya l o f f i c ia ls to 
enforce the law was seen as an invas ion o f border l i f e , as witnessed b y the murder o f 
hapless ' H o d g e ' à Fenwick i n 1537. Th is speaks o f a certain resentment towards the 
gent lemen o f the Marches, as each court was supposed to have a j u r y compr ised o f 
pr inc ipa l men and their tenants, w h i c h meant the segment o f society that was most 
adversely affected through Border ridings acted as judge , j u r y and executioner. 
A l t hough this put broken men at a dist inct disadvantage i n seeking a favourable 
outcome, the Wardens ' courts a l lowed just ice to be served i n an area that most o f 
England considered w i l d and w i thou t ru le, a l though i n many respects, the accused 
were already convic ted before the first inquest was he ld . Another prob lem was that 
：르 СВР, 11， no. 103, 374 and 881. 
՚ 2 4 BL , Add . MSS 32561 f. 269. 
՚ B L , Add. MSS 32651 f. 247 (August 2 1 , 1543). 
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the Wardens ' courts appeared at i r regular intervals; i t appears that the wardens 
preferred to direct most o f their attention towards days o f redress since these 
prov ided a stabi l is ing factor after cross-border raids had occurred. Moreover , i n the 
instabi l i ty o f the 1540'ร, Ma rch Wardens were probably more concerned w i t h the 
direct act ion o f open war fare and the pursui t o f Scott ish reivers and Engl ish rebels 
across the border than w i t h the h u m d r u m adminis t rat ion o f everyday just ice w i t h i n 
their o w n jur isd ic t ions. Border jus t ice and its out let, the Wardens ' courts, was 
l im i ted . 
Many northern of f icers v iewed a relentless admin is t rat ion o f just ice as the 
answer to the problems o f the Marches but some vo iced their certain misg iv ings 
about the ab i l i t y o f a single Wardens ' court i n each M a r c h to contro l lawlessness. 
Parr, for example, feared that Suf fo lk 's j ud i c ia l enthusiasm w o u l d on ly dr ive the 
Tynedalers in to the arms o f the Scott ish. '^^ Whar ton , o n the other hand, was w e l l 
k n o w n as a hanging j udge , pu t t ing pledges to death when the fami l ies they stood for 
reneged on thei r assurances o f good b e h a v i o u r . A s a complement to roya l jus t ice , 
raids and chevauchées in to Nor thumber land became commonplace dur ing the str i fe 
o f the 1540'ร and 1550'ร, when the government realised that the far No r t h when lef t 
to its o w n devices could develop its m i l i t a ry power independent ly from the c rown. 
The k i n g desperately desired to keep the borders under Eng l ish contro l . Cont inua l 
and sharp pol ic ies regarding the marches soon co loured royal act ion i n the nor th 
when ind iv idua l rebels and cr imina ls proved too w i l y to capture; the k i n g ' ร men 
w o u l d ruthlessly hunt d o w n their settlements and b u m their h o u s e s . I f an entire 
populat ion o f marchers had raised the i re o f the k i n g , their lands and crops became 
targets o f destruct ive chevauchées that lef t entire regions barren. In the end, these 
[ I I PRO, SP 1/178 f. 85 (May 24， !543). 
PRO, SP 1/179 f. 151 (June 1543). 
՚ 2 8 See chapter 4 for a wider discussion o f police actions. 
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were l im i ted in thei r success i n b r i ng ing offenders to jus t ice, ma in l y due to their 
ab i l i t y to sl ip over the border. N o po l ice ra id in to Tynedale was ever t ru ly 
successful i n ՅՄ6Տէ ւ ո§ men fo r the Wardens ' courts since there were ample escape 
routes in to Scot land, and w i t h them Scott ish lairds who were al l too w i l l i n g to 
resettle their Engl ish brethren. That the la i rd o f Hesleyside and his Char l ton 
relatives went unmolested b y the k ing 's of f icers was due to their sometimes 
residency in the shelter o f L iddesdale, w i t h the Armst rongs no less.'^^ Th is shelter 
prompted Bowes to order Heron into a ra id against Thor l ieshope, i n the ant ic ipat ion 
o f breaking up the cross-border ties o f Tynedale and Liddesdale. Even when such 
raids dropped on unsuspect ing customers, there was st i l l the task o f locat ing and 
assault ing the houses o f the ind iv idua ls in quest ion. Acco rd ing to Bowes' survey, 
these were al l p laced in strong, inaccessible locales,*"^' wh i l e L o r d Whar ton 
commented that the woods o f the dales ought to be fe l led so that the thieves w o u l d 
have no place to h ide, suggest ing that the Warden was s imp ly not power fu l enough 
to capture ch ie f o f f e n d e r s / W i t h such d i f f i cu l t ies , the arrest o f fugi t ives was nearly 
impossib le, despite the power o f the sher i f f and the Warden to make arrests w i t h i n 
and w i thou t the former L iber t ies. 
The keeping o f arrested suspects was even more d i f f i cu l t . The contempt w i t h 
wh i ch the men o f Nor thumber land treated the gaol-houses and their incumbent 
garrisons was not a matter for the Wardens ' courts since it was not considered March 
treason to interfere w i t h an ind iv idua l soldier (unless he was in the course o f 
pe r fo rm ing a hot t rod , or was act ing as the watch) ; neither was i t March treason to 
hamper the fiinction o f any o f the border garrisons, a l though i t cou ld be treated as a 
՚֊^  PRO, SP 1/117 ff. 181-82 and 1/123 ff. 214-15; ¿P, X I I (2 ) no. 291 (July 7, 1537). 
'-'^  BL， Add. MSS 32646 f. 270， (Dec. 2, 1541). 
'^' PRO SP 1/169 ff 19-54 (Bowes Survey of 1541). 
՚ 3 2 LP, X V I I I ( l ) no. 799 (This is listed as June 1543, although it could be dated up to two years 
earlier or later.) 
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fe lony. Yet , there was ample enough reason to fear for the securi ty o f the king's 
soldiers, as many were subjected to v io lence b y the surnames. The burn ing o f Tarset 
H a l l i n 1525 b y the dalesmen, the l iberat ion o f the prisoners inside, and the 
subsequent chasing o f the garr ison f r o m Tynedale, emphasized the dangers o f such 
posts. ՚^՝՛ A l t h o u g h there were no ambushes against gaol del iveries in this per iod, 
such actions were not unheard o f i n Nor thumber land. ՚^ ՛^  Th is puts into context the 
ja i lb reak at Hexham i n 1538, w h i c h , wh i l e underscor ing Carnaby's inept i tude, on l y 
contr ibuted i n a smal l w a y to a l ong h is tory o f j a i l breaking and escape i n the 
Marches o f Nor thumber land . Such assaults on the gaols were of ten done i n co l lus ion 
w i t h Scott ish al l ies; Tarset H a l l , Hexham, and the burn ing o f Ha l ton i n 1541 were al l 
done w i t h the help o f Liddesdale.^"^^ These indeed were M a r c h treasons due to the 
invo lvement o f the Scots surnames, a l though the Wardens were powerless to stop 
them. It is i ron ic that the m i l i t a r y and po l i c i ng infrastructures prov ided some o f the 
softest targets i n Nor thumber land , but w i thou t the power to t r y c o m m o n felons w i t h 
immed iacy , Wardens cou ld on l y wa i t and hope that apprehended felons w o u l d 
remain i n custody. Th is issue was never successful ly addressed, and as late as 1566, 
Redesdalers, led b y the Hal ls ( w h o were beg inn ing to come into their o w n power ) , 
attempted to break open the j a i l at Harbot t le , on ly to be fo i led by the guards. *՛^^ 
Border law o n l y received more scrut iny after the collapse o f the last Eng l ish 
garrisons i n Scot land i n 1550. The Nor thumbr ians w h o had served the Engl ish k i n g 
as whitecoats soon found their o l d ways again once they were dismissed from 
service, a stark contrast to the last years o f Henry V I I I , when the dalesmen "teetered 
'^^ LP, I V ( l ) n o . 1427 (June 17, 1525). 
՚^ ՛* In 1518, Lord Dacre lost several prisoners to an ambush at Rothbury by the men o f Redesdale, 
who also slew one o f his baronial officers. PRO SP 1/117 ff. 223-24; Robson, English Highland 
'^^ LP, I V ( l ) n a 1427 (June 17, 1525); PRO SP 1/140 ff. 77-8 (Dec. 11, 1538); B L Add. MSS 32646 
՚; 6 CSPF, (ed, 1871) no. 110 (Feb. 19， 1566). 
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on the edge o f respectabi l i ty." '^^ A f te r the resumpt ion o f the o ld borders after the 
Engl ish Pale had col lapsed, there were more opportuni t ies for the surnames to spoi l 
the honest inhabitants o f England and Scot land, so that b y 1551 their fo rmer 
commanders once again employed the pejorat ive terms that in the late 1530'ร had 
described thei r ' w i l d and misdemeaned' ways. '^^ The surnames' tendency to feud 
was a p r ime target o f the customary M a r c h Laws, w h i c h meant that i t was the duty 
o f the Warden to cur ta i l the war r ing and feud ing o f the surnames. The codes d rawn 
up b y Whar ton in 1552, when he served as deputy Warden-General under the Duke 
o f Nor thumber land , stated that any man who slew another from the opposite realm 
should be arrested and brought to a day o f redress w i t h the Scott ish Wardens / 
where they w o u l d receive their punishment. I t was M a r c h treason to conspire w i t h a 
Scot i n murder, burn ing , robb ing , rust l ing, and riot, w i t h i n the Engl ish Marches, and 
Whar ton added the penal ty o f death to these offences. ՚՛^ *^  O f most concern were the 
cross-border confederacies that def ied nat ional loyal t ies. Col laborat ion w i t h the 
Scots, and w i t h rebels and felons, especial ly du r ing t imes o f open conf l ic t , was a 
severe p rob lem for the c rown and its border of f icers. The mere existence o f 
proh ib i t ions d id not necessarily mean that they were obeyed or enforced; inf ract ions 
on l y increased when Wardens were occupied w i t h other business. R id ing w i t h or 
rece iv ing a Scot in to one's household wh i l s t i n the commiss ion o f a March cr ime 
was therefore one o f the M a r c h treasons that Wardens were eager to squash, usual ly 
b y execut ing ringleaders. Supp ly ing any Scot w i t h armour or ar t i l lery or horses 
earned the transgressor a death sentence as w e l l . Unl icensed t ryst ing w i t h the Scots, 
to the hurt o f the rea lm, was part o f Bel l 's code as w e l l , wh i ch was lef t in tent ional ly 
Robson, English Highland Clans, p. 199. 
：;: BL , Càlig. В V I I I f. 106 (Bowes Survey of 1551). 
՚ 3 9 Nicholson, Leges, pp. 56-71; Bell MSS, f. 62; Foedera, X V f. 265. 
"о Bell MSS, ff. 166-70. The power to try these crimes is listed by Bell as the main prerogative o f the 
Wardens Courts. 
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vague so that any cross-border confederacy could be treated as a March спте. ' ^ * ' 
Acco rd ing to the Pr i vy Counc i l , such trysts were the most common in f ract ion w i t h i n 
the Marches.'"^^ 
Part o f the p rob lem w i t h Nor thumber land was that its domestic securi ty was 
either decrepit or non-existent. Domest ic M a r c h law was designated to secure the 
front ier , and to p rov ide at least a nomina l posse comitatus fo r the watch and wa rd o f 
the front ier . The foremost p rob lem o f crimes re lat ing to defence were fa i lure to 
answer the cal l to a muster or a fray, and in ter fer ing i n the 'hot t r od ' , or pursuit o f 
reivers and thieves. The borders were expected to keep some degree o f m i l i t a r y 
preparedness, and any fa i lure to answer a muster amounted to an open door for al l 
reivers and fo re ign armi es. Before Whar ton addressed the prob lem, this part icular 
of fence of ten wen t unpunished. Dur ing the So lway Moss campaign o f 1542, some o f 
L o r d Dacre'ร tenants fa i led to respond to Whar ton 'ร muster. ^՚^^ Dacre h imse l f was 
soon accused o f not pe r fo rm ing his m i l i t a r y dut ies, as he should have. A l t h o u g h 
Dacre was never brought up on fo rma l charges, several letters from the k i n g 
expressed displeasure over such callousness. Dacre еуепШа І Іу pleaded ignorance 
and to soothe the k ing ' s anger, suppl ied h i m w i t h the names o f several traitors that 
the lo rd 's men had arrested. Desert ion from the Wardens ' rodes, too, shared a 
special place i n border l aw , w i t h a l l of fenders rece iv ing summary executions. In 
1542 and again i n 1545, Engl ish raids into the Scott ish m idd le marches met w i t h 
disaster when their escort ing border horsemen fled in the face o f the enemy/'*'* 
resul t ing in the deaths or captures o f many valuable royal of f icers and pensioners. O n 
both occasions, Hen ry V I I I personal ly ordered the capture and punishment o f al l w h o 
：으 Beil MSS, pp. 166-70. These crimes are listed by Bel l as the concerns o f the Wardens' Courts. 
՚ 4 2 APC, X X I I , p. 552. 
Ι Λ Χ ν ί Ι , no. 1119. 
1 ՜ ^ At Haddon Rig in 1542, the Redesdale men were the first to flee, while at Ancrum Moor in 1545 
the assured surnames under the Laird o f Bonjedward turned coat on their erstwhile English allies. 
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fled.^'*^ For a l l o f his e f for t , none o f the men who refused to attend thei r Wardens 
were brought up on charges as the penalty o f impr isonment was too d i f f i cu l t to 
enforce since ja i l b reak ing was commonplace. Whar ton sought to amend the p rob lem 
by adding the death penal ty to any fa i lure to respond to the fray, w h i c h made i t 
tantamount to m u t i n y / A l t h o u g h no records o f Wardens ' courts surv ive from 
Whar ton 's tenure as deputy Warden-General , there were no complaints from the 
gentry regarding the refusal to f o l l o w the fray. Whar ton ' ร measures seem to have 
had at least some ef fect , a l though the death penalty was later removed from this 
offence. '^^ 
M a r c h law re inforced Border service, and a l though there is no penal ty l is ted 
in Wharton 's code, i t was c o m m o n punishment for negl igent soldiers to compensate 
the bereaved. ՚՛*^ N igh t watches fe l l under this same code regarding border defence, 
w i t h s imi lar punishments o f fines and impr isonment at the off icer 's pleasure for non­
compl iance, a l though negl igent watches st i l l fe l l under the category o f M a r c h 
treason.'"*^ The law code specifies weaknesses throughout the Marches that were 
most susceptible to incursions, and ordered sentries to be posted at dark. M a n y o f the 
posts guarded fords across the Tyne , Coquet, Rede and Tweed rivers, as we l l as 
passes through the uplands o f the Pennineร and Cheviot . The most s igni f icant 
clause o f domest ic M a r c h law regarding the m i l i t a r y strength o f the f ront ier covered 
the keeping o f horse and harness. Whar ton required that every landlord should 
appoint suf f ic ient ground to each o f his tenants so that they cou ld a f fo rd horse, 
Had there been any trial over the actions o f the dalesmen, it would have been di f f icul t to 
successfully prosecute. The English after all had been caught off-guard, and there was no real 
precedent for executing soldiers who fled in a rout. A t best, it was a stretch for Henry to consider this 
a matter for the courts, Bowes, who divided his force while in hostile territory, committed the real 
mistake. 
" Nicholson, Leges, passim. 
Bel l MSS, ff. 180-82. 
Nicholson, Leges, ff. 143-47. 
For a fuller discussion o f this obligation and the placement o f the watches, see chapter five. 
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armour and weapons 'accord ing to the auncient use and custome o f the borders . ' ' ^ ' 
Despite the law, unfurnished men appeared at every muster. In the muster o f 1539, 
the heads o f each v i l lage were for the most part armed, yet the numbers o f i l l -
ftimished men were substantial, w i t h some vi l lages hav ing neither horse nor harness 
for any tenants, al though most o f these were i n areas that were not subject to constant 
raids, or feuding. '^^ 
The enforcement o f M a r c h law was problemat ic i n deal ing w i t h the 
unconstrained mi l i ta r i sm o f the Nor thumbr ians since the enforcement o f Border 
service, and the custom o f the hot t rod encouraged impu ls ive v io lence w i thout the 
guidance o f local m i l i t a ry author i ty. There were t imes when even garrisons became 
embro i led i n the same problems that plagued Nor thumber land society, so that 
m i l i t a r y l aw t r ied to al leviate the prob lem when March law proved inadequate. 
Of ten , there were cases that were d i f f i cu l t to classify. A n incident i n vo l v i ng the 
porter o f Be rw ick , L ione l Gray, cou ld have been tr ied as an of fence according to 
m i l i t a ry , c o m m o n and M a r c h laws. I n 1538, a rumour circulated Berw ick , suggesting 
that Gray had secretly o f fered the Scots entry in to Be rw ick in return for a substantial 
amount o f money. Gray a l legedly had plot ted to k i l l the tow๙ร of f icers , usher in the 
Scots and use the c i t y as a barga in ing ch ip to regain his lost lordship o f Brandford in 
the East Ma rch . Gray vehement ly denied the charges but was sent to Y o r k , and 
impr isoned wh i l e suf fer ing interrogat ion at the hands o f the Counc i l o f the Nor th . ^ ^՚^ 
The k i ng personal ly intervened in the matter, vouch ing personal ly for Gray's honesty, 
as Gray was one o f the k i ng ' ร Border pensioners. ՚^ ՛* The counci l cou ld not exact any 
confession from Gray, even after he was put to the quest ion, and suspicions 
Bell MSS, ñ. 180-82. 
- NRO, MSS ZAN D.25. 
[LP, XV I I I ( l ) no . 237. 
՚ LP, X V I I I ( l ) no. 277; BL, Calig. в ІІІ， ff. 203-205. 
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immedia te ly fe l l upon his accusers, who eventual ly confessed to fabr icat ing the story 
i n order to seek revenge upon Gray for a past s l i g h t . T h e matter was eventual ly 
settled as a common law v io la t ion , since there was no actual invo lvement o f Scots, 
and the c r ime d id not contravene any ex is t ing statutes that regulated the garr ison. 
Statutes in the border towns o f Be rw ick , Newcast le and Carl is le declared harsh 
penalties for entreating w i t h rebelร and Scots, wh i l e seriously h inder ing the ab i l i t y o f 
any Scott ish person to reside w i t h i n the Engl ish marches. In Carl is le, for example, no 
Scots resid ing in the c i ty were a l lowed to wander the streets after the watch had been 
set, wh i l e unl icensed Scots were immedia te ly impr isoned. '^^ In 1542, L o r d L is le 
proscr ibed a l ist o f ordinances for Be rw ick that inc luded strict regulat ions fo r al l 
soldiers i n the garr ison. '^ ' ' In theory, the Marsha l l dealt w i t h o f fend ing soldiers, but i t 
seems that at least i n Be rw i ck the Marsha l l courts shared power w i t h the courts o f the 
mayor, a l though the Warden migh t also intercede i n any part icular case i f the Pr i vy 
Counc i l ordered h i m to do so.^^^ In general, the garrisons remained d i f f i cu l t to 
contro l . The fact that the Berw ick garr ison had j o i ned the Heron-Carr feud 
demonstrated that even the c rown 's soldiers were l iable to embro i l themselves in the 
internecine v io lence o f the Marcher commun i t y . B y the end o f the Ang lo-Scot t i sh 
conf l ic t , i t was reported that the soldiers o f Be rw i ck were da i ly i nvo lved i n feuds and 
disputes, so that the Captain reported 'some seyvere punishment b y losy ing a hand or 
a member muste be used for the terror o f those wh iche nowe day lye desythe and 
otherweys o f fend th'offycers' . '^*^ It was also reported that bands o f soldiers had also 
1 5 5 LP, X V I I I ( l ) no 432 (3). The two conspirators were charged wi th the common felony o f sedition 
and sent to the pi l lory to have their ears cropped, a gruesome example o f the efficacy o f the common 
law courts in York and Berwick, 
" 6 CRO， C A 2/17, Carlisle City Domont Book. 
LP, X V I I , no. 343(1). 
1 5 ° Tough, Frontier, p. 164. 
՚ 5 9 PRO, SP 59/3/32. 
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roamed the Nor thumber land countryside, o f ten tak ing the oppor tun i ty to despoi l their 
rivals even when they wore the un i fo rm o f the k i ng ' ร bands. ՚^ ՛^  
The law codes that existed in the Marches were inadequate i n que l l ing the 
feuding and v io lence o f the Marchers. O n the one hand, the c rown encouraged the 
m i l i t a ry commun i t y to take an active part against the Scots, encouraging ' t hem o f 
T inda i l l and Ridd isdai l fo r th 'annoyance o f Scotland一God sende them al l good 
spede!，'6' Ye t , when the Marchers feuded w i t h each other, the c rown reacted w i t h 
surprise, as i f i t were out o f character. B y at tempt ing to inst i l law and order i n the 
Marches, the Wardens were charged w i t h an impossib le task. The Nor thumber land 
fami l ies were ent i re ly w i l l i n g to forget their allegiances i n order to pursue their o w n 
interests, and they of ten d id this b y means o f v io lence, so that their m i l i t a r i sm that 
was used against the Scots soon turned inwards. The m i l i t a r y commun i t y o f 
Nor thumber land was a paradox. A l t hough the t w o k ingdoms o f Scot land and 
England were i n theory un i f ied w i t h the accession o f James I i n 1603, feud ing and 
c r im ina l i t y remained a prob lem we l l into the seventeenth century. '^^ Border l aw, 
though, eventual ly faded away as the counties o f Nor thumber land, Cumber land and 
Westmore land, plus the uplands o f the Palatinate became " m i d d l e count ies" , los ing 
their status as a frontier. There was no perfect so lut ion to the northern p rob lem; 
endemic v io lence and instabi l i ty ensured this. 
M i l i t a r i sm manifested i tse l f i n t w o dist inct ways i n Nor thumbr ian society. 
The gentry 's ro le i n the defence o f the Marches re inforced their almost inst inct ive 
ne twork ing that prov ided m i l i t a ry power. The m i l i t a r y ro le that the gentry p layed 
PRO, SP 59/3/33. 
՚ 6 ՛ Edward Charlton, Memorials of North Tynedale and Its Four Surnames, (J.M. Carr: Newcastle, 
1871), pp. 38-9. 
PRO, SP 14/9A(1604). 
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depended upon this ne twork o f f a m i l y and tenants. However , this also made the 
m i l i t a r y commun i t y vulnerable to feuds and v io lence. The surnames, on the other 
hand, were mi l i tar ised out o f need for surv iva l . A f t e r 1536, this became a means o f 
support for the clans w h o were w i l l i n g to turn on their heidsmen and prov ide an 
act ive po l i c ing force. A f t e r the гішаї o f rec id iv ism and pardons played i tse l f out b y 
1541, the ma jo r i t y o f the clans found that their feud ing tendencies had been 
redirected towards Scot land by the c rown. A t the same t ime, the clans soon found 
that they had been outclassed o n the batt lef ie ld. Comb ined w i t h the feud w i t h 
Liddesdale that erupted after 1541 , the dales clans became bogged down b y their 
pover ty and their innately conservative brand o f m i l i t a r i sm. 
M a r c h law attempted to at least reduce the local m i l i t a r y power o f the 
Nor thumbr ians dur ing Dud ley ' s administrat ion. A t the same t ime, i t t r ied to amend 
the weaknesses that m i l i t a r i sm introduced into Nor thumbr ian society. I t spec i f ica l ly 
attacked the surnames' tendency to re ly on cross-border ties. I t also addressed 
internal security by at tempt ing to stem the Nor thumbr ians ' id iosyncrat ic feud ing, so 
that the gentry and their tenants also found themselves targeted b y Warden 'ร courts. 
guarantee the safety o f p la in t i f fs and witnesses. 
Mos t o f a l l , the power fu l connections o f k i t h and k i n w h i c h prov ided the 
foundat ion for m i l i t a r y power proved too power fu l for March law to w o r k 
ef fect ively. The Ford Castle dispute and the Heron-Camaby feud were hal lmarks o f 
m i l i t a r i l y power f t i l Border fami l ies. The Wardens s imp ly d id not have the m i l i t a r y 
resources to put an end to this type o f internecine feud ing, except dur ing the first 
h a l f o f the 1540'ร, when troop concentrations skyrocketed in Nor thumber land. 
V io lence and m i l i t a r i sm cont inued to act as a s tumbl ing b lock for Tudor author i ty , 
311 
and the attempt to harness the Marchers ' aggression for the wars against Scot land 
on ly made matters worse for the Nor thumbr ians i n the 1550'ร. 
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Chapter 8: Շ օ ո շ է ս տ յ օ ռ 
The Tudor responses to the Border conf l ic ts o f 1542-60 demonstrate the 
l imi ta t ions under w h i c h the Engl ish operated. The wars themselves were no th ing 
but a series o f destruct ive raids o f va ry ing sizes, punctuated from t ime to t ime b y 
either a major batt le or s imi lar catastrophe. Yet the Tudors were unable to secure 
the border. The conf l ic t lasted fo r near ly twenty years longer i f w e count the years o f 
covert war fare that preceded the escalat ion, and Nor thumber land absorbed most o f 
the b lows that Scotland del ivered. The wars o f Henry and Somerset had taxed the 
Nor thumbr ians so that they were incapable o f ef fect ive m i l i t a r y act ion after 1550. 
Poverty and inef fect ive leadership undermined border tenure. M a n y o f the gentry 
were lef t open to depredat ion because their tenants could not a f fo rd to arm 
themselves, w h i l e others ftinnelled m i l i t a ry resources into pr ivate feuds. In the 
absence o f cash, many c o m m o n Marchers resorted once again to theft , usual ly from 
their neighbours. 
The po l i t i ca l ambit ions o f Henry V I I I and Protector Somerset prov ided a 
possible avenue for m i l i t a r y re fo rm i n the Borders. The war w i t h Scot land had lef t 
open the chance for an overhaul o f their f ront ier defences. For a moment , i t 
appeared as i f the Marchers m igh t t ransform themselves into m o d e m soldiers wh i l e 
serving i n the Tudor armies, but especial ly i n the garrisons. The plan suffered from 
logist ical f laws. Marchers deserted the garrisons since both f requency o f pay and 
l i v i n g condi t ions were less than desirable. I n addi t ion, Nor thern cavalry were 
wasted i n an arena that required trained gunners, and there were no prov is ions made 
for t ra in ing the l igh t Border horse to use f i rearms. Tudor governments squandered 
their chances to re fo rm Nor thumber land 'ร m i l i t a r y inst i tut ions. Instead, the 
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Nor thumber land mi l i t a ry commun i t y was dangerously di lapidated by the end o f the 
wars. 
The fighting that occurred dur ing the ' rough w o o i n g ' per iod o f the conf l i c t 
(1542-51) also depleted the m i l i t a ry power o f the dalesmen. I ron ica l ly , their service 
to the k i n g resulted in a serious setback whereas i t should have prov ided an 
advantage. The Engl ish troops defeated at н addon R igg , A n c r u m and Mi l ls tanes 
were predominant ly Border horse, the ma jo r i t y o f them from No r th Tynedale, 
Redesdale and Bewcast le. Further casualties were suffered at the hands o f the 
El l io ts , N i xons and Croziers o f L iddesdale, who never forgave the Robsons and the 
Charl tons for tu rn ing coat in 1541. The surnames never were the same after the 
heavy f i gh t ing , w h i c h incurred heavy casualties. A l t hough they were able to field a 
smal l body o f l igh t caval ry for the Nor thern Earls i n 1569,' thei r numbers were 
nowhere near the 2,000 that they could raise i n 1541. B y 1597, Lo rd Eure 
commented that Tynedale could not muster even six able horsemen, w h i l e t w o -
thirds o f Redesdale could not a f ford the most basic weapons. 2 They were s t i l l 
capable o f f o i l i ng the plans o f their governors, as they d id when they broke the j a i l 
at Harbot t le in 1566 and 1567，3 so deplet ion that resulted from the wars d id not cure 
the problemat ic c r im ina l i t y in the dales. 
The ma in weakness in the Tudor s' m i l i t a ry schemes was the constant 
seesawing regard ing the employment o f Marchers. A s seen i n chapter three, myop ic 
pol ic ies ignored the f inancia l needs o f the Nor thumber land borders. T h e duke o f 
Nor thumber land 's adminis t rat ion was determined to recoup the financial losses 
incurred b y the collapse o f the garrisons, and the Nor thumbr ians were the first to 
feel the p inch. In the reign o f Queen M a r y , K i n g Ph i l ip o f Spain'ร conf l i c t w i t h the 
' Sadler Papers, pp. 38-55; Archaeologia Aeliana, vo l . 3, p. 366. 
3 CSPF, (ed. 1871), no 110; CSPF{Q± 1871)no.917. 
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the war ef for t on the continent. Once again, Nor thumber land defences p layed a 
secondary ro le to other m i l i t a ry ambi t ions. I n a b i d to cut m i l i t a r y expend i toeร 
a long the border, the garrisons o f Nor thumber land were empt ied o f Marchers, 
leav ing most to twis t i n the w i n d . Th is was coupled w i t h the resumpt ion o f Border 
service, w h i c h ensured the Marchers received no pay for their services. For the rest 
o f the cenณry, Border service remained a nebulous concept that frustrated those w h o 
were ob l iged to serve, as we l l as those w h o supposedly led էհ շա . ՛ * 
The disappearance o f m i l i t a r y service fo r the Nor thumber land Marchers and 
Border clans prompted the Tudor governments to come foil c i rc le i n their pol ic ies 
regarding internal security. The lack o f pay forced many Marchers back to their 
former roles as raiders, or as v ic t ims o f br igandage. W i t hou t income, the 
impover ished tenants o f No r t h Tynedale and Redesdale resorted to p rey ing upon 
their neighbours, a l though not to the extent that the region had witnessed jus t after 
the Pi lgr image o f Grace. S t i l l , b y 1558, M a r y Tudo r ' ร administ rat ion was again 
author iz ing pun i t i ve raids against the dales i n l ieu o f royal just ice, jus t as her father 
had done i n 1537-38.^ Instead o f re fo rm ing the re i v ing clans, as Henry had desired 
to do, the Tudors general ly used them as fodder i n their m i l i t a r y ambi t ions and then 
lef t the decaying remnants o f the No r t h Tynedale and Redesdale surnames to their 
o w n devices after the conf l ic t . Even the Char l tons o f Tynedale and Hal ls o f 
Redesdale suf fered, despite be ing the on ly reiver clans to register at least some 
success b y ga in ing posit ions i n the established m i l i t a r y commun i t y before the end o f 
4 P.G. Boscher, 'Polit ics, Administrat ion and Diplomacy: The Anglo^Scots Border, 1550-60/ 
Durham University Ph.D., 1985. See appendices I and I I on mi l i tary obligation. 
5BL, H a r l M S S 6 4 3 f. 3 1 2 B . 
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the wars.^ The attempted re format ion o f the surnames was hard ly a measure o f 
success for Tudor state bu i l d i ng ; b y the end o f the century al l were i n desperate need 
o f protect ion from the Scots o f Liddesdale and Teviotdale.^ 
B y 1560， there remained the quest ion whether Marchers were counted as 
professional soldiers, a l though their performance as l ight cavalry m igh t remove any 
doubt o f their professional capabil i t ies. The i r exc lus ion f r o m the garrisons may 
have been a matter o f expediency for Tudor f inances, or at least, i t was a means o f 
keeping the Border cavalry stationed at their homesteads i n the dales, w h i c h were 
most prone to Scott ish raids. Nevertheless, this re inforced thei r ambivalent , semi -
mobi l i sed status, a l though the government a lways insisted that their staณร as Border 
tenants imp l ied extraordinary m i l i t a r y responsibi l i t ies. Other than this insistence, 
the government was not fo r thcoming enough w i t h a scheme to enforce m i l i t a r y 
ob l igat ion. W i thou t firm and consistent po l i cy , the Nor thumber land March soldiers 
could hope for no th ing better than treatment as either specialist or i r regular t roops, 
and even then on l y in emergencies. Even then, they st i l l required money for armour. 
Some o f the Nor thumber land fami l ies who were act ive Borderers jus t after 
the Pi lgr image o f Grace managed to survive the wars and main ta in their rank ing. 
The Eures, despite their reputat ion as parvenus, retained their substantial roles as 
m i l i t a ry leaders and governors. The Herons also retained their power i n Tynedale, 
i n teφos ing between the k i ng and the rougher border fami l ies. Part o f this resulted 
from the dynamics o f leadership: character, connect ions and charisma have always 
been integral factors o f m i l i t a ry leadership. A m b i t i o n and cour t ly connections, l i ke 
6 CSPF (ed. 1869)， no. 602 (5). The Halls o f Otterbum were deputies o f the Redesdale Keeper by 
1560; they often consorted wi th their governor, Sir John Forster, in relieving the Scots o f cattle and 
sheep, much as they did during the raid described in this particular document. Halls o f Otterbum 
were also setters o f the watch, and for a time being, they were also Border pensioners under Henry 
V I I I . The Charltons, as relatives o f the Herons, were able to tie their fortimes to Chipchase. 
7 СВР, vol . Լ no. 162. The Scots Borderers enjoyed a much more prosperous economy beginning in 
the middle sixteenth century, mainly due to the mixed farming that survived the ravages o f the wars. 
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those that favoured Bowes i n the 1540'ร and Whar ton and dur ing the 1550'ร, were 
more v iab le i n securing m i l i t a r y of f ices than s imp ly be ing a Marcher or a border 
pensioner. That Bowes was able to lead men again even after the disaster at Haddon 
R i g demonstrates that the c rown appreciated his ta lents֊most ly as a lawyer for the 
cour t֊despi te his shortcomings as a m i l i t a r y leader. Pol i t ica l surv ivors w h o had 
other obvious talents to o f fer the c rown cou ld a f fo rd a m i l i t a r y b lunder and as such. 
Marchers who on ly knew sold ier ing d id not a lways rise to the top when it came to 
m i l i t a r y leadership. 
Y e t even before the wars had ended, many o f the Nor thumbr ian fami l ies lost 
their m i l i t a r y importance. M a n y o f the gentry disappeared f r o m the m i l i t a r y 
commun i t y dur ing the last phase o f the wars. M o s t notable were the Ratel i f fes and 
the Camabyร, w h o b y coincidence had suppl ied some o f the least talented m i l i t a r y 
leaders. Sir Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe poisoned his m i l i t a r y career at Haddon R i g g , as his 
command was the first to flee the field. Ratc l i f fe was never a l lowed another 
pos i t ion that entai led combat leadership; instead, he was shuf f led o f f to Be rw i ck 
under the watch fu l eye o f Sir W i l l i a m Eure, where he enjoyed a sinecure un t i l his 
death. 8 I t is no surprise that Ratc l i f fe lost h is Wardenry to Sir Ralph Eure, a l though 
any b lame for the defeat should have been p inned upon Sir Robert Bowes. M a n y 
Marchers were un f i t to lead. The numerous compla ints that the Duke o f N o r f o l k 
lodged against Sir John W idd r i ng ton and Sir Reyno ld Camaby demonstrate that 
residence i n the Marches d id not necessari ly translate to m i l i t a ry sk i l l .^ A l t hough 
these fami l ies eventual ly regained thei r standing i n Nor thumber land society, the 
m i l i t a r y incompetence o f their predecessors kept them from achiev ing leading roles 
i n the m i l i t a r y communi ty . 
Able to afford better weapons and equipment, the Scots were soon able to run roughshod over their 
impoverished English rivals. 
8 LP, X I X ( l ) no. 79 (item 51). 
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Other fami l ies , such as the Greys o f Ch i l l i ngham and the Delavals o f 
Coquetdale, s imp ly stagnated. Instead, the c rown looked to the gent lemen o f 
Durham and N o r t h Yorksh i re to act as M a r c h of f icers . F rom 1548-60, on l y two o f 
the f i f teen Wardens appointed to the East M a r c h were from Nor thumber land. ՚*^  In 
the same per iod, four o f the fourteen Wardens o f the M i d d l e March were from 
Nor thumber land. The rest were either seasoned soldiers l i ke Sir Robert Bowes and 
Thomas L o r d Whar ton , or inexperienced fai lures such as the Marqu is o f Dorset. 
Pol i t ic ians and lawyers displaced the Nor thumbr ian gentry from the lead ing of f ices, 
leaving them to p lay m ino r roles as deputies and sergeants. 
The Ang lo-Scot t i sh f ront ier was not immune to the ripples in the court , and 
as such, i t was subjected to the same po l i t i ca l w rang l i ng witnessed b y five separate 
administrat ions i n eleven years. Most M a r c h of f icers whose appointments were a 
matter o f po l i t i ca l expediency were incompetent m i l i t a r y leaders and incapable o f 
po l i c ing the Marches. Lo rd Conyerร, w h o received his o f f i ce as a Cathol ic adherent 
to M a r y ' ร re ign, was v i r tua l l y inef fect ive i n cont ro l l ing the dales since he was 
ordered to consult the government in al l matters, a sign that the government d id not 
necessarily have utmost fa i th in its recent appointee. 1 ' Lo rd Whar ton compla ined 
great ly o f Conyerร ' inab i l i t y to contro l his j u r i sd ic t i on throughout his tenure. '^ 
W h e n the Percys were able to regain the t w o Nor thumber land Wardenships after 
M a r y restored them to power in 1557, the Ear l p roved disastrously un f i t to lead. H is 
Cathol ic colleagues, the Earl o f Westmoreland and Lo rd Dacre, were supporters o f 
M a r y ' ร pol ic ies. Bo th Earls fa i led as M a r c h leaders. Leaders appointed sole ly on 
their po l i t i ca l connections had no real support i f they were not able to act e f fec t i ve ly 
See chapter 6 for a description o f their mil i tary inadequacies. 
'0 These were Ralph Grey o f Chil l ingham (November 1552 - December 1553) and Thomas Percy, 
Earl o f Northumberland (August 1557 一 October 1559). See CPĶ Edward VI, vol . 4， no. 258, and 
Foedera, vo l . 15, ff. 468-77. 
" л/^с, I I I , p. 443. 
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and independently. Pol i t ica l appointments to m i l i t a ry of f ices thus fostered an 
atmosphere o f incompetence when i t came to matters o f securi ty and defence. Th is 
g lar ing lack o f professional m i l i t a ry l e a お in the Marches o n l y underscored the 
fact that the Tudors had fa i led to re fo rm many Eng l ish m i l i t a r y inst i tut ions w i t h any 
effectiveness. M o r e impor tant ly , the pol i t ic isat ion o f March of f ices showed that they 
were st i l l awkward extensions o f the c rown , neither f u l l y developed as proper 
m i l i t a ry inst i tut ions nor reward ing enough to guarantee the f u l l m i l i t a r y support o f 
the Marchers. 
The wars h igh l ighted the central government 's inef fect ive cont ro l over 
Marcher af fairs, even though major campaigns always inc luded the consul tat ion o f 
the Pr ivy Counc i l and the c rown. W h e n Lieutenants and Wardens-General began to 
direct the war e f fo r t , the Tudor government appeared almost powerless to contr ibute 
any real strategy. A l t hough the c rown and the Pr i vy Counc i l ostensibly cont ro l led 
the March of f icers , there was re lat ive ly l i t t le that the government could do from 300 
mi les away. Thus , the specif ic i t ies o f Her t fo rd 'ร b r i l l i an t amphib ious operations i n 
1544 and 1545 were hard ly construed by the P r i vy Counc i l . I f the Counc i l 
interfered, i t usual ly hampered the war ef for t . The court-ordered raids at н addon 
R igg and A n c r u m M o o r both ended i n disaster when the M a r c h leaders proceeded 
w i thout the invo lvement o f the Marcher h igh command. W h e n M a r y ' ร government 
interfered w i t h Shrewsbury 'ร preparations i n 1557, the result was a f iasco, wh i ch 
ended up cost ing the Engl ish the chance to invade Scot land. The awkwardness 
imposed b y London 's distance f r om the Borders demonstrated that at least some 
devolved author i ty was required i f the government wanted ef fect ive leadership. 
Ef fec t ive March leaders were either capable, almost savage m i l i t a r y leaders, 
or d ip lomat ic enough to deal w i t h the clannish fami l ies o f Nor thumber land. The 
' ^Talbot M S S C f f . 111-113, 145֊4^ 
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Eures and the Herons were experienced enough to lead the Marchers i n the 
campaigns o f 1542-45. Sir Ra lph Sadler, on the other hand, was not su f f ic ien t ly 
conn iv ing to contend w i t h Tynedale and Redesdale i n 1559. H i s successor, Sir John 
Forster, was adroi t enough to remain Warden for over th i r ty years, a l though a choi r 
o f doubters i n the Counc i l constantly cr i t ic ised h i m , inc lud ing Sadler.'^ Ruthless 
m i l i t a ry leaders in the Marches were always prepared to do the worst ; Forster d id 
when he betrayed John Ha l l o f O t te rbum to the E l l io ts for a cool £1000 i n order to 
undermine Ot te rbum's m i l i t a r y p o w e r . " W a r d id not change the requirements o f 
March leadership. I f anyth ing, the instabi l i ty that the wars brought to 
Nor thumber land required M a r c h o f f i c ia ls to be as v ig i lan t as they were i n the 
months jus t after the Pi lgr image. 
The ro le that k i t h and k i n p layed in the m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i t y was unaf fected 
b y the war ef for t . B l ood ties t rumped roya l author i ty , w h i c h made the surnames 
more power fu l than any other commun i t y i n Nor thumber land , though their pover ty 
by the midd le o f the sixteenth century meant that they required access to weal th in 
order to mainta in their m i l i t a ry capabi l i t ies. The clan structure and the dues g iven to 
the heidsmen staved o f f dec imat ion, at least un t i l 1580， when on ly 134 m e n 
mustered for N o r t h Tynedale, w i t h many bear ing decrepit equipment and arms. '^ 
Other fami l ies o f Nor thumber land cont inued to en joy the m i l i t a r y strength that 
numbers and f am i l y connections prov ided. The Herons were able to exert their 
inf luence as of f icers in the Marches since they had k i n in bo th the East and M i d d l e 
Marches. That the Herons o f Chipchase were related to the Char l tons o f N o r t h 
Tynedale foreshadowed v io lence when they cal led to their extended fam i l y fo r 
m i l i t a ry assistance. The с arrs enjoyed some a f f in i t y , as they received the support o f 
13 Maureen Meik le, ' A Godly Rogue: The Career o f Sir John Forster, an Elizabethan Border 
Warden', Northern History 29 (1992), p. 128. 
CScotP, V I I I , no. 351. 
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the ColUngwoods dur ing the Ford castle dispute i n 1557, though they were not as 
w e l l connected in mi l i ta ry of f ices as the Herons were. The v io lence brought on b y 
f am i l y feuds was something that El izabeth 's just ices and M a r c h o f f i c ia ls had no real 
power to cont ro l , a remarkable cont inuat ion o f the status quo despite the best ef for ts 
o f the government. The v io lence that erupted between the Herons and the с arrs was 
w e l l beyond the contro l o f the Warden, as the parties were summoned to court to air 
their grievances, and even this had no staying power i n the conf l ic t . 
A l t hough the Wardens had the power to ho ld court , the speci f ic nature o f 
M a r c h law prevented Wardens from act ive ly in tervening i n feuds, as most were 
matters fo r either the Star Chamber, or the Counc i l o f the N o r t h . Some o f f i c ia ls 
were even invo lved i n the feud ing, and used their posi t ion to placate bo th c rown and 
Counc i l , wh i l e conspi r ing w i t h thei r k i t h and k i n to undermine the i r rivals.'^ A s 
fami l ies patrol led their distr icts wh i l s t heav i l y armed, there were t imes when 
Nor thumber land seemed on the verge o f c i v i l war , especial ly du r ing the Ford Castle 
dispute. I ron ica l ly , i t was on ly dur ing t imes o f wa r that the m i l i t a r y commun i t y was 
able to uni te in a c o m m o n cause since war seemed to be the on l y element that cou ld 
make the Marchers forget their grudges w i t h their neighbours. Under Henry V I I I 
and Somerset, feuds decl ined since the Nor thumbr ians were occupied w i t h the wars. 
Feuding blossomed i n the 1550'ร, at the t ime most young Marchers were sent home 
from the wars, a l though since many were m i l i t a r i l y depleted, thei r destructiveness 
nowhere equal led that o f the earl ier years. 
The few Nor thumber land soldiers who part ic ipated in the disastrous siege at 
Le i th i n 1560 were the last from their county to fight against the Scots in a fo rma l 
war. S t i l l , even after the end o f the wars, the Marches cont inued to func t ion as 
СВР, I, no. 50. 
I 6 The Herons and the Forsters were especially adept at this. 
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m i l i t a ry distr icts un t i l the un i f i ca t ion o f England and Scotland rendered the 
mi l i tar ised front ier meaningless. Th is a l lowed the m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i t y to surv ive, 
al though b y 1580 it was seen as both decayed and o f l i t t le use to the government i n 
main ta in ing the defence o f the Borders. Moreover , there was st i l l the same prob lem 
o f i ncoφo ra t i ng the March defences into an overarching nat ional m i l i t a r y 
organisat ion. Overa l l , Nor thumbr ians remained marked ly resistant to the new style 
o f warfare that had blossomed on the cont inent. Gunpowder weapons began to 
appear sporadical ly in the musters, but remained a rar i ty even as late as 1595. '^ The 
Scots, on the other hand, were increasingly l i ke l y to use f i rearms i n Border disputes 
after 1560. In 1611, a group o f Armst rongs and El l io ts dropped on some 
unsuspecting Robsons at Leapl ish in N o r t h Tynedale, and used their cavalry pistols 
to good effect i n wound ing or k i l l i n g near ly a l l o f the heidsmen who were present.*^ 
The Robsons were defenceless against such tactics, despite the seeming safety o f 
their bastle house. 
War brought l i t t le change to Nor thumber land 'ร m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i t y i n terms 
o f organisat ion. The overal l approach to warfare remained the same, as the terrain 
and the economic c l imate constrained the Marcher to the use o f nags and l ighter 
weaponry. The dalesmen w h o embarked to I re land i n the in i t ia l years o f James I 
were perfect for the I r ish marches and fighting against the keme, a l though they 
w o u l d have been out o f place anywhere else.*^ The more ordered Eng l ish regiments 
that witnessed action in the L o w Countr ies in the later sixteenth century were far 
more organised than the Band o f Nor thern Horsemen who had served at Boulogne. 
The appearance o f sergeants and colonels under the regimental system was a new 
СВР, I I , no. 168. 
IS Ralph Robson, The Rise and Fall of the English Highland Clans: Tudor Responses to a Mediaeval 
Problem. (Edmburgh: East L inton Press, 1989), p. 219; PRO, Londesborough MSS, May 28, 1611. 
CSPD James Լ X X V I I , p. 358; Godfrey Watson, The Border Reivers. (Bury St. Edmunds, 1974) p. 
195. 
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step for the Engl ish , but these of f icers were ut ter ly absent even from the roya l 
garr ison o f Berwick.^*^ W i t h o u t a more m o d e m structure o f author i ty i n Marcher 
m i l i t a ry inst iณt ions, the strat i f icat ion that existed dur ing the Anglo-Scots wars was 
bound to surv ive, even i f the Warden was no longer a m i l i t a r y leader but a governor 
w i t h m i l i t a r y powers. 
W i thou t any further attempts b y the Tudors to modernise the defences o f 
Nor thumber land, the nature o f the frontier and mere threat o f constant v io lence 
meant that after 1560 the Marchers had to re ly on their custom o f fami l ia l defence 
networks. The royal centre o f cont ro l and author i ty was too far from the f ront ier to 
b r ing about any real defence for Nor thumber land . The k ing ' s Lieutenants and the 
President o f the Counc i l o f the N o r t h tended to be either too ephemeral o r hamstrung 
b y the l im i t s placed upon their power to act as a power fo r ef fect ive change. W h i l e 
the p rob lem o f the Marches constant ly dogged the Pr ivy Counc i l , there was a 
dist inct lack o f consistent po l i cy . W i t h o u t a so l id commi tment f r om the government 
fo r m i l i t a r y re fo rm, the Nor thumber land m i l i t a r y commun i t y was destined to 
experience decay. 
շ 0 с. Cruickshank, Elizabeth 's Army, (London: OUP, 1946) pp. 41-60. 
A p p e n d i x I: W a r d e n s o f the N o r t h u m b r i a n M a r c h e s . 1536-60 
Middle March 
Robert L o r d Ogle Assist. Deputy Warden, 1532-45 
Henry , Ear l o f Nonhumber land 
Sir W i l l i a m Eure, Lo rd Eure 
Lord Warden General, 1527-37 
East March 
Lord Warden General, 1527-37 
Deputy Warden, 1537-1548 
Sir John Widd r ing ton Deputy Warden, 1537-40 
Sir Cuthbert Ratc l i f fe Deputy Warden, 1540-42 
Sir Ra lph Eure 
Thos. Manners , Ear l o f Rut land" 
Warden, 1543-45 
Warden-General, Aug . -Nov . 
1542 
Warden-General , 1542 
Edward Seymour, Earl o f 
Her t fo rd 
Warden-General, Sept.-Nov. 
1542 
John Dud ley , V iscount L is le 
Ear l o f W a r w i c k 
D u k e o f Norhtumber land 
Lo rd Warden-General , 1542-43 
Warden, 1550 
Lo rd Warden-General , 1551-53 
Warden-General , Sept . -Nov. 
1542 一 
L o r d Warden, 1 5 4 2 ^ 
Warden, J 550 
Lo rd Warden-General , 1551-53 
W i l l i a m L o r d Parr 
Sir Robert Bowes 
Lo rd Warden-General , 1543 L o r d Warden-General , 1543 
Assist. Deputy Warden, 1542 
Warden, 1545-49 and temp. 
1550-54 
Warden, 1545-49 and temp. 
1550-54 
Hen ry Manners , Ear l o f Rut land Warden General, 1549-5Г Warden General, 1549-51 
Hen ry Grey, M a r q . o f Dorset 
Thomas L o r d Whar ton 一 
Warden-General , 1551 Warden-General , 1551 
Deputy Warden-General , 1552 
Warden, 1555-57 
Deputy Warden-General , 1552 
Warden, 1555-57 Robert L o r d Ogle Deputy Warden, 1551-62 
Sir N icho las St i r ley Deputy Warden, 1550-51 
W i l l i a m L o r d Eure Warden, temp. Edward V I , M a r y 
and El izabeth 
Deputy Warden, temp. 1551-62 
Ra lph Gray o f Ch i l l i ngham 
W i l l i a m L o r d Dacre ― 
Warden, 1553-(？) 
Deputy Warden (？) 
Warden, 1554-55 
John L o r d Conyerร Warden, temp. M a r y 
Thomas Percy, Ear l o f 
Nor thumber land 
Sir Ra lph Sadler 
W i l l i a m L o r d Grey de W i l t o n 
Warden, 1557-59 
L o r d Warden-General, 1557-59 
(M idd le Marches on ly ļ ^ 
Deputy Warden, 1559-1560 
L o r d Warden, 1560 
Warden, 1557-59 
Deputy Warden, 1559-60 
L o r d Warden, 1560 
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Appendix II ะ The Battles of Haddon Rigg and Ancrum Moor 
Although they ended in defeat for the Northumbrian Marchers, the battles o f 
Haddon Rigg and Ancrum Moor ini t ial ly demonstrate the primary рифозе o f l ight 
cavalry: to reconnoitre and perform swift , l ightning raids. Because they had failed 
to properly perform as light cavalry, the English Marchers were handed a stunning 
defeat on both instances. 
The Haddon Rigg raid began in earnest, typi fy ing the Border custom o f 
f i r ing villages as Sir Robert Bowes and his men burnt several towns w i th impunity, 
d iv id ing into smaller groups but keeping Haddon in Teviotdale as their base. Much 
has been made o f this division o f force,' but this was common practice in the 
Borders, and Bowes cannot be faulted for employing the tactics that had become the 
standard. Bowes' error came in fai l ing to secure the services o f the men o f 
Redesdale. Af ter several successful raids around Teviotdale, Sir Robert had ordered 
all plunder, mcluding livestock, to be sent across the border for safekeeping. Sensing 
that their officers had duped them, the Redesdale bands o f light cavalry began to slip 
quietly away f rom the English camp. When Scottish forces led by Lord Huntley 
suddenly appeared on the horizon, the rest o f the Redesdale light cavalry fled 
without delay. 2 Their actions suggest that they were unwi l l ing to risk capture or 
death i f they were to be cut out from the spoils. Bowes and his remaining party tried 
to meet Huntley'ร forces on foot, but the 8,000 Scottish soldiers easily overwhelmed 
the outnumbered English. The route ended w i th the сарШге of Bowes and the rest o f 
' George MacDonald Fraser and Gervase Philips both have criticised Bowes for splitting his force. 
Yet, both admit that this was common practice, and that it had worked well before. Both authors 
neglect to discuss Bowes's lack of intelligence, which would have allowed him to track Huntley's 
movements. This, it seems, was в owes's chief undoing, rather than his use of a tried and true method 
of Border warfare. See George Macdonald Fraser, Stee! Bonnets, (London: Collin Harvels, 1989) p. 
248 and Phillips, The Angh-Scots War, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), p. 148. 
2 Gainsford Bruce, 'The English Expedition into Scotland in 1542.' Archaeologia Aeliana Third 
Series, vol. 3(1907), p. 195. 
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his captains, w i th the loss o f several hundred dead and wounded. Sir Robert had 
made a desperate error in focusing upon securing his plunder. Removmg booty f rom 
the English camp undercut the morale o f the men who were hoping to supplement 
their meagre wages w i th the spoils that they had collected. Al though he most l ikely 
had intended to split the spoils, his actions certainly would have looked suspicious to 
the experienced Marchers. Bowes' real blunder, though, lay in lack o f information 
regarding the enemy'ร whereabouts. This suggests that Bowes was not adept at 
gathering intelligence, a practice that was essential for any successful Warden. 3 By 
1542, there were assured Scots working w i th Bowes, including the Earl o f Angus, 
who barely escaped from Haddon wi th his l i fe. That Huntley utterly surprised 
Bowes w i th a cumbersome force o f 8,000 men suggests that Bowes failed to 
properly utilise his Scottish allies for information gathering. I t is possible, though, 
that Bowes received faulty information regarding Huntley's position, but i t seems 
unl ikely that such a large force could move through the populated dales o f Southern 
Scotland without advertising their intended route. 
Sir Ralph Eure, on the other hand, was probably the most successful English 
Border raider during the init ial stages o f the ' rough wooing. ' Eure exhibited certain 
flexibility, raiding either wi th small parties or w i th large troops o f l ight cavalry. 
Eure also demonstrated his grasp on the strategies o f Anglo-Scott ish border confl ict. 
In 1544, Eure proposed that he should march through Scotland to Lei th to cover 
Hertford'ร landing, thereby launching a two-pronged assault into Scotland that 
would keep the Borders pinned down whi le Hertford conducted his amphibious 
landing near the Scottish capital. Eure requested 1,000 horsed archers f rom 
Yorkshire and the Bishopric, to accompany his 2,000 elite horsemen, a tell ing 
՝ Sir Thomas Wharton was adept at gaining information. Wharton had a special talent for 
maintaining adequate spy rings' which he maintained through the application of bri bes and promises. 
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comment on his desire to utterly destroy the Scottish Borders."^ Mak ing good on his 
promise, Eure and his father burnt Jedburgh and sacked the abbey on 9 June 1544.^ 
Eure earned a reputation for having too much forwardness in combat, 
personally leading his troops in charges. By 1544, Eure had made quite a mess in 
the Marches, raiding up and down the Borders, taking t ime to spoil even the lands o f 
the Scots who had assured themselves to Henry V I I I . The Duke o f Suffolk spent 
much o f his time as Lieutenant trying to placate Sir George Douglas, who had al l ied 
himself w i th the English, and whose friends were continually raided by the Berwick 
garrison. It would have been almost cr iminal to al low Eure to oversee the days o f 
redress w i th the affronted Scotsmen, and to f i le the bi l ls that were presented as a 
result o f his own actions. In place o f Eure, i t was George Bowes who went to 
redress the Scottish allies, since he was impartial, unl ike Eure, whose men it was 
who raided the borders.^ The warl ike tendencies o f the Marchers fed o f f o f his 
aggressiveness, enabling the utter destruction o f Teviotdale over the course o f 
eighteen months. Yet this personal method o f combat leadership also had its 
drawbacks, none so apparent as the disaster at Ancrum Moor, 
In late February 1545, Eure and Sir Br ian Layton, the captain o f Norham 
castle, set o f f w i th several thousand men, for the риф08е o f burning Melrose and the 
surrounding area. The Earl o f Shrewsbury instructed them to raid cautiously, and 
await the power o f the B ishopr ic / Eure and Layton acted rashly, utterly ignoring 
Shrewsbury. For four days, the Marchers spoiled and plundered the countryside o f 
the Douglas fami ly, who had renounced their loyalty to England as a result o f Eure's 
actions. Whilst marching out o f Melrose along Dere Street, the English spied a few 
of Douglas's horsemen racing over L i l l iard 'ร Edge. Smell ing blood, Eure and his 
Ч Л Х Ї Х ( 1 ) п о . 335. 
¿p, X I X ( l ) n o . 684. 
' LP, XVII I (2) Ո0.423. 
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mounted contingent galloped furiously up the h i l l in pursuit. By the t ime they had 
reached the crest, Eure's men were in frenzy―Douglas would make good quarry. 
As a prisoner, his ransom would bring decent money, but his death would give the 
Middle Marchers a free hand in carving up Teviotdale for themselves. Yet upon 
cresting the h i l l , they encountered a schil l tron o f 2,000 Lowlander spearmen 
blocking their way. Undaunted, Eure and his men wanted battle, and they 
immediately alighted and charged in disordered ranks. Crashing agamst the 
disciplined Scottish spears, Eure and his men fought ftiriously in the init ial moments 
but ult imately broke. Eure and Layton were cut down almost immediately. Seeing 
that their leader had fallen, the Marchers fled, some on horse and others on foot, 
running directly into their own footsoldiers who had been running to catch up. 8 
Although casualty figures were comparatively l ight for such a rout, Dougłas noted 
that the dead included a high number o f captains, including Lord Ogle, al l o f whom 
had formed the front line o f the English charge. As reports o f the battle flowed in , it 
became apparent that control in the borders had been lost. The extent o f the damage 
was clear: all o f the good horses and all o f the garrison captains o f the Middle 
Marches had been lost in Scotland.^ 
The raids at Haddon ผ g g and Ancrum Moor demonstrate that the Marchers 
were much more suited for chevauchées rather than set battles. L ight horse were not 
mounted infantry; when they met w i th heavier armed soldiers, they could expect 
serious casualties. Running battles, such as that at Faimington in 1546, were much 
more suitable for l ight cavalry. Al though both raids at Haddon and Алсгшп Moor 
ended as battles, the bands o f l ight cavalry attempted to avoid such costly 
encounters. 
LP, XX(1) nos. 272， 332 and 395. 
9 ВЦ Add. MSS 32656 f. 172 and 195; LP, XX(1), nos. 95 & зш^ 
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